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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the collapse of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s,
financial reporting fraud has been a topic of great discussion, not only
among accountants but also among regulators, legislators and the general
public. In a broader context, accounting fraud was one of the principal
causes listed by plaintiffs in class action suits brought by shareholders
against public companies over the last several years. And then came
Enron. Over the period of late 2001 through the first half of 2002, with
a succession of high-profile bankruptcies of large companies related to
accounting fraud, which included Enron, Global Crossing and WorldCom,
the world changed for accountants. Congress responded with the passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that restructured the accounting profes-
sion and placed supervision in the hands of a government-appointed
entity.
Financial Reporting Fraud: A Practical Guide to Detection and Inter-
nal Control addresses the fraud issue from the practical perspective, using
illustrations and examples of fraud concepts, in addition to references
to research findings and authoritative literature. The text draws upon
findings of professionals and academicians studying fraud in publicly
traded companies because financial information from those companies is
readily available, but the lessons learned from those studies are equally
applicable to non-public companies, no matter the size or the industry.
Furthermore, the hightened standards of corporate governance imposed
on public companies by Sarbanes-Oxley and related regulations will
greatly impact private companies as well.
For instance, it would be difficult to imagine, in today’s environment,
that a bank loan officer would present to a loan committee the application
of a private company for a significant loan if that company’s board of
directors did not have an audit committee; should such a loan default
due to accounting fraud in the absence of an audit committee, bank
senior management and regulators would probably not be very forgiving.
Therefore, many of the reporting standards and internal controls now
being imposed or recommended for public companies will soon find their
way to private companies as well.
xiii
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For that reason, in addition to the discussions and illustrations of
areas of financial reporting fraud, Financial Reporting Fraud: A Practical
Guide to Detection and Internal Control provides in the appendixes some
of the key Securities and Exchange Commission proposed rules and staff
accounting bulletins that, while targeted at public companies, will likely
become standards for private companies also. A CPA preparing for the
world after Sarbanes-Oxley should be well-versed in these issues, regard-
less of the type of company involved.
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PART A
THE PROBLEM
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CHAPTER 1
THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL
REPORTING FRAUD
Financial reporting fraud involves the alteration of financial statement
data, usually by a firm’s management, to achieve a fraudulent result.
These altered financial statements are the tools then used by a company’s
unscrupulous managers to obtain some reward. The reward may consist
of direct compensation, such as receiving a bonus that otherwise would
not be paid without using altered, incorrect financial data to embellish
management’s operating performance. On the other hand, the compensa-
tion may be less direct, in that managers avoid being fired for failing to
achieve promised results. Compensation may also be indirect; for exam-
ple, management may use fraudulent financial statements to raise addi-
tional capital that, in turn, allows a firm to expand and presumably
enhance the value of shares held by management.
WHAT CONSTITUTES FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD?
What constitutes financial reporting fraud has been the subject of much
debate because the lines between fraud and discretion are not always
clear. It is easy to define fraud as a conscious effort by management to
produce financial statements with materially wrong accounting data. It
is almost as easy to identify as fraud misleading accounting entries that
management cannot justify under any applicable accounting standards.
Fraudulent acts become less obvious, however, when cloaked in the man-
tle of accounting standards that are incorrectly applied. For example,
the applicable accounting standards in the United States are generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and those principles may allow
management some discretion about when to recognize revenue or
expenses. Management is free to take full advantage of that discretion,
but, in pushing accounting concepts to their limit, management must be
3
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especially careful not to overstep. When operating on the edge of GAAP
permissibility, internal controls are stretched heavily, and one mistake in
a seemingly small area can result in significant and drastic consequences.
Honorable people can debate the most appropriate use of a principle
when looking at the gray or more broadly permissive areas of GAAP.
Less-than-honorable people, however, might make use of these gray areas
to produce financial statements that mislead. This practice is found most
often in concert with other misleading applications of GAAP.
Those who commit fraud almost always fail to discuss their misuse
of GAAP principles in the notes to financial statements. Although the
accounting for a certain transaction may appear to be supported by GAAP,
failure to disclose so as not to make the financial statements misleading
may take the reporting entity out of GAAP compliance. Without knowl-
edge of the impact of GAAP gray-area judgments on the financial state-
ments, unsuspecting readers may mistakenly assume that revenues and
expenses were accrued in a manner consistent with prior financial state-
ments when, in fact, they were not. The end result may be that continuing
operations appear to be profitable while, in reality, there may be serious
problems that the misuse of GAAP gray areas can cover up for a short
period of time.
As with proving any type of fraud, one must generally show that
there was scienter, meaning that the perpetrator knew that his or her
actions were designed to mislead. For purposes of this book, a perpetrator
with scienter—that is, a perpetrator who intends to use incorrect financial
statements to mislead—will be referred to as a ‘‘fraudster.’’ Thus, when
accounting decisions purportedly in conformity with GAAP produce finan-
cial statements intentionally designed (with scienter) to mislead the
reader, those decisions cross the line into fraud.
LEGAL AND REGULATORY GUIDANCE AND STANDARDS
There are numerous sources for guidance on the nature and standards
to establish the existence of financial reporting fraud. These sources
help the CPA determine what fraud is, where to look for it, and who is
responsible.
SEC Definition of Fraud
The principal concepts that govern fraud are codified in the U.S. securities
laws and regulations, especially Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Rule 10b-5, which states the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
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or the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity.
Publicly traded companies must conform to GAAP and to the rules
and regulations promulgated by the SEC under U.S. securities laws. The
SEC drew heavily on accounting literature when it addressed the issue
of accounting gray areas for materiality and other issues. SEC standards
that have their origin in GAAP provide substantial guidance to determine
financial reporting fraud not only for publicly traded companies, but also
for all firms issuing financial statements in conformity with GAAP.
Key Fraud Laws and Definitions
In addition to SEC Rule 10b-5, there are several other important laws
and accounting statements that guide the CPA in matters dealing with
fraud.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
One decades-old law that still carries significant weight today is the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). This legislation, well-
known for cracking down on bribery of foreign business and officials,
went further and codified the requirement that all public companies
maintain adequate internal controls. FCPA Section 102 states that the
public company shall:
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transac-
tions and dispositions of the assets of issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting con-
trols sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that—
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with manage-
ment’s general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (1) to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles or any other
criteria applicable to such statements . . .
Management, therefore, had to take responsibility for the firm’s
financial statements and establish internal controls that ensured trans-
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actions were entered in accordance with management’s instructions. Fur-
ther, management had to prepare its financial statements in accordance
with GAAP or other criteria, such as regulatory accounting for regulated
industries. The FCPA held management accountable if fraud existed in
the financial statements.
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Another area of law, contained in the federal sentencing guidelines,
addresses the steps a company may take to mitigate criminal penalties if
it is ever found to have violated U.S. law. Those steps include establishing
policies and procedures designed to implement an ‘‘effective program to
prevent and detect violations of law.’’ The sentencing guidelines require
that a company exercise ‘‘due diligence’’ to implement an ‘‘effective pro-
gram,’’ and such ‘‘due diligence’’ requires, at a minimum, that a company
must: (1) spell out its policies and procedures, (2) communicate them
effectively with its employees, and (3) designate individuals who will be
responsible for enforcing those standards. If there is a likelihood that
certain activities of a company or certain of its personnel are known to
be at risk of violating U.S. law, as may be demonstrated by prior conduct,
the federal sentencing guidelines impose heightened requirements on
management to take steps to discipline offenders and implement proce-
dures to prevent and detect such conduct in the future. Furthermore,
there must be a monitoring mechanism with:
Systems reasonably designed to detect criminal conduct by its
employees and other agents and by having in place and publiciz-
ing a reporting system whereby employees and other agents
could report criminal conduct by others within the organization
without fear of retribution. (FCPA Sec. 8A1.3(k)(5)).
However, even though the monitoring requirements of the federal
sentencing guidelines existed for many years, many companies had been
slow to implement such a reporting system until enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (see the discussion in the section titled ‘‘The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’’) and other post-Enron reforms. Only as
recent legislation and regulations imposed greater requirements on corpo-
rate audit committees and boards of directors have companies rushed to
install fraud-reporting hotlines and other reporting systems.
More important, however, is that if a company implements the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines, that company and its management can hold
up these actions taken as evidence of intent to prevent fraud. When the
CPA is looking at how serious an organization is about fighting fraud,
whether or not the organization has implemented steps previously
described is a clear indicator. Finally, failure to implement applicable
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government standards ‘‘weighs against a finding of an effective program
to prevent and detect violations of law.’’ In the case of financial reporting
fraud, those standards are expressed in GAAP and SEC rules and regula-
tions, among others.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53
In 1988, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued Statement
on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to
Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities. This Statement, since super-
seded, set out the basis for distinguishing the difference between fraud
and honest error. Referring to accounting fraud as ‘‘irregularities,’’ SAS
No. 53 stated:
The term ‘‘irregularities’’ refers to intentional misstatements
or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements.
Irregularities include fraudulent financial reporting under-
taken to render financial statements misleading, sometimes
called management fraud, and misappropriation of assets,
sometimes called defalcations. Irregularities may involve acts
such as the following:
• Manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting
records or supporting documents from which financial state-
ments are prepared
• Misrepresentation or intentional omission of events, trans-
actions, or other significant information
• Intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating
to amounts, classification, manner of presentation, or disclo-
sure
Fraud, then, had the element of intent that resulted in manipulation
of financial statements, misrepresentation of transactions, or misapplica-
tion of accounting principles.
SAS No. 82
By 1997, the ASB had issued SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 316), which replaced SAS No. 53 but essentially retained the SAS
No. 53 definition of fraud and added the concept of how fraud affects
financial statement users. SAS No. 82, since superseded, used the term
misstatement to characterize fraud, and stated the following:
Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclo-
sures in financial statements to deceive financial statement
users.
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Now, in addition to the presence of management intent, fraud’s defini-
tion was expanded to include its purpose, which was to deceive the user.
SAS No. 82 also provided a list of 25 fraud risk factors—that is, red
flags—to guide auditors in assessing risk and planning for an audit. The
statement allocated the 25 red flags among three broad categories:
1. Management characteristics and influence over the control environ-
ment
2. Industry conditions
3. Operating and financial stability characteristics
Examples of red flags included aggressive or unrealistic forecasts,
ineffective communication and support of entity values or ethics, and
domineering management behavior or attempts to influence audit scope.
Several years after the issuance of SAS No. 82, Barbara A. Apostolou,
John M. Hassell, Sally A. Webber, and Glenn E. Sumners conducted
research (‘‘The Relative Importance of Management Fraud Risk Factors,’’
Behavioral Research in Accounting, 1/1/2001) that evaluated the weight
placed by 140 external and internal auditors on each of the three catego-
ries and on the red flags in each category. The researchers found that
auditors had some fairly uniform feelings about circumstances most con-
ducive to finding financial reporting fraud:
The aggregate decision model indicates that 58.2 percent of the
total possible 100.0 percent decision weight is associated with
the group of red flags dealing with management characteristics
and influence over the control environment. Operating and
financial stability characteristics were associated with 27.4 per-
cent, while industry conditions red flags were associated with
14.4 percent of the total decision weight. Thus, red flags associ-
ated with management characteristics and influence over the
control environment were rated about twice as important as
operating and financial stability characteristics and about four
times as important as industry conditions red flags. The three
single-most important red flags, which account for almost 40
percent of the total decision weight, were all within the manage-
ment characteristics category: (1) known history of securities
law violations (14.6 percent), (2) significant compensation tied
to aggressive accounting practices (12.9 percent), and (3) man-
agement’s failure to display appropriate attitude about internal
control (12.6 percent).
Management characteristics and the control environment, then,
clearly stood out among auditors as the most important indicators of
potential fraud. Within that category, three red flags led the list: history
of violations, compensation tied to accounting, and lack of interest in
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internal controls. Subsequent chapters of this book cover management
characteristics and internal controls in greater detail.
SAS No. 99
The ASB continued to refine its auditing guidance with regard to fraud
and in 2002 released a new standard, SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,
AU sec. 316), to supersede SAS No. 82. The new standard has a more
extensive list of red flags organized into categories that look at (1) incen-
tives and pressures on management to commit fraud, (2) opportunities
to commit fraud, and (3) the attitudes and rationalizations found among
those who commit fraud. See Table 1.
Table 1. Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Reprinted from Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
316).
A.2 The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising
from fraudulent financial reporting.
Incentives/Pressures
a. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity
operating conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
— High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining
margins
— High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product
obsolescence, or interest rates
— Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in
either the industry or overall economy
— Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile
takeover imminent
— Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate
cash flows from operations while reporting earnings and earnings growth
— Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other
companies in the same industry
— New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements
b. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expecta-
tions of third parties due to the following:
— Profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional
investors, significant creditors, or other external parties (particularly expecta-
tions that are unduly aggressive or unrealistic), including expectations cre-
ated by management in, for example, overly optimistic press releases or
annual report messages
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— Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive—includ-
ing financing of major research and development or capital expenditures
— Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayment
or other debt covenant requirements
— Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on signifi-
cant pending transactions, such as business combinations or contract awards
c. Information available indicates that management or the board of directors’ per-
sonal financial situation is threatened by the entity’s financial performance aris-
ing from the following:
— Significant financial interests in the entity
— Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock
options, and earn-out arrangements) being contingent upon achieving aggres-
sive targets for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow1
— Personal guarantees of debts of the entity
d. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet
financial targets set up by the board of directors or management, including sales
or profitability incentive goals.
1 Management incentive plans may be contingent upon achieving targets relating only to
certain accounts or selected activities of the entity, even though the related accounts or
activities may not be material to the entity as a whole.
Opportunities
a.The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to
engage in fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
— Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business
or with related entities not audited or audited by another firm
— A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a certain industry sector
that allows the entity to dictate terms or conditions to suppliers or customers
that may result in inappropriate or non-arm’s-length transactions
— Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that
involve subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate
— Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close
to period end that pose difficult ‘‘substance over form’’ questions
— Significant operations located or conducted across international borders in
jurisdictions where differing business environments and cultures exist
— Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven
jurisdictions for which there appears to be no clear business justification
b. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
— Domination of management by a single person or small group (in a nonowner-
managed business) without compensating controls
— Ineffective board of directors or audit committee oversight over the financial
reporting process and internal control
c. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure, as evidenced by the
following:
— Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling
interest in the entity
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— Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or
managerial lines of authority
— High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board members
d. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
— Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls
over interim financial reporting (where external reporting is required)
— High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit,
or information technology staff
— Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations
involving reportable conditions
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management,
or employees, that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial
reporting, may not be susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the
auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it
in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from fraudulent financial
reporting. For example, auditors may become aware of the following information
that may indicate a risk factor:
• Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity’s
values or ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate
values or ethical standards
• Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the
selection of accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates
• Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or
claims against the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud
or violations of laws and regulations
• Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock
price or earnings trend
• A practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third
parties to achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts
• Management failing to correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis
• An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize
reported earnings for tax-motivated reasons
• Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate
accounting on the basis of materiality
• The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is
strained, as exhibited by the following:
— Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting,
auditing, or reporting matters
— Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints
regarding the completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor’s report
— Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit access
to people or information or the ability to communicate effectively with the
board of directors or audit committee
— Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially
involving attempts to influence the scope of the auditor’s work or the selection
or continuance of personnel assigned to or consulted on the audit engagement
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When looking for early warning indicators, the CPA should first
focus attention on the incentives and motives for fraud. When, for instance,
in the midst of well-known industry problems, a firm in that industry
provides guidance to securities analysts that earnings will not be affected,
a red flag emerges. Upon further investigation, the CPA may determine
that management has another incentive in that the firm’s compensation
plan awards bonuses based on accounting results. Then, there may be
opportunity to manipulate financial results because key senior managers
dominate a fairly green and inexperienced staff who would not likely
question management’s decisions. Finally, management would rational-
ize the use of fraudulent accounting because it enhances the value of
company stock.
This book examines incentives and motives in some detail, and
through the use of examples and illustrations, it looks at opportunities
and rationalizations as well.
Elimination of the Materiality Loophole
Qualitative Materiality
With the publication of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 in
1999, the SEC staff made clear that fraudulent accounting entries known
to senior management could not be left unadjusted if they were deemed
‘‘immaterial’’ using some mechanical, quantitative standard, such as a
percentage of net income. Relying purely on a quantitative basis, which
was a common practice before the publication of SAB No. 99, was no
longer acceptable. With the publication of SAB No. 99, qualitative materi-
ality clearly took first position when the SEC staff stated, ‘‘Materiality
concerns the significance of an item to users of a registrant’s financial
statements. A matter is ‘material’ if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable person would consider it important.’’ Therefore, any item
that could alter a reader’s perception of the financial condition of a com-
pany could be considered material. (Chapter 3 provides further analysis
of materiality from the perspective of the users of financial statements,
and the entire text of SAB No. 99 is found in Appendix B.)
The SEC staff provided examples.
Among the considerations that may well render material a
quantitatively small misstatement of a financial statement
item are—
• whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of
precise measurement or whether it arises from an estimate
and, if so, the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimate
• whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or
other trends
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• whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’
consensus expectations for the enterprise
• whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice
versa
• whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other por-
tion of the registrant’s business that has been identified as
playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations or
profitability
• whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compli-
ance with regulatory requirements
• whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compli-
ance with loan covenants or other contractual requirements
• whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing man-
agement’s compensation—for example, by satisfying
requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of
incentive compensation
• whether the misstatement involves concealment of an
unlawful transaction
For example, the following illustrates the first bullet point. Suppose
management legitimately had to book an estimate of a patent asset’s
value when it was acquired (along with some other assets that were
equally hard to value). Later in the reporting period, though, as the
patented technology was licensed, the value of the patent became clearer,
and that value was less than the originally booked amount. If the differ-
ence between the original and the correct value was less than the firm’s
quantitative materiality threshold, say 5 percent of assets, then, applying
just a quantitative standard, management was able to argue that no
adjustment would be required. SAB No. 99, though, most likely would
require management to make the adjustment because a more precise
value is obtainable.
Likewise, when looking at income statement items, the SEC viewed
the practice of indulging fraudulent and clearly erroneous entries up to
some arbitrary percentage limit as a license for management to mislead:
The staff believes that investors generally would regard as
significant a management practice to over- or under-state earn-
ings up to an amount just short of a percentage threshold in
order to ‘‘manage’’ earnings. Investors presumably also would
regard as significant an accounting practice that, in essence,
rendered all earnings figures subject to a management-directed
margin of misstatement.
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Undoubtedly, auditors would continue to use quantitative standards
when planning an audit, but when examining financial statement
accounts, in most cases detected fraudulent intentional misstatements
would be deemed material according to SAB No. 99. Any loophole that
fraudsters may have had before the issuance of SAB No. 99 to rely purely
on a mechanical application of quantitative materiality as a means of
justifying fraudulent entries was effectively closed.
Quantitative Materiality
In addition to imposing qualitative standards for materiality, the SEC
pursued other steps to lower the triggers for quantitative materiality. In
the matter of W. R. Grace (SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. 1141, June 30, 1999), Grace management set up and used
reserves (called ‘‘Cookie Jar Reserves’’; see Chapter 3) to manage the
reported earnings of its principal health care subsidiary, National Medical
Care, Inc. (NMC). In 1991 and 1992, NMC earned profits in excess of
targets given to securities analysts, and NMC took the excess profits to
a reserve account that had no stated purpose. In 1993 and 1994, NMC’s
actual profits were under the announced targets, so management drew
down on the reserve to increase reported earnings. This technique is
called ‘‘earnings smoothing’’ and is done to show consistent growth over
several reporting periods (the rationale for smoothing earnings is dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 3). W. R. Grace’s outside auditors knew about
the reserve, recognized that it violated GAAP (see Chapter 12 for a discus-
sion of reserve accounting), and proposed adjusting entries. Grace man-
agement refused to make the adjustments, though, and the auditors
passed on the adjustments because, when looked at from the perspective
of Grace’s consolidated financial statements, the NMC subsidiary adjust-
ments did not appear to be material.
The SEC disagreed. Grace management had focused the attention
of securities analysts on the performance of NMC and believed that NMC’s
perceived steady, consistent growth in earnings was important enough
to Grace’s stock value that management was justified in using reserves
to manage NMC’s earnings. In the SEC’s decisions issued in this matter,
the SEC bootstrapped materiality up from Grace’s Health Care Group,
mostly consisting of NMC, to the overall company:
The inclusion of the excess reserves in the Health Care Group
segment information for the period 1991 through 1994 resulted
in a material misstatement of segment information which, in
turn, was material to Grace’s consolidated financial statements
taken as a whole for one or more periods during the relevant
period.
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In other words, because NMC was material to the Health Care Group
and the Health Care Group was material to Grace, improper use of
reserves to manage NMC earnings was material to Grace. Setting aside
the fact that the reserve account itself would fail the qualitative material-
ity test because it was not set up in accordance with GAAP, the quantita-
tive materiality test was lowered from the consolidated company level
down to the segment level and even further to the level of a specific
subsidiary in the W. R. Grace case. In the SEC’s view, then, if management
touts the performance of a specific subsidiary and then manages its
earnings, Grace would apply quantitative materiality at the subsidiary
level.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
When accounting frauds were tied to the collapse of Enron Corp., Global
Crossing Ltd., and WorldCom, Inc., all occurring within the few months
from December 2001 to June 2002, Congress reacted rapidly by passing
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was signed by President Bush on
July 30, 2002. The Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) to oversee the audit and auditors of public companies
(referred to as ‘‘issuers’’ in the Act because those companies issue shares
that are publicly traded).
Among the duties of the PCAOB, Congress wanted the newly formed
entity to ‘‘establish auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and
other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers.’’
(Sarbanes-Oxley, Sec. 101(c)(2).) With regard to auditing, quality control,
and ethics, Congress mandated that auditors describe in each audit report
the testing of the internal control structure and the procedures used by
the company to implement those controls. Specifically, the Act states that
the audit report must present:
(I) the findings of the auditor from such testing;
(II) an evaluation of whether such internal control structure
and procedures
(aa) include maintenance of records that in reasonable
detail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer;
(bb) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are
recorded as necessary to permit preparation of finan-
cial statements in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and
expenditures of the issuer are being made only in
accordance with authorizations of management and
directors of the issuer; and
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(III) a description, at a minimum, of material weaknesses in
such internal controls, and of any material noncompliance
found on the basis of such testing. (Sec. 103(a)(2)(A)(iii).)
Thus, with Sarbanes-Oxley, the record-keeping requirements of the
FCPA are set out in greater detail, and the auditors are charged with
testing and reporting on the adequacy of controls relating to the mainte-
nance of those records. Auditors are also required to report material
weaknesses or ‘‘any material noncompliance’’ relating to internal controls.
Although one could argue that these steps are already required under
generally accepted auditing standards, the requirements for these proce-
dures now carry the force of federal law (and enhanced penalties under
the Act).
In addition, Section 404 of the Act required management to submit
to the SEC an ‘‘internal control report’’ with the company’s annually filed
financial statements and disclosures. That internal control report would:
(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and
procedures for financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent
fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal
control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial
reporting. (Sarbanes-Oxley, Sec. 404(a).)
In addition to the auditor’s evaluation of internal controls under
Section 103 of the Act described here, under Section 404(b), outside audi-
tors are required to ‘‘attest to, and report on,’’ management’s assessment
of company internal controls as well.
More noteworthy, though, are the requirements relating to audit
committees. The audit committee is defined as:
(A) a committee (or equivalent body) established by and
amongst the board of directors of an issuer for the purpose
of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting pro-
cesses of the issuer and audits of the financial statements
of the issuer; and
(B) if no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the
entire board of directors of the issuer. (Sarbanes-Oxley,
Sec. 2(a)(3).)
At least one member of the audit committee must be a ‘‘financial
expert’’ (or the company must disclose why it does not have such an
expert). The financial expert is a person who has:
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting princi-
ples and financial statements;
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(2) experience in
(A) the preparation or auditing of financial statements of
generally comparable issuers; and
(B) the application of such principles in connection with
the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves;
(3) experience with internal accounting controls; and
(4) an understanding of audit committee functions. (Sec.
407(b).)
Section 202 of the Act requires the audit committee to approve all
audit (and non-audit) services, effectively giving the audit committee the
power to hire and fire auditors. Section 204 spells out the minimum
content of reports that the auditor must provide to the audit committee,
which consist of:
(1) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used;
(2) all alternative treatments of financial information within
generally accepted accounting principles that have been
discussed with management officials of the issuer, ramifica-
tions of the use of such alternative disclosures and treat-
ments, and the treatment preferred by the registered public
accounting firm; and
(3) other material written communications between the regis-
tered public accounting firm and the management of the
issuer, such as any management letter or schedule of unad-
justed differences.
In short, the Act requires identification and discussion of the treat-
ment of ‘‘critical accounting policies,’’ including any differences of opinion
(‘‘alternative treatments’’) by and among company management and its
outside auditors. Congress, then, wanted to encourage a frank discussion
between the audit committee, company management, and outside audi-
tors of the use of accounting principles with material impact that were
subject to different interpretations. However, in no place does the Act
define critical accounting policies. For help with the term, one must look
to SEC pronouncements, and in particular the proposed rules contained
in Release Nos. 33-8098; 34-45907, which set out the SEC’s criteria for
determining critical accounting policies and estimates. This book exam-
ines those criteria in detail, building upon the actual examples used in
the SEC’s proposed rules.1
1 These examples are expanded from examples contained in Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) Releases No. 33-8098 and No. 34-45907, Disclosure in Management’s Discussion
and Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies to illustrate certain
aspects of financial reporting fraud. Additional assumptions are added to the SEC examples.
Subsequently, the SEC-recommended disclosures to the audit committee are presented to
illustrate how those disclosures would have increased the likelihood of fraud detection. The
examples, as shown, reflect the opinions of the author and not the SEC. The reader is
encouraged to read the SEC releases, which are included as an appendix to this book.
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Clearly, Sarbanes-Oxley places tremendous reliance on the audit
committee as the last line of defense within the firm against financial
fraud. If, as Congress intended, management and auditors make full
disclosure to the audit committee of the material accounting policies most
subject to differing interpretation, the audit committee becomes the final
arbiter before release of the financial statements of any judgment calls.
The Act, though, also makes clear that the audit committee is not
the only party responsible for overseeing the audit process and the ade-
quacy of internal controls. Just to make sure that senior management
understands its responsibilities, Section 302 of the Act requires the ‘‘prin-
cipal executive officer’’ and the ‘‘principal financial officer’’ to certify that
the financial statements are fairly presented and that:
(4) the signing officers—
(A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining inter-
nal controls;
(B) have designed such internal controls to ensure that
material information relating to the issuer and its con-
solidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers
by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which the periodic reports are being prepared;
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal
controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report;
and
(D) have presented in the report their conclusions about
the effectiveness of their internal controls based on
their evaluation as of that date;
(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer’s auditors
and the audit committee of the board of directors (or persons
fulfilling the equivalent function)
(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation
of internal controls which could adversely affect the
issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize, and
report financial data and have identified for the issuer’s
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls;
and
(B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves man-
agement or other employees who have a significant role
in the issuer’s internal controls; and
(6) the signing officers have indicated in the report whether
or not there were significant changes in internal controls
or in other factors that could significantly affect internal
controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation, includ-
ing any corrective actions with regard to significant defi-
ciencies and material weaknesses. (Sec. 302(a).)
By requiring that principal officers certify they have disclosed mate-
rial internal control weaknesses to the auditor and the audit committee,
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Congress has emphasized the officers’ role in communicating material
weaknesses and forced those officers to make a public declaration (subject
to significant penalties for perjury) to that effect. In summary, Congress
has placed responsibility for internal controls squarely on the shoulders
of senior management. This book also discusses in detail the role of senior
management in the act of and prevention of financial reporting fraud.
While Sarbanes-Oxley principally applies to public companies, the
Act and related reform measures will likely set the tone for corporate
governance in private companies as well. Concerns about financial
reporting fraud among those who provide capital to private entities, such
as banks and venture capitalists, will drive implementation of public
company standards into the non-public sectors. Therefore, whether the
CPA works with public or non-public entities, knowledge of all the rele-
vant standards is essential.
COMMON METHODS OF COMMITTING FRAUD
Research carried out for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
(COSO) of the Treadway Commission, found that, when it came to execut-
ing financial reporting fraud, the most common kinds of fraud methods
were the following:
1. Overstatement of earnings
2. Fictitious earnings
3. Understatement of expenses
4. Overstatement of assets
5. Understatement of allowances for receivables
6. Overstatement of the value of inventories by not writing down the
value of obsolete goods
7. Overstatement of property values and creation of fictitious assets
These methods tend to fall into three broad categories:
1. Earnings manipulation
2. Earnings management2
3. Balance-sheet manipulation
These three topics will be covered in each of the next three chapters.
2 There is no distinction in accounting literature between earnings management and earnings
manipulation. The author makes this distinction, however, for ease in explaining different
concepts of financial reporting fraud affecting the income statement.
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CONCLUSION
The following chapters in Part A cover the various kinds of financial
reporting fraud for each of the three categories and corresponding motives
for each kind. The early indicators of financial reporting fraud (both
quantitative and qualitative) are discussed in Part B, and the means
to detect some of the most difficult-to-find kinds of fraud are covered in
Part C.
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EARNINGS MANIPULATION
Earnings manipulation is the direct alteration of accounting data for the
purpose of fraudulently changing reported income. For example, booking
a sale that clearly does not meet the requirements for revenue recognition
increases revenues. Conversely, capitalizing marketing costs as an asset,
contrary to guidance in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
decreases current period expenses. Notice also that both examples affect
the balance sheet as well: Recognizing fictitious sales inflates accounts
receivable; deferring marketing expenses creates some type of amortiz-
able asset. Because the primary intent of these manipulations is, however,
to increase earnings rather than create assets, these practices are classi-
fied as earnings manipulation.
Though there is no distinction in accounting literature between earn-
ings management and earnings manipulation, to better explain the
impact of financial reporting fraud on the income statement, earnings
management is treated as a subset of earnings manipulation and is
discussed separately in Chapter 3, ‘‘Earnings Management.’’ Earnings
management generally involves the manipulation of a series of earnings
data to achieve a perception of profitability and/or growth in earnings,
as illustrated in W. R. Grace (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1141, June 30, 1999),
discussed in Chapter 1. The focus of this chapter is on the type of earnings
manipulation designed to give a one-shot boost to earnings.
Recent research has shed much light on the motives for earnings
manipulation. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission sponsored research published in 1999 (the COSO
Report) that examined SEC enforcement actions for the period of 1987
through 1997 (see Chapter 7 for a more complete discussion of the
findings). The COSO Report found that motives for fraud generally fell
into the following three broad categories. Firms or individuals attempted
to:
21
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1. Increase the stock price to increase the benefits of insider trading and
to obtain higher cash proceeds when issuing new securities.
2. Obtain national stock exchange listing status or maintain minimum
exchange listing requirements to avoid delisting.
3. Avoid reporting a pretax loss and bolster other financial results.
A fourth motive, to cover up assets misappropriated for personal
gain, does not involve earnings manipulation and is not discussed in this
book.
EARNINGS IMPROVEMENT
Secondary Securities Markets and Insider Trading
The motive to improve earnings usually works in concert with other
motives; rarely does it stand alone. For example, one of the most common
ancillary motives for earnings manipulation may be found in a firm’s
management compensation plan. Such plans generally reward manage-
ment based on reported earnings performance and, therefore, set the
stage for potential manipulation. To compound the motive for fraud, the
form of compensation paid to management for performing well is not just
cash; stock (or some equivalent such as options, stock appreciation rights,
or deferred compensation plans) is frequently a large component of com-
pensation that increases in value if senior managers can fraudulently
increase reported earnings before selling their shares.
Stock Compensation
Over the last several decades, management consultants, compensation
committees, and academicians have advocated the use of stock as a compo-
nent of compensation to align the interests of management with those of
the firm’s shareholders. Without significant share ownership, the advo-
cates claimed, management was free to pursue its own self-interests,
granting itself ever-higher cash salaries, benefits, and perquisites, and
in a period of placid boards stocked with friends of management, the only
recourse for unhappy shareholders was to sell their shares. The cost of
paying for management was referred to as ‘‘agency cost’’ because manage-
ment served as the agent for shareholders, and management was empow-
ered to run the company on their behalf. Agency cost was presumably
higher if management did not have significant equity ownership, hence
the push for equity-based compensation plans.
Once management received stock (or equivalent) awards under the
compensation plan, however, managers immediately began to look for
opportunities to sell some or all of their shares. The reasons behind
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managers’ desire to dispose of their equity varied, but most had to do
with lack of diversification. Typically, a manager compensated with stock
quickly finds his or her personal portfolio dominated with employer
shares. Further, given that the source of the manager’s cash earnings is
the same source as the major securities holding in his or her portfolio, a
significant amount of financial security for that manager rests in just
one firm: the manager’s employer. Therefore, the manager has every
incentive to diversify as soon as possible.
For senior management, though, who may have significant portions
of their net worth reflected in employer shares and who may also have the
ability to manipulate earnings (due to lax internal controls, for example),
there is tremendous incentive to maximize net worth by fraudulently
increasing reported earnings to increase share price long enough to allow
them to dispose of their shares. Due to the price/earnings (P/E) multiplier
used to value securities, a small, fraudulent increase in earnings per
share translates into a much greater increase in stock price—on the order
of 15 to 40 times as much, or more. When a senior executive is trying to
liquidate large numbers of shares, such an increase is meaningful. If,
though, the fraudulent increase in reported earnings helps meet stock
analysts’ expectations or changes negative earnings to positive, the
impact on share price may be much greater. During the late 1990s’
Internet boom market, then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt observed that
companies missing street earnings per share (EPS) expectations by as
little as one penny per share were hammered. Senior executives wishing
to avoid such a drop in share price would push hard to find the extra
penny, probably through some type of manipulation.
Stock compensation, then, provides a powerful motivator for income
statement manipulation and subsequent illegal insider trading. A man-
ager who is heavily compensated in stock needs to sell to diversify. If the
stock is volatile such that small changes in reported earnings have a
significant impact on market price and if actual earnings do not appear
to be meeting expectations, the manager will come under pressure from
the perspective of personal net worth and from colleagues in similar
situations to manipulate earnings. If the manager gives in to the pressure
and then sells shares, that manager likely trades on material nonpublic
information—information that the books are cooked—and is guilty of
illegal insider trading.
Contingent Compensation
In addition to the drive to pay management in stock, compensation experts
added the requirements that pay (whether cash or stock) be made contin-
gent upon performance. This contingency was also designed to align
management’s interests with those of shareholders. Management com-
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pensation agreements, for instance, may require the achievement of some
absolute level of net income or an increase in net income over some
benchmark to trigger bonus payments. Also, to give the contingent com-
pensation plan the power to motivate managers, consultants urged com-
pensation committees to make bonuses a significant part of total
compensation. The end result was that managers certainly were moti-
vated to increase reported earnings, but some managers, faced with the
prospect of seeing their compensation fall significantly if they failed to
hit their goals, succumbed to the temptation to manipulate earnings. For
those managers, the increase in reported earnings was not necessarily
an accurate reflection of their business performance. Even though the
compensation experts may have been correct and justified, in theory, to
try to align management’s interests with shareholders’, they may have
unwittingly set up strong motivators for financial statement fraud. Cer-
tainly incentive compensation is a valid concept, but it must be imple-
mented with well-designed and rigorously enforced internal controls.
New Securities Price Enhancement
The discussion of stock and insider trading thus far has largely centered
on the impact of earnings manipulation on shares trading in the secondary
securities markets, that is, the trading of previously issued shares on the
regulated exchanges and markets. In contrast, the primary securities
markets consist of that group of investors (principally institutions and
investment banks) who purchase newly issued stock; those investors then
begin trading that stock in the secondary markets after shares are issued.
The primary markets, though, present yet another opportunity for finan-
cial statement fraud, especially for earnings manipulation, because share
values are usually a function of projected future income.
When most people think about newly issued securities, they think
of initial public offerings (IPOs) of shares of companies that were not
previously publicly traded. True, IPOs constitute a part of the primary
securities markets, but so do the sales of new shares by firms that already
have other identical shares trading publicly. The latter are referred to
as seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) because, at the time of the sale of new
shares, there are other, seasoned, shares outstanding that are already
trading. Both IPOs and SEOs present unique opportunities for fraudsters,
but in either case, the fraudsters’ objective is usually the same: to raise
more capital than they could if they told the truth about their firm’s
financial condition. With the extra capital, the fraudsters can then award
themselves larger compensation packages, acquire related entities at
overvalued prices, or simply stay afloat longer while incurring operating
losses.
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IPOs
Companies preparing to go public are under intense pressure to clean
up their books and, if actual results are insufficient, to enhance historical
earnings to be published in the offering prospectus through fraudulent
methods. For firms that were privately held for some period of years
before the IPO, there are numerous fraud motives and methods. (Chapter
5 also covers the special pressures exerted on private firms by venture
capitalists.) In the privately held environment, a firm’s primary reporting
responsibilities are to banks and tax authorities; shareholders and man-
agement are typically closely aligned (if not one and the same), making
their reporting needs secondary (see Chapter 5). For public companies,
however, the reporting priority shifts to shareholders, especially those
not in management, who do not have access to financial information
about the firm beyond its published financial statements.
As discussed in Chapter 5, one area of greatest concern for potential
fraud in private firms is related party transactions. If one company out
of a group of related companies planned to go public, the expense sharing
and revenue allocations among the related entities, done most likely for
tax minimization, need careful review as well as thorough documentation.
A tax fraud scheme probably has elements of financial fraud as well,
except the financial fraud may not become effectuated until other people
(investors) begin to rely on those financial statements. For example, say
that two related firms shared manufacturing plant facilities in a number
of locations, but, due to heavy development costs, one firm’s marginal
income tax rate was only 10 percent and the other firm’s rate was 35
percent. When management, which was essentially the same for both
firms, began to allocate rent expense for the shared facilities, manage-
ment devised a fraudulent expense-sharing arrangement that allocated
deductions away from the firm with a low marginal tax rate to the firm
incurring a higher marginal tax rate. That scheme would violate various
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (see Revenue Procedure 2002-
18 for a discussion of IRS-imposed reallocations used to correct such
schemes). However, should the low marginal rate firm later go public,
its historical financial statements would not reflect an accurate share of
its expenses; rent expense would be too low. An investor or investment
banker, then, relying on those financial statements to value the shares,
may underestimate future rent expense. The end result is financial state-
ment fraud arising from tax fraud and an overvaluation of the IPO shares.
SEOs
Academic research over the last decade has found several curious events
surrounding firms that issue new shares in an SEO. Michael Gombola,
Hei Wai Lee, and Feng-Ying Liu cited research that found share prices
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declined only slightly, about 3 percent, after a firm announced an SEO.1
Some price decline is expected because the firm is increasing its outstand-
ing shares, thus diluting earnings, at least in the near term; in the
long run, the firm hopes new capital provided in the SEO will provide
additional earnings that make up for and eventually reverse any near-
term dilution. Reviewing other research, however, Gombola, Lee, and Liu
found that actual performance after an SEO did not meet expectations:
Despite the price decline at the announcement, Loughran and
Ritter (1995) show further substantial declines after the SEO
announcement. Their findings suggest that to account fully for
the post-offering stock price underperformance over a five-year
horizon, the price decline accompanying the announcement
should be as large as 44 percent. Their research indicates that
the stock of firms offering seasoned equity remains substan-
tially overvalued long after the announcement is made public.
Similarly, McLaughlin, Safieddine, and Vasudevan (1996) show
a significant decline in profitability during the three years fol-
lowing the announcement. This finding is also consistent with
the hypothesis that firms offering seasoned equity issues are
overpriced following the offering.2
Clearly, something is amiss. The market may be consistently overop-
timistic, hoping for quicker, higher returns from the new capital infusion
than actually occurs, or the share prices at the time of the announcement
may be inflated by fraudulent financial statements. The latter possibility
appears to be aided by the fact that the fraud resulted in raising more
capital that, in turn, could have been invested to produce earnings that
cover up the fraud in later periods. The following example illustrates
how.
Example Scenario. The Operating System Co., a publicly traded com-
pany, designs and sells software that enhances the data processing
performance of mainframe computers. Operating System recently
acquired, in a purchase transaction, the assets of Data Mover Corp.,
a firm that develops and distributes software designed to improve
distributed processing capabilities through quicker data transfers. The
transaction was financed by junk bonds placed with institutional inves-
tors. Operating System management believed that Data Mover’s prod-
uct would complement their own and that, since the target market for
both products was the same—mainframe users—there was an opportu-
1 ‘‘Evidence of Selling by Managers after Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements,’’ Finan-
cial Management, September 22, 1997.
2 Ibid.
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nity to reduce redundancies in the combined sales forces and achieve
a synergistic benefit from the acquisition. In other words, only one
salesperson was now needed to call on an Operating System/Data
Mover customer instead of two.
Operating System’s chief financial officer (CFO) recognized that
trimming the sales force could have potentially adverse consequences
for some customer relationships, so she set up loss contingencies for
possible early contract cancellations, write-offs of accounts receivable,
and product discounts to accommodate unhappy customers. The loss
contingencies were set up under a balance sheet account titled ‘‘Acquisi-
tion Reserves.’’ The charge for these reserves went to goodwill (see
Chapter 11 for a discussion on setting up acquisition reserves).
Soon after the acquisition, Operating System decided to float an
offering of new shares and secured, at the company’s annual meeting,
the approval of its shareholders to issue the shares. Proceeds from the
offering, net of offering expenses and underwriters’ fees, would be used
to pay down the high-interest rate acquisition debt. When Operating
System’s CFO contacted the firm’s investment bankers who would
manage the offering, the investment bankers noted that Operating
System’s stock price had slumped after the Data Mover acquisition
because the market did not believe that synergies from the acquisition
would be significant. ‘‘You’re going to have to prove to the Street that
you will indeed have synergies from this acquisition in your next quar-
terly filing, or we will have to discount the offering price severely,’’
said the managing director of the investment banking firm. This put
the CFO under significant pressure because she had assured senior
management that she believed the price the new shares would fetch
would be close to the current price of shares already trading on the
market. Her pricing assumption was important because management
did not want to see significant dilution.
The next quarterly filing with the SEC was due in two weeks; the
quarter had ended one month earlier. The CFO had to think fast. She
knew that in the weeks after the acquisition, senior sales managers
decided to have Data Mover sales personnel pair up with Operating
System salespeople to make joint calls on common customers to mini-
mize customer defections to competitors. As a result of this executive
decision, the hoped-for redundancy reductions were not showing up as
quickly as planned. On the other hand, though, the joint sales calls
had so far resulted in fewer unhappy customers, so the acquisition
reserves went largely untapped, though it was still too early to tell
whether they would be needed.
The CFO concluded, then, that she could, in her words, ‘‘recharac-
terize’’ the acquisition reserves to include redundant sales salaries as an
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acquisition expense. Even though anticipated personnel terminations
were accounted for in a separate charge, she rationalized that carrying
the extra sales personnel on the payroll was an expense incurred in
lieu of the expected losses from unhappy customers. The CFO instructed
the controller to charge the redundant salaries to acquisition reserves
instead of payroll expense. The controller, when asked why he did not
question the CFO’s instruction, said that he believed that because the
account title for the reserves was so broadly worded, ‘‘the acquisition
reserves could be used for just about any acquisition-related expense
that came up.’’
By running the expense for redundant personnel through the bal-
ance sheet account, the CFO was able to show a reduced payroll cost,
compared to the combined payroll of both Operating System and Data
Mover before the acquisition, in the quarterly income statement filed
with the SEC. The investment bankers were pleased and priced the
offering of new shares with only a small discount from quoted prices
on shares already trading. As an added bonus, when the market saw
that payroll cost had declined due to perceived synergies in the acquisi-
tion, the price of Operating System’s stock increased, covering most of
the underwriting costs of the seasoned equity offering.
Example Analysis. While this example deals with loss contingencies,
as discussed in Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contin-
gencies, and FASB Statement No. 141, Business Combinations, the
facts here do not require much analysis in that area (however, see
Chapter 11 for a more detailed discussion of reserves). Essentially, the
CFO attempts to justify debiting salary costs against reserves set up
for other purposes, which violates GAAP; moreover, it is not likely that
redundant salary costs would even qualify as a loss contingency. The
fact that the account title is ambiguous is irrelevant; the stated pur-
poses for the reserves were to absorb anticipated financial consequences
of unhappy customers. The fact that management spent more money
than originally planned to keep the customers happy does not allow
the company to access those reserves.
Furthermore, to use the reserves to effectively hide salary expense
to give the appearance of improved operating results is deceptive with-
out adequate disclosure, which was pointedly missing in the example.
Materiality may not even be a workable defense in this situation. The
amount of the payroll costs squirreled away in reserves may not have
been large relative to overall net income from the perspective of quanti-
tative materiality, but the fact that investment bankers and their
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clients, the primary capital market investors, were closely observing
payroll costs caused that payroll item to rise in importance. Using the
W. R. Grace standard discussed in Chapter 1, the SEC would likely
assert that materiality should be judged against the increase in
operating income caused by reclassing some of the payroll costs. From
the perspective of qualitative materiality, relying on Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, the SEC would likely go further to assert that any
knowing violation of GAAP, such as using reserves for reasons contrary
to their original intent, is material, regardless of the amount.
EXCHANGE LISTING
Finally, earnings manipulation may help a company obtain or retain its
listing on a stock exchange. The initial and continued listing requirements
of many exchanges provide for some type of net income test. Although
companies failing this test may qualify for initial or continued listing
under other tests such as overall market capitalization, companies whose
share prices have declined sharply in a weak market may find net income
manipulation to be their only hope.
The NASDAQ Stock Market, for example, looks to income from con-
tinuing operations for several of its listing standards for both the
NASDAQ National Market (NNM) and the NASDAQ SmallCap Market
(SmallCap), as summarized in the accompanying tables at the end of this
chapter. To become listed on NNM for the first time, a firm must meet
at least one of three initial listing standards. The first NNM initial listing
standard requires a firm that wishes to be listed to have reported pretax
income before continuing operations of at least $1 million in either the
last fiscal year or in two of the last three years. The second and third
NNM initial listing standards do not have an income requirement but
do require that the firm demonstrate certain levels of shareholders’ equity
or market value. To initially list on the SmallCap, a firm must have net
income from continuing operations of at least $750,000 in either the latest
fiscal year or in two of the last three years.
There is also a requirement that a firm traded on NNM or the
SmallCap have a minimum number of market makers. Market makers
are securities brokerages that meet certain requirements and have pub-
licly stated to the market that they stand ready to make a market in a
given security. As such, a market maker usually maintains an inventory
of shares in the security so if an investor wishes to purchase some shares
and there are, at that moment, no ready sellers in the market, the market
maker is obligated under NASDAQ rules to sell a minimum number of
shares from its inventory. In this manner, the market maker helps main-
tain an orderly market by providing liquidity. Without a market maker,
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a purchaser who comes to the market wishing to buy shares may find
that, absent a ready seller, he or she may have to place a bid at a
substantial premium over the last trade just to attract a seller into the
market. On the flip side, a seller who shows up and who is not lucky
enough to encounter a buyer at that moment may have to part with his
or her shares at a steep discount to attract a buyer. Therefore, liquidity
is important, and market makers provide that liquidity.
Once a firm’s stock meets the initial listing standards, it must meet
the continued listing standards to remain listed, and those standards
operate in a manner similar to the standards for initial listing. The only
difference is that continued listing standards are more relaxed to allow
for negative changes in income and stock price after the initial listing.
More important, though, all NASDAQ listing standards have set
minimums for market value of publicly held shares (MVPHS) and bid
price that are largely a function of reported revenues or earnings. For
listing purposes, publicly held shares are those shares in the hands of
investors who are not directors, officers or major (10 percent or more)
shareholders. The bid price used for listing requirements is the bid at
the close of market trading on a given day. MVPHS, then, is a function
of shares outstanding times the price per share. Price per share, though,
is a function of the P/E multiple applied to forecasted earnings per share,
and analysts typically forecast earnings beginning with historical earn-
ings. Substituting historical, basic earnings per share (EPS) in place of
forecasted EPS for simplicity, the MVPHS equation becomes:
MVPHS = (Total shares outstanding - Shares held by directors,
officers, and major shareholders) · P/E · Basic EPShistorical.
EPS is, of course, a function of earnings; therefore, from the equation,
it is clear to see that reported earnings are an important driver in this
listing standard. (During the Internet bubble, when some analysts did
not give as much weight to traditional earnings measures, companies
used another income statement item, sales revenues, as their metric;
thus, even for Internet firms without positive earnings, the income state-
ment still provided the key to setting value.)
Bid price is simply the last two terms of the previous equation:
Bid price per share = P/E · Basic EPShistorical.
Other factors can affect the price of a share of stock from day to day,
such as institutions or market makers purchasing or selling large blocks
of stock, limited trading volume (liquidity) in the stock on a given day,
page 30 05-09-03 10:47:46
Chapter 2: Earnings Manipulation 31
and overall market movements, to give three examples. However, over
the long run, earnings is the key driver.
Therefore, given that reported earnings are either an explicit or
implicit component of the listing standards, income statement manipula-
tion to achieve or maintain listing on an exchange becomes an important
tool for fraudsters.
Why is exchange listing so important if delisted or unlisted firms
can trade their shares on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB)
market? The OTCBB is an electronic market, administered by NASDAQ,
on which shares are traded between brokerage firms on behalf of their
customers. However, unlike the NNM or the SmallCap, there is no
requirement that a firm traded on OTCBB have a minimum number of
market makers.
How much is liquidity worth? Valuation studies of shares issued by
public companies that are restricted, that is, not allowed to be traded
like the companies’ publicly registered shares, find that the restrictions
produce a 30 percent to 40 percent discount from the price of the publicly
traded shares. After having served on the NASDAQ Listing Qualifications
Panel for several years, the author believes that shares delisted from the
NNM or the SmallCap to the OTCBB may incur a decline of 20 percent
in price. This finding, while anecdotal, does make sense in the context
of the valuation studies: Restricted shares may not be traded at all except
under strict limits set by securities regulations (see SEC Rule 144);
OTCBB shares remain freely tradable, but the market in which they
trade is much less liquid than those exchanges that require a minimum
number of market makers to support every listed stock. Nevertheless, a
20 percent hit to a firm’s market capitalization can be a serious blow and
provides ample incentive for fraudsters to manipulate income to keep
their firms listed on established markets.
CONCLUSION
The three primary motives for earnings manipulation cited in the COSO
Research Report—earnings improvement, new issue enhancement, and
exchange listing—provide a starting point for CPAs to identify issues
that may lead to earnings manipulation. From the viewpoint of fraud
prevention, the three areas signal the need for better internal controls—
controls that address specific issues raised by each motive and controls
that are rigorously enforced once in place.
For example, a firm with a management compensation plan tied to
reported earnings may wish to carve certain internal accounting person-
nel out of the plan so their compensation is not tied to earnings. Under
this internal control recommendation, personnel who have responsibility
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for signing off on earnings would not have a compensation-related motive
to manipulate those earnings. To make sure that this internal control step
functions as planned, though, the firm will need to establish a separate
reporting chain so that, for compensation matters at least, those personnel
do not report to managers in the incentive plan. A reporting line from
the accounting personnel to the compensation committee of the board of
directors may be appropriate, for example. In this recommendation, then,
the internal controls address the fraud motives typically found in incen-
tive compensation plans and are designed to rigorously enforce accounting
standards by using a separate reporting line to a committee of the board.
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NASDAQ LISTING STANDARDS
The following tables summarize the initial and continued listing stan-
dards of the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quota-
tion (NASDAQ) markets. NASDAQ uses a two-tier market system that
differentiates between more mature companies and smaller, usually
younger, companies. The first table summarizes the listing standards for
the NASDAQ National Market, the market for larger companies; the
second table summarizes the listing standards for the SmallCap market.
Among the various listing standards, the requirements for net income,
shareholders’ equity and market value of publicly held shares tend to be
the principal, though not exclusive, targets of fraudsters using earnings
manipulation. The standards for corporate governance that relate to audit
committees are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, ‘‘Research Findings
on Fraudulent Accounting’’ and Chapter 8, ‘‘Role of the Audit Committee.’’
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Ó Copyright 2003, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. Reprinted with permission.
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Ó Copyright 2003, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. Reprinted with permission.
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CHAPTER 3
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
A subtler variant of earnings manipulation is earnings management.
Although both involve the manipulation of accounting data, earnings
management attempts to manipulate reported earnings over multiple
reporting periods to give the impression of consistent profitability and
growth, usually with the objective of meeting previously published fore-
casts. The reasons fraudsters engage in earnings management go beyond
simply trying to meet a forecast, though. A company that demonstrates
consistency in growth reaps significant financial benefits, which translate
into a higher stock price. If actual earnings for a given period undershoot
or overshoot the desired level needed to show that consistency, the
fraudster attempts to use improper accounting entries to adjust earnings
up or down to meet that target.
Stock analysts and business appraisers like predictable trends. Their
job, when it comes to valuing a company, is to forecast earnings, and a
consistent trend in historical earnings makes predicting future earnings
much easier. Moreover, predictability lowers the risk that the analyst’s
or appraiser’s estimate is off and narrows the range of possible outcomes.
A business experiencing consistent growth in earnings between 4 percent
and 6 percent per year is much easier to value than a firm with earnings
that swing from negative 15 percent to positive 25 percent. For that
second type of firm, a forecast looking five years out could have a number
of widely divergent outcomes. For example, five years of negative 15
percent per year change in earnings puts earnings in year five at 44
percent of the base year earnings, whereas five years of 25 percent annual
growth produce year five earnings equal to over 300 percent of base. In
contrast, the more predictable firm, after five years, will have earnings
ranging from 122 percent to 134 percent of base year earnings. Clearly,
the more predictable firm is easier to value.
There is more to predictability, though, than making an analyst’s or
appraiser’s job easier. The capital markets respond in a similar fashion.
37
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The more predictable a firm’s earnings, as a general rule, the lower its
cost of equity capital, and lower capital costs, in turn, contribute to higher
stock prices.
COST OF EQUITY
The price of a share of a company’s stock can be represented as the
present value of future expected cash flows that consist of the regular and
liquidating dividends forecast for all future years (that is, in perpetuity).
Those cash flows are discounted to the present using the company’s cost
of equity. The lower the cost of equity, the lower the rate used in the
denominator to discount future expected cash flows to the present, and
the lower the discount rate, the higher the present value of the stock.
For example, assume a company pays dividends of $20 per share annually,
forecast to remain constant in perpetuity. If its cost of equity is 10 percent,
the price per share will be $20 divided by 10 percent, or $200. However,
if the firm’s cost of equity is 15 percent, the extra 5 percent will lower
the share price by $67 ($20/15% = $133).
Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model to Determine the
Cost of Equity
Modern Portfolio Theory, as developed by William Sharpe, John Lintner,
and others, demonstrated that a particular stock’s return (both price
appreciation and dividends) could be estimated with the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), frequently used by valuation experts to determine
a firm’s cost of equity capital. For illustration purposes, assume that
there are two publicly traded companies, Consistent Co. and Volatile,
Inc. Consistent’s stock has risen steadily over the last decade and is fairly
predictable. Volatile’s stock gyrates significantly from period to period.
The CAPM formula for Consistent is:
R Consistent = R f + b m,Consistent (R m - R f)
where:
RConsistent is the total return (dividends and price appreciation) of
Consistent’s stock
R f is the risk-free rate (such as the rate on a Treasury bond)
Rm is the long-term rate of return on all stocks in the market (usually
approximated by the returns on the S&P 500 or a broader index)
(Rm - R f) is the amount by which returns of the overall market exceed
the risk-free rate; that is, the equation in parentheses measures the
‘‘excess returns’’ of the market
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b m,Consistent, called by its Greek letter ‘‘beta,’’ is a measure of the degree
changes in excess returns of Consistent’s stock mirror changes in
excess returns of the overall market
In other words, a stock with a beta of 1.0 has excess returns (over
the risk-free rate) that tend to track the excess returns of the market for
any given period of time, whether the market is going up or going down.
By way of example, if over the next year the market is expected to
increase 15 percent over the risk-free rate, and Consistent stock has a
beta of 1.0, the excess returns on Consistent’s stock (returns from divi-
dends and price appreciation in excess of the returns on Treasury bonds)
should also increase by the same percent. As another example, assume
Volatile has a stock with a beta of 2.0. When the market increases by 15
percent in a given year, Volatile stock has excess returns of 30 percent;
however, if the market declines by 15 percent, Volatile stock declines by
30 percent, while Consistent stock declines by only 15 percent. Therefore,
stocks with higher betas, like Volatile’s, have greater volatility of returns.
The Price of Volatility
The market extracts a penalty, though, for volatility. Using the CAPM
formula and the examples of Consistent and Volatile, assume the risk-
free rate is 5 percent and the market excess return is 15 percent.
The return on Consistent stock will be:
RConsistent = 5% + (1.0 · 15%) = 20%
The return on Volatile stock will be:
RVolatile = 5% + (2.0 · 15%) = 35%
Volatile’s cost of equity, then, is 15 percentage points more than
Consistent’s cost of equity, due to the fact that Volatile’s stock moves
twice as much (that is, it is more volatile) relative to the overall market
as Consistent’s stock. Given that the cost of each firm’s equity discounts
its future cash flows to the present, the discount rate for Consistent’s
forecast dividends is lower than the discount rate for Volatile.
To illustrate the impact of that lower discount rate, assume that
Consistent’s dividends are expected to be $10 per year and Volatile’s
dividends are expected to be $15 per year (both cash flows are without
growth and projected in perpetuity). The value of a share of Consistent’s
stock is $10 divided by 20 percent, or $50.00. The value of a share of
Volatile’s stock is $15 divided by 35 percent, or $42.86. Therefore, even
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though Volatile’s stock pays a dividend expected to be 150 percent of
Consistent’s dividend, Volatile’s stock has a lower value because it is
more volatile.
Why Manipulate Earnings?
The motive for earnings management is closely tied to this example. If
a firm is free to manipulate its earnings, financial theory says it will do
so to make its earnings more predictable, or perhaps more to the point,
to make the firm’s growth in earnings more predictable. With steady,
predictable growth in reported earnings that appears to be unaffected by
the firm’s industry sector or perhaps even the overall economy, returns
on that stock appear to be less volatile than returns from its peer group
and maybe even less volatile than the rest of the market. In other words,
by earnings manipulation, the firm appears to be less risky than its peers
and less risky relative to market returns, and it succeeds at lowering its
beta. Then, with a lower beta, the manipulator’s cost of capital declines,
and therefore, without having to raise dividends, the manipulator is able
to raise its stock price.
ENHANCED SHARE VALUE
The importance of steady growth does not affect just cost of equity, though.
The perception of growth increases valuation in even more direct ways.
For companies with high cost of equity capital, growth is the principal
mechanism used to enhance share value. In other words, if a firm incurs
high cost of equity due to high volatility of its returns relative to the
market, the firm can make up for some of that cost by convincing investors
that it will grow rapidly in future years.
Using the Single-Stage Gordon Growth Model to Determine
Share Value
A rudimentary version of the Gordon Growth Model, the Single-Stage
Gordon Growth Model, is used by securities analysts to determine share
price. For example, assume Volatile, Inc. has no marketable debt.
According to the single-stage model, the share price of Volatile’s stock is
determined as follows:
P Volatile = [DVolatile (1 + g )]/(RVolatile - g )
where:
PVolatile is the current market price per share of Volatile stock
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DVolatile is Volatile’s current annual dividend
R Volatile is the cost of equity capital (calculated above)
g is the annual compound growth rate for Volatile dividends
To illustrate, assume Volatile has been able to demonstrate a long-
term growth rate, albeit a volatile one, of 15 percent. Volatile’s annual
dividend remains at $15 and cost of equity is 35 percent. The Gordon
Growth Single-Stage Model calculates the price of Volatile’s stock as:
PVolatile = [$15(1 + 15%)]/(35% - 15%)
= $86.25
Therefore, adding a 15 percent growth rate, Volatile’s stock price
rises from $42.86, the value assuming no growth, to $86.25, double its
stock price. (The previous equation used to value Volatile stock without
growth was actually the Gordon Growth Single-Stage Model with g set
to zero.)
The Reward of Consistency and Growth: Price/Earnings
Multiples
The end result is companies that are successful in combining both consis-
tency and growth are rewarded with high price/earnings (P/E) multiples
on their stock. For example, Consistent Co. had a lower beta and cost of
equity. If it managed to achieve growth of 15 percent, its share price
would be:
PConsistent = [$10(1 + 15%)]/(20% - 15%)
= $230.00
Even though Consistent paid current dividends of only $10 per share
compared to Volatile’s $15, with the same growth rate of 15 percent,
Consistent’s share price is much higher than Volatile’s due to lower cost
of capital.
Why was Consistent’s cost of equity capital less? Its more consistent
earnings allowed the market to assign a lower beta, bringing its stock
price to $50 (without growth), or more than $7 over Volatile’s (no-growth)
price, even though Volatile paid a much larger dividend. Combined with
growth, though, Consistent’s stock price really took off, moving to $230
and achieving a price that was more than two and one-half times
Volatile’s.
The P/E multiple is the measure that ties all these concepts together.
Assume both Consistent and Volatile pay 75 percent of their earnings in
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dividends (that is, their dividend payout ratio is 75 percent). Earnings
per share, then, would equal the annual dividend divided by the payout
ratio; in the present case, EPS equals current dividend divided by 75
percent. To contrast consistency and growth, assume Consistent has both
and Volatile has neither. As calculated above, when both earnings consis-
tency and growth were included in Consistent’s stock price, that price
was $230. Recall that when Volatile, with its high cost of equity capital
due to its volatile earnings history, had no growth, its stock price was
$42.86. The P/E multiples for each would then be:
P/EConsistent = $230.00/($10/75%)
= 17.25
P/EVolatile = $42.86/($15/75%)
= 2.14
Though this example was designed to emphasize the differences, the
firm that exhibits consistent earnings and earnings growth, Consistent,
has a markedly higher P/E than the firm that exhibits volatile earnings
and no growth, Volatile. The P/E ratios, then, effectively convey the
impact of both consistent earnings and predictable growth; that makes
P/E the prime target for fraudsters, and earnings manipulation is the
tool of choice they use to inflate P/E.
SUSTAINING SHARE PRICE: HOW FRAUDSTERS BENEFIT
Fraudsters want to manage earnings to increase stock prices for many
reasons. Chapter 2 discusses issues relating to executive stock compensa-
tion and bonus plans tied to a specific period’s financial performance.
For plans that pay out based on long-term, multiperiod performance,
fraudsters are similarly motivated to use a series of earnings manipula-
tions, that is, earnings management, to achieve higher-than-justified
stock and bonus awards. The motives for earnings management, however,
are broader and include fraudsters’ efforts to use earnings management
to support the share price of a publicly traded company until they can
sell their holdings.
Getting Around Time Restrictions
The fraudsters may need to engage in such an effort if time restrictions
prevented the granting or sale of those shares at an earlier date. Examples
of stock granting or sale restrictions and inducements include the
following:
page 42 05-09-03 10:55:20
Chapter 3: Earnings Management 43
1. Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans that postpone
ownership until a future date
2. Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers from acquir-
ing shares until specified dates or the occurrence of specific events
3. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 144 restrictions that
limit the number of shares that can be sold on U.S. securities exchanges
on a given trading day
4. Income tax provisions that afford more favorable tax treatment to long-
term capital gain on the disposition of shares that meet the holding-
period requirements
5. Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding significant
blocks of stock past some event such as an annual shareholders’ meeting
before they can be sold
The following example ties together the concepts of earnings manage-
ment and motive.
Example Scenario. Acme Aerospace Inc. had a long and storied record
of achieving consistent earnings and dividend growth, and along with
that growth came a rising stock price that made investors and analysts
happy. Acme’s principal operating segments consisted of defense air-
craft (30 percent of last fiscal year’s earnings), civilian aircraft (50
percent of earnings), and satellite components manufacturing (20 per-
cent of earnings). Acme had weathered the consolidations in the defense
industry following the fall of the Berlin Wall by successfully implement-
ing company-wide cost-reduction measures and shifting its focus away
from defense products. These adjustments kept growth on track and
earned Acme’s chief executive officer the title of ‘‘miracle worker.’’
Not surprisingly, Acme’s executives were well compensated. While
Acme’s executive salaries were handsome, the bulk of executive com-
pensation came in the form of cash and stock bonuses contingent on
long-term performance of the company. The cash bonus plan paid signif-
icant bonuses if earnings targets were met for each year of a five-year
period; if targets were not met for a given year, the bonuses were scaled
back or eliminated. The stock bonus plan granted shares of stock to
senior management if the price of Acme’s shares reached certain levels
and remained above those levels for a period of at least 90 days. The
compensation committee of Acme’s board of directors believed that the
emphasis on bonuses helped align management’s interests with those
of Acme’s shareholders. The compensation committee, after conferring
with its consultants, set the stock price targets for stock bonuses each
year (for each five-year period) with objectives of achieving 15 percent
growth over each prior year’s earnings.
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Budgets were set for each business segment such that, as they
rolled up to the corporate level, Acme could achieve both the cash bonus
and stock bonus targets for that year. The cash bonus targets were
keyed to earnings growth, and the budgets could be set accordingly,
with a projected year-over-year increase in profits of 15 percent. The
stock bonus targets, set to a specified stock price, were more difficult
to gauge. Acme had recently achieved a P/E ratio of 22, though, and
if that ratio could be maintained and if the cash bonus earnings target
could be met, Acme’s chief financial officer (CFO) believed that the
stock bonus would come in as well. The budgets for the current fiscal
year were a stretch and left little room for error, but management
thought they were achievable.
Early in the year, however, the satellite components manufactur-
ing division began to experience problems. Commercial launches were
postponed or canceled as satellite communications ventures failed to
attract new customers and as traffic on existing satellites did not grow
as expected. Several of Acme’s contracts were terminated, idling some
plant and equipment; other customers announced that they would not
exercise renewal provisions in their contracts after current production
was complete, so it was probable that more equipment would be idled
later. Needless to say, the satellite division was falling further and
further away from its budget goals, placing the entire Acme budget in
jeopardy.
The CFO had a serious problem if the satellite division failed to
perform. Due to news of problems with Acme’s satellite customers,
Acme’s stock was starting to gyrate as rumors of customers declaring
bankruptcy came and went. Acme’s treasury department routinely
tracked share price volatility to measure the firm’s weighted average
cost of capital: the average of Acme’s cost of equity and cost of debt
weighted for the market value of each. The treasury group was responsi-
ble for assessing a finance charge for funds from financing activities
used by a given division based on each division’s capital expenditures
and working capital demands. The corporate treasurer reported to the
CFO that if Acme’s stock continued to oscillate widely, the cost-of-
equity component would have to increase as Acme’s beta increased.
The CFO knew that a higher cost of equity not only would affect Acme
divisions that were net users of funds but also would cause the securities
analysts that track Acme stock to adjust, at some point, their discounted
cash flow models and lower their P/E forecasts. With a lower P/E ratio,
the CFO knew that achieving the stock bonus target would be close to
impossible.
To allay market concerns about the satellite division’s impact on
Acme earnings, the CFO believed that reported earnings over the next
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several quarters would be key. Those earnings needed to come in on
target with analyst expectations to demonstrate that Acme could
weather the problems in the satellite industry just as it had earlier
weathered those in the defense industry. The CFO’s most immediate
problem was the idle plant and equipment: an impairment charge, he
thought, would tank earnings and eliminate any chance for Acme’s
stock to hit the bonus target. To complicate matters, more equipment
would likely be idled in future quarters as work was completed on
existing contracts that would not be renewed or replaced. In addition,
the CFO would have to assess how the company could find a way to
make up the profit lost on the canceled satellite contracts. Finding
more revenue, though, would be quite a challenge because demand for
components in the aerospace industry is tied to contracts that have
already been awarded and does not fluctuate much over a one-year
period.
Over a series of late nights, the CFO and his staff came up with
a plan. The corporate controller noted that most of the plant and equip-
ment that were idled initially were acquired in a purchase combination
about one year ago, when the satellite division acquired the assets of
Orbit Company. The controller recommended an adjustment of the
purchase price to allow for a loss contingency for idled plant and equip-
ment, which he believed was permitted under Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 141, Business Combinations, if done within 12 months of the trans-
action date. The controller proposed to debit goodwill from the purchase
transaction and credit a reserve account on the balance sheet for the
plant and equipment that was idled now. Then, Acme could take the
impairment charge for the idle plant and equipment in the current
quarter and debit the reserve instead of an income statement account.
The CFO thought this was ‘‘a brilliant solution.’’ As to the equipment
that would likely become idle in future quarters (and was not part of
the Orbit transaction), the CFO instructed the controller to list the
equipment as ‘‘in transit’’ to several of Acme’s defense division aircraft
components plants to be used in aircraft parts production. The CFO,
though, did not check with the aircraft components plant managers to
see if they actually needed the equipment.
Turning, then, to the problem of lost profits on cancelled contracts,
the CFO asked his contract analyst to ‘‘revisit’’ the estimates she made
for profitability on certain long-term aircraft components contracts.
Acme recognized revenue and related costs on its long-term contracts
on the percentage of completion method. In most cases, Acme served
as subcontractor to a prime contractor, and in Acme’s defense segment
the prime contractors were fulfilling procurement contracts with the
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U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). The CFO pointed out to the contract
analyst that depreciation, storage, and relocation costs from the idled
equipment that was ‘‘in transit’’ needed to be included in the estimates
for those DOD contracts that were bid on a ‘‘cost plus’’ basis: As the
cost of the contract increased, the CFO knew that the revenues and
recognized profit would increase as well. In each successive quarter,
as more equipment was idled, the equipment immediately generated
revenue as related expenses were added to the cost base for defense
contracts. The CFO also told the controller that charges to the reserves
and redesignations of ‘‘in transit’’ equipment costs were not to be han-
dled by plant controllers and not reflected on plant financial state-
ments; he wanted these items to be handled at the corporate level ‘‘so
as not to burden plant controllers with these issues.’’
At year end, the CFO carefully supervised the analysis of goodwill
under FASB Statement No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Costs,
to make sure there was no impairment. The Orbit transaction was not
quantitatively material to overall operations, he thought, so he hoped
that his revenue estimates for the remaining Orbit assets would not
be scrutinized too thoroughly by auditors. Anyway, even if he did have
to write down the Orbit goodwill, the CFO believed he could explain
the impairment as a one-time event with no impact on future earnings.
After all, the cost shifting he had accomplished with regard to the idled
plant and equipment had protected Acme’s gross margin and allowed
the firm to meet its earnings growth target. Furthermore, as the securi-
ties markets saw Acme report earnings in line with expectations, trad-
ing in Acme stock calmed down and the P/E ratio remained at 22, thus
allowing Acme management to meet that year’s stock price target.
When the chief executive officer announced the year-end cash and
bonus awards, he threw a dinner party in honor of the CFO.
Example Analysis. This case illustrates the misuse of acquisition
reserves (see Chapter 11), and the failure to make impairment charges
to income. For a manufacturer, the unanticipated write-off of plant
and equipment is generally a serious threat to achieving a performance
bonus because it is next to impossible for the manufacturer, in the
near term, to find enough new customers and bring their products into
production to make up for the charge to net income. If performance
bonuses are tied to tight budgets, management will find taking write-
offs to be quite difficult because those write-offs will likely sacrifice a
major portion of management’s compensation.
In this example, the fraudsters had two objectives in mind. First,
they wanted to protect the budget so earnings growth targets were
page 46 05-09-03 10:55:20
Chapter 3: Earnings Management 47
achieved, keeping management on track to receive all the cash perfor-
mance bonus. Second, the fraudsters wanted to avoid alerting the secu-
rities markets to the fact that problems in the satellite industry would
affect Acme. If the markets were to detect problems in that segment,
securities analysts might adjust their cash flow projections or discount
rates to reflect slower growth due to the drag on future profits caused
by satellite industry problems. Even though current reported earnings
per share might not be affected greatly because the satellite division
accounted for only 20 percent of Acme’s net income, lowering the growth
rate would increase the discount rate used in the Gordon Growth Single-
Stage Model and lower the P/E ratio. With a lower P/E, the fraudsters
believed they would miss the stock bonus target.
To pull off these objectives, the fraudsters needed to hide asset
impairments over several quarters, that is, engage in earnings manage-
ment. To lower the chance of detection, they split the impairment
charges between two schemes. The first would create loss contingency
reserves from a previous acquisition that would then absorb some of
the write-offs. The second scheme would route the cost of idle equipment
over to the defense division, where contracts could turn the extra
expense into income. Both schemes violated generally accepted account-
ing principles (GAAP).
For the acquisitions reserves scheme, the controller’s reference to
FASB Statement No. 141 was only, at best, partially correct. FASB
Statement No. 141 does provide guidance about the amount of time,
the ‘‘allocation period,’’ the buyer has to make adjustments to the
purchase price of an acquisition:
Although the time required will vary with circumstances,
the allocation period should usually not exceed one year from
the consummation of a business combination.1
Acme may have met the one-year guidance in FASB Statement
No. 141, as the controller noted, but idle plant and equipment did not
meet the FASB Statement No. 141 requirements to be included in the
purchase price of Orbit. To adjust the purchase price, the idle capacity
issue had to be identified before the acquisition to qualify as a ‘‘preacqui-
sition contingency,’’ defined as:
A contingency of an entity that is acquired in a business
combination that is in existence before the consummation
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 141, Business Combinations (FASB, Original Pronouncements, vol. 2, FAS141),
Appendix F, Glossary.
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of the combination. A preacquisition contingency can be a
contingent asset, a contingent liability, or a contingent
impairment of an asset.2
The problems in the satellite industry that idled the Orbit assets
did not arise until one year after the Orbit transaction; therefore, the
idle plant and equipment was not a preacquisition contingency. Without
being considered a part of Orbit’s purchase price, the contingency could
not create goodwill, as the controller did when he debited goodwill and
credited a reserve account.
The second scheme of placing idled equipment in some state of
limbo was a more straightforward fraud, but the CFO hoped to avoid
detection by dribbling in small amounts over several quarters. Here,
the fraudsters actually violated a second GAAP principle in addition
to failing to take an impairment charge. The example stated that early
in the fiscal year, ‘‘it was probable that more equipment would be idled
later’’ due to discussions with Acme’s satellite customers. Accordingly,
assuming the amount of equipment that would be idled could be esti-
mated, a loss contingency under FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting
for Contingencies, should have been established (with a charge to cur-
rent net income) for that entire amount in the current quarter, not
spread out over several quarters. Such a hit to earnings coming in an
early quarter was not what the fraudsters wanted because the write-
off would have alerted the markets to problems Acme was having in
the satellite division and would have imperiled the P/E ratio. However,
loss contingencies are required under GAAP for precisely that reason:
to alert financial statement readers.
Being a public company, the fraudulent accounting used to hide
losses was, if deemed material, a violation of federal securities laws.
Specifically, the accounting scheme likely violated SEC Rule 10b-5
because it was designed to defraud with the intent ‘‘to omit to state a
material fact necessary [that is, the asset impairments] in order to
make the statements made [Acme’s quarterly income statements], in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made [problems
the market noted in the satellite industry], not misleading.’’
In addition to violating GAAP and SEC rules, by allocating unmeri-
ted equipment expenses to DOD contracts, the fraudsters also likely
violated federal acquisition rules (FAR) and are liable under federal
procurement fraud statutes (also, if material, SEC regulations would
have required disclosure of the FAR violations as well).
2 Ibid.
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The example contained some clues that could have signaled these
frauds. Adjustments to purchase price late in the one-year allocation
period discussed in FASB Statement No. 141 should be scrutinized
carefully. Looking at the requirements to qualify as a preacquisition
contingency, the contingency must have existed before the acquisition,
and all that is left is to quantify the contingency. FASB Statement
No. 141 provides guidance about how to determine the amount of the
contingency (discussed in more detail in Chapter 11) and states that
‘‘the existence of a preacquisition contingency for which an asset, a
liability, or an impairment of an asset cannot be estimated does not,
of itself, extend the allocation period.’’3
Facts should generally emerge in the first few months that help
narrow the range of possibilities of a preacquisition contingency and
allow for a materially accurate estimate. Therefore, there should be a
strong and convincing reason for why a contingency could not be
resolved until nearly one year after acquisition, and a CPA should
carefully review the rationale to be sure that the allocation period
was not held open simply due to the existence of the preacquisition
contingency.
Another flag is found in the recurring reclassifications of idle equip-
ment into a holding category, such as ‘‘in-transit’’ in the example.
Setting aside the audit question regarding whether the machines would
actually be moved and put back in service, just looking at the series
of entries in the holding category account would indicate that equip-
ment was being idled and placed ‘‘in-transit’’ on a regular, recurring
basis. Those recurring entries beg the question, Did management see
this coming? If the answer is yes, a loss contingency for at least the
estimated moving costs and down time may be needed for past or future
periods. More important, in the process of investigating the need for
the loss contingency, the CPA would likely discover that the equipment,
in the example, never went back into productive service.
The CFO might be right about not getting caught on his FASB
Statement No. 142 goodwill impairment analysis if auditors blindly
apply a qualitative materiality standard when setting up their audit
program. The FASB Statement No. 142 analysis was the CFO’s Achilles’
heel, though, because the controller’s ‘‘brilliant idea’’ manufactured
additional goodwill from the Orbit acquisition that might not withstand
the FASB Statement No. 142 earnings test: The present value of future
earnings from the Orbit assets, now in the hands of Acme, have to
equal or exceed the assets’ carrying value on Acme’s books or Acme
3 Ibid.
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will have to take a write-down to earnings. Adding more goodwill for
the idled plant and equipment increased the carrying value on Acme’s
books but decreased future earnings because the former Orbit assets
would no longer be productive. An honest analysis of the higher carrying
value might have resulted in a write-down, reversing all the CFO’s
efforts to cover up the problems in the satellite segment. The CFO
might try to explain away the write-off as a one-time charge, but the
analysis would likely open up to questioning about why goodwill was
increased just before being written off. Therefore, a useful addition
to audit procedures would be the review of activity in preacquisition
reserves, especially any reserves set up or adjusted after the acquisition
date.
FLEXIBILITY IN ACCOUNTING: A NUMBERS GAME?
Management, fearing the precipitous decline that can result if analysts
scale back their growth estimates, may believe that the company must
engage in earnings management to meet analysts’ expectations. In this
environment, the moral issue of reporting earnings that truly measure
the company’s economic activity is a matter of management intent. The
very nature of accrual accounting leaves open the possibility that manage-
ment judgment, even within GAAP, may be colored by the intent to show
the company in the best possible light. Accrual, deferral, and allocation
procedures designed to permit the relation of revenues and expenses,
gains, and losses across periods also allow management considerable
leeway about when to declare any monies as earned. When, within this
process, does discretion become the intent to deceive? Within what limits
should management be acting to permit investors to price the company’s
securities in the market? How much earnings smoothing actually misrep-
resents the trend of economic performance as opposed to the irregularities
of cash flows?
Earnings management is fraudulent if improper accounting is used
to hide true company performance. Arthur Levitt, when serving as chair-
man of the SEC, expressed the SEC’s concern about this subject in a
1998 speech titled ‘‘The Numbers Game’’:
Flexibility in accounting allows it to keep pace with business
innovations. Abuses such as earnings management occur when
people exploit this pliancy. Trickery is employed to obscure
actual financial volatility. This, in turn, masks the true conse-
quences of management’s decisions.
Thus, Levitt acknowledged that there is flexibility in accounting.
CPAs may reach different, though defensible, conclusions when applying
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accounting literature. Earnings management occurs, however, when
management, in Levitt’s words, attempts to ‘‘exploit’’ accounting flexibil-
ity by reaching a conclusion that ‘‘masks the true consequences’’ of its
actions.
Failure to Perform Punishes the Stock Price
Within this range of discretion, the managements of publicly traded
companies, especially growth and high-tech companies, have for the last
two decades been under tremendous pressure from both analysts and
investors to perform. Failure to report continued profit growth has
resulted in dramatic punishment to the stock price, even if the shortfall
is by only a few cents per share. Even performances that are good by
historical standards can cause a price decline if they are below analysts’
expectations. This kind of market reaction has been an incentive for
companies that are just meeting analysts’ forecasts or even falling slightly
below to show a modest increase in reported profit.
Discovery of earnings manipulation can lead to the dismissal of senior
executives, lawsuits by shareholders, and sharp declines in the price of
the company’s stock. Other consequences will be a decline in the number
of analysts following the company and an increase in the number of short
sellers.
Four Types of Earnings Management
In his 1998 speech, Levitt focused on the following four main fraudulent
practices used to enhance earnings.
Big Bath Restructuring Charges
Big bath restructuring charges are the large one-time charges associated
with a restructuring. Management may take a big bath charge on the
assumption that the company stock price will get pummeled whether the
restructuring charge is large or small. Using that logic (which may be
correct), management opts for the big charge by establishing large
reserves for shutting down operations or shifting operations to other
areas. If the reserve estimates are too large and actual expenses do not
consume all the reserves, management can later reverse the unused
portion back into income. As an added bonus, the reversal back to income
may occur at a time when earnings need a boost because of disappointing
current operating results. Hence, Levitt observed that overestimation
can leave charges that are ‘‘miraculously reborn as income when estimates
change or future earnings fall short.’’
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In-Process Research and Development
After one company acquires another, research and development (R&D)
work performed in one or both of the companies may be redundant because
of a change in corporate direction under the new management. For that
reason, companies may write off some in-process R&D projects that have
yet to be expensed because they do not fit into the new corporate plans.
A number of companies, however, have taken advantage of the opportu-
nity to write off substantial amounts of in-process R&D, by applying a
principle similar to the big bath restructuring charge. Management
believes that the company can take a large, one-time hit to earnings
without further hurting its stock price when the financial community is
already expecting some write-offs because of the acquisition. By taking
the write-off at the time of the acquisition, these R&D expenses will not
weigh on future earnings.
Cookie Jar Reserves
Fraudulent managers tend to cloak their deception in an accounting rule,
although in reality the accounting rule is not properly applied or other
accounting rules are broken. The use of loss reserves is a good example
of the abuse of a GAAP principle to manage the final earnings figure. In
a calendar quarter in which a company expects to outperform market
expectations, it might create a reserve for future losses on such items as
long-term contracts to create the effect of lowering earnings closer to the
market consensus forecast. Then, in a future quarter, after the company
has predicted it will not make enough income to meet market expecta-
tions, management can reverse out some of the reserves on the grounds
that future contract losses no longer appear probable.
On the surface and viewed in isolation, the creation and reversal of
the loss reserves may appear unrelated to earnings expectations. GAAP
provides for the booking of loss contingencies in FASB Statement No. 5,
provided the loss contingencies are both quantifiable and probable. In
reality, however, the possibility of losses on future contracts most likely
existed before the establishment of the reserve and continued to exist
after the reserve was reversed into income. The reserves then become an
accounting artifice used by management to manage earnings to meet
market expectations. Moreover, management violated GAAP, in this
example, either by creating the reserve without justification or reversing
the reserve without any change in the degree of risk that the loss would
in fact occur. Such reserves are known as cookie jar reserves because
management can reach into the cookie jar and pull them into income
whenever the need arises.
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Materiality
Underlying the discussion of financial statement fraud to this point is
the assumption that the accounting manipulations cited are all material
in that the manipulations significantly change the information presented
in the financial statements. Much of the accounting literature contains
provisions that except immaterial amounts from a given accounting stan-
dard. However, the evolution of the definition of materiality has intro-
duced another element of judgment into determining whether or not there
is fraud.
The SEC decided to weigh in on this matter when it issued Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (discussed initially in Chapter 1; the full
text is included in Appendix B), which helped clarify some of the key
materiality concepts. One issue the SEC addressed head-on was the use
of quantitative materiality to waive accounting violations. A blind applica-
tion of quantitative materiality essentially looks at the monetary amount
of an accounting entry (or series of entries) that was indefensibly
improper. If the amount were less than some arbitrary standard, such
as 5 percent of net income, neither management nor company auditors
would insist on changing that entry, even though it blatantly violated
accounting standards. The SEC said that although quantitative stan-
dards may serve as a starting point for investigating potential accounting
irregularities, relying exclusively on an arbitrary percentage to avoid
application of appropriate accounting standards has no basis in account-
ing literature (or in U.S. securities laws).
The FASB in 1980 issued Statement of Financial Accounting Con-
cepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, which
addressed materiality as follows.
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report
is material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the
magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the judg-
ment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have
been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the
item.4
In other words, materiality is viewed from the standpoint of the
reader of financial statements. If the correction of an erroneous account-
ing item would probably cause the reader to come to a conclusion different
from the conclusion reached upon reading the uncorrected statement, the
item is material. Before the release of FASB Concepts Statement No. 2,
4 FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of
Accounting Information (FASB, Original Pronouncements, vol. 3, CON2), paragraph 132.
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the U.S. Supreme Court, in reviewing a securities case (TSC Industries
v. Northway, Inc.) involving materiality issues, ruled that a fact is mate-
rial if there is ‘‘a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
‘total mix’ of information made available.’’ Therefore, both accounting
literature and the U.S. Supreme Court look to the reader or user of the
financial statements and ask whether it is probable or substantially likely
that the reader would have come to a different conclusion. If the answer
is yes, the item in question is material.
CONCLUSION
Earnings management is one of the most subtle areas of financial state-
ment fraud because it takes place over several reporting periods and
frequently involves judgment calls on materiality. The materiality issues,
especially the qualitative issues, are difficult because they require the
CPA to climb into the mind of the financial statement user and ask what
information would change his or her opinion. There is now more guidance
in the form of SAB No. 99 and case decisions coming from the SEC, such
as W. R. Grace (SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.
1141, June 30, 1999; see Chapter 1). The CPA’s challenge is to keep up
with the rapidly changing landscape of materiality issues.
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BALANCE SHEET MANIPULATION
The balance sheet used to be the backwater of financial statement fraud.
The more sophisticated fraudsters were supposed to focus on earnings
because multiples of earnings drove valuations, and inflated valuations
led to illicit gain: Due to the multiplier effect of the price/earnings (P/E)
ratio, a small fraudulent change in earnings could produce a much larger
inflated stock value. According to conventional wisdom, only second-tier
fraudsters bothered with the balance sheet because potential monetary
rewards were smaller for the fraud effort required. Now, though, balance
sheet frauds have become more complex and the potential rewards much
greater as the balance sheet has grown in importance and as fraudsters
have devised more sophisticated ways to implement their schemes.
GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE BALANCE SHEET
A balance sheet represents a firm’s financial position as of a certain date.
Under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), most assets on
a balance sheet are recorded at their original historical cost and are
not adjusted as their market values change. Through the urging of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), though, accounting stan-
dard-setters over the last decade have moved closer to reflecting values
for assets and liabilities at current prices, especially if the values of those
assets and liabilities are volatile and subject to significant change over
short periods of time. For example, financial and commodity derivatives
are now marked to their market values under Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.
Even presumably less volatile assets, such as plant and equipment, under
certain circumstances, can be written down (though not up) to fair value
under FASB Statement No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Dis-
posal of Long-Lived Assets. Thus the balance sheet, with some justifica-
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tion, has gained more importance as it has become a more accurate
reflection of current values of assets and liabilities. Lenders and investors,
then, have come to rely on the balance sheet more. Indeed, numerous
academic studies have tracked the relationship between a firm’s book
value (that is, its shareholders’ equity as reflected on its balance sheet)
and its market value and found that book value contains meaningful
information for investors looking for undervalued stocks.
Fraudsters manipulate balance sheets either directly through the
booking of incorrect accounting entries or indirectly by keeping trans-
actions off the books entirely. The latter category, the indirect method,
has grown significantly in sophistication and importance.
The motives for balance-sheet manipulation frequently relate to
reporting requirements established by lenders, rating agencies, and regu-
lators who tend to focus more heavily on balance-sheet items. A typical
bank revolving-loan covenant, for example, may set out one or more of
the following requirements:
1. A minimum amount of shareholders’ equity
2. A maximum debt-to-equity ratio
3. A minimum current ratio
If the borrowing company’s balance-sheet accounts violate the loan
covenants, two events occur:
1. The firm may be in default under the terms of the loan and subject to
accelerated repayment of the loan.
2. The firm may be precluded from any future loan advances.
Therefore, the fraudster may wish to increase the stated value of
short-term assets, such as receivables and inventory, in order to improve
a current ratio. Or, the fraudster may need to keep the debt-to-equity
ratio down by not recording liabilities.
Moreover, a publicly traded firm that was in trouble on its bank
revolving line of credit, or ‘‘revolver’’ for short, would have additional
incentive to commit a fraud because it would otherwise have to report
to securities regulators that it was in default under its loan covenants
and, as a likely consequence, suffer a decline in its stock price. Similarly,
companies in regulated industries, such as insurance and banking, must
maintain certain amounts of capital to meet regulatory requirements.
Failure to do so may result in sanctions or even closure by the regulators.
DIRECT METHODS OF BALANCE SHEET MANIPULATION:
FRAUDULENT ENTRIES
The most straightforward form of balance sheet manipulation involves
the use of fraudulent entries that inflate the recorded values of assets or
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reduce the values of liabilities. These entries require overriding internal
controls and, to be sustained over long periods of time, fooling internal
and outside auditors (and the audit committee if constituted by the firm’s
board of directors). If there is collusion, especially among senior personnel,
the fraud may be especially difficult to detect, but collusion is risky from
the fraudster’s perspective because there is always the possibility that
one of the conspirators could turn in the others. For that reason, indirect
methods of balance sheet fraud, which rely less on outright collusion (see
the following section), have become more popular.
The motives for direct manipulation are usually straightforward and
relate to raising capital, both debt and equity, for the firm. By inflating
booked asset values on the balance sheet or by reducing liabilities, the
fraudster establishes an illicit basis for greater borrowing capacity. Also,
the same actions may make a firm look more financially sound to a
potential equity investor. For example, an asset-based lender that loans
funds to a firm based on reported values of inventory may unwittingly
extend more credit than it should if inventory values are overstated.
Similarly, a factor that discounts a firm’s accounts receivable may overex-
tend credit if there are fictitious receivables.
Direct balance sheet manipulation does not necessarily take place
in a vacuum, though. Through earnings manipulation, for example, cost
of goods sold may be understated using a fraudulent system that fails to
relieve inventory as products are shipped. The result is not only a lower
cost of goods sold on the income statement, but also an inflated inventory
figure on the balance sheet.
An asset-based lender, then, may have the impression that there is
more collateral than is actually present. In the same manner, earnings
manipulation that increases sales revenue probably increases accounts
receivable as well, assuming the fraudster has fabricated sales for which
no one has paid. As receivables increase, then, the factor, in the short-
run at least, is led to believe that the firm expects to receive more cash
flows in the future. With greater expected, though fraudulent, future
cash flows, the factor is tricked into extending more credit and then is
left without collateral if the firm declares bankruptcy.
INDIRECT METHODS OF BALANCE SHEET MANIPULATION:
HIDING TRANSACTIONS
The indirect method of balance sheet manipulation is more devious. Here,
the fraudsters attempt to hide transactions or deflect transactions to
another entity when those transactions should have been recorded on
the company’s books. These maneuvers are done for many reasons:
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1. Fraudsters may wish to bolster the assets of another entity.
2. Fraudsters may wish to keep asset values at unsustainably high levels
to hide management mistakes by failing to record impairments and
write-downs.
3. Fraudsters may wish to hide liabilities to avoid difficult questions from
lenders, current investors, potential investors, and regulators.
4. Fraudsters may wish to manipulate financial ratios to make a firm
look stronger than it really is.
What makes these frauds so devious is that they are more difficult
to detect because the CPA is most likely faced with trying to find trans-
actions that did not get booked in the firm’s transactions journals. Failing
to record an asset impairment, for example, requires special procedures
to detect and correct the fraud, and, as an example later in this chapter
illustrates, determining whether an actual fraud has been committed
requires a significant amount of judgment. It is not always clear when
an asset is impaired, and fraudsters take advantage of every element of
accounting judgment to avoid the write-down.
Compounding the devious nature of an indirect balance sheet fraud,
such as failing to record an asset impairment, is that the fraudster can
concoct a passingly plausible story for why the impairment is not neces-
sary, and that story may, for a time, convince coworkers and senior
managers that all is well. Therefore, armed with a seemingly credible
story, the fraudster does not need to engage in the dangerous task of
building a conspiracy or expanding an existing conspiracy beyond a few
people. The fraud is implemented with a much lower risk of detection.
MANIPULATION TECHNIQUES: EXAMPLES
The following examples illustrate how fraudsters accomplish balance
sheet manipulation. The first example scenario demonstrates a direct-
method fraud; the second example shows the indirect method.
Direct-Method Example: The Case of the Vanishing
Payables
This example looks at a number of issues, but the principal fraud is an
inappropriate write-down of debt on the balance sheet. The firm used in
the example, called Betascott (a name taken from an SEC proposed rule
release),1 is shown as a publicly traded company to cover some issues that
1 This example is expanded from examples contained in Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Releases No. 33-8098 and No. 34-45907, Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and
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arise due to public disclosure requirements, but the fraud and motives
illustrated can be found in nonpublic companies as well.
Example Scenario. Betascott Company manufactures and sells data
storage devices, principally computer hard drives. Betascott has two
subsidiaries, each focused on different markets: The Megadrive subsid-
iary manufactures and assembles hard drives for mainframe systems,
and the Pocketdrive subsidiary assembles hard drives for personal
computers.
Pocketdrive buys some of its components from Megadrive and
records a credit to intercompany payables with each purchase. Mega-
drive periodically uses Pocketdrive assembly personnel during peak
demand periods. The intercompany payables are rarely settled in cash;
usually, Pocketdrive offsets those payables against amounts Megadrive
owes. No bills are produced; the subsidiary controllers merely keep a
running tally of the components shipped and labor used. Discrepancies
at the end of the fiscal year are closed to a balance sheet account labeled
‘‘Intercompany’’ because, according to the controllers, the discrepancies
tend to reverse themselves every few years and are not worth the
time to track down. ‘‘After all,’’ Megadrive’s controller told the outside
auditors, ‘‘the amounts will simply wash out in the intercompany elimi-
nations when the consolidated financial statements are prepared.’’ No
one has reconciled the ‘‘Intercompany’’ account since the two subsidi-
aries were formed over 15 years ago.
When talking to investors and securities analysts, Betascott man-
agement touts Pocketdrive’s rapid earnings growth because Mega-
drive’s profits have been declining significantly over the last several
years due to increased competition. Both Betascott and Pocketdrive
management determined that, due to Megadrive’s poor profitability,
it was better for Pocketdrive to arrange its own bank financing. Pocket-
drive’s revolving credit facility requires it to maintain certain balance
sheet ratios, including a current ratio of at least two to one. However,
in the present year, even Pocketdrive is experiencing problems with
lower margins on its products, and the profit forecast for the rest of
the year is bleak. To make matters worse, some of Pocketdrive’s custom-
ers have gone bankrupt, and Pocketdrive has had to write off significant
Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies to illustrate certain aspects
of financial reporting fraud. Additional assumptions are added to the SEC examples. Subse-
quently, the SEC-recommended disclosures to the audit committee are presented to illus-
trate how those disclosures would have increased the likelihood of fraud detection. The
examples, as shown, reflect the opinions of the author and not the SEC. The reader is
encouraged to read the SEC releases, which are included as an appendix to this book.
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accounts receivable. The write-offs threaten to bring the current ratio
below the two-to-one threshold, at which point the bank could accelerate
Pocketdrive’s loan or, at a minimum, refuse to give the company any
more credit. Pocketdrive, though, depends heavily on the bank line to
meet its obligations because Betascott is already strained trying to
keep Megadrive afloat.
Pocketdrive’s controller, whose bonus is contingent on Pocketdrive
performance, presents a plan to Pocketdrive management to ‘‘clean up’’
the accounts payable. The controller’s plan is essentially to reverse any
unbilled payables outstanding for more than 90 days. ‘‘If our vendors
have not sent us a bill within three months of delivering components,’’
he told the subsidiary’s managing vice president, ‘‘they’ve probably
forgotten about the shipment, and we certainly are not going to remind
them!’’ The vice president asks which vendors have failed to send a
bill, and the controller names some unaffiliated suppliers that have
overlooked a few shipments. The vice president then asks how much
the ‘‘clean-up’’ will contribute to their problem with the current ratio,
and the controller responds that the ratio should climb to 2.5:1 by year
end. The vice president approves the plan, suspecting that most of the
improvement in the ratio is attributable to write-offs of intercompany
payables owed to Megadrive. The vice president, though, does conve-
niently forget to tell Betascott management about the ‘‘clean-up’’ plan,
and Pocketdrive’s controller reports to the bank that Pocketdrive is
in compliance with all requirements of the credit facility agreement,
including the minimum current ratio.
Example Analysis. This example illustrates how deficient internal
controls, particularly at a firm’s subsidiary level, can contribute to and
make possible a fairly simple scheme to write off payables. While the
scheme was originated to avoid problems with an outside lender, many
motives were involved. The subsidiary’s managing vice president
wanted to avoid making what might have been a career-limiting report
to senior management at Betascott stating her company was going
to violate loan covenants. The violation would have probably been
a reportable event that would have triggered a filing with the SEC
explaining that a key source of financing was no longer available and
that the debt may become immediately due and payable. Moreover,
because Betascott management had focused investor and analyst atten-
tion on the performance of Pocketdrive, any negative news would likely
devastate the stock price, and lawsuits filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys
purporting to represent shareholders would follow.
As for the Pocketdrive controller, he was probably motivated
mostly by cash. His bonus depended on earnings performance of Pocket-
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drive, and while the ‘‘clean-up’’ plan was designed to solve the problem
with the bank, the controller knew that the payables write-off would
help reduce cost of goods sold on the income statement and increase
gross margin. With a higher gross margin, reported profits would be
higher. Pocketdrive’s margins were being squeezed by competition, so
the ‘‘clean-up’’ would bring those margins closer to their historical
average and thus probably escape notice of auditors who rely on histori-
cal averages to detect anomalies. The controller, then, set out to manip-
ulate the balance sheet and produced the ancillary benefit of
manipulating the income statement so that he would get his bonus.
Was there collusion? Most likely. Even though the vice president
was not told about the write-off of payables to Megadrive, the reduction
in total payables was so significant that she had to suspect that inter-
company payables were a primary contributor because it was very
unlikely that unaffiliated vendors would forget to bill for such large
quantities of shipments. Furthermore, the vice president’s failure to
inform Betascott management implies that she knew something was
amiss and did not want any internal auditors looking into the matter.
At the very least, the vice president was negligent in failing to make
further inquiry herself.
One can readily see a number of ways this fraud could have been
detected earlier or stopped. Tightening up on internal controls by sim-
ply reconciling the ‘‘Intercompany’’ account would have highlighted the
write-off and led to some follow-up inquiry. The root of the problem,
however, was grounded in the visibility of Pocketdrive, purposely engi-
neered by Betascott management. Whenever management focuses
attention in such a specific manner, the pressure on that operating
segment is enormous. Therefore, the focus of internal and external
auditors should likewise follow.
This illustration also points out to auditors the importance of
treating business segments that operate as stand-alone entities as
separate audit entities as well. In W. R. Grace (SEC Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1141, June 30, 1999), management
attempted to assert that fraudulent accounting entries on the books
of a division were not material when looked at in the context of Grace’s
consolidated financial statements. The SEC’s enforcement division pre-
vailed, though, by pointing out that Grace management had trumpeted
the division’s earnings growth and prospects, thereby moving the mate-
riality test down from the corporate to the division level. The message
to auditors is clear: If management is talking up a certain segment of
the company, that segment should be subjected to additional testing
procedures using a materiality standard geared to the financial state-
ments of the segment.
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Indirect Method Example: The Missing Impairment Loss
Continuing with the Betascott example, the following scenario looks at
the failure to book an impairment loss on assets.
Example Scenario. The hard drive industry is subject to intense
competition and significant shifts in market share among the competi-
tors. In the last three years, Betascott’s Megadrive subsidiary has
reported falling sales and market share, which caused Betascott to
incur an overall loss from operations in the prior fiscal year. (Betascott
discussed this trend in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A) section of its Form 10-K filing with the SEC for that year.)
As of year end, Megadrive had $200 million in property, plant,
and equipment (PP&E) used in producing hard drives serving as collat-
eral on approximately $160 million of secured debt. Debt covenants
provided that Megadrive would be in default if collateral value declined
below the balance of the loans, and default would immediately acceler-
ate payment of the entire principal. The company’s accounting policies
require that it test long-lived assets for impairment whenever indica-
tors of impairment exist. Megadrive’s controller knew that the prior
fiscal year loss from operations in that subsidiary, coupled with Mega-
drive’s falling sales and market share, were indicators of a potential
impairment of the hard drive-related PP&E.
The controller asked his assistant to prepare a cash flow projection
over the expected lives of the assets in accordance with FASB Statement
No, 144, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets. That
accounting standard sets out a two-step process:
1. If the sum of the future cash flows expected to result from the assets,
undiscounted and without interest charges, is less than a company’s
reported value of the assets, the asset is not recoverable and the
company must recognize an impairment.
2. If there is an impairment as determined in the first step, the amount
of impairment to be recognized is the excess of the reported value
of the assets over the fair value of those assets.
So the controller could get a sense of the amount of the impairment
should the company fail the first test, he asked his assistant to deter-
mine the fair value of Megadrive’s PP&E as well.
The assistant consulted several industry forecasts, including one
study commissioned by Betascott last year, most predicting a moderate
turnaround in sales and gross margins over the next several years.
Then, in preparing a forecast of future sales, the assistant looked at
recent sales data for existing products, planned timing of new product
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launches, customer commitments related to existing and newly devel-
oped products, and current unsold inventory held by distributors. From
those data, she constructed a current estimate of expected future cash
flows for Megadrive’s PP&E, undiscounted and without interest
charges. To her chagrin, she found the sum of those cash flows, no
matter which industry forecast she used, was under the reported value
of the PP&E, indicating that the assets were impaired.
To assess the amount of the impairment, the assistant applied a
discount rate to the cash flows to determine its fair value, in accordance
with the provisions of FASB Statement No. 144. The assistant recog-
nized that both hard drive sales and margins had declined over the
last three years, producing an operating loss last year. To predict a
turnaround, then, as the industry forecasts had done, the assistant
believed there was significant risk in the cash flow forecast she had
prepared. Therefore, the assistant selected a discount rate that was
in excess of Betascott’s cost of capital. Using that discount rate, she
discounted her forecasted cash flows to the present and determined
that the PP&E had a fair value of $170 million. Megadrive, then, would
have been required to recognize an impairment loss of approximately
$30 million if the assistant’s estimate of those discounted future cash
flows was correct.
Upon seeing the assistant’s analysis, the controller realized that
there was a serious problem and went to Megadrive’s managing vice
president. An impairment charge of $30 million would lower the value
of Megadrive’s PP&E to a point just $10 million above the minimum
default trigger under the debt covenants with Megadrive’s lenders.
While the vice president thought she might be successful in shopping
around for a valuation that did not produce as large an impairment,
she felt that any disclosure of an impairment, no matter how small,
would likely cause the lenders to bring in their own valuation experts
who would not be as pliable, and the $10 million margin was just too
close for comfort. Also, thanks to disclosures in the MD&A section of
Betascott’s 10-K about deteriorating margins, she knew that lenders
were already skittish about the security of their loans. An additional
disclosure of impairment would bring attention she did not need.
The vice president, though, knew that a recently introduced prod-
uct for high-speed data access applications was seeing some success.
The new product was called the ‘‘Stored’’ line of hard drives. The control-
ler’s assistant had used an estimate of future Stored sales that adjusted
down the rosy forecasts prepared by the marketing department; the
marketing numbers were always adjusted by a discount factor that
historically had proven to be a good estimate of the percentage of deals
marketing would actually close. The vice president, though, told the
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controller that the assistant’s reliance on the historical discount for the
Stored line was inappropriate because she personally knew of potential
sales not recorded in marketing’s sales pipeline analysis. ‘‘This time,’’
she told the controller, ‘‘the marketing guys are being conservative,
and we should use their forecasts for the Stored line without any
discount. Rerun the numbers accordingly.’’ In actuality, though, the
potential sales referred to by the vice president were nothing more
than casual conversations she had with attendees at a trade convention
the prior month, but no one else knew that was the case.
The assistant reran the forecast, as instructed. The undiscounted
future cash flows totaled to $220 million, mostly due to the marketing
department’s hope that future sales of the Stored line would achieve 40
percent market share within three years. Therefore, using the inflated
sales data, the first step of the FASB Statement No. 144 test was
apparently met because undiscounted future cash flows now exceeded
the $200 million carrying value of the PP&E. Megadrive barely escaped
reporting an impairment charge.
Example Analysis. The vice president concocted a story that others
bought into, partly because of the power of her position, partly because
the others may have desperately wanted a solution. This indirect fraud,
the failure to book an impairment, was achieved without the overt
need for the vice president to recruit a conspiracy due, in large measure,
to the strength of the story.
In retrospect, the controller should have questioned abandoning
the historical haircut given to marketing’s forecasts, but the controller
probably saw some of marketing’s forecasts come true in the past, and,
not being a marketing expert himself, most likely felt he was out of
his field of expertise to question the vice president’s judgment. One
item, though, may have been gnawing at the controller’s conscience:
How often is it that marketers leave potential sales out of their fore-
casts? If the answer is ‘‘Not often if ever,’’ the controller may have
sought out help, but where does he turn? This is the point where an
audit committee designated to take up and confidentially investigate
questions raised by employees could step in. That committee could
then access the necessary expertise to assess the cash flow forecast.
The controller, therefore, should have had a mechanism to bring this
issue to the attention of the audit committee.
Obviously, this is a hard fraud to catch without someone sounding
the alarm, and the warning signs that independent auditors may notice
are few. In all likelihood, the audit plan for asset impairment will call
for the auditors to review Megadrive management’s forecast of future
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cash flows and assess the reasonableness of the forecasts. There is a
good chance the auditors may notice and inquire about the lack of a
reduction in marketing’s forecast for the Stored line, but since there
is little historical data on that line, the auditors may conclude that the
forecast is reasonable under the circumstances. FASB Statement No.
144 allows for a wide interpretation of forecasting techniques for future
cash flows, and using a probability-weighted forecast, for instance,
auditors may conclude that Megadrive’s estimate was appropriate.
But the auditors can go further. If there is an audit committee
(which is required for public companies), Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards (SAS) No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 380), as amended, states that
‘‘[t]he auditor should determine that the audit committee is informed
about the process used by management in formulating particularly
sensitive accounting estimates and about the basis for the auditor’s
conclusions regarding the reasonableness of those estimates.’’ There-
fore, the auditor is required to inform the audit committee of the reason-
ableness of ‘‘sensitive accounting estimates.’’ It may help the audit
committee, though, if the auditor also spelled out the range of possibili-
ties for those accounting estimates that are most critical and subject
to material change. If, in the example of Betascott, the auditors could
point out that, while Megadrive did not record an asset impairment
on its PP&E, the cash flow forecast provided only a 10 percent margin
before an impairment was required. That disclosure may then prompt
the audit committee to review the issue more thoroughly. Such a review
might lead, in turn, to reconsideration of the Stored line forecast.
The SEC has proposed rules that would require disclosure of
‘‘critical accounting policies,’’ such as the range of possible outcomes
for material accounting estimates, in the MD&A section of filings for
public companies. Such disclosure, though, would be helpful to readers
of financial statements of private companies as well. Assuming that
the estimated sales for the Stored line is defensible, the following is a
suggested disclosure for Betascott, taken from the SEC’s proposal:
Application of Critical Accounting Policies
We evaluate our property, plant and equipment (‘‘PP&E’’)
for impairment whenever indicators of impairment exist.
Accounting standards require that if the sum of the future
cash flows expected to result from a company’s asset, undis-
counted and without interest charges, is less than the
reported value of the asset, an asset impairment must be
recognized in the financial statements. The amount of
impairment to recognize is calculated by subtracting the fair
value of the asset from the reported value of the asset.
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We reviewed our hard drive-related PP&E in our Mega-
drive subsidiary for impairment, as of yearend, due to a trend
of declining sales and market share. We determined that the
undiscounted sum of the expected future cash flows from the
assets related to Megadrive’s PP&E exceeded the recorded
value of those assets, so we did not recognize an impairment
in accordance with GAAP. Megadrive’s PP&E represents
approximately two-thirds of our total PP&E.
We believe that the accounting estimate related to asset
impairment is a ‘‘critical accounting estimate’’ because: (1)
it is highly susceptible to change from period to period
because it requires company management to make assump-
tions about future sales and cost of sales over the life of the
hard drive-related PP&E (generally seven years); and (2) the
impact that recognizing an impairment would have on the
assets reported on our balance sheet as well as our net loss
would be material. Management’s assumptions about future
sales prices and future sales volumes require significant
judgment because actual sales prices and volumes have fluc-
tuated in the past and are expected to continue to do so.
Management has discussed the development and selection
of this critical accounting estimate with the audit committee
of our board of directors and the audit committee has
reviewed the company’s disclosure relating to it.
Our estimates of future cash flows assume that our
sales of hard drive inventory will remain consistent with
current year sales. While actual sales have declined by an
average of approximately 2% per year during the last three
years, our introduction of the Stored line of hard drives in
August has resulted in a 0.5% increase in market share
over the last five months of this year, and a corresponding
increase in sales of 5% over the comparable 5-month period
last year. We therefore have assumed that sales will not
continue to decline in the future. We have also assumed that
our costs will have annual growth of approximately 2%. This
level of costs is comparable to actual costs incurred over the
last two years.
In each of the last two years, we have tested Megadrive’s
PP&E for impairment, and in each year we determined that,
based on our assumptions, the sum of the expected future
cash flows, undiscounted and without interest charges,
exceeded the reported value and therefore we did not recog-
nize an impairment. Because this year’s sales were lower
than those in the prior two years, despite the improvement
in the latter part of the year, and because our estimates of
future cash flows are assumed to be consistent with current
year sales, the current year impairment analysis includes
estimated sales that are 2% and 5% less than those assumed
in the prior impairment tests.
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As of yearend, we estimate that our future cash flows,
on an undiscounted basis, are greater than our $200 million
investment in hard drive-related PP&E. Any increases in
estimated future cash flows would have no impact on the
reported value of the hard drive-related PP&E. In contrast,
if our current estimate of future cash flows from hard drive
sales had been 10% lower, those cash flows would have been
less than the reported amount of Megadrive’s PP&E. In that
case, we would have been required to recognize an impair-
ment loss of approximately $30 million, equal to the differ-
ence between the fair value of the equipment (which we
would have determined by calculating the discounted value
of the estimated future cash flows) and the reported amount
of Megadrive’s PP&E. A $30 million impairment loss would
have reduced PP&E and Total Assets of Betascott as of year-
end by 10% and 3%, respectively. That impairment loss also
would have increased Net Loss Before Taxes, for the current
year, by 100%.
If we had been required to recognize an impairment
loss on Megadrive’s PP&E, it would likely not have affected
our liquidity and capital resources because, even with the
impairment loss, we would have been within the terms of
the tangible net-worth covenant in our long-term debt
agreement with our lenders. (SEC Release No. 33-8098 and
No. 34-45907, Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and
Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Poli-
cies)
Such a disclosure may appear to be too bitter a pill for private
companies to swallow, especially if, as in the above example, manage-
ment believes that disclosure will open the possibility of more problems.
Frankly, though, the lenders in the example have probably already
made some assessment about the value of Megadrive’s assets, and
disclosure of a well-reasoned valuation may actually serve to head off
any further action by the lenders.
However, at the very least, a private company’s senior manage-
ment or auditors could provide such a statement similar to this proposed
disclosure to the company’s audit committee. Then, the audit committee
would clearly be on notice, not only that there was an important issue
involving asset impairment, but also that the magnitude of the issue
was significant as well.
CONCLUSION
As accounting standard-setters move from the traditional historical cost
basis toward a fair value standard for the balance sheet, the balance
sheet has become more valuable and, likewise, a greater target for fraud.
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Manipulation of the balance sheet occurs directly when fraudulent
accounting entries are made that alter account balances or indirectly
when fraudsters deliberately fail to record a transaction. The indirect
method of fraud is the most difficult to catch because it requires the CPA
to look for something that was not booked; that is, there is no audit trail.
The motives of balance sheet manipulation include the following:
• Pressure from management to avoid write-downs so not to appear to
be caught off guard
• Potential violations of lending covenants and the perceived actions
creditors would take
• Pressure from senior management and investors to attain certain per-
formance goals that would be at risk should financing be cut off
• Need to convince lenders and investors to increase the firm’s capital
• Desire to manipulate earnings through balance sheet manipulation to
obtain other objectives, such as performance bonuses
The general warning signs of balance sheet manipulation include
those found in all areas of financial statement fraud: tone at the top
of the organization (see Chapter 7), lax internal controls, and external
pressure to perform. The pressures that tend to give rise to balance sheet
fraud, though, typically come from creditors (and regulators in regulated
industries) that use balance sheet accounts as measures of financial
security (also see the section in Chapter 1 titled ‘‘Examples of Fraud Risk
Factors’’).
The best preventative measures are good internal controls and a
functioning internal audit mechanism that allows employees to raise
issues confidentially with the audit committee and have those issues
investigated thoroughly. Outside auditors can also play an important
role by identifying critical accounting policies and flagging them for the
audit committee. In addition to flagging the issues, auditors can also
explain the range of values used for key estimates and the consequences
if lower (or higher) values turn out to be correct.
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SPECIAL ISSUES FOR CLOSELY
HELD COMPANIES
Publicly traded companies have received much attention with regard to
financial statement fraud for two reasons. First, market reaction to the
disclosure of the frauds is generally swift and severe, accompanied by
significant share price declines, with the news media devoting extensive
coverage to the issues relating to the fraud. Second, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), with jurisdiction over public companies,
has been in the forefront of both setting standards by which fraudulent
actions are judged and, working in concert with the Justice Department
and other agencies, the prosecution of fraud in publicly traded companies.
Closely held private companies, however, can equally well experience
every type of fraud discussed in this book; only the motives and timing
are slightly different.
Although the management of closely held companies might not have
to worry about securities analysts’ expectations, outside shareholders,
bankers, and venture capitalists may demand better earnings perfor-
mance. These demands might lead management to employ any of the
earnings manipulation schemes discussed in earlier chapters. Of course,
if management bonuses are a function of increased earnings, there is a
motive for earnings manipulation regardless of whether the company is
publicly traded. The timing of these pressures may differ from that of
public companies, though. If the outside investors are passive, the
moment of performance assessment for management will most likely be
the end of the fiscal year. Management of public companies, on the other
hand, may feel pressure to hit targets quarterly, when they have to
publish their financial statements. However, whether the pressures come
annually or quarterly, the motives for fraud still exist.
The flip-side of earnings manipulation that improperly creates addi-
tional income for financial reporting purposes is earnings manipulation
69
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that improperly lowers income for tax reporting purposes—tax fraud. To
achieve this result, the manipulator may be operating with two sets of
books that do not reconcile: one for investors and bankers and one for
the tax authorities. Most companies, of course, maintain separate, tax-
basis books that allow them to determine tax gains and losses from
asset dispositions, for instance. The difference between the fraudster’s
tax books and legitimate tax books is that the fraudster’s books may not
reconcile to the financial reporting books through legal reconciling entries.
For example, revenues parked off-shore in a tax haven or through the
use of related entities is able to shift costs from low-tax rate to high-tax
rate affiliates.
THE PRESSURE TO PLACATE OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS
Those shareholders of private companies who are not part of management
may find themselves in the minority. The founders of the company usually
serve in management positions, and if the need to raise capital is not so
great as to force the company to go to venture capitalists (see the section
of this chapter titled ‘‘The Pressure to Go Public for the Venture Capital-
ists’’), the founders and key managers can retain control as they sell
shares to outsiders.
The minority outsiders, though they are outvoted by insiders, can
nevertheless make demands on management. State laws generally pro-
tect minority shareholders if the majority owners attempt to implement
a financial or share distribution plan that favors the majority over the
minority. Setting up a stock bonus plan for management, for instance,
may require minority shareholder approval. To obtain approval, manage-
ment may attempt to placate minority shareholders’ concerns by demon-
strating strong financial performance, and if actual firm performance is
lacking, management may seek to dress up the income statement with
some earnings manipulation.
THE PRESSURE TO SATISFY THE BANKER LENDERS
For the closely held firm, the bank is the typical source of debt financing.
When bankers make loans, they generally tie covenants in the debt instru-
ment to a firm’s balance sheet to provide some assurance that there will
be sufficient assets available to collect on the loan in the event of default.
For instance, the covenants may require the firm to maintain a maximum
debt-to-equity ratio and a minimum amount of shareholders’ equity. The
covenants also define the events that cause a default, and balance sheet
accounts may be a part of the numerical and ratio tests the bank imposes
to determine whether the firm has suffered a ‘‘material adverse change’’
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that would allow the bank to call the loan due and foreclose if necessary.
In addition, for revolving credit facilities that allow for periodic borrowing,
repayment, and borrowing again, banks usually establish a borrowing
base. That base is a calculated dollar amount that is usually a percentage
of receivables and inventory. The firm, then, may borrow up to the amount
of the base, but no more, effectively limiting the use of the bank’s funds
to financing current assets.
The motives for and methods of balance sheet fraud on lenders apply
to the closely held company as well as public companies (see Chapter 4).
However, in light of the importance of bank financing to the closely held
company, the CPA should be especially aware of the potential for fraud
in this context. The motives for private firm management to manipulate
the balance sheet to avoid a cutoff of bank financing are especially
important because alternative sources may not be readily or cheaply
available. Therefore, the CPA should watch carefully those accounts
(usually balance sheet items) that are used in the tests imposed by the
bank.
Also, the CPA should keep in mind that there is a potential for fraud,
not just to avoid a material adverse change or default event, but also to
improperly expand the borrowing base. For example, the borrowing base
calculation may be set at 80 percent of accounts receivable, but only those
receivables outstanding for less than 90 days are counted. If the firm
receives partial payment from a customer for a recent bill, the firm may
apply that payment to an older bill—say, past 90-days—to keep the recent
bill in the borrowing base. Likewise, the firm may attempt to cancel old
bills and reissue them just to keep a larger balance in the under-90-days
category. Therefore, the CPA needs to pay special attention to the activity
within accounts receivable when receivables are part of the borrowing
base.
THE PRESSURE FROM VENTURE CAPITALISTS TO GO
PUBLIC
If the private firm is funded by venture capital, pressure to perform can
be enormous. For instance, venture capitalists (VCs) in high technology
ventures generally look to cash out of their investments within three to
five years earning an annualized rate of return in excess of 40 percent
over their entire portfolio of early stage companies. However, the VCs
also expect that most of the firms they back will fail, a few will break
even, and only about 10 percent to 20 percent will succeed. For those
companies lucky enough to succeed, the VCs expect annualized rates of
return of about 100 percent or more to make up for the losses sustained
in firms that did not succeed.
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The Small Initial Public Offering Window
The exit plan for most venture capitalists is usually an initial public
offering (IPO) of stock to be publicly traded. Part of the shares offered
to the investing public consists of those shares held by the VCs. In some
public offerings, the VCs cash out all their shares through the IPO; in
other offerings, the VCs may retain some of their ownership after the
firm goes public. The IPO market, though, is fickle, and favorable condi-
tions come and go based on the direction of the overall stock market and
how the firm’s peer group is performing. Therefore, when an IPO window
opens, investment bankers may join with the VCs to push firm manage-
ment to go public regardless of the firm’s financial position. The VCs are
looking for their exit so they can book a handsome return to show their
investors; the investment bankers are looking for a big fee.
Securities Law
Consequently, the period leading up to going public is a time of intense
pressure and negotiation. For this reason, the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act) sets stricter liability standards for firms going public than the
standards under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), which
govern trading in securities after firms go public. Essentially, if there is
fraud in the IPO filing, referred to as the ‘‘registration statement,’’ Section
11 of the 1933 Act imposes strict liability such that there is no need to
show that firm management had knowledge of that fraud; management
is presumed to know about the fraud and is held accountable. Conversely,
under Section 10 of the 1934 Act, if fraud occurs in the secondary, post-
IPO, market, management must have knowledge of the fraud (that is,
scienter) in order to be held responsible.
Nevertheless, the CPA must be especially alert when looking at the
books and records of firms planning to go public. Due to the strict liability
standards imposed by the 1933 Act, if management were to attempt to
manipulate financial data, the manipulation would be most carefully
hidden. In all likelihood, any manipulation would come by the indirect
methods described in previous chapters and make full use of accounting
gray areas. In particular, the CPA should watch out for changes in
accounting methodology management makes just before the IPO to
improve reported earnings, as illustrated in the following example.
Example Scenario. Link Company develops and installs software
applications that perform supply chain management functions. Link’s
principal product is JIT, a package that allows manufacturers to control
the level of inventories so components arrive ‘‘just in time’’ on the
production line. Link was founded three years ago by a management
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team that left a competitor and located seed capital from a VC firm.
Link ownership was split 20 percent to management and 80 percent
to the VC.
Link management had aggressively pushed the development of
JIT over the years, focusing principally on adding features demanded
by customers. As Link added features and integration capability to
JIT, the development staff made little attempt to track and separate
which changes constituted minor modifications and which were signifi-
cant additions; their attention was purely on the development process.
As a result, documentation was sloppy. Each change, no matter how
large or small, was given a new version number (such as 1.0, 2.0, 3.0).
JIT was commercially feasible, as the term is used in Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Account-
ing Standards No. 2, Accounting for Research and Development Costs,
with the launch of its first version. Since management and the VC
were interested only in the monthly cash burn rate, though, neither
paid much attention to the financial statements. Link’s chief financial
officer (CFO), then, simply expensed the development costs because
she felt that trying to separate capitalizable costs under FASB Stan-
dard No. 2 would be too much trouble, and it did not appear that anyone
cared anyway.
Then Link’s CFO, a 28-year-old who had previously worked at
Link’s auditing firm before coming to Link, received a call from her
VC counterpart. The VC director explained that his investment banker
had determined that the recent surge in tech stocks had opened the
window for Link to go public. The VC director went on to say that his
investors view this opportunity as the best time to exit and cash out
all their shares. Because the VC firm held voting control, the CFO
knew Link management would have to comply even though she wanted
another year to show improved profitability.
The VC director, though, had an additional request. To allow the
VC shares to be cashed out entirely in the IPO, the new investors
would want some comfort that Link’s earnings were improving suffi-
ciently over time. Otherwise, it would look like the VC was bailing
from a bad investment and leaving the IPO investors with ‘‘a dog.’’ The
director said that his investment banker said Link’s ‘‘earnings need to
be spruced up a bit’’ to achieve that result. The VC added that he
wanted a restatement that would capitalize enough of development
costs to achieve a ‘‘20 percent reduction in development costs,’’ and he
wanted the adjustments made quickly because he did not know when
the IPO window would close.
Link’s CFO concluded that since documentation was so poor and
the time was so short, she would implement the 20 percent reclassifica-
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tion. ‘‘After all,’’ she rationalized, ‘‘20 percent seems like a reasonable
amount and, if we are called into question about the amount we capital-
ize, we ought to be able to find sufficient documentation when we have
the time to look for it.’’ The CFO also knew that the auditors performing
due diligence, being rushed as well, would likely rely on her ‘‘analysis’’
of capitalized development costs and accept a ‘‘judgmental sample’’
she selected from what little documentation she had to support the
capitalization reclass.
Example Analysis. The principal warning sign for possible fraud was
that there was a change in accounting method just before the IPO.
Hopefully, the CFO’s hunch is wrong and the auditors would, upon
discovering the change, insist upon making a thorough examination.
The auditors may have to spoil the IPO party by insisting that more
study of development costs be performed, but it would not be the first
time auditors held up an IPO.
An additional warning sign was the relative inexperience of the
CFO. Lack of experience probably meant that she did not have an
appreciation for the strict liability standards of the securities laws that
would likely affect the other members of the management team, even
though they may not have known about the fraud.
Other members of Link’s accounting staff would have to be
involved, though, to make the reclasses. If the other staff had little
accounting experience themselves, they might accept the CFO’s ratio-
nale that 20 percent seemed the right amount and documentation could
be done later. However, an inexperienced staff should serve as an
additional warning sign, because a more experienced accountant might
have questioned the reclasses. Since Link was going public, the
exchange listing requirements probably mandated that the firm estab-
lish an audit committee (if it did not have one already), so an experi-
enced accounting staff member could have taken the issue to that
committee.
SPECIAL VALUATION ISSUES
The need to value shares in a closely held company may also give rise
to earnings management. If shares are being valued for sale or any
other purpose, such as collateral for a bank loan to a major shareholder,
earnings management may be employed to achieve the appearance of a
steady rise in earnings. This misleading rise in earnings could induce an
appraiser or stock valuations specialist to assign a higher growth rate
to projected earnings. It is just as likely, however, that the appearance
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of consistently rising earnings could suggest the use of a lower firm-
specific risk premium to calculate the present value of that projected
earnings stream because earnings would appear to be less volatile. The
end result of earnings management in a closely held company is thus
similar to the effect of earnings management on the price/earnings (P/E)
multiple of publicly traded companies (see Chapter 3).
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES-BASIS
STANDARD
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are the standard of
accounting for companies that are publicly traded and listed on U.S. stock
exchanges because those firms must file financial statements with the
SEC, and the SEC requires those statements to conform to GAAP. Private
companies, though, may use other accounting methods, such as cash basis
or tax basis methods. Both alternative methods offer unique opportunities
and methods for fraudsters.
Cash Basis and Accrual Basis
For a closely held company, reducing fraud in the financial statements
starts with requiring that financials presented to the board of directors
and to outsiders be in conformity with GAAP. Some closely held firms
use cash basis accounting, but the timing of cash flows in cash-basis
accounting can lead to the manipulation of financial statements. For that
reason, U.S. tax laws generally require corporations to report on an
accrual basis when gross receipts exceed an average of $5 million per
year over the prior three tax years (Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sec.
448).
Accrual-basis accounting looks to economic events to determine
whether a debt is incurred or whether revenue is earned; the time of the
occurrence of those events may be quite different from when cash is
paid or received. What limits the possibility for fraud in accrual-basis
accounting is the reduced opportunity to hide a debt or record unearned
revenue since the standards of recognition are more explicit than those
for cash-basis accounting.
Tax Incentives
One of the most common uses of financial information from private compa-
nies is for income tax reporting purposes, and most taxable entities will
strive to reduce reported income to minimize income taxes. Firms can
and do maintain separate records for book and tax reporting with the
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objective of reporting as much income in the former and as little income
in the latter as possible. Firms can legally lower taxable income to levels
well below GAAP-basis net income through a number of allowable exclu-
sions, deductions, and accelerated write-offs. For example, when a firm
sells assets at a gain on an installment sale basis under which the seller
will receive payments over a period of years, that firm can defer recogniz-
ing a portion of the gain until future tax periods for income tax purposes
(IRC Sec. 453(c)). Under GAAP, the gain is recognized entirely in the
year of sale.
However, the corporate alternative minimum tax imposed on earn-
ings and profits through the adjusted current earnings (ACE) mechanism
(IRC Sec. 56(c)(1) and 56(g)) has reduced, to some extent, the perceived
advantage of using two sets of books. The ACE adjustment was designed
to bring alternative minimum taxable income to a level closer to book-
basis net income. Gains from installment sales, for instance, are recog-
nized in the year of sale under ACE, just as they are under GAAP.
To achieve income minimization as a tax reduction strategy, then,
a private firm may be willing to take on expenses that should otherwise
be shared with other related parties, including owners. Conversely, a
firm that has significant net operating loss carryforwards (NOLs) for tax
purposes may be willing to absorb income from other related parties. For
example, assume two firms are under common ownership, and one firm,
a manufacturer, makes products used by the second firm, its customer.
The manufacturer, though, has a sizeable NOL from prior tax years. The
related party customer, wishing to minimize its taxes, may allow the
manufacturer to mark up the price of products it sells so the manufacturer
reports more income to use up its NOL carryforward. The (illicit) markup,
then, has the effect of increasing the customer’s inventory cost that,
eventually, reduces its income and its taxes, while not causing the manu-
facturer to pay any current period tax. Aside from being subject to penal-
ties and other measures for tax fraud (under IRC Sec. 6663), the
manufacturer’s and the customer’s GAAP-basis books are fraudulent as
well. Moreover, the manufacturer appears to be more profitable than it
otherwise is. Thus, tax reduction can be an incentive for private companies
to manipulate earnings.
THE CORRELATION BETWEEN COMPANY SIZE AND FRAUD
Additional fraud reduction measures include the implementation of inter-
nal controls and promoting an ethical environment (see Chapter 7). For
middle-market firms (as the term is used by banks and venture capital-
ists), meaning, those with annual revenues of $10 million to $100 million,
the findings of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) (see
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Chapter 7) are especially applicable since research conducted for the
COSO found that smaller companies were more susceptible to fraud.
The importance of financial statement fraud reduction measures
increases directly with company size. For a very small company, fraudu-
lent financial statements that slightly inflate earnings or assets could be
used to secure a bank loan or small investment, but little else. Steps
taken to prevent fraud at that level should reflect the potential for dam-
ages resulting from such misstatement. For larger, middle-market compa-
nies or small companies fraudulently representing themselves as larger
companies, potential damages are more serious; steps taken to reduce
fraud should therefore be more visible and systematic. For example, a
middle-market company should implement reviews of internal controls
at least once a year by outside CPAs and more frequently by internal
accounting staff. If budgets allow, a significant fraud-reduction measure
would include hiring an internal auditor who is a CPA to assess the
effectiveness of each business unit’s controls. Assessments of internal
control adequacy would help significantly with early fraud detection.
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE’S ROLE
As illustrated in the Link Company example, the reporting of irregulari-
ties to an audit committee comprising independent board members is
one of the most important fraud-prevention measures available to closely
held companies. The opening of such a formal reporting channel increases
the likelihood that corrective action will be taken. Without such a
reporting channel, management, even if not directly involved in a fraud,
might be inclined to sweep the problem under the rug for fear of reprisal
or embarrassment. Private companies are not required to have an audit
committee; however, they should at the very least have independent
directors (see Chapter 8 for a discussion of the independence of outside
directors). The closely held firm that has no outside directors has a high
potential for financial statement fraud, and a significant step to reduce
the risk of fraud would be the appointment of such directors. Indeed, in
an era of heightened sensitivity to the potential of fraud, the presence of
an active audit committee is one of the best signals to the capital markets
that a firm is taking seriously the validity of its reported financial results.
CONCLUSION
Closely held companies present special and unique fraud opportunities
and motives. Pressures from outside investors, banks, and venture capi-
talists tug and pull firm management in many directions and may vary
in intensity depending on the financial objectives of the firm. A firm
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looking to minimize dilution of ownership will likely be more reliant on
bank financing and thereby more susceptible to bank-related financial
statement fraud. A firm looking at venture capital financing will come
under different, and perhaps unexpected, pressures if the VC’s exit strat-
egy is to take the firm public. For firms that do not intend to go public,
outside investors may be a key source of capital and a key target of fraud.
To add more complexity to this mix of funding scenarios, the closely held
company may report its financial results on a basis other than GAAP.
To adequately detect and prevent against fraud in closely held compa-
nies, then, the CPA must either be a bit of a generalist or have access
to a wide range of expertise. The CPA should have an understanding of
how closely held companies are financed and the pressures they face. The
CPA should also have a feel for how tax minimization affects management
decisions. A functioning audit committee is also a key resource and fraud
prevention measure for closely held businesses, and the CPA should
strongly encourage clients to adopt such a committee or designate at
least one outside board member to function in that capacity. See Chapter
8, ‘‘The Role of the Audit Committee,’’ for more detail.
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NOT-FOR-PROFIT AND
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
It may come as a surprise to some, but management in not-for-profit
organizations (NPOs) and government entities does have reason to engage
in financial statement fraud. Instances of management pilfering the
assets of a charitable organization and using financial fraud to cover
up the theft have been well publicized. Likewise, most people think of
government fraud as asset theft or conversion. However, both NPOs and
governmental entities have motives and means that lie below the obvious;
auditors and CPAs simply need to dig a little, and be aware of the circum-
stances—some similar to companies in the public and private sector, and
some completely unique—that can lead to fraud.
NPOS: SIMILAR TO AND YET SEPARATE FROM THE
FOR-PROFIT WORLD
For the most part, motives and issues that affect closely held companies
(see Chapter 5) also affect NPOs, but the terms are somewhat different.
In a desire to secure or retain bank financing, for instance, the NPO may
wish to show itself to be fiscally responsible by showing a positive reported
change in net assets on the NPO’s statement of activities. To accomplish
this objective, management may attempt to record contributions as reve-
nue before receiving firm commitments from donors. This scheme is essen-
tially the same as a for-profit entity prematurely recognizing revenue to
produce positive net income on its income statement.
There are other similarities with closely held companies as well.
Issues that a company has with outside shareholders are akin to those
NPO management encounters with the board or trustees empowered with
overseeing NPO activities. If management wishes to secure a pay raise,
79
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showing improved financial results (a positive change in net assets) would
help support the request. For that matter, NPO management may have
incentive compensation plans as well, and all the motives for manipulat-
ing financial statements discussed in previous chapters would apply here
as well.
There are differences, however, that set NPOs apart.
Reputation Over Compensation
The one key difference between NPOs and for-profit firms is that manage-
ment compensation may not be quite as strong a motivator. Instead,
NPOs and their managers, especially those looking to the public for
support and donations, are very concerned about their image (perhaps
more so than for-profit companies). As a result, management of an NPO
that is facing financial problems may hope to cover up the issues so the
reputations of management and the NPO are not tarnished. The desire
to protect reputations, then, can be as strong an inducement for NPO
management to manipulate financial data as any contingent bonus.
Revenue Recognition
Unlike in closely held companies, recognizing revenue may be difficult
for the NPO because it is not always clear when a donor has made a firm
commitment or merely an expression of interest. Also, as will be seen in
the following example, not all funds coming into an NPO are revenue:
The NPO may be acting as an agent or transferor for other beneficiaries.
Restricted Funds
When an NPO receives donations, the revenue may be restricted as to
how it can be spent or invested (and the earnings from the investments
may be restricted also). In addition to purpose restrictions, restrictions
may be time-limited (that is, temporary) or exist in perpetuity (that is,
permanent). Within these categories are other categories required by
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 117, Financial Statements of Not-for-Profit
Organizations :
14. Information about the nature and amounts of different types
of permanent restrictions or temporary restrictions shall be
provided either by reporting their amounts on the face of the
statement or by including relevant details in notes to financial
statements. Separate line items may be reported within perma-
nently restricted net assets or in notes to financial statements
to distinguish between permanent restrictions for holdings of
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(a) assets, such as land or works of art, donated with stipula-
tions that they be used for a specified purpose, be preserved,
and not be sold or (b) assets donated with stipulations that
they be invested to provide a permanent source of income. The
latter result from gifts and bequests that create permanent
endowment funds.
15. Similarly, separate line items may be reported within tem-
porarily restricted net assets or in notes to financial statements
to distinguish between temporary restrictions for (a) support
of particular operating activities, (b) investment for a specified
term, (c) use in a specified future period, or (d) acquisition of
long-lived assets. Donors’ temporary restrictions may require
that resources be used in a later period or after a specified date
(time restrictions), or that resources be used for a specified
purpose (purpose restrictions), or both. For example, gifts of
cash and other assets with stipulations that they be invested
to provide a source of income for a specified term and that the
income be used for a specified purpose are both time and pur-
pose restricted. Those gifts often are called term endowments.1
These various types of restrictions present significant classification,
reporting, and documentation challenges that require significant atten-
tion to detail. Given that NPOs try to limit administrative costs (see the
next section), it is frequently the case that an NPO’s accounting personnel
are strained to keep up, either because the NPO cannot hire accountants
with sufficient training and experience or there simply are not enough
on staff to get the job done.
Strain on accounting personnel presents an opportunity for a
fraudster who may wish to show more unrestricted funds available to
allow, perhaps, an increase in compensation or some other benefit. The
fraudster may be able to convince inexperienced personnel to incorrectly
book a transaction or, if personnel are too busy, to simply not bother to
verify or monitor how funds are classified.
Expense Ratios
Many NPOs desire to demonstrate to potential donors that a significant
portion of each contribution goes into worthwhile programs and is not
spent on administrative functions, referred to as ‘‘supporting activities’’
by FASB Statement No. 117. An example of a measure used to assess
the relative amount spent on nonprogram costs could be the ratio of
support expenses as a percentage of total revenues. Such expense ratios
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 117, Financial Statements of Not-for-Profit Organizations (FASB, Original
Pronouncements, vol. 2, FAS117), paragraphs 14 and 15.
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are typically compared to other NPOs in the same field to determine
which are more efficient. There is a strong incentive, then, to classify as
much in expense away from support to program activities as possible to
minimize the ratio.
FASB Statement No. 117 gives some guidance about definitions:
27. Program services are the activities that result in goods
and services being distributed to beneficiaries, customers, or
members that fulfill the purposes or mission for which the
organization exists. Those services are the major purpose for
and the major output of the organization and often relate to
several major programs. For example, a large university may
have programs for student instruction, research, and patient
care, among others. Similarly, a health and welfare organiza-
tion may have programs for health or family services, research,
disaster relief, and public education, among others.
28. Supporting activities are all activities of a not-for-profit
organization other than program services. Generally, they
include management and general, fund-raising, and member-
ship-development activities. Management and general activi-
ties include oversight, business management, general record-
keeping, budgeting, financing, and related administrative
activities, and all management and administration except for
direct conduct of program services or fund-raising activities.
Fund-raising activities include publicizing and conducting
fund-raising campaigns; maintaining donor mailing lists; con-
ducting special fund-raising events; preparing and distributing
fund-raising manuals, instructions, and other materials; and
conducting other activities involved with soliciting contribu-
tions from individuals, foundations, government agencies, and
others. Membership-development activities include soliciting
for prospective members and membership dues, membership
relations, and similar activities.2
As the following example demonstrates, though, these definitions
are not always as easy to implement as they appear.
Example Scenario. The Snail Darter Foundation is a not-for-profit
organization established by environmental activists to perform
research and educate others on behalf of endangered species. It is a
qualified tax-exempt entity under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section
501(c)(3), and its primary source of revenues come from solicited, tax-
deductible contributions from individuals. Snail Darter also receives
2 FASB Statement No. 117, paragraphs 27 and 28.
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about 30 percent of its funding from grants provided through the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to perform certain research.
The executive director of Snail Darter is tasked with overall man-
agement of the foundation’s operations, as well as fundraising, and
reports to the foundation trustees. The staff numbers between 50 and
60 people in various functions, and the current year budgeted revenues
are $3,000,000.
The executive director had been rather successful in raising funds,
including grants from EPA, in past years and asked that his compensa-
tion package include a cash bonus contingent upon Snail Darter achiev-
ing certain revenue targets. The trustees, anxious to expand the
organization’s programs by attracting more revenues, accepted the
executive director’s proposed compensation plan and implemented
the plan for the current year that just started. Under the plan, the
executive director would receive a significant bonus if revenues
increased by 20 percent over current-year budgeted levels. The bonus
would scale down to zero if revenues failed to increase.
In January of the current year, though, a new administration took
office in Washington, and the EPA severely cut back on funding for
research conducted by nongovernmental organizations, such as Snail
Darter. While grants made under the previous administration would
be funded into the current year, the result of the change in policy was
that several of Snail Darter’s research grant applications submitted a
few months earlier were returned, and no more would be accepted.
When the executive director asked the bookkeeper (Snail Darter had
no controller) to assess the impact of the loss of the research grants,
the bookkeeper responded that grant revenue for the current year
would be approximately one-third of the amount budgeted, causing a
shortfall of $600,000 in total revenues.
The executive director had projected that fundraising from individ-
uals would increase in the current year, but he counted on that increase
to qualify him for his bonus. Now, with the loss of government research
funds, he stood to lose the entire bonus that he previously thought was
easily in reach. Just as important to the executive director, though,
was that the standing of his organization among fellow environmental-
ists may fall: A decline in Snail Darter’s revenues would be seen as a
loss of political influence.
The executive director’s first step was to prepare to operate at a
lower level of revenues. He could pare back the research program staff
as their grant-funded work came to an end, but his supporting activities
costs would still remain. Making any reductions to administrative staff
was next to impossible because they were thinly spread already. The
end result would be the likely increase in Snail Darter’s supporting
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expenses as a percentage of revenues. That increase, though, would
cause embarrassment for the executive director in the future because he
frequently stressed to potential donors the high percentage of revenues
going to programs at Snail Darter relative to other organizations.
After giving the matter some thought, the executive director
instructed the bookkeeper to allocate 20 percent of the supporting
expenses to the various programs because ‘‘at least a portion of the
work performed by our administrative staff directly helps our pro-
grams.’’ That reason made sense to the bookkeeper, who felt under-
appreciated and thought that including a portion of the cost in the
program budgets would elevate the status of administrative staff. Thus,
the executive director put in place some ‘‘insurance,’’ as he referred to
the expense allocation, in the event that he could not replace the lost
grant revenues in the current year, to protect Snail Darter’s historically
low expense ratio.
Making up for the revenue shortfall would prove more challenging.
The executive director had previously been approached by the Trees
Unlimited Foundation, an NPO that was just starting up, to share
Snail Darter’s mailing list of donors. The executive director jealously
guarded that list and would not let anyone have it, but he offered to
make a mailing on behalf of Trees Unlimited whereby contributions
from the mailing would come to Snail Darter and Snail Darter would,
in turn, make distributions of the funds to Trees Unlimited. Not only
did this method protect the names of people on the donor list from
disclosure to outsiders, but it gave the executive director—he thought—
a way to recognize the contributions as income to Snail Darter that
would count toward his bonus and replace some of the shortfall. Under
the plan, the funds would flow through to Trees Unlimited, net of any
out-of-pocket costs and a small fee for staff time.
While the donor list was tapped out for contributions to Snail
Darter, the Trees Unlimited appeal struck a responsive chord, and
donors came up with several hundred thousand dollars of contributions.
But that was not enough. The executive director had one more idea.
In previous lawsuits filed by Snail Darter to halt plant relocations to
environmentally sensitive areas, the executive director had come to
know officials at a labor union that had supported Snail Darter in the
suits. The union now wanted to make donations to certain pro-labor
candidates for public office; because of past legal problems and a pend-
ing criminal investigation, however, the candidates did not want to
accept the money from the union. A union official suggested to the
executive director that the union make the contributions to Snail Darter
and that Snail Darter send those contributions on to the appropriate
candidates (after deducting a ‘‘handling fee’’). To the executive director,
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the concept sounded similar to the Trees Unlimited proposal, and since
the union’s list of candidates had positions supportive of Snail Darter’s
cause, the executive director believed he could not object.
The union’s contributions, when added to the Trees Unlimited
funds, covered the shortfall due to loss of the research grants. The
increase in donor contributions to Snail Darter, forecast by the execu-
tive director, materialized as well, bringing in a 15 percent increase
in revenues over the budgeted amount and giving the executive director
a substantial bonus. As an added benefit, the allocation of a portion of
administrative costs to program expenses combined with the increase
in contributions caused the expense ratio for the current year to decline
markedly as supporting expenses dropped and revenues went up. The
executive director made sure the bookkeeper recorded the outflow of
funds to Trees Unlimited and to the candidates as program costs, so
the statements given to the trustees ‘‘would not raise any unnecessary
questions.’’
Example Analysis. This example sets up a number of issues to discuss.
First, the executive director’s allocation of 20 percent of administrative
costs to program expense was arbitrary and unsupportable under gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Perhaps after a position-
by-position analysis, some functions could be deemed to be ‘‘activities
that result in goods and services being distributed to beneficiaries’’ that
would qualify under FASB Statement No. 117 as program activities, but
it is difficult to see how any portion of, say, the fund-raising staff
included in administrative costs provides those services. The 20 percent
was probably selected to scale back supporting expenses to stay in line
with rebudgeted revenues that were expected to drop by the same
percent due to loss of government grants. The result was precisely the
‘‘insurance’’ the executive director mentioned: protection for the NPO’s
expense ratio. The lesson for CPAs is to insist on documentation for
expense allocations, even though such documentation may be hard to
come by given the typical demands placed on NPO staff.
The Trees Unlimited funds create a more subtle complication.
Appropriate GAAP guidance is found in FASB Statement No. 137,
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—
Deferral of the Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 133 :
11. Except as described in [other paragraphs] of this State-
ment, a recipient organization that accepts assets from a
donor and agrees to use those assets on behalf of or transfer
those assets, the return on investment of those assets, or both
to a specified beneficiary is not a donee. It shall recognize
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its liability to the specified beneficiary concurrent with its
recognition of cash or other financial assets received from
the donor.3
Therefore, unless an exception applies, funds that simply flow
through an NPO on their way to another beneficiary must be recorded
as a liability to the NPO, not as revenue when received or program
expense when disbursed. The only exception potentially relevant in
this case is found in FASB Statement No. 137, paragraph 12, which
states that the contributions can be booked as revenues ‘‘if the donor
explicitly grants the recipient organization variance power—that is,
the unilateral power to redirect the use of the transferred assets to
another beneficiary.’’ For the example, there is no specific mention of
variance power one way or the other. Whether there is variance power
frequently becomes an issue of the latitude granted to the recipient
organization from the donors. In this case, when Snail Darter solicited
contributions to go to Trees Unlimited, Snail Darter may have made
an explicit or implicit promise that all funds raised, net of expenses,
would go to Trees Unlimited. It is likely that the understanding of the
donors was such. It would fall to the executive director to make a case
that his organization had variance power, and his case looks weak—
but not impossible. This example of the flow-through charitable contri-
butions, then, illustrates a key area CPAs should examine in the context
of potential financial statement fraud at NPOs.
The case of the political contributions is clearer and has more grave
repercussions. Setting aside whether running the union contributions
through the NPO is a violation of campaign finance laws, the contribu-
tions to political candidates violate the IRC Section 501(c)(3) prohibition
on participating in any political campaign. As such, the contributions
fall outside the stated purpose of Snail Darter’s program activities.
The stated activities were research and education; if political cam-
paigning had been listed as one of the NPO’s activities, the IRS would
not likely have granted it 501(c)(3) status. Therefore, it would not
qualify as a program expense and Snail Darter, acting as an agent for
the union, would have to record the funds as a liability until dispersed.
The political contributions, then, would not increase revenues. More
important, though, loss of 501(c)(3) status may severely hamper the
NPO’s ability to raise funds in the future because those contributions
may no longer be tax deductible.
3 FASB Statement No. 137, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—
Deferral of the Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 133 (FASB, Original Pronouncements,
vol. 2, FAS137), paragraph 11.
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The motives for the executive director, in this example, were not
all monetary. His bonus was a key driver, but his and his organization’s
status was just as important. Therefore, the CPA, when looking for
motives, may find nonmonetary motives playing a larger role with
NPOs.
The lack of internal controls is evident but, unfortunately, not that
uncommon. If an NPO truly cannot afford to hire a knowledgeable
accountant, the trustees or board members must step in and take on
some review, and perhaps approval, functions. If those functions make
the trustees or board members uneasy, perhaps priorities should be
rearranged to allow for retaining the appropriate personnel. Fre-
quently, the establishment of strong internal controls within an NPO
is a matter of priorities competing with the NPO programs. The CPA,
then, must carry the argument for strong controls and spell out the
consequences if controls fail. Those consequences may include irrepara-
ble harm to the NPO’s reputation, loss of tax-exempt status, and dam-
age to reputation may be fatal for many NPOs dependent on public
donations.
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
As with NPOs, governments have motives to publish misleading financial
statements, and those motives are quite similar to those for NPOs. This
section looks at motives and methods used within governmental entities.
The Significance of Compensation and Reputation
Compensation actually can be a motive in government. Even though
salaries in grade are set by governing bodies (such as legislatures), promo-
tions depend, at least in part, on perceived capabilities. Perceived capabili-
ties in government, to no small degree, depend on reputation. Managers
who, due to adverse circumstances, find their governmental units in
difficult financial condition, may find that the desire to protect their
reputations will cause them to attempt to manipulate financial reports.
Therefore, the motivational elements present in NPOs are also found in
government.
The Dangers in Greater Disclosure
New reporting standards may also provide incentive for fraud. As Govern-
ment Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 34, Basic
Financial Statements—and Management’s Discussion and Analysis—for
State and Local Governments, is implemented at various levels of govern-
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ment through 2003, the format for financial reporting by governmental
entities will become more like the reporting by publicly traded companies.
In fact, GASB Statement No. 34 mandates a Management’s Discussion
and Analysis (MD&A) section as Required Supplemental Information
that is similar in nature and objective to the MD&A required by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Summary for GASB
Statement No. 34 explains:
MD&A should provide an objective and easily readable analysis
of the government’s financial activities based on currently
known facts, decisions, or conditions. MD&A should include
comparisons of the current year to the prior year based on the
government-wide information. It should provide an analysis
of the government’s overall financial position and results of
operations to assist users in assessing whether that financial
position has improved or deteriorated as a result of the year’s
activities. In addition, it should provide an analysis of signifi-
cant changes that occur in funds and significant budget vari-
ances. It should also describe capital asset and long-term debt
activity during the year. MD&A should conclude with a descrip-
tion of currently known facts, decisions, or conditions that are
expected to have a significant effect on financial position or
results of operations.
With the additional MD&A disclosures, though, come motives for
fraud. If a governmental fund, for instance, is faced with having to report
that its financial position has deteriorated as a result of the year’s activi-
ties, its managers may attempt to manipulate either the balance sheet
or the statement of revenues, expenditures, and fund balances.
For the most part, fraudulent manipulation techniques discussed
elsewhere in this book apply to governments as well, but the following
sections discuss a few fraud areas that are unique to government.
Methods for Hiding Problems
In the past, governments may have been able to report only selected
information to the public, thus avoiding embarrassing disclosures of bad
news, until the problem became so severe that it required drastic action.
Under GASB Statement No. 34, though, governments are required to
issue government-wide financial statements with certain larger funds
broken out and then reconciled to the government-wide statements. Will
all this disclosure reduce fraud? Not likely; it simply will force fraudsters
to become more creative.
Fraudsters in government may try to hide problems by shifting them
among different funds, and there are a plethora of different types of funds
used in government:
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• Governmental funds
• Proprietary funds
• Fiduciary funds
• Special purpose government funds
• Enterprise funds
If within one government-wide reporting unit, one fund has problems
and another does not, a loan or transaction from one to the other may
cover up the issue, at least for a short period.
Gray Areas in Revenue and Asset Classification
To the government, revenues are taxes, fees, fines, and other assessments.
However, some revenues come to the government for special purposes,
such as building a convention center or funding secondary education.
Those revenues are restricted and must be separately tracked. Similarly,
on the balance sheet, according to GASB Statement No. 34, ‘‘the net
assets of a government should be reported in three categories—invested
in capital assets net of related debt, restricted, and unrestricted.’’ There-
fore, just as with NPOs, governments must properly determine how reve-
nues create net assets in each of those categories.
There are often ambiguities, though, that provide ample room for
fraudsters to maneuver. For example, a fund set up to receive revenues
earmarked for a special purpose may fulfill that special purpose, at least
for the current fiscal year, and have excess funds left over. A fraudster,
trying to deal with a shortfall of revenues in the general fund, may be
able to loan money from the special purpose fund, though that would
require some documentation and would leave a paper trail.
A more clever solution would be to leave the excess funds where they
are and simply count the excess toward the general fund’s assets. One
method to accomplish recording the assets in a different fund would be
to reclass the revenues in excess of special purpose needs as those
revenues are received, hoping that the multiple small reclasses will go
unnoticed.
Another, perhaps more straightforward, method would be to consoli-
date the special purpose fund into the general fund if the special purpose
fund was not so large that it did not need to be separately disclosed.
CONCLUSION
Financial statement fraud at NPOs and governmental units have common
motivators in compensation and reputation, with both playing equal roles.
This slight shift away from the dominant role compensation plays in
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for-profit company financial statement frauds will require CPAs to
approach suspected fraud in NPOs and governments in a different way.
In the for-profit company, if the CPA can figure out who got rich from
the fraud scheme, he or she may be close to identifying the perpetrators.
In an NPO or government unit, however, no one may be rich as a result
of the fraud scheme; someone just may have kept his or her job and
reputation (until caught), and that may be motivation enough.
The rules of accounting for NPOs and governments are markedly
different from those of for-profit companies, but the methods to implement
financial statement fraud still deal with the basic concepts of manipulat-
ing assets, revenues, expenses, and other items. The challenge for the
CPA is to master the specific accounting rules in these specialized areas
because the fraudsters have done so and will attempt to hide their moves
in the arcane technicalities embedded in NPO and governmental
accounting.
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CHAPTER 7
RESEARCH FINDINGS ON
FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTING
Significant and path-breaking research into financial statement fraud
has been conducted since the 1980s, when the savings and loan industry
collapsed and audit failures were contributing factors. The AICPA, among
others, led the research effort by participating in the Committee of Spon-
soring Organizations (COSO), a voluntary private sector organization
dedicated to improving the quality of financial reporting. COSO was
sponsored and funded by the National Commission on Fraudulent Finan-
cial Reporting, chaired by James C. Treadway, Jr., then executive vice
president and general counsel of Paine Webber, Incorporated, and the
commission came to be known as the Treadway Commission.
In October 1987, the Treadway Commission published the 1987
Treadway Report. The report covered a wide range of research projects,
but chief among them was a review of all accounting and disclosure cases
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against public
companies over the prior five years. In 1999, to continue the work begun
with the 1987 Treadway Report, COSO sponsored further research pub-
lished under the title Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997, An
Analysis of U.S. Public Companies (the 1999 Research Report). That
report sought to identify and examine company and management charac-
teristics in corporations involved in financial statement fraud by
reviewing SEC enforcement actions over the 1987 to 1997 period, picking
up where the 1987 Treadway Report left off. In addition, between the
1987 Treadway Report and the 1999 Research Report, in 1992 COSO
published Internal Control—Integrated Framework (the Internal Control
Report) in an effort to derive a common definition of internal control and
identify its key components.
The 1987 and 1999 reports provided the basis used today to identify
the motives and conditions found in companies that engage in fraudulent
93
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financial reporting. The reports also identified numerous internal control
weaknesses addressed by the Internal Control Report. This chapter
reviews report findings important from the CPA’s viewpoint. One key
area in all reports was the audit committee’s role, which, because of its
importance, is covered in a separate chapter (see Chapter 8).
THE 1987 TREADWAY REPORT
In addition to reviewing a large quantity of published research in the area
of fraudulent financial reporting, the Treadway Commission sponsored
10 research projects with external academicians and practitioners and
launched 20 studies conducted by its own staff (paid for by COSO). Among
the external studies were such topics as:
• Expansion of nonaudit services and auditor independence
• Surprise write-offs—financial reporting, disclosure, and analysis
• The independent public accountant’s responsibility for the detection
of fraudulent financial reporting
It is interesting to see that these particular topics were discussed in
the 1980s because each returned to the forefront of discussions among
practitioners in the recent past.
• Nonaudit services to audit clients have been the focus of extensive
discussions between the SEC and major accounting firms over the last
few years and were sharply limited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
as part of the post-Enron reforms.
• Surprise write-offs were one of the topics chosen by Arthur Levitt,
former SEC chairman, for a speech a decade after the Treadway Report,
in 1998. He referred to them as ‘‘big bath restructuring charges’’ (see
Chapter 3). The write-offs were addressed in Staff Accounting Bulletin
No. 100, Restructuring and Impairment Charges (see Chapter 12).
• The accountant’s responsibility for the detection of fraud has been a
long-standing, ongoing issue and was specifically addressed in both
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82 and SAS No. 99, Con-
sideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Profes-
sional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), which replaced SAS No. 82 in
2002 (see Chapter 1).
One study conducted by the COSO staff is of particular interest: the
review of SEC cases involving fraudulent financial reporting. Looking at
all accounting and disclosure cases from July 1, 1981 through August 6,
1986, the staff reached the following conclusions:
page 94 05-09-03 11:34:54
Chapter 7: Research Findings on Fraudulent Accounting 95
• Forty-four percent of the cases against public companies occurred in
industries that were experiencing, or about to experience, a general
economic decline.
• Eighty-seven percent of the cases against public companies involved
manipulation of the financial disclosures, as opposed to misappropria-
tion of assets for personal gain (3 percent). Frequently used techniques
were improper revenue recognition methods (47 percent), deliberate
overstatements of company assets (38 percent), and improper deferral
of current period expenses (16 percent). In 27 percent of the cases
against public companies, the SEC alleged that other information dis-
seminated to the public was inadequate or otherwise contained false
and misleading statements.
• In 45 percent of the cases against public companies, the SEC alleged
that the fraud occurred because of a breakdown of the company’s
internal controls. In many of these instances, the company had ade-
quate internal accounting controls; these controls, however, were over-
ridden by management.
• The SEC cited a member of upper-level corporate management (chief
executive officer, president, or chief financial officer) as being involved
in 66 percent of the cases against public companies.
• Although 84 percent of all public companies are audited by national
public accounting firms, 74 percent of the actions brought against
independent public accountants were against smaller, regional, or local
firms or sole practitioners.
The findings place senior management at the scene of the fraud in
two-thirds of the cases, setting the stage for the Internal Control Report
to conclude that the ‘‘tone at the top’’ of an organization was very
important, a message echoed by the 1999 Research Report as well. As to
the methods used by fraudsters, the findings gave early warnings of
revenue recognition and asset overstatement problems that would con-
tinue into the next decade. In the 1990s, accounting standard-setters
attempted to address those issues. Concerning revenue recognition prob-
lems, the SEC issued in December 1999 Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements (see Chapter 12). Over-
statement problems were addressed in Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 121,
Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived
Assets to Be Disposed Of, issued in March 1995.
Many of the findings and statistics of the 1987 Treadway Report did
not change when the 1999 Research Report looked at the same issues,
with one notable exception. Regional and local accounting firms were
singled out in the last bullet point as being the source of 74 percent of
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the actions brought against accountants. Ten years later, that percentage
had decreased.
THE 1999 RESEARCH REPORT
In 1998, COSO commissioned a study led by three academicians, Mark
S. Beasley, Joseph V. Carcello, and Dana R. Hermanson, to follow up on
the findings of the 1987 Treadway Report. The study researchers surveyed
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued
over the period of 1987 to 1997 to identify about 300 companies involved
in alleged financial statement fraud. Of those companies, the researchers
randomly selected 204 to review in-depth, and they published their find-
ings in March 1999.
Some of the principal report conclusions of interest to accountants
today deal with findings about the operating and financial condition of
the companies that were the subject of SEC fraud investigations, the
quality of internal controls at those companies, and the nature of the
frauds committed. The following sections summarize findings in each
area.
Operating and Financial Condition
Size
The typical company cited in an AAER was small, with median assets
of $15.7 million and median revenues of $13 million. Though there were
a few very large companies, at least three-quarters of the firms cited had
less than $100 million in either assets or annual revenues.
Trends
Earnings reported in the years preceding the fraud gave the researchers
information about earnings trends. For 99 of the 204 companies in the
sample, the researchers were able to obtain clean financial statements
for the years before frauds identified in the AAERs. With data from those
companies, the researchers performed the following procedures:
We also analyzed income statements for the last two years
before the year of the last clean financial statements. Net
income increased in the one-year period from the year before
the last clean financial statements to the year of the last clean
financial statements for 49 of the 99 companies. Of these 49
companies, net income for 30 companies increased for two years
in a row. Net income decreased in the one-year period from the
year before the last clean financial statements to the year of
the last clean financial statements for 43 of the 99 companies.
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Of these 43 companies, net income for 22 companies decreased
two years in a row. We were unable to observe any trends for
seven of 99 companies because they were in their first year of
operations or represented development stage companies with
no meaningful income statement results.
To summarize, it appears that 22 companies experienced
a downward trend in net income preceding the first year of the
fraud, while 30 companies experienced an upward trend. This
suggests that the subsequent frauds may have been designed to
reverse downward spirals for some companies and to preserve
upward trends for other companies.
The findings on earnings trends were important because little
research had examined the company operating results before they
attempted to manipulate financial data. Moreover, these findings estab-
lished the importance of trends in earnings as a motivator of financial
statement fraud. It was no surprise that firms with negative trends
attempted to reverse those downward trends. It was more interesting
that firms with positive trends attempted to maintain those upward
trends at the risk of detection by the SEC (in another section of their
report, the researchers described the results of fraud detection for the
management of these companies, which was catastrophic). Why was
maintaining a positive earnings trend so important to those 30 compa-
nies? One answer is the market rewarded consistent or predictable earn-
ings increases, as discussed in Chapter 3. The role of earnings trends,
then, was a path-breaking discovery.
Quality of Internal Controls
Just as the 1987 Treadway Report found, top management was heavily
involved in fraudulent activity, only the percentages were worse in the
1999 Research Report. The researchers recorded the positions of individu-
als named in the AAERs who were related to a cited financial statement
irregularity. Aggregating those individuals by title, they found that 72
percent were chief executive officers and 43 percent were chief financial
officers; in 83 percent of the cases, the CEO or the CFO, or both, were
involved. The 1987 Treadway Report placed the percentage of senior level
involvement at 66 percent. Thus, the trend in fraud was more senior
management involvement, and the ‘‘tone at the top’’ of an organization
became a paramount issue.
The researchers, after reviewing the motives for fraudulent behavior
of senior managers, determined that incentive compensation plans were
a key concern. They also found that outside pressures, such as meeting
analysts’ expectations, played a role. The 1999 Research Report con-
cluded:
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The frequency of CEO and CFO involvement highlights the
importance of assessing key performance pressures faced by
senior executives. Boards of directors and audit committees
need to consider the potential for these pressures when design-
ing executive compensation plans for their key executives.
Board of director and audit committee members need to exercise
professional skepticism when evaluating top management
actions. Boards and audit committees may also look for pres-
sures from outside the organization for meeting key company
performance targets. Monitoring perceived pressures from the
investment community to meet stated performance expecta-
tions, for example, may be warranted for boards, audit commit-
tees, and auditors.
The study also found problems with audit committees. First, audit
committees of AAER companies met only once a year or were nonexistent.
Furthermore, about two-thirds of audit committee members had little
accounting or finance experience. Also, 60 percent of audit committee
members who were supposed to be independent actually had significant
ties to the company, making them what the researchers called ‘‘gray
directors.’’ In addition, about 40 percent of the AAER companies had
family relationships between officers and/or directors. Thanks to these
findings, though, the national stock markets have implemented require-
ments, as part of their listing rules, that address these issues. The
NASDAQ, for example, sets a standard that requires three independent
directors for most listed companies, at least one of which must be finan-
cially literate:
Marketplace Rule 4350(d)(2) Audit Committee Composition
(A) Each issuer must have, and certify that it has and will
continue to have, an audit committee of at least three members,
comprised solely of independent directors, each of whom is able
to read and understand fundamental financial statements,
including a company’s balance sheet, income statement, and
cash flow statement or will become able to do so within a reason-
able period of time after his or her appointment to the audit
committee. Additionally, each issuer must certify that it has,
and will continue to have, at least one member of the audit
committee that has past employment experience in finance or
accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting,
or any other comparable experience or background which
results in the individual’s financial sophistication, including
being or having been a chief executive officer, chief financial
officer or other senior officer with financial oversight responsi-
bilities.
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In Marketplace Rule 4200(a), the NASDAQ defines an independent
director by describing relationships that could interfere with the exercise
of independent judgment:
(14) ‘‘Independent director’’ means a person other than an offi-
cer or employee of the company or its subsidiaries or any
other individual having a relationship which, in the opin-
ion of the company’s board of directors, would interfere
with the exercise of independent judgement in carrying
out the responsibilities of a director. The following persons
shall not be considered independent:
(A) a director who is employed by the corporation or any
of its affiliates for the current year or any of the past
three years;
(B) a director who accepts any compensation from the
corporation or any of its affiliates in excess of $60,000
during the previous fiscal year, other than compensa-
tion for board service, benefits under a tax-qualified
retirement plan, or non-discretionary compensation;
(C) a director who is a member of the immediate family
of an individual who is, or has been in any of the past
three years, employed by the corporation or any of its
affiliates as an executive officer. Immediate family
includes a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings,
mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-
in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and anyone who
resides in such person’s home;
(D) a director who is a partner in, or a controlling share-
holder or an executive officer of, any for-profit busi-
ness organization to which the corporation made, or
from which the corporation received, payments (other
than those arising solely from investments in the cor-
poration’s securities) that exceed 5% of the corpora-
tion’s or business organization’s consolidated gross
revenues for that year, or $200,000, whichever is
more, in any of the past three years;
(E) a director who is employed as an executive of another
entity where any of the company’s executives serve
on that entity’s compensation committee.
There is an exception to the requirement that all audit committee
directors be independent if there is one (and no more than one) individual
who, due to exceptional skills or knowledge, would be suitable for the
audit committee but would not pass all the above requirements. However,
this person could not be a current officer or related to a current officer.
There is also an exception for small business firms that qualify as
filers under SEC Regulation S-B. Their audit committees may consist of
only two members if both are independent. If an S-B company’s audit
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committee has more than two members, some nonindependent members
are allowed as long as the majority is independent. According to SEC
Rule 405, the term small business issuer means an entity that meets the
following criteria:
1. [The entity] has revenues of less than $25,000,000;
2. [The entity] is a U.S. or Canadian issuer;
3. [The entity] is not an investment company; and
4. If a majority owned subsidiary, the parent corporation is also
a small business issuer,
Provided however, that an entity is not a small business issuer
if it has a public float (the aggregate market value of the out-
standing voting and non-voting common equity held by non-
affiliates) of $25,000,000 or more.
Therefore, there is a carve-out for a special individual who, in the
opinion of the board of directors, would be a valuable asset to the audit
committee but who lacks all the elements of independence. There is also
a relaxed exception for small companies.
Even though it is worthwhile to see how the securities markets
addressed the issue of audit committee quality in wake of the findings
of the 1999 Research Report, it is just as important for CPAs who consult
to private companies to understand these standards as well. The audit
committee is the linchpin to the internal control mechanism (see Chapter
8). Many types of material financial fraud perpetrated by firm manage-
ment can be detected (and perhaps prevented) by an effective audit com-
mittee. A private company, then, that is serious about demonstrating
its commitment to high business ethics will adopt an audit committee
structure similar to those used by the nation’s markets.
Nature and Duration of Fraud
The size of financial reporting frauds relative to the size of the AAER
companies was large. The median asset misstatement was $4.9 million,
compared to median total assets for an AAER company of $15.7 million.
The median revenue misstatement was $4.4 million, compared to median
total revenues of $13 million.
Regarding how fraud was committed, the number of companies split
evenly between improper revenue recognition and asset overstatement.
Fictitious revenues and premature recognition of revenues dominated
the revenue recognition category; overstating existing assets, as opposed
to creating new fictitious assets, stood out in the asset overstatement
category. The following table, taken from the 1999 Research Report,
summarizes the findings.
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Common Financial Statement Fraud Techniques*
Percentage of the 204
Sample Companies
Methods Used to Misstate Financial Statements Using a Fraud Method
Improper revenue recognition:a 50%
Recording fictitious revenues—26%
Recording revenues prematurely—24%
No description/‘‘overstated’’—16%
Overstatement of assets (excluding accounts receivable
overstatements due to revenue fraud):a 50%
Overstating existing assets—37%
Recording fictitious assets or assets not owned—12%
Capitalizing items that should be expensed—6%
Understatement of expenses/liabilities: 18%
Misappropriation of assets: 12%
Inappropriate disclosure (with no financial statement
line-item effects): 8%
Other miscellaneous techniques: 20%
aNote: The subcategories such as premature revenues or fictitious revenues and
assets do not sum to the category totals due to multiple types of fraud employed at
a single company.
*From Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public
Companies.
Fictitious revenues included:
• Sham sales to nonexistent customers
• Unauthorized shipments of products to existing customers who did
not order them
Premature revenue recognition occurred due to:
• Failure to complete the terms of the sale
• Use of side letters that imposed additional significant (and usually
secret) conditions
• Improper sales cutoffs that brought sales from a subsequent period
into a previous period
• Improper use of percentage of completion method by incorrectly accel-
erating estimates of completion
• Recognizing revenue from consignment sales
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These issues were addressed by the SEC in SAB No. 101 (see Chapter
12) in December 1999.
Asset overstatements fell into a number of categories, but the most
common were inventory and accounts receivable, as shown in the follow-
ing table.
Asset Accounts Frequently Misstated
Number of Sample
Asset Accounts Typically Overstated Companies Involved
Inventory 24
Accounts receivable (other than revenue fraud) 21
Property, plant, and equipment 15
Loans/notes receivable 11
Cash 7
Investments 7
Patents 7
Oil, gas, and mineral reserves 7
Looking forward, the change in accounting treatment of goodwill,
implemented after the date of this study, may change the composition of
the previous list. Due to the promulgation of FASB Statement No. 142,
Goodwill and Other Intangibles, which ended the amortization of goodwill
and subjected goodwill to periodic testing, CPAs would do well to watch
this asset class closely to be sure it is not overstated (see Chapter 12 for
a discussion of how acquisition reserves can be used to inflate goodwill).
Also, while understatement of expenses and liabilities came in a
distant third place on the survey that ended in 1997, a more recent survey
may yield a different result. A survey that picks up the post-1990s market
boom companies that both went into bankruptcy and were the targets of
financial statement fraud investigations may produce a different finding.
Some of those companies went into bankruptcy because they allegedly
hid expenses or debts. After the investigations of those companies are
complete and the nature of fraud, if any, is determined, the expenses/
liabilities category may rank higher on the list in a future survey. The
bottom line is that the CPA needs to be as cognizant of expense/liability
fraud as of improper revenue recognition and asset misstatements.
Duration
The median fraud extended 21 months, covering several quarterly filings
as well as at least one year-end filing. This finding led the researchers
to conclude that the fraud began small and grew as it went undetected:
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From our readings of the AAERs, we observed that many frauds
allegedly were initiated in a quarterly Form 10-Q, with the
first manipulation sometimes at relatively small amounts.
After observing that the fraud was undetected in initial
attempts, the fraud scheme was repeated in subsequently
issued quarterly or annual financial statements, with the fraud
amount often increasing over time and generally stretching
over two fiscal years.
This finding tells CPAs to watch for the warning signs at the early
stages of fraud. For instance, a regional manager engaging in improper
revenue recognition may brag at a firm-sponsored conference that she
was able to meet sales goals when most other regions had great difficulty.
If not investigated early and stopped, her practices may spread to other
regions as other managers see revenue manipulation as the only way to
keep up and rationalize that because another region got away with it,
they can as well.
INTERNAL CONTROL REPORT
Clearly, the 1987 Treadway Report and the 1999 Research Report pointed
to internal control failures that gave rise to the frauds. Between the
publication of the two reports, COSO published an analysis of the internal
control framework in 1992. One objective of the Internal Control Report
was to reach a common definition of internal controls. COSO concluded
that internal control was:
A process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, manage-
ment and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the follow-
ing categories: effectiveness and efficiency of operations, relia-
bility of financial reporting, compliance with applicable laws
and regulations.
COSO recommended implementation of five ‘‘interrelated compo-
nents’’ of internal control to ensure reliability of financial reporting and
compliance with applicable laws. Actually, the five components are closer
to steps in a process of implementing internal controls and go in order:
• Control environment. This is the term COSO used to express the organi-
zation’s ‘‘tone at the top’’ that is charged with setting ethical standards
to establish a ‘‘control consciousness’’ among the people, management,
and board of an organization.
• Risk assessment. The organization must identify, assess, and then
manage risk. More important, it must implement a process that
addresses ‘‘risks associated with change.’’
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• Control activities. The organization must implement the policies and
procedures that effect the risk management concepts identified in the
previous step.
• Information and communication. Having developed policies and proce-
dures, the organization must communicate them internally and exter-
nally to customers, suppliers and shareholders.
• Monitoring. An ongoing process assesses the quality of internal controls
through independent evaluation of internal and external auditors.
These ‘‘concepts’’ or steps provide the CPA with a simple model for
determining the adequacy of internal controls. When fraud materializes
that went undetected for a period of time, a failure in one or more of the
internal control steps is usually present as well.
For example, the Boeing Company adopted recommendations from
the Internal Control Report and came up with a list of criteria to be used
to establish an unsatisfactory rating. Dennis Applegate and Ted Wills,
in their 1999 article, ‘‘Struggling to Incorporate the COSO Recommenda-
tions into Your Audit Process? Here’s One Audit Shop’s Winning Strategy’’
(Internal Auditor, December 1999), described Boeing’s warning signs for
each step:
• Control environment
—Hard controls [specific procedures] are missing or inadequate.
—There are verified instances of breakdowns or soft controls [general
policies].
• Risk assessment
—Management has not predefined relevant objectives.
—Such objectives are incompatible with broader objectives.
—Management has not identified relevant risks to achieving its objec-
tives.
—Management does not have a basis for determining which risks are
most critical.
—Management has not ensured mitigation of critical operating risks.
—Audit tests detect key risks not previously contemplated by manage-
ment.
• Control activities
—Key control activities are not functioning as intended.
—Management’s risks mitigation strategy is not adequately reflected
within control activities.
• Information and communication
—Key metrics are not identified, collected, and communicated.
—Employees’ misunderstanding of their control responsibilities is
pervasive.
—Customer or supplier complaints and disputes are not resolved or
remedial action is not undertaken in a timely manner.
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• Monitoring
—Management has not established a means of determining the quality
of the internal control system over time, either through independent
evaluations or ongoing, structured, and independent process checks.
• Overall
—The ratings of all components should be considered to determine
whether controls provide reasonable assurance that management
objectives will be achieved. Strength in the internal controls of one
component may compensate for a control weakness in another.
The last sentence illustrates some of the compromises that are made
when internal controls are implemented. It was the authors’ contention
that strength in one area could possibly compensate for weakness in
another. Many companies, when implementing procedures such as these,
have to operate knowing that certain controls may be inadequate. CPAs,
who tend to see any control deficiency as a chance for fraud, should try
to understand the cost/benefit analysis that allows companies to operate
with less-than-perfect controls. That said, though, CPAs should not hesi-
tate to bring all observed weaknesses to management’s attention because
such weaknesses may provide what the opening fraudsters need. Then,
by quantifying the fraud potential, the CPA may be able to drive the cost/
benefit analysis to a different conclusion that results in strengthening
of internal controls.
CONCLUSION
COSO brought attention to the nature of financial statement fraud
through its studies, and its findings helped shape the development of a
significant amount of accounting literature. For CPAs, COSO studies
provide a roadmap to help look for fraud.
Internal control failures, which include lack of appropriate ethical
standards set by senior management, were found to be the root cause of
the frauds COSO investigated. The key check and balance that assures
compliance with internal controls is the audit committee. Here, COSO
identified the weaknesses in audit committees so the securities markets
could modify their listing criteria to address those problems. The audit
committee role is indeed critical, and Chapter 8 examines its role in
greater detail.
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CHAPTER 8
THE ROLE OF THE AUDIT
COMMITTEE
The audit committee is at the epicenter of the fight against financial
statement fraud. Answerable to the board of directors and composed of
members of that board, the audit committee sits at the crossroads of
information flow between other key players in the internal control process.
For that reason, in September 1998, the New York Stock Exchange and
the NASDAQ Stock Market sponsored the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (the Blue
Ribbon Committee) to explore operational and regulatory means to
enhance the functions of audit committees. Many of the Blue Ribbon
Committee’s recommendations were implemented (see Chapter 7 for
audit committee member requirements).
CPAs should understand the role of the audit committee in pre-
venting, detecting, and correcting financial statement fraud so that,
should fraud occur as a result of internal control failure, they are in a
position to recommend appropriate corrective action.
KEY PLAYERS IN INTERNAL CONTROL
To appreciate how the audit committee functions, CPAs must understand
the role of other participants in the internal control process. Each partici-
pant operates within prescribed bounds, but those bounds either intersect
or overlap to provide checks and balances. The following discussion is a
simplified illustration of how the various parties interact and portrays
the participants in roles they typically perform.
Financial Management
Members of financial management primarily responsible for the functions
of internal controls include the chief financial officer, the corporate
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controller, and the corporate treasurer, among others. If there is an
internal audit function within a company, the chief audit executive is
certainly another management member responsible for internal controls,
but internal auditors’ duties and responsibilities are operationally differ-
ent from the other listed positions in that internal auditors do not origi-
nate accounting transactions. For that reason, internal auditors comprise
a distinct and separate function within the internal control framework.
The CFO, controller, treasurer, and other financial management
personnel are primarily responsible for preparing financial statements
and the related disclosures. Their role in the control framework is to
implement the policies and procedures established by senior management
(see Chapter 7 for a discussion of the process used to develop those
policies). They are the front line in the battle against financial statement
fraud because they are the ones who propose, approve, and book financial
accounting entries.
Many people perform these functions to maintain separation of
duties, a fundamental internal control concept. Firms implement separa-
tion of duties to cause, as best as possible, a fraudster wishing to alter
accounting data to collude with another person. Collusion raises the risk
of detection because it may force the fraudster to reveal his or her scheme
to others who may not only reject the idea but turn him or her in as
well. If collusion works initially, so accounting data are manipulated, the
conspirators may break ranks with each other at a later point, when
others inquire into questionable transactions. Thus, collusion forces more
than one person to participate in a scheme, and the more schemers
involved, the greater the chance of detection.
Senior Management
Fraudsters can, however, circumvent the internal control protections,
such as separation of duties if policies and procedures are weak or if
there is a corporate climate of lax enforcement of controls. Both policies
and procedures and the control environment are the responsibility of
senior management. Establishing adequate control policies and demon-
strating a commitment to those policies in the day-to-day decisions senior
managers make is a principal component of setting the proper ‘‘tone at
the top.’’
Failure to set a proper tone invites opportunities for senior managers
and others to impose their will on subordinates to violate accounting
rules, though they may rationalize the process by saying they are only
bending the rules or taking advantage of accounting ‘‘gray areas.’’ When
performance pressures arise, as they inevitably do, senior managers
operating in an environment of poor controls may, in turn, exert pressure
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on subordinates to manipulate accounting data. With such weak controls,
the subordinates either go along out of ignorance or believe they have
no alternative.
Internal Auditors
The internal auditors are the onsite verifiers of financial accounting data,
but they cannot be everywhere at once or catch every irregularity. They
provide long-term and continuous monitoring of accounting and other
corporate functions. If the internal auditors adequately identify key areas
of risk, and if corporate management gives them adequate resources,
they can test and evaluate those accounting functions most likely to
experience problems. They must be selective, though, because the internal
audit budget is always limited (as are all corporate resources), and, in
being selective, internal auditors have to be effective in identifying areas
of potential fraud or they may overlook problems entirely.
Audit Committees
If internal auditors or others within a corporation do discover an account-
ing irregularity, though, there must be a mechanism to report the issue
to the appropriate people who will take corrective action. If the suspected
fraudsters are in senior management, that reporting mechanism becomes
critical because the fraud detectors cannot be made to report their findings
to the fraud perpetrators. Here is where the audit committee comes in.
A committee of the board of directors acts under a grant of authority from
that board to receive reports from internal auditors and other company
personnel on suspected financial statement fraud. Upon receiving such
a report, the audit committee is empowered to investigate the issue and
present its finding to the entire board of directors.
Because the audit committee may receive information about mis-
deeds of senior management, the securities markets have limited the
membership of audit committees, in most cases, to outside directors who
have few ties, if any, to senior management. Therefore, the audit commit-
tee, in theory and hopefully in practice, provides a safe refuge for fraud
detectors if senior management is implicated.
The audit committee is also responsible for fulfilling the board’s
obligation to oversee the establishment of adequate financial internal
control policies and procedures. Effectively, the audit committee reviews
and assesses the adequacy of controls that are the responsibility of senior
management to develop. In a sense, the audit committee provides an
objective, second opinion on management’s policies.
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Finally, the audit committee is charged with hiring the outside audi-
tors and communicating with those auditors on important accounting
judgments and internal control issues.
Outside Auditors
Outside auditors perform more functions than just the annual audit. The
Blue Ribbon Committee recommended, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) adopted, rules that require auditor review of interim
quarterly financial statements before filing with the SEC, so an audit
committee should have discussions frequently over the course of the year
relating to accounting issues and controls. In particular, the auditors, in
accordance with Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 61, Commu-
nication With Audit Committees (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,
AU sec. 380.08), as amended, ‘‘should determine that the audit committee
is informed about the process used by management in formulating partic-
ularly sensitive accounting estimates and about the basis for the auditor’s
conclusions regarding the reasonableness of those estimates.’’ Therefore,
the auditors provide an objective opinion on accounting positions taken
by management over the course of the year.
If outside auditors detect fraud by senior management or any fraud
that has a material effect on the financial statements, they are required
under generally accepted auditing standards to report that fraud directly
to the audit committee. If the company is publicly traded (or otherwise
required to make filings with the SEC), then, upon notification of fraud
by the auditors, the audit committee must act decisively and quickly to
force changes by senior management. Section 10A(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides explicit instructions:
2. Response to failure to take remedial action.—If, after
determining that the audit committee of the board of direc-
tors of the issuer, or the board of directors of the issuer in
the absence of an audit committee, is adequately informed
with respect to illegal acts that have been detected or have
otherwise come to the attention of the accountant in the
course of the audit of such accountant, the independent pub-
lic accountant concludes that
A. the illegal act has a material effect on the financial state-
ments of the issuer;
B. the senior management has not taken, and the board of
directors has not caused senior management to take,
timely and appropriate remedial actions with respect to
the illegal act; and
C. the failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected
to warrant departure from a standard report of the audi-
tor, when made, or warrant resignation from the audit
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engagement; the independent public accountant shall,
as soon as practicable, directly report its conclusions to
the board of directors.
3. Notice to commission; response to failure to notify.—An
issuer whose board of directors receives a report under para-
graph (2) shall inform the [Securities and Exchange] Com-
mission by notice not later than 1 business day after the
receipt of such report and shall furnish the independent
public accountant making such report with a copy of the
notice furnished to the Commission. If the independent pub-
lic accountant fails to receive a copy of the notice before
the expiration of the required 1 business day period, the
independent public accountant shall—
A. resign from the engagement; or
B. furnish to the Commission a copy of its report (or the
documentation of any oral report given) not later than
1 business day following such failure to receive notice.
Therefore, if the audit committee fails to act appropriately when
fraud is reported, the outside auditor must notify the audit committee
that, in the auditor’s opinion, the committee and the board have failed
to act. At that point, within one day of receipt of the auditor’s notification,
the audit committee must notify the SEC that it received such a notice,
at which point it is likely that the SEC would begin an investigation of
its own. If the audit committee fails to notify the SEC within the required
time, the next day the outside auditor must inform the SEC.
The provisions of Section 10A, then, place significant responsibilities
upon the audit committee and the outside auditor to take corrective action
in the event material fraud is detected.
PRINCIPAL BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
It is worthwhile for CPAs to know at least some of the key recommenda-
tions of the Blue Ribbon Committee because, even if they have not been
implemented by standard-setters yet, several are on their way to being
implemented as part of the post-Enron reforms, and all serve as guidelines
for the effective functioning of audit committees.
Charter and Reporting Lines
The Blue Ribbon Committee recommended and the stock markets adopted
the requirement that audit committees write and publish their charters.
The committee explained its rationale: ‘‘Just as good boards often adopt
formal guidelines on how they should operate, a good audit committee
should memorialize its understanding of its role, responsibilities, and
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processes in a charter.’’ NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 4350 spells out the
requirements of a charter:
(1) Audit Committee Charter
Each Issuer must certify that it has adopted a formal written
audit committee charter and that the Audit Committee has
reviewed and reassessed the adequacy of the formal written
charter on an annual basis. The charter must specify the fol-
lowing:
(A) the scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities, and
how it carries out those responsibilities, including
structure, processes, and membership requirements;
(B) the audit committee’s responsibility for ensuring its
receipt from the outside auditors of a formal written
statement delineating all relationships between the
auditor and the company, consistent with Indepen-
dence Standards Board Standard 1, and the audit com-
mittee’s responsibility for actively engaging in a
dialogue with the auditor with respect to any disclosed
relationships or services that may impact the objectiv-
ity and independence of the auditor and for taking, or
recommending that the full board take, appropriate
action to oversee the independence of the outside audi-
tor; and
(C) the outside auditor’s ultimate accountability to the
board of directors and the audit committee, as represen-
tatives of shareholders, and these shareholder repre-
sentatives’ ultimate authority and responsibility to
select, evaluate, and, where appropriate, replace the
outside auditor (or to nominate the outside auditor to
be proposed for shareholder approval in any proxy
statement).
Paragraph c implements another Blue Ribbon Committee recommen-
dation, that outside auditors are ultimately accountable to the board and
the audit committee who nominate, hire, and fire the auditor. Thus the
reporting lines are clearly established from the audit committee (or board)
directly to the outside auditor, and, notably, company management is
not in that reporting line. That is not to say that auditors should ignore
or refuse to confer with company management; to the contrary, auditors
should engage in active and frequent discussions with management about
audit execution and findings. However, if outside auditors defer to man-
agement when seeking explanations for potential irregularities without
bringing those irregularities to the attention of the audit committee (or
other appropriate personnel), that behavior infers that management has
indeed moved into the reporting chain where it should not be: between
the audit committee and the outside auditors. Management was kept out
of that chain precisely so it could not filter findings of the auditors before
presenting information to the audit committee.
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With reporting lines come lines of communication. The Blue Ribbon
Committee summed up the objective of an effective flow of information:
The lines of communication and reporting should facilitate
independence from management and encourage the outside
auditors and the internal auditors to speak freely, regularly
and on a confidential basis with the audit committee.
Thus, both outside and internal auditors are brought into the same
line of communication. To effect this line of communication for internal
auditors, at least some part of their reporting requirements should be to
the audit committee as well. The end result should be that internal
auditors cannot be unduly influenced by management evaluations and
therefore resistant to raising accounting and reporting issues with the
audit committee. The CPA, then should observe that the chief audit
executive have frequent and, if necessary, private meetings with the audit
committee. Also, those meetings should occur even if the chief audit
executive has ‘‘nothing to report’’ because it is important that audit com-
mittee members be allowed an opportunity to explore any issues or con-
cerns they may have, and because any system of internal controls can
be improved. Lack of direct contact between internal auditors and the
audit committee over the course of a fiscal year should be a warning flag
that complacency has set in, and with complacency comes the opportunity
for fraud.
Communications Between Auditor and Audit Committee
The discussion to this point has focused on the quantity and direction of
communications between auditors and the audit committee, but the Blue
Ribbon Committee also addressed the quality of those communications
as well. As previously stated, SAS No. 61 required that auditors discuss
with the audit committee the ‘‘process used by management in formulat-
ing particularly sensitive accounting estimates’’ and ‘‘the basis for the
auditor’s conclusions regarding the reasonableness of those estimates.’’
SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316.20 and .22), added
affirmative obligations for the auditor to inquire of management about
whether there was knowledge of fraud or suspected fraud and for the
auditor to make similar inquiries of the audit committee.
The Blue Ribbon Committee went further:
The Committee recommends that Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards (GAAS) require that a company’s outside auditor
discuss with the audit committee the auditor’s judgments about
the quality, not just the acceptability, of the company’s account-
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ing principles as applied in its financial reporting; the discus-
sion should include such issues as the clarity of the company’s
financial disclosures and degree of aggressiveness or conserva-
tism of the company’s accounting principles and underlying
estimates and other significant decisions made by management
in preparing the financial disclosure and reviewed by the out-
side auditors. This requirement should be written in a way to
encourage open, frank discussion and to avoid boilerplate.
The SEC has proposed new regulations that would implement this
suggestion by requiring company management to identify a limited num-
ber, perhaps three to five, of critical accounting policies (CAPs). A CAP
would consist of either an accounting policy that management adopted
when there were other choices or an accounting estimate that was subject
to material changes if there were other, equally valid estimates available.
For each CAP, management would provide a range of alternative account-
ing policies or estimates that the audit committee would review (or state
in the company’s annual filing with the SEC why the audit committee
did not review the CAP). To see how this proposal would work, see the
indirect method example in Chapter 4.
Therefore, if management provides the audit committee with man-
agement’s selection of CAPs, at the very least this starts a dialogue
between the audit committee and management on where the potential
problems are. The audit committee may believe that management’s list
was not large enough or that it glossed over a serious issue, at which
point the committee can send management back to do more analysis. The
end result is that the audit committee is better informed about potential
problem areas and, preferably, that management has been challenged
on its selection and analysis of CAPs. Here, the CPA (who is not the
auditor) may be able to perform a special service as consultant to the
audit committee to help the committee evaluate management’s CAP sub-
missions.
AUDIT COMMITTEE OVERLOAD
After having reviewed the issues relating to audit committees, it is easy
to see that tremendous responsibility rests upon committee members.
While much has been said about the audit committee members’ legal
risks possibly being more than the risks faced by other board members,
the CPA should focus on whether the audit committee is attempting to
do too much without the proper resources. John Olson, who served on a
panel looking into the function of audit committees for the National
Association of Corporate Directors, compiled the following list in 1999 of
audit committee duties:
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Several recent examples of audit committee charters identify
more than twenty separate ‘‘duties’’ frequently assigned to
audit committees. These duties include private meetings with
both the external and internal auditors and a review of:
(i) financial statements and accompanying notes;
(ii) the 10-K Annual Report filed with the SEC;
(iii) quarterly and other private reports filed with the SEC;
(iv) financial press releases;
(v) the external audit plan;
(vi) the internal audit plan;
(vii) staffing and quality of internal audit;
(viii) audit fees;
(ix) non-audit (consulting and other) work and fees of the
external auditors;
(x) codes of conduct;
(xi) the system of internal controls;
(xii) compliance with codes of conduct and internal controls;
(xiii) litigation exposure;
(xiv) risk identification and risk management;
(xv) performance of the chief financial officer, chief account-
ing officer, and head of internal audit;
(xvi) the annual ‘‘management letter’’ (from the outside audi-
tors);
(xvii) expense reports of senior management;
(xviii) management ‘‘conflict of interest’’ transactions with the
corporation; and
(xix) alleged fraudulent actions or violations of law reported
by internal compliance programs or, under the terms
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), by the outside auditor.
Of course, the audit committee is generally charged with select-
ing, or at least recommending, the external auditors, periodi-
cally reviewing their performance, approving their fees and,
where the committee deems appropriate, recommending a
change in auditors.
Given that the list was compiled in 1999, before the implementation
of stock market listing changes brought about by the Blue Ribbon Commit-
tee and before proposed SEC regulations relating to ‘‘critical accounting
policies,’’ the list has since expanded and will most likely continue to
expand. If Olson’s list were contained in a single audit committee charter,
the committee may be spread too thin, and that is a dangerous condition
that CPAs should try to identify.
With knowledge of the proper functions, internal controls, and the
role of the audit committee, the CPA should help the board of directors
remove unnecessary duties from the audit committee charter. For
instance, performance assessments of the financial management should
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be assigned to a compensation committee, if that is a function that the
board wishes to take on; otherwise, senior management can assess all
firm personnel with the possible exception of the chief audit executive,
who should have board-level input. Reviewing expense reports and poten-
tial conflict of interest situations can also be assigned to management or
other board committees. For other functions, the audit committee may
require additional resources (and perhaps its own budget). The audit
committee, for example, should be able to hire consultants to assist its
review of financial reports, internal controls and legal requirements if
the demands of the workload or additional expertise so require.
CONCLUSION
The audit committee occupies a pivotal position in the fight against finan-
cial reporting fraud. The structure proposed by the Blue Ribbon Commit-
tee requires both internal and external auditors to report to the audit
committee. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (discussed in Chapter 1)
mandates, for public companies, that the audit committee approve all
audit services, and private firms would be well-served to follow this
requirement as well. Generally accepted auditing standards require out-
side auditors to both confer with the audit committee and to make inqui-
ries of that committee about actual or potential fraud.
However, one of the most important developments in the prevention
of financial reporting fraud is the audit committee’s review (required
under Sarbanes-Oxley for public companies) of critical accounting poli-
cies. If those policies, and the related accounting estimates, are brought
to the attention of the audit committee, the committee will have a platform
from which to make further inquiry and launch investigations, if neces-
sary. The key issue is whether the audit committee sees all material
policies and estimates. The chapters in Part C of this book will examine
some of the more difficult fraud issues and how the audit committee,
working in concert with internal and outside auditors, can identify those
issues.
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CHAPTER 9
QUANTITATIVE PREDICTORS OF
FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD
Can fraud be predicted from the characteristics of companies that are
the subject of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement
actions? Can fraud be predicted using the financial data of fraudster
companies? The answer according to empirical studies is a qualified ‘‘yes.’’
There appear to be common characteristics among companies that subse-
quently engage in financial statement fraud. If a company has some or
all of those characteristics, though, that does not necessarily mean the
company will commit fraud. The quantitative predictors merely serve to
provide additional warning signs to the CPA in addition to the qualitative
warning signs discussed in the preceding chapters.
COSO RESEARCH
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) funded research in the area of financial reporting frauds and
published it under the title, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997,
An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies (the 1999 Research Report). Chap-
ter 7 covered several key aspects of that research dealing with the nature
of the frauds committed by the survey companies. The 1999 Research
Report had more information that would be of use to CPAs, though.
The 1999 Research Report was compiled from companies that were
the subject of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER
companies) during the years of 1987 through 1997. The financial and
other characteristics of companies that fell into that group, then, would
provide some hints at potential warning signs to look for in other compa-
nies.
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Size
To gain an understanding of the size of the AAER companies, the research-
ers grouped companies by total assets and net income using the financial
statements published immediately before the period when fraud began
according to the SEC (see Table 1).
Table 1. Financial Profile of Sample Companies
(n = 99 companies)
Last Financial Statements Before the Beginning
of Fraud Period
(in 000s)
Net Stockholders’
Income Equity
Assets Revenues (Loss) (Deficit)
Mean $532,766 $232,727 8,573 $86,107
Median $15,681 $13,043 $175 $5,012
Minimum
value $0 $0 ($37,286) ($4,516)
1st quartile $2,598 $1,567 ($448) $1,236
3rd quartile $73,879 $53,442 $2,164 $17,037
Maximum
value $17,880,000 $11,090,000 $329,000 $2,772,000
The data indicate that while most of the companies were rather
small, with 50 percent of the companies having revenues ranging from
$1.6 million to $53.4 million, there were some very large companies in
the sample, with revenues that ranged up to $11 billion. As a result, the
mean size of an AAER company was markedly less than the median size.
Not many companies reported large losses in the last, prefraud
period. The largest net loss was $37 million, but ranking the firms by
net loss and then net income, the 25th firm up the list had a net loss of
only $448,000. Reaching the 50th firm, net income is positive. Therefore,
losses incurred in a single given year are not necessarily an indicator of
or precursor to fraud. However, there was evidence of some companies
trying to protect a positive trend in earnings or reverse a negative trend
(see Chapter 7).
Amount of Misstatements
The quantity of misstatements classified by income or balance sheet item
provides some useful insights (see Table 2).
The mean numbers are larger than the medians because the means
are influenced by the very large companies in the sample, but this leads
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Table 2. Amount of $ Misstatements by Fraud Type
Median
Number of Mean Cumulative Cumulative
Sample Misstatement Misstatement
Misstatement Type Companies (in millions) (in millions)
Asset misstatements 38 $39.4 $4.9
Revenue or gain
misstatements 32 $9.6 $4.4
Net income
misstatements 31 $16.5 $2.3
Pretax income
Misstatements 30 $9.2 $5.4
Misappropriation
of assets 12 $77.5 $2.0
Note: See Table 1 for the typical size of the companies involved.
to some interesting observations. When ranked by means, which reflects
the weighting of larger companies in the sample, asset misstatements
clearly dominate among the financial statement fraud categories (all but
misappropriations of assets). When looking at medians, which reduce the
impact of the very large firms, no one category stands out markedly from
the rest. Therefore, larger companies contributed significantly to the size
of asset misstatements, indicating to CPAs that, when dealing with very
large companies, the balance sheet is a key area of concern.
Stock Market Listing and Industry
AAER companies tended to congregate on the NASDAQ stock market
(see Table 3).
Table 3. Sample Companies’ National Stock Exchange Listing
Number Percentage
National Stock Exchange of Companies of Companies
New York Stock Exchange 20 15%
American Stock Exchange 10 7%
Over-the-counter markets 104 78%
Number of sample companies with
available stock exchange information 134 100%
For that reason, the citations in this book for issues concerning stock
market listing requirements and the composition and charter of audit
committees are to the NASDAQ Marketplace Rules. The researchers did
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not distinguish among the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, but it is likely
that many of the AAER companies were traded on the Bulletin Board,
which during the survey period had few financial and disclosure require-
ments. After the survey period end in 1997, though, NASDAQ took some
important fraud-fighting measures, such as tightened listing require-
ments on all markets, including the Bulletin Board, and opening a Listing
Investigations Group to examine potential fraud in listed companies. A
future tabulation of AAER companies, then, may find the percentage to
be less.
The industry classifications also provide some useful information
(see Table 4).
Table 4. Primary Industries of Sample Companies
Number of Fraud
Companies in Percentage of
Industry Classification Industry Fraud Companies
Computer hardware/software 25 15%
Other manufacturers 25 15%
Financial service providers 23 14%
Healthcare and health products 19 11%
Retailers/wholesalers 14 8%
Other service providers 14 8%
Mining/oil and gas 13 8%
Telecommunication companies 10 6%
Insurance 6 4%
Real estate 5 3%
Miscellaneous 14 8%
Number of sample companies with
available information on industry 168 100%
While almost no industry was immune from financial statement
fraud, the top three industries did stand out from the rest, accounting
among themselves for 44 percent of all AAER companies. Those industries
were computer hardware and software, manufacturers (other than com-
puters), and financial services. The examples in this book draw heavily
from those industries. Certain fraud techniques tend to be associated
with each industry, such as improper revenue recognition with software
developers, asset overvaluation with manufacturers, and hidden debts
with financial services. The healthcare industry also made a strong show-
ing in Table 4 and so should not be overlooked. CPAs, therefore, should
be aware that financial statement fraud did tend to concentrate in certain
industries and they should exercise additional caution when working in
those industries.
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Audit Committees
The 1999 Research Report had some interesting findings on the composi-
tion and operation of audit committees (see Table 5).
Table 5. Audit Committee Profile
Number of Companies
Item With Information Result
Existence of audit
committee 96 75% had audit committee
Number of audit committee
members 71 Mean = 3.0
Type of audit committee
member: 71
Insider Mean = 11%
Gray Mean = 21%
Audit committees with no
insiders 71 69%
Audit committees composed
entirely of outside
directors 71 38%
Number of audit committee Mean = 1.8
meetings per year 66 Median = 1.0
Audit committees meeting
at least twice per year 66 44%
Percentage of audit
committee members with
accounting or finance
expertise 71 Mean = 35%
Audit committee disclosures
provide evidence of an
internal audit function 63 19% mentioned internal
audit function
First, most AAER companies had audit committees, even though
stock market listing requirements did not always require them. Second,
the audit committees were relatively free of insiders, though a good
number had ‘‘gray directors,’’ defined by the researchers as:
Former officers or employees of the company, a subsidiary, or
an affiliate; relatives of management; professional advisors to
the company; officers or owners of significant suppliers or cus-
tomers of the company; interlocking directors; officers or
employees of other companies controlled by the CEO or the
company’s majority owner; owners of an affiliate company;
those who are creditors of the company.
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Nevertheless, 38 percent of audit committees of AAER companies
had no gray or inside directors.
That said, though, the most telling statistic in Table 5 is that the
mean number of audit committee meetings per year was just under two
and the median number was just one. If the number of meetings indicates
the level of involvement of audit committee members, which is a logical
assumption when the number of meetings is so low, one can conclude
that, for the most part, audit committees of AAER companies were for
show only and had no substance. The lesson for the CPA is that, given
the importance of the role and tasks of audit committees, it is very difficult
to see how any committee can fulfill its obligations by meeting only once
or twice per year.
ACADEMIC RESEARCH
Independent research continued after the COSO studies were published
that examined financial statement fraud. One important study published
in 1999, ‘‘The Detection of Earnings Manipulation,’’ was performed by
Messod D. Beneish of Indiana University.1 Beneish asked whether, just
by examining publicly available financial statements, one could predict
financial fraud. Beneish’s study (the Prediction Study) looked for quanti-
tative fraud warning signs by analyzing financial ratios and other data
from companies that were known manipulators and those that were
nonmanipulators. Like the COSO-sponsored studies, Beneish used
AAERs and published reports of restated financials to identify 74 compa-
nies as earnings manipulators from 1987 to 1993. In terms of timeframe
for the companies studied, Beneish’s work paralleled, to some extent, the
1999 Research Report.
Characteristics of Sample and Control Companies
Like the 1999 Research Report, the Prediction Study found that most
manipulators were found in the manufacturing and services industries.
The only industry identified by the 1999 Research Report that did not
have as many manipulating companies in the Prediction Study was the
computer software industry. In total, Beneish identified 74 manipulator
companies and then matched those companies by two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code to data from 2,332 other companies
that presumably were nonmanipulators. For each manipulator company,
he obtained data for the fiscal year immediately before the year the
1 Messod D. Beneish, ‘‘The Detection of Earnings Manipulation,’’ Financial Analysts Journal,
September/October, 1999.
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manipulation occurred (similar to the methodology used in the 1999
Research Report) and compared that company’s data to its nonmanipula-
tor peers’ financial statements for the same period. As with the 1999
Research Report, the Prediction Study reported that, in each manipulator/
nonmanipulator category, there were many small companies and rela-
tively few large companies, with small medians for assets and sales
contrasted with the large mean values. Comparing the two categories of
companies, manipulators were smaller in terms of assets and sales; they
were also less profitable, slightly more leveraged, and growing much
faster than nonmanipulating companies.
When looking at the AAERs and press reports, earnings manipula-
tion typically occurred by recording fictitious revenues or inventory,
unearned or uncertain revenues, or capitalizing costs improperly.
Ratio and Index Analysis
The Prediction Study hypothesized, based on prior academic research,
that earnings manipulation was more likely to occur (1) when companies’
prospects were poor, (2) when cash flows did not match accrued income,
and (3) when management had compensation incentives to manipulate
earnings. This analysis led to eight different financial statement ratios
that were tested on each manipulator company by first looking at the
change in that company’s ratio from the year before manipulation to the
manipulation year. Then the same analysis was run on the nonmanipula-
tors from the same industry and the same period. If a given ratio for the
manipulators was statistically different from those for the nonmanipula-
tors, it was likely that the ratio had some predictive value. In other words,
if a ratio passed this test, a CPA looking at any two successive fiscal
years of financial data for a company could use the ratio to see if
there was a warning sign to indicate that the second year’s data may be
manipulated.
Of the eight ratios, five passed the test as statistically significant. The
following describes each statistically significant ratio. Beneish converted
most of the ratios into indexes to provide more easily applied benchmarks.
For the formulas presented, current-year income statement and balance-
sheet items are indicated with a subscript t and prior year items have a
t - 1 subscript. The change in account balances from one year end to the
next year end is denoted by D.2
2 The formulas were adapted from Messod D. Beneish, ‘‘The Detection of Earnings Manipula-
tion,’’ Financial Analysts Journal, September/October, 1999, p. 27.
page 123 05-15-03 11:48:48
124 Financial Reporting Fraud
Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
Days’ Sales in Receivables Index =
(Accounts Receivable t /Sales t )
(Accounts Receivable t - 1 /Sales t - 1 )
When a company attempts to inflate revenues by booking fictitious
sales, receivables may provide a telltale sign because the fictitious custom-
ers have failed to pay. If receivables spike relative to sales levels, there
is the possibility that some of the sales were fictitious. The days’ sales
in receivables index (DSRI), designed to capture this effect, is the year-
over-year comparison of the annual receivables/sales ratio, with the cur-
rent year’s ratio in the numerator and the prior year’s ratio in the denomi-
nator. Thus the index, like all the other indexes in this study, should be
roughly equal to one if receivables as a percentage of sales do not change
from year to year. If, however, receivables are beginning to become large
in relation to sales and the index jumps to, say, 1.2:1 or more, fraudulent
sales practices may be coming into place. The Predictive Study actually
found that the index for manipulators was close to 1.5:1. The year-over-
year change in days’ sales in receivables was about 3 percent for non-
manipulators but over 46 percent for manipulators. Manipulators showed
an increase of about 42 percent in days’ sales in receivables over the
average change for the nonmanipulator peer group. Of course one should
look for other explanations, such as a more liberal credit policy that could
have resulted in increased receivables, but an exceptionally large increase
in receivables relative to sales might suggest revenue manipulation.
Gross Margin Index
Gross Margin Index =
[(Sales t - 1 - Cost of Sales t - 1 )/Sales t - 1 ]
[(Sales t - Cost of Sales t )/Sales t ]
Companies facing poor earnings prospects have a greater incentive to
manipulate earnings. Based on metrics used in analysts’ reports, Beneish
selected gross margin as a proxy for future profitability. If gross margin
shrinks from one year to the next, future prospects of profitability are
dimming and management may be more inclined to resort to earnings
manipulation, perhaps by booking fictitious revenues or through some
other method. The gross margin index (GMI) is the year-over-year com-
parison of gross margins taken as a ratio, with the most recent year in
the denominator. If the GMI is greater than one, gross margins have
weakened. Statistically, this index was one of the stronger predictors, so
a GMI significantly greater than one is a red flag that financial statement
manipulation may be present. The Predictive Study found that the GMI
for manipulators was about 1.2:1.
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Asset Quality Index
Asset Quality Index =
1 - F(Current Assets t + Net Fixed Assets t )Total Assets t G
1 - F(Current Assets t - 1 + Net Fixed Assets t - 1 )Total Assets t - 1 G
Manipulators may try to hide expenses by capitalizing them as intan-
gible assets (see Chapter 12 for a discussion of these techniques). In the
first year this capitalization occurs, the quality of the assets on the balance
sheet will decline. The Prediction Study defined poor asset quality as the
amount of noncurrent assets, exclusive of property, plant, and equipment
(PP&E), relative to total assets in a given year. The noncurrent assets,
outside of PP&E, then, were assumed to be most subject to manipulation
and would include goodwill, deferred costs, and other intangibles. The
asset quality index (AQI) ratio measures the proportion of the current
year’s percentage of poor-quality noncurrent, non-PP&E assets to the
prior year’s percentage. An AQI greater than one indicates that more
costs may be capitalized in the current year, and thus reported expenses
may be too low. The end result is a warning flag for earnings manipulation.
AQI for manipulators in the study was found to be 1.25:1.
Sales Growth Index
Sales Growth Index = Salest /Salest - 1
Exceptionally strong sales growth from one year to the next may,
by itself, indicate the presence of financial statement fraud in the form
of revenue manipulation. The sales growth index (SGI) is the ratio of
sales for the current year over sales from the previous year, and turns
out to be the strongest indicator of manipulation in the Prediction Study,
with manipulators showing 60 percent one-year growth compared to 10
percent growth for nonmanipulators. Any dramatic increase in the SGI
on the order found in the study, which for manipulators ranged from 34
percent to 58 percent, should alert the CPA to possible problems.
Total Accruals to Total Assets
Total Accruals to Total Assets
=
DWorking Capital t - DCash t
- DCurrent Taxes Payable t - DCurrent portion of LTD t
- DAccumulated depreciation and amortization t
Total Assets t
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A firm running short of cash may also be motivated to engage in
balance sheet manipulation to secure additional sources of capital. To
identify cash trends, Beneish looked at changes in working capital and
reasoned that a firm running low on cash would see the composition of
its working capital shift away from cash to receivables and inventory.
He then devised the total accruals to total assets (TATA) measure (which
was not an index) to assess the amount of working capital net of cash
relative to total assets. In other words, a firm with a lot of cash will have
a lower TATA compared to a firm with a little cash. To make TATA
less subject to fluctuation from company to company, he deducted from
working capital the change in current maturities in long-term debt and
income taxes payable. He then deducted the change in accumulated depre-
ciation and amortization balances as a proxy for capital expenditures. A
firm running short of cash, then, will have a higher TATA measure. The
study found that TATA for nonmanipulators was .018; the measure for
manipulators was .031, or about 72 percent higher. A TATA measure in
excess of .03, then, would be an indicator of a potential fraud motive
arising from cash shortages. In addition, the TATA measure, which
reflects noncash working capital to total assets, probably picks up the
increases in receivables that typically accompany revenue manipulation.
These characteristic measures provide a quick and easy means of
detecting the possibility of financial statement fraud. They are indicators
and do not by themselves prove fraud. However, CPAs may want to
consider including these characteristic measures in their financial state-
ment analyses. Also, as an element of internal control, an internal auditor
or controller could apply these measures when reviewing financial infor-
mation, especially data from subsidiaries and divisions. An increase in
any of the characteristic measures in this magnitude should trigger addi-
tional inquiries. Such inquiries may very well head off an incipient fraudu-
lent scheme.
Application of Predictive Measures
The following example demonstrates how the characteristic measures
can indicate the potential for fraud and how those measures interrelate
with one another. The facts and data are simplified to allow the reader
to follow the characteristic measure calculations.
Example Scenario. Medical Products Specialties (MPS) is a whole-
saler and distributor of pharmaceutical products. Its customers include
major drug store chains and independent drug stores. It provides both
prescription and over-the-counter products. Early in the previous fiscal
year, MPS was acquired by Great Drug Co., a major pharmaceutical
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manufacturer, in a purchase transaction for a price that many consid-
ered to be high relative to MPS historical earnings.
As a result of the high price paid, MPS management was under
pressure from Great Drug to at least maintain, if not grow, it earnings.
A decline in earnings so soon after the acquisition, while not very
significant to Great Drug overall, would make Great Drug senior man-
agement look bad.
The once-lucrative prescription drug market had changed mark-
edly over the last few years as insurers changed their formularies to
favor lower cost generic drugs. Thus, margins were dropping as more
generics were prescribed. On the other hand, though, the ability of
health care providers to substitute drug treatment regimens for more
expensive procedures, such as surgery, meant that prescription drug
sales were increasing. The MPS unit, in its monthly reports to Great
Drug senior management, reported that these trends continued
throughout the year, causing MPS sales to increase significantly while
its gross margin declined. With that explanation, Great Drug senior
management was content with MPS’s performance, as long as earnings
did not decline.
MPS closed its books on the current year in preparation for the
year-end audit. The current year was MPS’s second fiscal year as a
subsidiary of Great Drug. As part of the closing process, Great Drug’s
internal audit department received preliminary MPS income state-
ments and balance sheets for the prior year and current year just ended
(see Table 6).
Table 6. MPS Income Statements and Balance Sheets
Year 1 Year 2
(in (in
Income Statements thousands) thousands)
Sales 1,000 1,500
Cost of goods sold 600 1,200
Gross profit 400 300
Selling, general, and
administrative expenses 300 200
Net income before taxes 100 100
Balance Sheets, as of the last day of Year 1 Year 2
Cash 400 200
Receivables 300 700
Inventory 300 500
Plant, property, and equipment 2,000 2,100
(continued )
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Balance Sheets, as of the last day of Year 1 Year 2
Less: accumulated depreciation (1,200) (1,300)
Intangibles 500 800
Total assets 2,300 3,000
Current payables 200 400
Long-term debt (all non-current) 600 1,000
Equity 1,500 1,600
Total liabilities and equity 2,300 3,000
While MPS was not considered an important profit center by Great
Drug management and did not get much attention, the chief audit
executive (CAE) became interested in the subsidiary when she observed
sales increasing dramatically without any increase in pre-tax profit.
She knew sales of generics were increasing, but she was not aware of
any expansion of the sales staff or channels of distribution that would
readily explain such a large increase in sales. The CAE then asked
one of her staff members to prepare an analysis of predictive ratios to
see if warning flags emerged.
The results of the staff analysis are as follows:
DSRI = (700/1,500)/(300/1,000) = 1.56
GMI = [(1,000 - 600)/1,000]/[(1,500 - 1,200)/1,500] = 2.00
AQI =
{1 - [(200 + 700 + 500 + 2,100 - 1,300)/3,000]}
{1 - [(400 + 300 + 300 + 2,000 - 1,200)/2,300]}
= 1.23
SGI = 1,500/1,000 = 1.5
DWorking capital = (200 + 700 + 500 - 400)
- (400 + 300 + 300 - 200)
= 200
D(Cash = (200 - 400) = - 200
DAccm depreciation = 1,300 - 1,200 = 100
Current maturities of LTD and income taxes payable are assumed to
be zero.
TATA = [200 - (- 200) - 100]/3,000 = 0.10
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Comparison to peer group benchmarks:
Characteristic MPS Peer group % over peers
DSRI 1.56 1.03 51%
GMI 2.00 1.10 82%
AQI 1.23 1.04 18%
SGI 1.50 1.20 25%
TATA 0.10 0.05 100%
Based on the analysis, the CAE drew the following conclusions:
• MPS’s significant sales growth could not be justified by the switch
to generics alone; it was well ahead of the peer group that would
presumably experience the same effect in their reported sales. Peer
group sales did increase by 20 percent, but MPS was well ahead of
that benchmark, with 50 percent growth. The CAE had to acknowl-
edge the SGI was a red flag.
• In a similar analysis, the CAE concluded that the decline in gross
margin at MPS was out of line with the rest of the industry. Yes,
the peer group experienced some deterioration in margins, but not
to the extent of MPS, which had a GMI that was 82 percent greater
than its peers. The GMI suggested that MPS was not as profitable
as in the past, and so the CAE was suspicious about how it could
maintain its pretax profit.
• The CAE noted that the DSRI was well over peer group levels, as
well. Receivables growth accompanied by large sales growth were
indicators of possible fictitious sales, so the CAE then looked at a
recent receivables run for additional insight. The accounts receivable
by customer file showed that a large number of new accounts were
opened in the last few months of Year 2 and had yet to pay. Inflated
sales could be one explanation for how profits were maintained.
• Looking further, the CAE observed that the total accruals to total
assets measure was significantly high, confirming her preliminary
belief that some sales may be fictitious because MPS was running
low on cash. Using the increase in receivables as a reason, MPS
requested and received from Great Drug an additional $400,000 in
interest-only loans to MPS over the course of Year 2. The question
that ran through the CAE’s mind was, Where did the money go?
She saw $200,000 probably provided for increased inventory, but
that left another $200,000 unaccounted for.
• The CAE got her answer when she looked at the AQI. The AQI is
generally rather stable for wholesalers because intangibles and other
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noncurrent assets rarely fluctuate significantly. Here, MPS’s change
in noncurrent assets was 18 percent over the peer group change,
and that index caused the CAE to examine the large change in
intangibles—an increase of $300,000 over Year 2. Her investigation
later revealed that $100,000 of sales expenses had been capitalized
because, according to the MPS controller, the expenses were incurred
as part of a major marketing push for certain pharmaceutical prod-
ucts and should have ‘‘long-term impact’’ on future sales. Because
this marketing effort was performed with existing personnel, the
effect of the capitalization was to shift $100,000 from selling, general,
and administrative expenses to the balance sheet. The CAE then
noted that the shift helped MPS make up for a $100,000 decline in
gross profit and thereby maintain its pretax profit.
• There was more to the intangible assets analysis, though. Spending
$200,000 of cash from Great Drug’s loan, MPS had purchased a
series of prospective customer lists through various sources, several
the CAE had never seen before. When her staff investigated the list
purchases, they found that the firms that sold the lists were owned
by senior members of MPS management.
Example Analysis. The characteristic measures were not proof in
themselves that MPS had committed fraud, but they did prove to be
good indicators. Analysis of the indicators helped direct the CAE to
certain areas of the financial statements that, in turn, led to further
investigation, such as looking more closely at accounts receivable and
intangibles. The characteristic measures also interrelate with each
other: For example, the SGI and the DSRI, when giving the same
signal, add weight to the possibility of revenue manipulation.
CONCLUSION
COSO and academic research can provide useful guidelines for internal
and external auditors, as well as forensic accountants, in helping priori-
tize areas of investigation. Rarely does the CPA receive funds to allow
examination of every financial statement account. Indeed, generally
accepted auditing standards require the auditor to assess at an early
stage the probability of financial statement fraud to perform the audit
efficiently and effectively.
Furthermore, the analytical procedures described in this chapter can
guide outside auditors in the additional procedures required in Statement
on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Finan-
cial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
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316), when there are specifically identified risks of material misstatement
due to fraud. SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.52) states that the nature, timing,
and extent of procedures may need to be changed if there are specific
risks. An increase in SGI that is out of line with peer companies, then,
may indicate that the nature of evidential matter collected may change
to include more independent sources to verify the existence of customers.
Similarly, an increase in DSRI may suggest a shift in the timing of
receivables testing to the end of the period. An increase in TATA, for
example, may point to an increase in the extent of testing performed on
intangible assets. Analytical procedures have long been a part of the
audit process, but with empirical evidence providing certain indicators,
auditors now have better tools that will allow them to fulfill their SAS
No. 99 responsibilities.
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CHAPTER 10
LOSS CONTINGENCIES AND ASSET
IMPAIRMENTS
Fraud related to loss contingencies and asset impairments tends to follow
the same formula: Ignore the issue and cover it up if necessary. Generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require recognition to warn finan-
cial statement readers that there may be problems ahead; fraudsters
want to keep those problems out of sight. Disclosure of a problem poses
difficulties for management in that:
1. Investors and analysts may begin to adjust downward their expecta-
tions of future cash flows due to the problem, thus reducing the firm’s
share price.
2. Lenders may become nervous if they detect a material adverse change
in the firm’s financial position (or if there is an outright breach of a
lending covenant that sets minimum asset or equity values) and call
their loans.
3. Management may lose its performance-linked incentive compensation
(or perhaps even face employment terminations).
For these reasons, loss contingencies and asset impairments tend to
be swept under the carpet with management thinking that, if they can
be kept out of sight, they can be kept off the financial statements. As
such, the CPA faces some especially difficult challenges in detecting these
irregularities, but there are some useful warning signs that may appear
and lead the CPA to an unrecorded liability.
LOSS CONTINGENCIES
A loss contingency is defined in Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting
for Contingencies, as:
135
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An existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involv-
ing uncertainty as to possible . . . loss . . . to an enterprise that
will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events
occur or fail to occur. (footnote omitted)1
FASB Statement No. 5 adds that the ‘‘[r]esolution of the uncertainty
may confirm . . . the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence of
a liability.’’ In a financial statement fraud context, though, the resolution
of a material and probable uncertainty that was known to management
beforehand should generally not be the first time readers of the financial
statements learn of the uncertainty.
FASB Statement No. 5 lists examples of loss contingencies, which
include the following:
• Collectibility of receivables
• Obligations related to product warranties and product defects
• Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property
• Threat of expropriation of assets
• Pending or threatened litigation
• Actual or possible claims and assessments
• Guarantees of indebtedness of others
• Agreements to repurchase receivables (or repurchase related property)
that have been sold
A firm is required to accrue a loss contingency when that contingency
is both probable and able to be estimated. FASB Statement No. 5 states
the following:
An estimated loss from a loss contingency . . . shall be accrued
by a charge to income if both of the following conditions are
met:
a. Information available prior to issuance of the financial state-
ments indicates that it is probable that an asset had been
impaired or a liability had been incurred at the date of the
financial statements. It is implicit in this condition that it
must be probable that one or more future events will occur
confirming the fact of the loss.
b. The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.2
A future event is probable if it is ‘‘likely to occur.’’ The following
discussion principally focuses on failure to accrue a probable loss contin-
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (FASB, Original Pronouncements, vol. 1, FAS5),
paragraph 1.
2 FASB Statement No. 5, paragraph 8.
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gency. However, violations of GAAP (and securities laws if the company
files with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)) may occur if
the firm has a reasonably possible loss contingency, according to FASB
Statement No. 5, but fails to make the required disclosure of that contin-
gency in its financial statements. FASB Statement No. 5 states that a
contingency is reasonably possible if the ‘‘chance of the future event or
events occurring is more than remote but less than likely.’’
Having set the ground rules, it is worthwhile to examine some specific
examples in the following sections to see how CPAs can detect fraud
related to loss contingencies. The discussion focuses on warranty and
product claims because the issues surrounding those claims are complex
and occur with ever-greater frequency. Collectibility of receivables, which
is another major loss contingency that may give rise to fraudulent finan-
cial statements, is discussed in the example scenario in Chapter 2.
Warranty and Product Claims Reserves
If a manufacturer experiences postproduction problems with a certain
product, it may begin to experience higher-than-expected returns or, more
likely, claims for reimbursement or repair. Those claims may arise under
a specific warranty, under product tort law, or under consumer protection
laws and regulations. At that point, the manufacturer must assess its
overall cost exposure. It might be possible to estimate the extent of future
claims as a percentage of production based on past experience with other
products subject to similar problems. It might also be possible to estimate
the cost of each claim, meaning the cost of replacement or repair for each
defective unit of product. If both an estimate of future claims and the
cost of each claim are available, the amount of loss can be reasonably
estimated. FASB Statement No. 5 would require the booking of a loss
contingency if the future claims were likely to occur. If, however, the
manufacturer is already seeing large numbers of claims before or soon
after the close of its financial reporting period, it would be reasonable to
assume that the likelihood of future claims is high and that a FASB
Statement No. 5 reserve should be accrued with a charge to current
earnings. Actually, FASB Statement No. 5 requires the assessment of
contingencies arising from ‘‘information available prior to issuance of the
financial statements’’ (emphasis added). Therefore, if claims relating to
a prior period come to the attention of management during the prepara-
tion of financial statements for that prior period, management should
consider booking a contingency as of the end of that period.
However, a manufacturer under pressure to achieve increased earn-
ings may be very reluctant to accrue a warranty or product claims loss
contingency. Management may take the position that the problem does
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not exist or cannot be quantified. An alert CPA, however, may detect
certain red flags that indicate a problem does indeed exist and that its
extent can be estimated. The red flags that indicate the existence of a
contingency include the following:
1. The incidence of claims before the issuance of financial statements
(previously discussed)
2. Discussions with (and bills from) outside legal counsel
3. Internal correspondence within production and research staffs about
the need to address a critical problem with a product already on the
market
4. Internal correspondence among department heads of production,
research and development (R&D), general counsel, and senior man-
agement about postproduction problems and product claims
5. External correspondence between the manufacturer and its customers
about a given product concerning special price concessions or special
return privileges
6. The incidence of special or overbudget freight charges to accommodate
returns and/or the shipment of replacement product
7. Shifting of production schedules to manufacture replacement product
8. Halt to manufacturing of the product in question
9. Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research projects to applica-
tions engineering relating to redesign of existing products
10. Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts to customers
on a regular basis over a period of weeks or months that indicate
some arrangement to compensate for product defects
Many of the flags in this list come from areas outside the accounting
department, such as production, R&D, legal, and sales. The key, then,
to detection of a warranty loss contingency, or any other contingency for
that matter, is for the CPA to take a firm-wide perspective and probe into
departments that typically do not have much contact with accountants.
Once the existence of a loss contingency or the likelihood that it will
occur has been established, the next step is to determine whether the
potential loss can be quantified. In this case, if the firm itself does not
have actual experience with product claims or if that experience is not
relevant to the product in question, the CPA should look outside the firm.
Industry statistics on product liability and the incidence of claims may be
available from trade associations, government regulators, or independent
research organizations. In the course of examining internal correspon-
dence between department heads and within departments, however, the
CPA will likely find some internal estimates of the extent of the problem.
This becomes especially obvious if the correspondents are attempting to
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justify the allocation of additional staff and financial resources to combat
the problem or to explain why production was shifted or halted. In short,
the members of management not directly involved in manipulating the
financial statements may speak quite frankly about the loss contingency.
Estimation Issues
Estimating a loss contingency is rarely easy and is subject to manipula-
tion. The following example, taken from an SEC rule proposal,3 illustrates
the complexities involved.
Example Scenario. Alphabetical Company manufactures and distrib-
utes electrical equipment used in large-scale commercial pumping and
water treatment facilities. The company’s equipment carries standard
product warranties extending over a period of 6 to 10 years. If equip-
ment covered under the standard warranty requires repair, the com-
pany provides labor and replacement parts to the customer at no cost.
Historically, the costs of fulfilling warranty obligations have principally
related to providing replacement parts, with labor costs representing
the remainder. Over the past three years, the cost of copper included
in replacement parts constituted approximately 35 percent to 40 per-
cent of the total cost of warranty obligations.
Alphabetical’s accounting policies accrue a liability for the expected
cost of warranty-related claims when equipment is sold. The amount
of the warranty liability accrued reflects the company’s estimate of the
expected future costs of honoring its obligations under the warranty
plan. Because of the long-term nature of the company’s equipment
warranties, estimating the expected cost of such warranties requires
significant judgment. Alphabetical’s chief financial officer oversees the
estimation process performed by Alphabetical’s finance group every
calendar quarter. Alphabetical is able to hedge its exposure to copper
price movements in the commodities markets for a period of up to five
years; beyond that point, Alphabetical is exposed to price risk for the
remainder of the warranty period. Also, throughout the warranty
period, Alphabetical is exposed to the risk that it may need to acquire
3 This example is expanded from examples contained in Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Releases No. 33-8098 and No. 34-45907, Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and
Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies to illustrate certain aspects
of financial reporting fraud. Additional assumptions are added to the SEC examples. Subse-
quently, the SEC-recommended disclosures to the audit committee are presented to illus-
trate how those disclosures would have increased the likelihood of fraud detection. The
examples, as shown, reflect the opinions of the author and not the SEC. The reader is
encouraged to read the SEC releases, which are included as an appendix to this book.
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more copper in a given year than forecast, thus exceeding the quantity
that may be hedged in that year and forcing Alphabetical to buy copper
in the cash market for whatever the going price may be. In each of
the last three years, warranty expense represented approximately 19
percent to 22 percent of cost of sales, and 35 percent to 40 percent of
that warranty expense represented the cost of copper used in replace-
ment parts.
The forecasting model used by the finance group to estimate the
company’s exposure to copper price movements 6 to 10 years out used
data from historical commodities prices looking back 10 years and data
from the commodities futures market. Historically, the price of copper
has been quite volatile. Eight years ago, the price increased by 72
percent in one year; last year, the price declined by 19 percent. Changes
of that magnitude had a material impact on Alphabetical’s warranty
costs and cost of sales.
With a recent improvement in the economy, sales were increasing
in the current year, but so was the price of copper, as well. As Alphabeti-
cal prepared to enter the final quarter of its fiscal year, the chief
financial officer (CFO) was concerned that the rising cash market price
for copper had already begun to affect the futures market prices, which
were an important component of the forecasting model. In the last
month alone, the futures prices for copper had jumped by about 7
percent for all delivery dates. An increase in warranty costs as a per-
centage of sales would affect the gross margin, and the CFO knew that
securities analysts watched that margin carefully as a sign of future
profitability. The CFO had hoped the recent increase in sales would
provide enough support for key analysts to upgrade Alphabetical’s
stock, which many analysts had at a lackluster ‘‘hold’’ rating. Alphabeti-
cal needed to retire some high interest rate debt, and the CFO wanted
to float a secondary offering of stock to pay down the debt. The CFO
believed an increase in analysts’ ratings would increase the price of
shares already outstanding as well as of the new shares to be sold
through the secondary offering. A rise in warranty costs relative to
sales, though, would likely kill any chance of an upgrade from analysts,
making any secondary offering more expensive in terms of the number
of shares Alphabetical would need to offer to raise the needed capital.
In addition, the CFO and other members of senior management
wished to exercise and sell some of their vested company stock options
that had languished for over three years because Alphabetical’s stock
price had not moved much from the time the options were issued (the
options’ exercise price was set at the market price at time of issue).
Finally, with the increase on Alphabetical’s sales, senior management
believed they would soon have their chance to cash in the options at
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a profit if the stock price would increase. The chief executive officer
(CEO) had spoken with the CFO on several occasions about ‘‘finally
getting the stock price we deserve’’ so that, by exercising the options,
‘‘we can finally get the compensation we deserve.’’ The CEO emphasized
to the CFO that ‘‘we’re all counting on you’’ to convince the analysts
to upgrade their ratings.
The copper price forecast had a dramatic impact on warranty costs
because even a small increase in price affected all warranty work
performed 6 to 10 years out. The rapid rise in futures prices recently
signaled that, by the end of the fourth quarter, just as analysts would
be reassessing their ratings on Alphabetical stock, the copper pricing
model would show a significant increase. The CFO, then, believed he
needed to modify the model to ‘‘compensate’’ for the increase likely to
come from rising futures prices. He instructed the finance group to run
another version of the model using historical data for only five years
instead of the 10-year look-back currently used in the model. By trun-
cating historical data at five years, the CFO knew the model would
not pick up the 72 percent price increase of eight years ago. When the
finance group reported the results of the modified model, the truncated
historical data produced enough of a downward estimate to counter
the upward estimate from the futures market data. The end result was
no change in the copper price estimate for 6 to 10 years out, and,
therefore, no need to increase the warranty cost as a percentage of
sales.
By the end of the fourth quarter, the modified model performed
to the CFO’s expectations and warranty costs came in at a tolerable
40 percent of cost of sales for the year. The auditors, who never spent
much time analyzing the model and viewed it as a ‘‘black box’’ that
was hopelessly difficult to understand, did not note any exception to
the change in historical data used. When the CFO saw that he ‘‘got
this past the auditors,’’ he decided he would not even ‘‘bother’’ with
making any disclosure in the footnotes to the financial statements.
Soon after Alphabetical announced its fiscal year results, the CFO
received phone calls from two analysts saying that they were upgrading
their ratings, and the stock price moved accordingly.
Example Analysis. The auditors did not call on the CFO to defend
this change in his modeling methodology, but if they had, the CFO
would have probably claimed he simply made a change in accounting
estimate that does not need to be disclosed. Indeed, GAAP would give
him some support. Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 20,
Accounting Changes, states:
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10. Changes in estimates used in accounting are necessary
consequences of periodic presentations of financial state-
ments. Preparing financial statements requires estimating
the effects of future events. Examples of items for which
estimates are necessary are uncollectible receivables, inven-
tory obsolescence, service lives and salvage values of depre-
ciable assets, warranty costs, periods benefited by a deferred
cost, and recoverable mineral reserves. Future events and
their effects cannot be perceived with certainty; estimating,
therefore, requires the exercise of judgment. Thus account-
ing estimates change as new events occur, as more experi-
ence is acquired, or as additional information is obtained.
The change in methodology for warranty costs, then, could fall
under this definition. As to footnote disclosure, APB Opinion No. 20
states:
33. Disclosure. The effect on income before extraordinary
items, net income and related per share amounts of the cur-
rent period should be disclosed for a change in estimate that
affects several future periods, such as a change in service
lives of depreciable assets or actuarial assumptions affecting
pension costs. Disclosure of the effect on those income state-
ment amounts is not necessary for estimates made each
period in the ordinary course of accounting for items such
as uncollectible accounts or inventory obsolescence; however,
disclosure is recommended if the effect of a change in the
estimate is material.
One could argue that the warranty cost estimates affect several
future periods and thus need to be disclosed. The debit to warranty
cost each period credits or adds to a loss contingency reserve on the
balance sheet. That reserve is then debited as actual warranty work
is performed in future periods. However, an allowance for doubtful
accounts works essentially the same way and yet is considered by APB
Opinion No. 20 to be made ‘‘each period in the ordinary course of
accounting,’’ which does not require disclosure, though disclosure is
recommended if the item is material. Again, the CFO has a defensible
argument on this point as well because disclosure would just be recom-
mended and not required under APB Opinion No. 20.
The CFO, though, may violate GAAP when he files Alphabetical’s
financial statements with the SEC. The filing requirements for year-
end statements filed with the SEC on Form 10-K set a minimum of
three years of comparative income statements and two years of balance
sheets ending with the filing year. Accompanying the current year
income statement, then, will be income statements for at least the
previous two years. Then, when comparative financial statements are
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presented to be comparable, according to Accounting Research Bulletin
(ARB) No. 43, Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulle-
tins, any exceptions to comparability must be clearly disclosed. There-
fore, the change in accounting estimate for calculating warranty costs
would need to be disclosed if it is deemed material. That said, however,
APB Opinion No. 20 amended ARB 43 to defer to the APB in matters
involving ‘‘accounting changes,’’ so the CFO still has an argument if
he can bring the discussion back to APB 20. Therefore, the issue of
whether an undisclosed change in estimation methodology violates
GAAP is very much open to debate.
From the perspective of securities fraud, though, the provisions
of Rule 10b-5 are clearer. In this tightly constructed scenario, the
analysts’ opinions would have likely changed if they saw warranty
costs increasing relative to sales because analysts tracked Alphabeti-
cal’s gross margin closely. Warranty costs, in turn, were very sensitive
to changes in the estimate of future copper prices. Therefore, a change
in the method of calculating those future prices very likely would be
information that analysts would need to know to be sure that the gross
margin from the current year was comparable to prior years’ margins.
Recall from Chapter 1 that Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . .
(b) . . . to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading. . . .
Thus, the omitted disclosure of the change in estimation methodol-
ogy may rise to the level of a Rule 10b-5 violation under these facts as
presented in this example because the omission led analysts to think
gross margins were consistently presented with prior years’ margins
and comparable. Also, in light of the pending secondary offering of
stock, the strict liability provisions of Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933 may apply, and so the stakes are raised: If there is securities
fraud, the purchasers of new stock may be able to recover the amount
of any market price correction without having to prove how much of that
correction was due to the fraudulent misrepresentation. In addition,
existing shareholders could sue under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 provisions, and with management selling stock acquired through
option exercises, there could be adequate motive to plead a case. How-
ever, in real-life situations, the facts are rarely so clear.
Of course, the auditors should test the adequacy of the warranty
loss contingency and review management’s methodology in the process
of examining the warranty accounts. Indeed, generally accepted
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auditing standards (GAAS) guidance relating to consideration of fraud
in audit planning (see Chapter 1) tells auditors to focus on revenues
and expenses based on significant estimates that involve unusually
subjective judgments or uncertainties. Clearly, the copper estimates
contained in the warranty cost would qualify.
The SEC has proposed rule changes that would address issues
with ‘‘critical accounting estimates’’ such as the above (see Chapter 8).
The proposals would require management to identify key estimates
and present an explanation of the range of possibilities along with a
discussion of the possible impact on financial statements and company
operations. The critical accounting estimates would then be disclosed
in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of SEC
filings. For Alphabetical, the SEC proposed disclosure reads as follows:
Alphabetical’s products are covered by standard prod-
uct warranty plans that extend 6 to 10 years. A liability for
the expected cost of warranty-related claims is established
when equipment is sold. The amount of the warranty liability
accrued reflects our estimate of the expected future costs of
honoring our obligations under the warranty plan. We
believe the accounting estimate related to warranty costs is
a ‘‘critical accounting estimate’’ because: changes in it can
materially affect net income, it requires us to forecast copper
prices in the distant future which are highly uncertain and
require a large degree of judgment, and copper is a significant
raw material in the replacement parts used in warranty
repairs. . . .
Historically, the costs of fulfilling our warranty obliga-
tions have principally related to replacement parts, with
labor costs representing the remainder. Over the past 3
years, the cost of copper included in our parts constituted
approximately 35% to 40% of the total cost of warranty
repairs. Over that same period, warranty expense repre-
sented approximately 19% to 22% of cost of sales.
Over the past 10 years, the price of copper has exhibited
significant volatility. For example, during 1994, the price of
copper rose by approximately 72%, while in 2001 the price
decreased by approximately 19%. Our hedging programs pro-
vide adequate protection against short-term volatility in cop-
per prices, . . . but our hedging does not extend beyond 5
years. Accordingly, our management must make assump-
tions about the cost of that raw material in periods 6 to 10
years in the future. Management forecasts the price of copper
for the portion of our estimated copper requirements not
covered by hedging. . . .
Each quarter, we reevaluate our estimate of warranty
obligations, including our assumptions about the cost of
copper. . . .
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If, for the unhedged portion of our estimated copper
requirements, we were to decrease our estimate of copper
prices as of [the end of the current year] by 30%, our accrued
warranty costs and cost of sales would have been reduced
by approximately $27 million or 6% and 4%, respectively,
while operating income would have increased by 9%. If we
were to increase our estimate as of [the end of the current
year] by 50%, our accrued warranty costs and cost of sales
would have been increased by approximately $45 million or
10% and 7%, respectively, while our operating income would
have been reduced by 23%.
A very significant increase in our estimated warranty
obligation, such as one reflecting the increase in copper prices
that occurred [eight years ago], could lower our earnings and
increase our leverage ratio (leverage refers to the degree to
which a company utilizes borrowed funds). That, in turn,
could limit our ability to borrow money through our revolving
credit facilities. . . .
Our management has discussed the development and
selection of this critical accounting estimate with the audit
committee of our board of directors and the audit committee
has reviewed the company’s disclosure relating to it in this
MD&A.
This disclosure clearly sets out the impact on earnings when a
volatile component, such as copper prices, changes. Readers of financial
statements can then better assess the risks involved and value the
firm or its stock accordingly.
The process of drafting this disclosure would involve the audit
committee, as well as outside auditors, in the review of the methodology
used to forecast copper prices. With the audit committee tasked to
review these critical accounting estimates, then, it would be more likely
that (1) the change in methodology would be uncovered and (2) the
rationale for the change would be questioned. While this disclosure
would not be mandatory for private companies, providing similar disclo-
sure, if only to the audit committee, would be a valuable addition to
standard financial statement disclosures.
ASSET IMPAIRMENTS
An asset is not always worth its balance-sheet carrying value. Even if
an appropriate depreciation schedule is established when the asset is
acquired, over time the needs of the business enterprise may change.
Because of rapid changes in engineering and materials applications, for
example, manufacturing processes may need to be updated to remain
economically competitive. The machinery used in the old processes may
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become obsolete well before the machines themselves actually wear out
and are depreciated down to salvage value. Similarly, changes in customer
demand may force a manufacturer to discontinue a certain product line
and render useless equipment specially designed to build that product.
Firms operating in highly competitive markets may lose business to a
low-cost competitor and be forced to idle production lines. Occasionally,
to obtain or retain a customer relationship, a firm may even deliberately
quote a price for its products that does not cover the cost of acquiring
and operating the equipment used to produce those products. In all these
cases, management should assess whether the equipment carrying value
is impaired, especially if there are no reasonable prospects of finding an
alternative use for the equipment. In the event an impairment loss should
be taken, however, management may fraudulently postpone that charge
if it causes earnings to fall below a managed earnings target.
To detect this fraud, the CPA must be particularly adept at seeing
through management’s pretensions to get to the facts. The best place to
begin is to review fixed assets with divisional or production personnel.
FASB Statement No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of
Long-Lived Assets, provides the following list of possible events that may
give rise to an impairment of a single asset or a group of assets:
a. A significant decrease in the market price of a long-lived
asset (asset group)
b. A significant adverse change in the extent or manner in
which a long-lived asset (asset group) is being used or in its
physical condition
c. A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the busi-
ness climate that could affect the value of a long-lived asset
(asset group), including an adverse action or assessment by
a regulator
d. An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the
amount originally expected for the acquisition or construc-
tion of a long-lived asset (asset group)
e. A current-period operating or cash flow loss combined with
a history of operating or cash flow losses or a projection or
forecast that demonstrates continuing losses associated with
the use of a long-lived asset (asset group)
f. A current expectation that, more likely than not, a long-
lived asset (asset group) will be sold or otherwise disposed
of significantly before the end of its previously estimated
useful life.4
4 FASB Statement No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets
(FASB, Original Pronouncements, vol. 2, FAS144), paragraph 8.
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The CPA may wish to draw questions for firm personnel from this
list and look for evidence of changes in production and product demand
to determine whether an asset is impaired.
Clearly, if equipment has been moved off the shop floor into storage,
and there are no plans for future use of that equipment, an impairment
loss is highly likely. The more difficult issues arise if equipment is still
in use but profitability is less certain. Profitability is at issue because
assets may be impaired if they are not recoverable. FASB Statement No.
144 states that the ‘‘carrying amount of a long-lived asset (asset group)
is not recoverable if it exceeds the sum of the undiscounted cash flows
expected to result from the use and eventual disposition of the asset
(asset group).’’ Therefore, the CPA must ascertain the projected net cash
flows for a given asset, or for an asset group if it is not possible to forecast
cash flows for a single asset. Under FASB Statement No. 144, the cash
flow projections generally must extend to the end of an asset’s estimated
useful life (which is presumably the remaining depreciable life of the
asset). If the asset is not recoverable, the firm may need to recognize an
impairment charge if the fair value of that asset is less than the carrying
value. Fair value is frequently determined by using the forecast cash
flows and discounting those cash flows by an appropriate discount rate,
so if an asset fails the recoverability test using undiscounted cash flows,
it has to trigger an impairment charge if discounted cash flows are used
to calculate fair value. For that reason, fraudsters desiring to maintain
the inflated value of assets on the balance sheet will strive to manipulate
the cash flow forecast used in the recoverability test. If the fraudster can
deceptively pass the recoverability test, the asset will not be subjected
to the impairment test.
Getting a handle on cash flow forecasts, then, is the key to halting
asset impairment fraud. Most management information systems measure
profitability by product line or by customer; in today’s competitive envi-
ronment, it is rare to find a business operating without this information.
Indeed, the activity-based costing initiatives begun in the 1980s were
a direct result of the need for management to understand a product’s
contribution to overall firm profitability. CPAs may not be accustomed
to reviewing product line profitability reports because they typically work
from trial balances or traditional income statements, but product line
reports source revenues to the costs to produce them and can answer
directly whether a given production process has been historically profit-
able. Internal budgets and management reports are other good resources
to use.
If the CPA can obtain forecasts directly from the personnel with line
responsibility for production, those personnel might be inclined to render
a more accurate estimate because they may be unaware of management’s
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earnings target. One should keep in mind that line managers may have
an incentive to show as positive a picture as possible to avoid a shutdown
of production. Also, line managers may receive hints or outright requests
from management to produce an overly favorable forecast. In either case,
however, if the forecasts are accompanied by written narratives, the
narratives generally list all the downside possibilities to provide political
cover for the line manager should events not turn out as planned. If there
are no narratives, the CPA can probably obtain a list of potential downside
possibilities simply by asking the line managers. The CPA may be able
to assess the reasonableness of the forecast, given the known conditions
at the time and the likelihood of those downside possibilities.
In addition, sales personnel may prove to be a good source of informa-
tion for forecast revenues. However, the CPA should always question
how thoroughly the sales person constructed the forecast and the probabil-
ities for closing sales.
Proving fraud in a forecast is difficult because a forecast is by its
very nature a best guess (see AICPA Guide for Prospective Financial
Statements ). If that forecast, however, was based on facts known to be
incorrect, such as a major customer’s known unwillingness to buy the
product, the forecast was fraudulently constructed. A forecast may also
become fraudulent if it is used at a later time to justify a management
decision because management knows that significant facts have changed.
For example, a forecast may accurately reflect that, at the time of prepara-
tion, there was a possibility that a certain major customer wanted to buy
the product. If, however, by the balance-sheet date, management knows
the customer is not interested and there are no alternative buyers, it
would be fraudulent to assert that the forecast is still accurate and then
use it to justify not writing down the value of assets used to produce that
product.
DEBT AND EQUITY INSTRUMENTS
Another area of asset valuation that can fall victim to fraud relates
to investments in the nonpublicly traded securities of companies. Such
securities are difficult to value because transaction prices are not publicly
available. If the security held is stock and there have been substantial
historical operating losses with little hope of future profitability (meaning,
the decline in value is other than temporary), that stock may be impaired
according to FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments
in Debt and Equity Securities. Likewise, FASB Statement No. 115 states
that for debt (footnotes omitted):
16. . . . if it is possible that the investor will be unable to collect
all amounts due according to the contractual terms of a debt
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security not impaired at acquisition, an other-than-temporary
impairment shall be considered to have occurred. If the decline
in fair value [of any security ] is judged to be other than tempo-
rary, the cost basis of the individual security shall be written
down to fair value as a new cost basis and the amount of the
write-down shall be included in earnings (that is, accounted
for as a realized loss).5
Without recent prices for the sale of stock and debt in a private
company, the CPA might have to look at financial information from the
investee company. The investor, if it holds a significant position in the
investee, should have financial information on file (if not, this should be
a red flag that something may be amiss). That data would likely include
results of operations that would give historical profitability. For future
profit estimates, one should look to company forecasts and assess the
validity of those forecasts based on known relationships, if any, between
the management of the investor and investee. If there exists common
representation within management or on the boards of both companies,
further inquiry may be necessary to determine the validity of any forecast.
Losses over several past years may be sufficient to establish impairment.
CONCLUSION
Detection of fraud in loss contingencies and asset impairments is difficult
because it is a search for a transaction that was not booked. Successful
detection requires drilling down within an organization to obtain informa-
tion from either or both of the following:
1. Lower level accounting personnel who may have specific knowledge of
facts pointing to the fraud without a desire (or knowledge) sufficient
to cover up the fraud
2. Personnel in other departments, such as sales and legal, who may
know relevant facts but not be aware of any attempt to hide those
facts.
From various sources, the CPA may be able to piece together that
picture of a contingent loss that was not recognized or an impaired asset
that is carried at original cost.
Estimates play a significant role in both loss contingencies and asset
impairments and are subject to manipulation. Detecting that manipula-
tion requires an internal control process that challenges the estimation
assumptions.
5 FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities
(FASB, Original Pronouncements, vol. 2, FAS115), paragraph 16.
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An audit committee that is aware of the sensitive areas most subject
to unrecorded loss contingencies and asset impairments will, at the very
least, be in a position to make inquiries that may lead to detection of
frauds. The key to the audit committee’s success is the flow of information
from internal and outside auditors that point to these issues.
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CHAPTER 11
MANIPULATION OF
PREACQUISITION RESERVES
If one company acquires another using the purchase method of accounting
for the transaction as required under Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141,
Business Combinations, the purchase price paid is allocated to the identifi-
able tangible and intangible assets of the acquired company based on the
fair value of those assets. Any excess of purchase price over the fair value
of identifiable assets acquired is booked as goodwill.
The purchase price can be paid with cash, stock of the buying com-
pany, or other assets conveyed to the seller. Liabilities can also be trans-
ferred from the seller to the buyer or accrued in the transaction. Those
liabilities assumed by the purchaser effectively increase the amount paid.
If the asset portion of the purchase price covers the fair value of identifi-
able assets acquired, liabilities assumed over and above the assets con-
veyed increase goodwill.
One type of liability managers of an acquiring company may wish
to set up is preacquisition loss contingencies as provided under FASB
Statement No. 141, presumably for potential problems inherited when
the target company is acquired. These loss contingencies or reserves, as
they are more commonly known, typically increase the goodwill paid for
the acquired company: The entry establishing the loss contingency is a
credit to a reserve liability and a debit to goodwill. Under FASB Statement
No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, the goodwill remains on
the books at its unamortized carrying value unless it is impaired. The
reserve on the balance sheet, however, with its credit balance, serves to
absorb debits from expenses in future years; that is, the expenses never
get to the income statement. This makes the preacquisition contingency
a particularly useful tool for fraudsters who want to hide expenses.
151
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FASB RATIONALE FOR ALLOWING PREACQUISITION
CONTINGENCIES
The FASB’s purpose for recognizing preacquisition expenses was to allow
adjustments to the purchase price for contingencies that require more
time to be quantified. FASB No. 141 defines a preacquisition contingency
as a ‘‘contingency of an entity that is acquired in a business combination
that is in existence before the consummation of the combination,’’ and
allows for contingent assets as well as liabilities.
It is not necessary that the contingency be known before the acquisi-
tion, but, once discovered, it must have existed before the acquisition.
Not all contingencies that result from a business combination give rise
to a preacquisition contingency, though. Reserves established by the pur-
chaser for anticipated problems resulting from the acquisition, such as
reserves for possible early contract cancellations, write-offs of accounts
receivable, and product discounts as illustrated in the example scenario in
Chapter 2, most likely will not qualify as preacquisition reserves because
those contingencies arose after the transaction.
Loss Contingencies: FASB No. 141 Versus FASB No. 5
Contingencies not governed by FASB Statement No. 141 would fall under
FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, but fraudsters will
attempt to blur the difference. A FASB Statement No. 5 reserve is set
up by taking a debit charge to current period earnings; a FASB Statement
No. 141 preacquisition reserve is established by debiting an asset, usually
goodwill. The fraudster who wants to divert current period expenses
away from the income statement will try to characterize postacquisition
contingencies as if they were preacquisition to avoid FASB Statement
No. 5 treatment.
Allocation Period
Fraudsters do not have unlimited time in which to manufacture preacqui-
sition contingencies, but unfortunately generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) do give them enough time to cause mischief. There is
a period of time, called the ‘‘allocation period,’’ which is designed,
according to FASB Statement No. 141:
B 175. . . . for discovery and quantification of preacquisition
contingencies. . . . [After the allocation period,] subsequent
adjustments of the amounts recorded as a part of the purchase
allocation [will] be included in the determination of net income
in the period in which the adjustments are determined. In
contrast to the amounts deemed paid for the asset or liability,
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those subsequent adjustments are gains or losses that result
from the uncertainties and related risks assumed in the pur-
chase.1
Therefore, GAAP requires that all acquisition-related loss contingen-
cies be identified during the allocation period to set up preacquisition loss
contingency reserves. After the allocation period ends, any adjustments to
the purchase price are put through the income statement.
The rationale for the allocation period is to allow time to adequately
value the components of a transaction. The FASB determined that the
allocation period should not continue for long after the transaction closes,
and in most cases not more than one year, when it defined the allocation
period as the:
F1. . . . period that is required to identify and measure the fair
value of the assets acquired and the liabilities assumed in a
business combination. The allocation period ends when the
acquiring entity is no longer waiting for information that it
has arranged to obtain and that is known to be available or
obtainable. Thus, the existence of a preacquisition contingency
for which an asset, a liability, or an impairment of an asset
cannot be estimated does not, of itself, extend the allocation
period. Although the time required will vary with circum-
stances, the allocation period should usually not exceed one
year from the consummation of a business combination.2
Time Limits
The FASB gave the following examples and explained its rationale for
forcing the allocation period to a close:
B 183. . . . [A]ppraisals might be required to determine replace-
ment cost of plant and equipment acquired, a discovery period
may be needed to identify and value intangible assets acquired,
and an actuarial determination may be required to determine
the pension liability to be accrued.
. . . The Board concluded that it should relate the
recording of preacquisition contingencies in the purchase allo-
cation to the nature and process of the allocation, rather than
to an arbitrary time limit. However, to indicate the Board’s
intent that the defined ‘‘allocation period’’ should not be unrea-
sonably extended, paragraph [F1] notes that the existence of
a preacquisition contingency for which an amount cannot be
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 141, Business Combinations (FASB, Original Pronouncements, vol. 2, FAS141),
paragraph .B175.
2 FASB Statement No. 141, paragraph F1.
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estimated does not, of itself, extend the ‘‘allocation period.’’ For
example, the existence of litigation for which no estimate can
be made in advance of the disposition by a court does not extend
the ‘‘allocation period.’’ That paragraph also notes that the
‘‘allocation period’’ should usually not exceed one year from the
consummation date.3
Simply because an estimate may be difficult to obtain, then, is no
excuse to hold the allocation period open. Also, the allocation period is
not necessarily one year and may well be much less. Fraudsters, though,
may try to use the whole year to go shopping for postacquisition expenses
that they can mischaracterize as preacquisition contingencies.
Amount of the Contingency
FASB Statement No. 141 provides a two-pronged test for determining
the value of a preacquisition contingency and sets out the following condi-
tions for recognizing the contingency:
40. A preacquisition contingency . . . shall be included in the
purchase price allocation based on an amount determined
as follows:
a. If the fair value of the preacquisition contingency can
be determined during the allocation period, that preac-
quisition contingency shall be included in the allocation
of the purchase price based on that fair value.
b. If the fair value of the preacquisition contingency cannot
be determined during the allocation period, that preac-
quisition contingency shall be included in the allocation
of the purchase price based on an amount determined
in accordance with the following criteria:
(1) Information available prior to the end of the alloca-
tion period indicates that it is probable that an asset
existed, a liability had been incurred, or an asset had
been impaired at the consummation of the business
combination. It is implicit in this condition that it
must be probable that one or more future events
will occur confirming the existence of the asset, lia-
bility, or impairment.
(2) The amount of the asset or liability can be reason-
ably estimated.
The criteria of this subparagraph shall be applied using
the guidance provided in FASB Statement No. 5, Account-
ing for Contingencies, and related FASB Interpretation No.
14, Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of a Loss, for
application of the similar criteria of paragraph 8 of State-
ment 5. [Footnotes omitted ]4
3 FASB Statement No. 141, paragraph B183.
4 FASB Statement No. 141, paragraph 40.
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Therefore, FASB Statement No. 141 provides that the amount of the
contingency can be determined using fair value (the value set by a willing
buyer and a willing seller) or it can be estimated, if the contingency is
probable, using methods established by FASB Statement No. 5.
Fraudsters, though, rarely concern themselves with these fine distinc-
tions. Their goal is to create as large a preacquisition reserve as possible.
And why not? If the reserve is created by debiting goodwill, there is no
income statement charge to set it up. If the fraudster can convince others
that the goodwill is not impaired, no charge reaches the income statement
in following periods. However, in those following periods, if costs arise
that the fraudster wishes to hide, he or she can debit the reserve and keep
those costs off the income statement as well. In the end, preacquisition
reserves appear to be a fraudster’s paradise, except when confronted with
a CPA who is wise to his or her ways.
PREACQUISITION RESERVE EXAMPLE
Fraud using reserves may seem easy at first look, but if used to hide
significant quantities of costs, this type of fraud can be quite difficult to
pull off. The following example illustrates the balancing act required
for a fraudster to successfully employ preacquisition reserves to commit
financial statement fraud.
Example Scenario. Great Strength Life and Health Insurance Com-
pany, a publicly traded stock insurance company, specialized in under-
writing whole life and term insurance products sold through
independent agents throughout the United States. The fiscal year had
recently closed and the GAAP-basis financial statements were being
prepared; the insurer’s accounting staff had just finished financials
prepared according to regulatory accounting practices (RAP) to be filed
with states’ insurance commissioners.
The year had not been a good one due to recent unfavorable claims
experience that suggested that certain products had been underpriced.
Great Strength’s chief executive officer, a former insurance salesman
who rose through the ranks, paid no attention to the warnings from
his chief financial officer (CFO), though, and all through the year
declared that ‘‘Great Strength was on track to continue its long record
of 15 percent per year increases in earnings per share.’’
The company’s actuaries had steadily increased the claims reserve
throughout the year. In the fourth quarter, though, the actuaries
decided that, due to a large surge in reported claims, incurred but not
reported (IBNR) claims had to be growing as well. With the increase
in IBNR, then, came a large increase in the claims reserve in the fourth
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quarter. For each quarterly filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the CFO had been able to cover up some of Great
Strength’s problems with an inadequate claims reserve by allocating
some administrative and general marketing costs to the deferred policy
acquisition costs account, a deferred expense account on the balance
sheet that is amortized into expense over the life of policies in force.
By the fourth quarter, however, the problem with claims was just too
bad to cover so easily. The CFO tried to have a conversation with the
firm’s actuaries to convince them to lower their estimate of IBNR
claims, but he found that talking to the actuaries produced no reaction
whatsoever; they simply said ‘‘no’’ and went back to crunching numbers.
Stymied, the CFO asked the controller to ‘‘reassess’’ the preacquisi-
tion reserves set up when Great Strength acquired another insurance
carrier, named Old Life and Heath Insurance Company, late in the
previous year. When the controller pointed out that FASB Statement
No. 141’s allocation period usually ended after one year, the CFO
responded that since they had not formally closed the fourth quarter,
there was still time.
The controller examined the claims experience by book of business
(that is, by policy type) and found that a significant quantity of policies
with larger-than-expected claims were underwritten by Old Life,
though the claims problem did not occur until this fiscal year. She was
not sure whether the recent adverse claims experience could be linked
back to the preacquisition period, but the CFO had no doubts when he
saw the analysis: ‘‘The Old Life underwriters,’’ he said, ‘‘made a mistake
in not establishing a large enough claims reserve.’’ The controller
brought up the fact that Great Strength had retained an outside actuar-
ial consulting firm to evaluate the adequacy of the reserves when it
bought Old Life, but the CFO simply said, ‘‘Well, they were wrong,
too!’’
The price paid for Old Life was in excess of its identifiable assets,
so there already was a goodwill account from the transaction. The CFO,
then, asked the controller to make the following entry to record a
retroactive increase in the claims reserve for Old Life policies:
Goodwill—Old Life $XXX
Claims reserve $XXX
This entry had the effect of doubling the amount of goodwill from
the Old Life transaction, so the CFO knew that another challenge lay
ahead: testing goodwill for impairment. If the FASB Statement No.
142 impairment test results in a write-down of goodwill, all the CFO’s
scheming to keep costs off the income statement would be for naught.
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Goodwill impairment was a real possibility, even before the preac-
quisition entry above was recorded. FASB Statement No. 142 required
testing the Old Life goodwill by treating all the assets acquired in that
transaction, including goodwill, as a ‘‘reporting unit’’ and then valuing
the reporting unit as a whole. If the fair value of the reporting unit
turned out to be less than the carrying amount of all the assets, all
the non-goodwill assets of the reporting unit would then be valued,
with the difference between the value of the individual assets and the
value of the reporting unit being imputed to goodwill. If that imputed
goodwill was less than the carrying amount of goodwill, the difference
would be the amount of the write-down charged to current earnings.
For Old Life, its value as a reporting unit was declining rapidly as the
claims reserves were increased. Effectively, the Old Life policies were
now not as valuable as when Old Life was purchased, and Great
Strength overpaid. An impairment of the original goodwill booked in the
transaction was possible; with goodwill doubled by the preacquisition
contingency adjustment, a write-down was almost certain.
The CFO was not going to give up, however. Out of the CFO’s
fertile mind sprang more ideas. Like Great Strength, Old Life was an
underwriter of whole life insurance policies. Old Life’s policyholders,
though, tended to be higher risk due to past medical conditions, which
probably contributed to the higher-than-expected claims. Great
Strength also had policies targeted to high-risk groups, except Great
Strength’s policies were appropriately priced and were very profitable.
The CFO did some quick calculations and decided that the high-risk
products combined would show a healthy profit, healthy enough to
carry the newly enlarged amount of goodwill. So he asked the controller
to prepare a FASB Statement No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment
or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets, asset group impairment test for the
high-risk products that would be a part of a larger impairment test of
all assets.
In performing the FASB Statement No. 144 impairment test for
the high-risk products, the CFO knew the controller would include the
carrying value of Old Life goodwill (both original and additional) in
the test. The controller scheduled out the net cash flows for the asset
group and added the undiscounted cash flows to determine if there
was an impairment, in accordance with FASB Statement No. 144. The
sum of the undiscounted net cash flows easily exceeded the combined
carrying value of the high-risk products asset group. However, the CFO
asked the controller to take the additional step of calculating the fair
value of the asset group, as if the asset group were impaired, using
discounted net cash flows. When the controller asked why she should
run the second calculation when the asset group passed the first FASB
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Statement No. 144 impairment test, the CFO explained that he wished
to show the analysis to the audit committee ‘‘to help the committee
better understand the impact, if any, of a potential write-down.’’ The
CFO went on to explain that the SEC had proposed changes to its filing
requirements that would require companies to explain their ‘‘critical
accounting estimates,’’ and he simply wished to show the committee
that ‘‘Great Strength had nothing to worry about.’’
The controller prepared the discounted net cash flow analysis as
instructed. The sum of the discounted cash flows for the high-risk asset
group exceeded the carrying value, thanks to the inclusion of the Great
Strength policies. The CFO was quite pleased when she gave him the
analysis. The CFO took the spreadsheet, in electronic format, and
changed the title from ‘‘FASB Statement No. 144 Impairment Analysis’’
to ‘‘FASB Statement No. 142 Impairment Analysis’’ and inserted ‘‘Old
Life Acquisition’’ in the title.
The CFO also instituted a policy renumbering process that, offi-
cially, was designed to ‘‘bring the Old Life policy numbering system
into conformity with Great Strength’s.’’ The Great Strength numbering
system used the suffix ‘‘HR’’ for policies issued under its high-risk
underwriting; effectively all Old Life’s policies were recoded with the
same number of digits in the prefix and the same ‘‘HR’’ suffix as the
Great Strength policies in that risk group. The effect was that policies
obtained from the Old Life acquisition became much harder to distin-
guish from those of Great Strength.
During the year-end audit, the audit manager questioned the
increase in goodwill from the Old Life acquisition. When the CFO
showed him the ‘‘FASB Statement No. 142 Impairment Analysis,’’ the
audit manager was satisfied and did not pursue any other issues regard-
ing the booking of the preacquisition contingency.
By diverting the unanticipated additional claims cost to the good-
will account, the CFO kept reported claims expense within budget, and
Great Strength hit its EPS target.
Example Analysis. This example illustrated a number of fraud
schemes. First, the CFO engaged in a simple diversion of costs from
the income statement to the balance sheet by reclassifying administra-
tive and general marketing expenses as deferred policy acquisition
costs (DAC). According to FASB Statement No. 60, Accounting and
Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, though, DAC should include only
those costs that ‘‘vary with and are primarily related to’’ the selling,
or acquisition, of the policies, such as insurance sales commissions
and underwriting costs. Most administrative and general marketing
expenses do not vary with and are too remote from the acquisition
process and therefore are not eligible for DAC treatment.
page 158 05-09-03 12:21:46
Chapter 11: Manipulation of Preacquisition Reserves 159
The simple cost-shifting scheme does not solve the entire problem
of higher claims, though, so the CFO has to employ other schemes.
The CFO devises a plan to use preacquisition contingency reserves
relating to the Old Life acquisition, but the plan calls for a doubling
of the goodwill booked from that transaction. That increase in goodwill
causes another problem in that it might trigger an impairment. Thus,
the CFO has to balance how far he can go with this scheme; if he gets
too greedy in creating or adding to goodwill, he may see his efforts
unraveled when the goodwill is tested for impairment.
So the CFO creates cover by fabricating a ‘‘FASB Statement No.
142 Impairment Analysis’’ from a ‘‘FASB Statement No. 144 Impair-
ment Analysis,’’ which includes more profitable policies from Great
Strength’s book of business. (In a more realistic scenario, the CFO
would probably have asked the controller to prepare a FASB Statement
No. 60 ‘‘premium deficiency’’ analysis that would have followed some
of the same steps, but for illustrative reasons and to make the example
more broadly applicable, FASB Statement No. 144 is demonstrated
here.) The fabricated analysis is successful, though, only if the inclusion
of Great Strength policies goes undetected. To hide this deception,
the CFO initiates the renumbering process that blurs the distinction
between an Old Life policy and a Great Strength policy. His success
in carrying out this scheme depends on how much attention auditors
have paid to the Old Life acquisition in the past to see if the data used
in his ‘‘FASB Statement No. 142 Impairment Analysis’’ conformed with
the quantity of policies originally acquired.
The auditors stopped short of asking the more important question
regarding the propriety of the entire preacquisition contingency, how-
ever. The auditors, and the controller, appeared to accept the concept
that there is generally a one-year allocation period to identify and book
preacquisition contingencies. In this case, though, Great Strength hired
outside actuaries to assess the adequacy of claims reserves, and,
according to paragraph B183 of FASB Statement No. 141, previously
cited, the rendering of the actuaries’ opinion should have fulfilled the
requirements for closing the allocation period. Any change to reserves
subsequent to closing the allocation period should have been recognized
in the income statement as gain or loss on the transaction. Therefore,
by not following up on the rationale for the preacquisition reserve, the
audit manager lets the fraud slip by.
CONCLUSION
Use of preacquisition reserves to commit fraud is complex and difficult
to pull off, but this type of fraud is also very lucrative for fraudsters and,
unfortunately, worth the effort if they are successful. With a fraudulently
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constructed preacquisition reserve, fraudsters can hide or divert signifi-
cant quantities of current expenses, such as higher claims costs in the
example, to create or maintain the appearance of profitability.
Without restrictions on the booking of reserves after an acquisition,
the management of an acquiring company could constantly (and conve-
niently) create reserves to absorb current losses from an acquired com-
pany. At some point, however, current management must take
responsibility for current period results. CPAs should carefully review
the allocation period cutoff, as provided in FASB Statement No. 141, to
make sure that it is not abused. Management crosses the line into fraud
when its only justification for extending the allocation period is to cook
up unmerited reserves.
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CHAPTER 12
COST AND DEBT SHIFTING
Chapter 11 discusses the methods fraudsters use to move costs from the
income statement to preacquisition contingency accounts on the balance
sheet. This chapter explores the techniques used to move both costs and
debts from a company’s financial statements to the financial statements
of another, probably related, entity. The process of illicitly moving costs
and debts to another entity is tricky because it frequently involves legal
and financial issues, such as setting up a separate entity and convincing
third parties (suppliers, investors, and lenders) that the separate entity
is creditworthy. However, with the greater challenges come greater
rewards for the fraudster in that, if successful, costs and debts do not
appear anywhere in the company financial statements, making them
very difficult for auditors and others to locate.
COST SHIFT TO RELATED ENTITY
Sometimes fraudsters can deceive by moving costs from one entity to
another under common control. This technique is most often found in
industries that customarily use joint ventures and partnerships to accom-
plish specific objectives. For instance, due to the high risks associated
with locating and extracting oil and gas, exploration and production firms
typically establish joint ventures with other parties to share the risk. If
these other parties consist of passive investors, a fraudster may wish to
take advantage of the lack of oversight and to allocate costs that should
be sourced to other ventures or to the fraudster’s company over to that
joint venture. Other industries, such as real estate development, operate
in a similar fashion using multiple limited partnerships.
Cost Shifting at Livent
The entertainment industry also provides an example of cost shifting
in the Livent, Inc. case (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
161
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Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) No. 1095, January
13, 1999). Livent, Inc. was a Canadian theater company that produced
a number of successful Broadway shows, including Phantom of the Opera,
Show Boat, and Ragtime. In January 1999, the SEC concluded an enforce-
ment proceeding against nine former employees of Livent alleging:
A multi-million dollar kick-back scheme designed to misappro-
priate funds for their own use; the improper shifting of prepro-
duction costs, such as advertising for Ragtime, to fixed assets,
such as the construction of theaters in Chicago and New York;
and the improper recording of revenue for transactions that
contained side agreements purposefully concealed from Liv-
ent’s independent auditors.
This scheme operated from 1990 through 1998. It inflated net income
over that period by Cdn$98 million, causing the share price of Livent’s
stock to fall 95 percent when the fraud was revealed, wiping out more
than US$100 million of market capitalization.
Of the many fraud schemes used at Livent, the one called the ‘‘amorti-
zation roll’’ was most interesting. Under Livent’s accounting policies,
production costs, such as advertising, sets, and costumes, that were
incurred before the opening of a show were capitalized. When the show
commenced, the capitalized production costs were to be amortized over
the expected life of the show (up to a maximum of five years). Under the
amortization roll scheme, though, production costs for a show currently
running would be transferred to a show that had yet to open or to a show
with a longer amortization period remaining. The effect of the transfer
was to delay the commencement of amortization, to lengthen amortization
beyond periods stated in Livent’s financial statements, and to make cur-
rent shows appear to be more profitable.
As was the custom in this industry, shows produced by Livent had
many different rights owners who were to receive profit participations
in certain shows run in specific geographic areas. Therefore, as was the
case with oil and gas and real estate ventures, Livent had to maintain
separate accounts for each show, such as Ragtime or Show Boat, and
perhaps even separate accounts for shows running in certain locations.
The amortization roll, then, had the effect of sending costs of an earlier
show cascading down through the accounts of later shows or later produc-
tions of the same show running in different locations. The SEC stated
that for 1996 and 1997, ‘‘approximately $12 million relating to seven
different shows and twenty-seven different locations was transferred to
the accounts of approximately thirty-one different future locations and
ten other shows then in process.’’ From a fraudster’s point of view, this
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scheme must have appeared to be a masterful display of both cunning
and brazen manipulation.
With so much cost shifting and other schemes going on, management
had to maintain separate books to keep track of the true state of affairs.
The information technology (IT) manager also managed to devise ways
to electronically hide the movement of expenses. When costs were first
incurred, they were recorded on the accounts of a certain production.
When those costs were shifted, the IT manager overrode the accounting
software’s audit trail so when those shifted costs arrived on the books of
another show, they appeared to be original entries. The altered accounting
system also secretly kept track of the net effect of the amortization roll
and other schemes so management could translate fraudulent financial
statements into accurate ones. These fraudsters were no dummies.
Fraud Detection at Livent
There were clues, though, that could have tipped off the frauds. The
financing of Show Boat and Ragtime provides an insight. In 1996 and
1997, Livent sold the rights to various North American locations for the
shows to Pace Theatrical Group, Inc., for fees totaling US$11.2 million.
In return, the sale contract gave Pace the right to reimbursement of
theater production costs and, according to the SEC, a ‘‘limited percentage
of adjusted gross ticket sales as profit participation.’’ Moreover, the fee
Pace paid was nonrefundable, and Livent was not required to actually
run the shows in North America. Under these facts as presented, Livent
convinced its auditors to allow it to book the rights transaction as sales
revenue.
Unknown to the auditors, though, were side letters that allowed
Pace to recoup its fees and earn additional profit as the shows were
performed. From a financial perspective, then, the Pace transactions
made little sense without the side letters. According to the agreements
shown to the auditors, for significant, presumably nonrefundable fees,
Pace would essentially receive a small profit participation. The side let-
ters, which auditors did not see, provided downside protection and a more
reasonable profit interest. However, the poor economics of the transaction,
as presented to the auditors, could have signaled a problem.
In the auditors’ defense, they did ask for and receive confirmations
from Pace that there were no agreements other than those known to the
auditors. After Livent management told Pace that the auditors had the
side letters, Pace responded without raising any red flags. Therefore, to
catch such a scheme, CPAs in the future will have to go further than
simply asking whether any side letters exist. The line of inquiry with
outside parties needs to probe into the rationale of the transaction to
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ask, essentially, What do you get out of this? If the answer does not make
sense on the surface, the CPA may need to investigate further, looking,
for instance, for related party connections or undisclosed agreements.
More often, though, the third party does not have as much interest in
hiding the fraud as the fraudster and may explain everything to avoid
the possibility of being linked to the fraud.
Other Fraud Detection Steps
To say that this fraud was difficult to catch would be an understatement.
In 1998, new management at Livent, which was not aware of the schemes,
discovered one of the side letters with the profit participant that had
rights to Ragtime and Show Boat in the United Kingdom. This discovery
led to an internal investigation that brought down the entire house of
cards. Without that discovery, many of the schemes could have continued
for some time. The ‘‘amortization roll,’’ for one, could have continued until
either:
1. A disgruntled rights owner insisted on an audit of specific show
expenses; or
2. Livent ran out of funding for new shows to keep the ‘‘roll’’ going.
Where adequate audit trails exist, CPAs would be well served to
look for credits appearing in expense accounts to detect cost shifting.
Such credits may indicate that the entity incurring the cost accrued the
expenses on its books first as debits and then transferred the expenses
out with offsetting credits. It is not safe, however, to assume that the
subsidiary incurring the expense initially recorded it as such. There may
be a special reserve or liability account on the balance sheet set up to
record the initial debits with the transfer credits appearing later. As the
expenses are being booked, significant debit balances in the liability
account will grow until the transfer is made. Such debit balances in a
liability account should stand out. Also, if the transfers take place over
time, there is likely to be some correspondence spelling out the procedures,
especially if the initial debit is to an unusual account, such as a liability
reserve.
With Livent, though, internal controls that were compromised by
extensive collusion made detection of the amortization roll difficult
because shifted expenses had the appearance of original entry. Neverthe-
less, sourcing the expenses of a given show to the accounts for that show
may have revealed a difference as some of those costs were shifted to later
shows. But for the occurrence of one of the events previously described, the
only person standing in the way of fraudsters running such a cost shifting
scheme is a CPA who insists on looking at the source documents.
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‘‘HIDDEN DEBTS’’ AND THE SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES
The collapse of Enron Corp. in 2001 brought extensive attention to the
role of off-balance sheet entities known as special purpose entities (SPEs).
Critics alleged that Enron’s SPEs were used to ‘‘hide debts’’ by moving
them from Enron’s balance sheet to the SPEs’ balance sheets. This discus-
sion does not include an analysis of Enron SPEs specifically but covers
general methods used by fraudsters to improperly move debts off the
balance sheet.
Enron was not the first company to use SPEs. SPEs had long been
in use to own buildings and other real estate that companies wanted to
sell and lease back to themselves. In addition, financial institutions had
for many years used SPEs to securitize loans. The securitization process
used by a bank was fairly straightforward. The bank would package a
group of loans, such as credit card debt, and have one of the bond rating
agencies assess the portfolio of loans for creditworthiness. The bank would
then set up an SPE with a small amount of capital provided by outsiders.
The SPE would then issue bonds in sufficient quantity to purchase the
loan portfolio, and because the bonds were rated, those bonds would be
marketable to institutional investors. With the proceeds of the bond sale,
the SPE would purchase the loans from the bank. After the transaction,
then, the bank had additional capital with which to go out and make more
loans. Indeed, many Americans today have SPEs to thank for providing a
mechanism for banks to extend them credit.
Were the bonds issued by the SPE and used to acquire the loans
‘‘hidden’’ from the bank’s balance sheet? The SPE holds the debt, along
with the loan assets the bank transferred. As long as the SPE is not
required to be consolidated with the bank for financial reporting purposes,
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) do not require the bank
to show the bonds on its balance sheet. Consolidation, then, is the key
GAAP criterion that determines whether debts are to be shown on or off
the balance sheet. Fraudsters trying to ‘‘hide debt’’ will attempt to obviate
the consolidation requirements such that an SPE that should be consoli-
dated is shown as a stand-alone entity.
GAAP Standards for SPEs
There are essentially two broad categories of SPEs:
1. Qualifying SPEs, defined in Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140,
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extin-
guishments of Liabilities, that hold primarily financial assets
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2. Nonqualifying SPEs, defined in various Emerging Issues Task Force
(EITF) Issue Statements and FASB Statements, which hold a wide
range of assets
Tests used to determine whether an SPE will be consolidated with
the firm (the transferor) that transfers assets and liabilities to the SPE
vary depending on the category of the SPE.
Qualifying SPEs
Continuing the example of the transferor-bank discussed above, under
the provisions of FASB Statement No. 140, the bank would recognize
gain or loss on the transfer of financial assets to the qualifying SPE under
the following conditions:
9. A transfer of financial assets (or all or a portion of a financial
asset) in which the transferor surrenders control over those
financial assets shall be accounted for as a sale to the extent
that consideration other than beneficial interests in the trans-
ferred assets is received in exchange. The transferor has sur-
rendered control over transferred assets if and only if all of the
following conditions are met:
a. The transferred assets have been isolated from the trans-
feror—put presumptively beyond the reach of the trans-
feror and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other
receivership.
b. Each transferee (or, if the transferee is a qualifying SPE
(paragraph 35), each holder of its beneficial interests) has
the right to pledge or exchange the assets (or beneficial
interests) it received, and no condition both constrains the
transferee (or holder) from taking advantage of its right
to pledge or exchange and provides more than a trivial
benefit to the transferor.
c. The transferor does not maintain effective control over
the transferred assets through either (1) an agreement
that both entitles and obligates the transferor to
repurchase or redeem them before their maturity or (2) the
ability to unilaterally cause the holder to return specific
assets, other than through a cleanup call. (references
omitted)1
The requirements for a ‘‘qualifying special purpose entity’’ are very
precise and complex. FASB Statement No. 140 spells out the elements:
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguish-
ments of Liabilities (FASB, Original Pronouncements, vol. 1, FAS140), paragraph 9.
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35. A qualifying SPE is a trust or other legal vehicle that meets
all of the following conditions:
a. It is demonstrably distinct from the transferor (paragraph
36).
b. Its permitted activities (1) are significantly limited, (2)
were entirely specified in the legal documents that estab-
lished the SPE or created the beneficial interests in the
transferred assets that it holds, and (3) may be signifi-
cantly changed only with the approval of the holders of at
least a majority of the beneficial interests held by entities
other than any transferor, its affiliates, and its agents.
c. It may hold only:
(1) Financial assets transferred to it that are passive in
nature
(2) Passive derivative financial instruments that pertain
to beneficial interests (other than another derivative
financial instrument) issued or sold to parties other
than the transferor, its affiliates, or its agents
(3) Financial assets (for example, guarantees or rights to
collateral) that would reimburse it if others were to
fail to adequately service financial assets transferred
to it or to timely pay obligations due to it and that it
entered into when it was established, when assets
were transferred to it, or when beneficial interests
(other than derivative financial instruments) were
issued by the SPE
(4) Servicing rights related to financial assets that it holds
(5) Temporarily, nonfinancial assets obtained in connec-
tion with the collection of financial assets that it holds
(6) Cash collected from assets that it holds and invest-
ments purchased with that cash pending distribution
to holders of beneficial interests that are appropriate
for that purpose (that is, money-market or other rela-
tively risk-free instruments without options and with
maturities no later than the expected distribution
date).
d. If it can sell or otherwise dispose of noncash financial
assets, it can do so only in automatic response to one of
the following conditions:
(1) Occurrence of an event or circumstance that (a) is
specified in the legal documents that established the
SPE or created the beneficial interests in the trans-
ferred assets that it holds; (b) is outside the control of
the transferor, its affiliates, or its agents; and (c)
causes, or is expected at the date of transfer to cause,
the fair value of those financial assets to decline by a
specified degree below the fair value of those assets
when the SPE obtained them
(2) Exercise by a [Beneficial Interest Holder] (other than
the transferor, its affiliates, or its agents) of a right
to put that holder’s beneficial interest back to the SPE
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(3) Exercise by the transferor of a call or [removal-of
accounts provision] specified in the legal documents
that established the SPE, transferred assets to the
SPE, or created the beneficial interests in the trans-
ferred assets that it holds
(4) Termination of the SPE or maturity of the beneficial
interests in those financial assets on a fixed or deter-
minable date that is specified at inception. (references
omitted)2
Therefore, there are significant and highly restrictive legal and finan-
cial requirements to set up and operate qualifying SPEs.
However, a key feature is requirement (a) above that says that the
qualifying SPE must be ‘‘demonstrably distinct from the transferor.’’ To
be able to keep SPE assets and debts off the transferor’s balance sheet,
that requirement is met by making sure that an outside party holds at
least 10 percent ownership in the qualifying SPE or an outside party has
given a ‘‘substantive guarantee’’ (in the words of FASB Statement No.
140, paragraph 182) of the debt in the form of a ‘‘guaranteed mortgage
securitization’’:
36. A qualifying SPE is demonstrably distinct from the trans-
feror only if it cannot be unilaterally dissolved by any trans-
feror, its affiliates, or its agents and either (a) at least 10 percent
of the fair value of its beneficial interests is held by parties
other than any transferor, its affiliates, or its agents or (b) the
transfer is a guaranteed mortgage securitization.3
The substantive involvement of an outside party, either as a holder
of interests in the qualifying SPE or as a guarantor of the debt, is a
critical element that allows a qualifying SPE to stand on its own and not
be consolidated.
Non-Qualifying SPEs
A Nonqualifying SPE may hold a wide range of assets and has more
flexibility in its capital structure. EITF Topic D-14 sets out the require-
ments with regard to nonconsolidation:
Generally, the SEC staff believes that for nonconsolidation and
sales recognition by the sponsor or transferor to be appropriate,
the majority owner (or owners) of the SPE must be an indepen-
dent third party who has made a substantive capital investment
in the SPE, has control of the SPE, and has substantive risks
2 FASB Statement No. 140, paragraph 35.
3 FASB Statement No. 140, paragraph 36.
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and rewards of ownership of the assets of the SPE (including
residuals).
What constitutes a ‘‘substantive capital investment’’ is not very clear,
though. In an exchange of questions and answers between the EITF
and the SEC in 1990 and published in EITF Issue No. 90-15, Impact of
Nonsubstantive Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provi-
sions in Leasing Transactions, the SEC described the minimum capital
investment necessary for SPEs that own and lease assets such as build-
ings:
The initial substantive residual equity investment should be
comparable to that expected for a substantive business involved
in similar leasing transactions with similar risks and rewards.
The SEC staff understands from discussions with [EITF] Work-
ing Group members that those members believe that 3 percent
is the minimum acceptable investment. The SEC staff believes
a greater investment may be necessary depending on the facts
and circumstances, including the credit risk associated with
the lessee and the market risk factors associated with the leased
property. For example, the cost of borrowed funds for the trans-
action might be indicative of the risk associated with the trans-
action and whether an equity investment greater than 3 percent
is needed.
The SEC went on to say that ‘‘the conditions set forth in [EITF]
90-15 may be useful in evaluating other transactions involving SPEs.’’
Therefore, for SPE leasing transactions, the SEC accepted an initial
minimum capital requirement of 3 percent of SPE assets when the assets
are first transferred to the SPE. If conditions require, the SEC would
expect the capital to exceed 3 percent to reflect increased risk. Outside
of leasing transactions, though, the SEC’s guidance is merely suggested
in that it ‘‘may be useful’’ to determine if the capital invested is ‘‘compara-
ble to that expected for a substantive business’’ engaged in similar trans-
actions. The FASB pronouncements issued after 1990 do not provide
much additional guidance in this area. Therefore, with the exception
of leasing transactions, GAAP is not clear as to the minimum capital
required.
SPE Fraud
Substantive Ownership
That said, a qualifying or nonqualifying SPE can be manipulated by
fraudsters to make it appear to be substantively owned by outsiders when,
in fact, it is not. Substantive ownership is tested differently depending on
the type of SPE:
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1. For qualifying SPEs, the test is a minimum of 10 percent ownership
or ‘‘substantive guarantees’’ of debt by third parties.
2. For nonqualifying SPEs, the test is a third party capital investment
‘‘comparable to that expected for a substantive business,’’ which for
leasing transactions is defined as a minimum of 3 percent of assets.
Substantive ownership is important because it provides the GAAP-
authorized means by which assets and debts are moved off, or ‘‘derecog-
nized’’ from, the balance sheet of the original owner and moved on to the
balance sheet of the SPE, as explained in FASB Statement No. 140:
After a transfer of financial assets [to an SPE by an entity], an
entity recognizes the financial and servicing assets it controls
and the liabilities it has incurred, derecognizes financial assets
when control has been surrendered, and derecognizes liabilities
when extinguished.4
A lack of substantive ownership means the SPE is consolidated with
the original owner for financial reporting purposes, bringing the assets
and liabilities back onto the original owner’s balance sheet and thereby
obviating one of the principal objectives of the SPE.
Asset Quality
To continue the bank example, the bank benefited by moving the loan
assets from its balance sheet because the securitization turned the loans
into cash. With more cash, the bank could originate new loans. In a sense,
though, the bonds used by the SPE to finance the purchase of the loan
assets could be called the ‘‘hidden debt’’ of the bank since the bonds did
not show up on the bank’s balance sheet. What critics of SPEs fail to
clearly state is that there are ‘‘hidden assets,’’ the loans in this example,
that move off the balance sheet as well. Implied in their criticism of SPEs,
then, is the idea that the assets are not worth the amount of the debt
issued against them. The quality of those assets, then, becomes another
issue in assessing the legitimacy of an SPE.
Fraud Methodology
Asset quality and substantive ownership are related. Fraudsters manipu-
late both when they use the SPE vehicle to move debts off the balance
sheet. The methods fraudsters use essentially break down into three
steps:
1. Fraudsters attempt to locate assets on or off the company balance sheet
that present difficulties in valuation, such as financial instruments,
4 FASB Statement No. 140, paragraph 35.
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real estate, or other assets that are not publicly traded, to place in the
SPE at inflated values. Fictitious assets, such as illusory accounts
receivable, also work if fraudsters can manufacture them.
2. By inflating the value of these non-publicly traded assets, the
fraudsters can then move large quantities of debt equal to the inflated
asset values from the company balance sheet to the SPE.
3. Fraudsters then attempt to avoid having to place capital at risk in the
SPE because, with overvalued assets, the capital will be wiped out
when the debts come due.
If an SPE has substantive capital at risk invested by an independent
third party, that investor is likely to make sure the assets placed in the
SPE are worth at least the amount of the SPE’s debt, otherwise the third-
party investor stands to lose its capital. A fraudster who wants to truly
‘‘hide debt,’’ however, will attempt to move bogus or overvalued assets into
an SPE loaded with debt, where there is little or no outside investment to
avoid analysis and scrutiny.
Fraudulent Funding Schemes
Clearly, though, if there is no outside capital in the SPE, the assets and
liabilities must be consolidated with the transferor firm that set up the
SPE. In effect, the assets and liabilities that the firm tried to move off
its balance sheet come right back on if there is no outside equity.
The fraudster, then, tries to create the appearance of a substantive
outside investment in the SPE containing assets of dubious value. The
schemes used to manufacture outside investment may closely resemble
the schemes popular during the savings and loan (S&L) scandals that
provided down payments for real estate loans made to straw-man borrow-
ers. Under the old S&L scam, the lender would front funds to the borrower
for the down payment on a real estate purchase through another borrower.
That second borrower would then make an ‘‘investment’’ in the straw-
man borrower equal to the funds needed for the down payment, and the
S&L would provide the rest of the funds needed to complete the purchase.
An SPE fraud may work the same way, with funds coming from the firm
that is trying to unload the assets and debts transferred to the SPE. The
firm simply needs intermediaries to cover the movement of firm funds
to the straw-man outside investor.
The source of the capital invested in the SPE, then, is a key element
in uncovering SPE fraud. If real outside capital is at risk, the investor
generally makes sure that other components of the SPE, as may be
required under the provisions of EITF Issue No. 90-15, FASB Statement
No. 140, or other areas of GAAP, are in place. In addition, a provider of
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outside capital may also insist on other safeguards, such as independent
appraisals of assets placed in the SPE.
CONCLUSION
Cost and debt shifting pose serious challenges to CPAs. However, the
schemes are usually revealed when CPAs ask seemingly obvious ques-
tions about the vigilance exercised by the outside parties that enter into
transactions with the fraudsters. In the case of cost shifting, if the outside
parties, such as joint venturers or limited partners, did not insist on and
failed to exercise the right to audit the financial statements of the joint
venture or limited partnership, there is the potential for fraudsters to
move costs from one project to another. Similarly, should fraudsters
attempt to hide debts using an SPE, if the prospective outside SPE inves-
tor did not insist on an appraisal of hard-to-value assets sold to the SPE
by the fraudsters and did not insist on periodic audits of operations, then
it is possible that the investor is not independent or is a straw-man. In
short, the behavior of third parties provides the best clues to identifying
this type of fraud. The CPA, then, needs to look beyond the operations
of the firm and delve into the activities of business partners to find these
clues.
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CHAPTER 13
RECOGNIZING FICTITIOUS
REVENUES
The AICPA, among others, led the research effort by participating in the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), a voluntary private
sector organization dedicated to improving the quality of financial
reporting. In 1999, COSO sponsored research published under the title
Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public
Companies (the 1999 Research Report), which found that one-half of the
financial reporting frauds in the period 1987 to 1997 were attributable
to overstating revenue. Of those companies overstating revenue, the 1999
Research Report found that recording fictitious revenues and recording
revenues prematurely were the primary causes of the fraud. Revenue
recognition issues have occupied the accounting profession for many years
as well. In 1984, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued
FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 5, Recognition
and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises. That
statement set out the following two basic requirements for recognizing
revenue:
a. Realized or realizable. Revenues and gains generally are not
recognized until realized or realizable. Revenues and gains
are realized when products (goods or services), merchandise
or other assets are exchanged for cash or claims to cash.
Revenues and gains are realizable when related assets
received or held are readily convertible to known amounts
of cash or claims to cash. Readily convertible assets have
(i) interchangeable (fungible) units and (ii) quoted prices
available in an active market that can rapidly absorb the
quantity held by the entity without significantly affecting
the price.
b. Earned. Revenues are not recognized until earned. An enti-
ty’s revenue-earning activities involve delivering or produc-
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ing goods, rendering services, or other activities that
constitute its ongoing major or central operations, and reve-
nues are considered to have been earned when the entity has
substantially accomplished what it must do to be entitled
to the benefits represented by the revenues. . . . (footnotes
omitted)1
In Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 101, the Securities and
Exchange (SEC) staff identified a long list of additional accounting pro-
nouncements that address revenue recognition, including the following:
• FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13, Account-
ing for Leases
• FASB Statement No. 45, Accounting for Franchise Fee Revenue
• FASB Statement No. 48, Revenue Recognition When Right of Return
Exists
• FASB Statement No. 49, Accounting for Product Financing Arrange-
ments
• FASB Statement No. 50, Financial Reporting in the Record and Music
Industry
• FASB Statement No. 51, Financial Reporting by Cable Television
Companies
• FASB Statement No. 66, Accounting for Sales of Real Estate
• Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 10, Omnibus Opin-
ion—1966
• Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) Nos. 43 and 45, Long-Term Con-
struction-Type Contracts
• AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Stan-
dards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316)
• AICPA Statement of Position (SOP) No. 81-1, Accounting for Perfor-
mance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type Contracts
• SOP No. 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition
• Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue No. 88-18, Sales of Future
Revenues
• EITF Issue No. 91-9, Revenue and Expense Recognition for Freight
Services in Process
• EITF Issue No. 95-1, Revenue Recognition on Sales with a Guaranteed
Minimum Resale Value
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts
No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises (FASB,
Original Pronouncements, vol. 3, CON5), paragraph 83.
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• EITF Issue No. 95-4, Revenue Recognition on Equipment Sold and
Subsequently Repurchased Subject to an Operating Lease
One could also add FASB Statement No. 140, Accounting for Trans-
fers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities,
to the list above. In addition, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Profes-
sional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), discusses procedures specific to a
presumption of improper revenue recognition.
Also in SAB No. 101, the SEC staff set out its interpretation of the
literature listed and concluded the following:
The staff believes that revenue generally is realized or realiz-
able and earned when all of the following criteria are met:
a. Persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists
b. Delivery has occurred or services have been rendered
c. The seller’s price to the buyer is fixed or determinable
d. Collectibility is reasonably assured. (footnotes omitted)
With regard to a fixed or determinable selling price, the SEC staff
amplified its position by looking to SOP 97-2, which defines a fixed fee
as a ‘‘fee required to be paid at a set amount that is not subject to refund
or adjustment.’’ Even though SOP 97-2 addressed software revenue recog-
nition, the staff thought that the requirement of not being subject to
refund or adjustment was applicable to all transactions. If the buyer
retains a right to a refund of the purchase price, collectibility cannot be
assured. Indeed, it would be difficult to meet the FASB Concepts State-
ment No. 5 realization test if the cash or other payment tendered were
subject to refund at the buyer’s discretion. Yet refund arrangements are
a common area for revenue recognition fraud. If company management
wishes to inflate revenues by booking fictitious sales, in all likelihood,
one or more of the SEC’s conditions will have been violated. These condi-
tions are described in the following sections.
LACK OF AN AGREEMENT WHEN BOOKING SALES
As the reporting quarter draws to an end, companies straining to achieve
a revenue target face pressure to close sales by the last day. That pressure
may lead to the fraudulent booking of premature or nonexistent sales.
In the rush to close transactions by a certain date, sales personnel may
represent to management that there is an oral agreement with a customer
when, in fact, there is none.
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Standards of Evidence
Because of pressures and possible misrepresentations, the SEC standard
requires ‘‘persuasive evidence,’’ which generally means some written doc-
umentation from either the buyer or a third party, such as a purchasing
agent. Assume, for example, that Company A’s salesperson has obtained
verbal approval from Company B’s customer management about the
terms of a sale. Further assume that customer management must obtain
approval of the sale’s term from Company B’s legal department, and the
agreement is held up at the end of the quarter due to legal department
review. Without a requirement for written documentation of the sale,
Company A’s salesperson may represent (perhaps accurately) that Com-
pany B’s purchasing decision maker has signed off on the sale but misrep-
resent that all conditions for revenue recognition are met. With the
requirement for a signed contract, however, recognition of the sale would
not occur at quarter end and for good reason: Company B has not agreed
to the terms until legal department review is complete. Such a policy
is put in place to ensure the company conforms to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). Violating that policy causes a GAAP viola-
tion if, in footnotes to the financial statements or elsewhere, management
represents that sales are not recognized without a written agreement.
Actually the SEC looked beyond company policies in SAB No. 101.
A hypothetical posed in the bulletin stated the normal and customary
business practice was to obtain written agreements and did not mention
the existence of a company policy to obtain written agreements. The
staff’s position was that companies could not book as revenue sales lacking
written agreements, regardless of company accounting policies, when the
normal and customary business practice for the industry was to obtain
written agreements.
Detecting Fake Agreements
Good sales cut-off procedures can generally detect lack of proper
agreements; but if written agreements are fabricated, detection is much
more difficult. Random sampling of orders booked as revenue near the
end of a quarter should provide a list of customers to call to verify that
documents are authentic. For a document fabrication scheme to succeed
over several quarters or years, however, the fabricated agreements must
be replaced by authentic agreements and real sales or there will be
significant reversals of prior period sales. Therefore, CPAs can compare,
perhaps on a random basis, contracts on file at the end of a given reporting
period with contracts on file for the same transaction at a later period
of time. If the original (fake) contract has been switched, there probably
was an attempt at fabrication. Conversely, if the authentic document
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does not appear, the sale may never have been completed, in which case
there would be a reversal in the subsequent period. Numerous instances
of such reversals would point to revenue recognition problems.
NONDELIVERY
What constitutes delivery varies from industry to industry but generally
occurs when title and risk of loss pass to the buyer. Delivery of some
products requires shipping documents that provide a paper trail that can
be audited. Delivery of products such as software, though, may occur
over the Internet at near instantaneous speed with no or lagging paper
documentation. Nevertheless, there should be some follow-up hard copy
documentation or electronic receipt verification.
Attempts at achieving fraudulent deliveries usually involve some
person or entity willing to hold the product until such time as its sale
can be arranged. As part of the fraud scheme, the recipient executes
documents or e-mails that appear to confirm delivery. This recipient is
sometimes part of the scheme or can be a customer who inadvertently
accepts delivery before consummating the sale. The inadvertent error
may be easier to detect because customers receiving products before they
are wanted tend to complain to company management.
Third-party recipients who park goods temporarily may be harder
to detect but usually require some payment for their services. Payment
may come in the form of above-average discounts if the third parties
resell the products over future periods, or there may be special terms
allowing for product returns. An analysis of average product selling prices
may point to one customer who stands out from the rest by receiving
better deals.
If returns from a given customer are abnormally high, that fact may
also indicate special arrangements, especially if the returns occur in a
later reporting period. If one customer receives such favorable treatment,
the CPA should make additional inquiries about why. In addition, delivery
schemes involving resellers typically become more apparent if other
resellers cannot sell the product as expected because of a change in market
conditions. If a reseller is still taking substantial deliveries of product
after many others are experiencing sales declines, the CPA should
attempt to understand why that reseller’s channels of distribution are
clear while others are blocked.
NO FIXED PRICE
A price may not be fixed due to design or due to deceit. A price fixed
due to design may arise from a sales price being a function of royalty
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percentages, sliding scales, or other features that depend on future events
before they become fixed and determinable. Such a price usually consists
of hidden agreements that allow the buyer to pay less than the stated,
presumably fixed, sales price.
Royalties
Sometimes prices are difficult to determine, particularly if the product
is to be combined with other products before being sold to an end user.
Such sales may involve a royalty payment that is a function of the selling
price. It would be inappropriate to book anticipated future royalties as
current revenues until the amount of those royalties becomes fixed upon
ultimate sale. Minimum royalties, however, may be booked when they
become due. Fraud occurs when royalties are recognized on fictitious or
anticipated ultimate sales. Such royalty arrangements, however, typi-
cally require the royalty payor to report to the royalty recipient the
quantity of ultimate sales on a periodic (usually quarterly) basis. This
permits an accounting of the final sales that can be used to verify reported
royalty income.
Side Agreements
The more deceptive form of fraud used to circumvent the fixed price
requirement is the clandestine use of side letters or arrangements that
allow for refunds or discounts at the buyer’s option or in certain circum-
stances. Under tight market conditions, or perhaps because the product
is new and untested, it may be necessary to use these side letters to make
a sale.
The most likely candidates for this type of fraud are sales personnel
with some discretion and authority, such as divisional managers and
above. Implementation of such a scheme requires their authority to alter
records or invent excuses should the buyer exercise his or her rights
under the side agreement. As a general rule, side letters are the result
of some type of internal control failure when the divisional manager is
able to effect economic outcomes and alter accounting records.
These side letters are quite hard to detect because the buyer usually
realizes he or she is receiving a special deal and does not want to publicize
it. Of course, the fraudsters in the selling company will attempt to keep
such agreements secret. These schemes must come to the surface if the
buyer exercises his or her rights under the agreement. A more senior
member of management is usually involved to cover up the refund with
a fabricated reason or another transaction. Nevertheless, there is usually
some documentation of the refund if corporate controls are in place. The
page 178 05-09-03 12:46:32
Chapter 13: Recognizing Fictitious Revenues 179
CPA who suspects the existence of side letters can certainly look for
refunds and discounts that are out of the ordinary.
The CPA, however, should keep in mind that the customer probably
demanded the right to obtain a refund or discount in the course of negotia-
tions for the sale. To catch the existence of side letters before refund
demands are made, a suspicious CPA may review sales files for correspon-
dence, notes, or other evidence of such demands from the prospective
customer. Further, if the products involved require personnel, such as
engineers, to install or service the products, those personnel not directly
reporting to the fraudsters may know details of the side agreement. An
inquiry from the CPA to the service personnel may unearth significant
information about the sales transaction, about customer demands and
how those demands were handled. It is also likely that if fraudsters used
side letters with one customer, there might be side letters with other
customers as well.
RECEIVABLES ARE NOT COLLECTIBLE
Financially weak firms may not pay their bills. To prevent sales to firms
in poor financial condition, some type of customer-approval process inde-
pendent of the sales function needs to be in place to assess customer
health, especially if the customer is placing large orders. This review
function should be integrated with the approval process for customer
refunds and discounts to prevent the implementation of side letters, which
also affect collectibility, as previously discussed. From a CPA’s point
of view, an unusual concentration of orders from small or distressed
customers, particularly near the end of a reporting period or a sales
campaign, should raise concerns.
Fraudsters attempt to hide the customers’ poor financial condition
by fabricating financial statements, misrepresenting the buyer’s financial
condition, or falsely representing that there are adequate financial guar-
antees. Typically, to accommodate these misrepresentations, the
fraudsters extend credit and payment terms so that, when the seller’s
financial statements are prepared, the financially weak customer’s lack
of payment is not an immediate red flag. The CPA may be able to detect
such a scheme, though, by combining analysis of changes in credit policies
with analysis of new customers. New customers buying significant quanti-
ties of product near period end under relaxed credit terms should be
carefully reviewed. If the new customers do not publish or provide audited
financial statements and lack other means of verification, they may be
potential fraud vehicles.
The following scenario is drawn from SEC corporate governance
proposals setting out a disclosure mechanism for ‘‘critical accounting
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estimates.’’2 It illustrates the issues involved in revenue recognition, set
in foreign countries.
Example Scenario. MQB Corp., based in San Diego, California, is a
developer and marketer of desktop publishing software. MQB’s custom-
ers consist of third-party distributors, resellers, and retailers, and,
collectively, they constitute MQB’s channels of distribution. MQB’s
products are sold in a highly competitive market, and to accommodate
its customers, MQB has a liberal product return policy that has histori-
cally accepted significant product returns. MQB permits its customers
to return software titles published and distributed by the company
within 120 days of purchase. This policy allows the customers to return
product to MQB should a competitor’s product or weakened economic
conditions affect sales.
MQB recognized revenues under SOP 97-2, Software Revenue Rec-
ognition. MQB recognizes revenue upon shipment of its software prod-
ucts, provided that payment collection determined to be probable and
no significant obligations on MQB’s part remain. At the time revenue
is recorded, MQB accounts for estimated future returns by reducing
sales by its estimate of future returns and by reducing accounts receiv-
able by the same amount. For example, MQB reduced its gross sales
and accounts receivable by 12 percent for its current fiscal year to
reflect estimated product returns. In the last three years, the range in
which the company has reduced its gross sales and accounts receivable
to reflect product returns has been between 11 percent and 13 percent.
MQB had recently expanded into Europe and established a sepa-
rate division for its European operations based outside Paris. The
European division head had been heavily recruited and, when he came
on board six months earlier, he had insisted on complete autonomy to
design and implement his marketing plan. ‘‘After all,’’ the division head
stated, ‘‘the European market is quite different from the American and
requires a completely different approach.’’ That autonomy extended to
financial as well as marketing operations management in Europe, but
the European controller had a ‘‘dotted line’’ or secondary reporting
2 This example is expanded from examples in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Releases No. 33-8098 and No. 34-45907, Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analy-
sis about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies, to illustrate certain aspects of
financial reporting fraud. Additional assumptions are added to the SEC examples. Subse-
quently, the SEC-recommended disclosures to the audit committee are presented to illus-
trate how those disclosures would have increased the likelihood of fraud detection. The
examples, as shown, reflect the opinions of the author and not the SEC. The reader is
encouraged to read the SEC releases in their entirety, which are included as an appendix
to this book.
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requirement to the corporate controller in the United States. The Euro-
pean division head hired all personnel, drawing upon French colleagues
he had worked with while at previous firms. With the exception of a
few software technicians who had to come from the United States
because no one in Europe was yet trained, he declined to take on any
other American personnel. ‘‘French laws are very restrictive,’’ he said,
‘‘and impose onerous taxes on foreign workers.’’ The software techni-
cians were on call to help with potential integration problems with
MQB’s larger corporate customers.
While the division head commanded a sizeable compensation pack-
age, MQB senior management had insisted on setting performance
goals that, if met, would constitute a substantial part of the cash and
company stock he was to receive. The company, overall, was straining
to meet the forecast financial results published by securities analysts
and could not afford to carry an unprofitable division any longer; by
this point in time, the European division had to show profitability in
the current quarter or the company would miss the consensus earnings
target set by analysts. The division manager’s compensation was also
tied to achieving profitability in the current quarter.
When he came on board six months earlier, the European division
head had initiated a three-prong strategy that targeted:
1. Direct sales to large corporate customers.
2. Sales to the rapidly growing number of resellers that were achieving
significant market penetration among small businesses in both Great
Britain and on the continent.
3. Sales to retailers that were opening new stores in areas with well-
educated and technically savvy populations, such as Germany.
For the current quarter, the sales goal needed to achieve target
operating income was, in euros, C= 3,200,000 (or about US$3.1 million).
The marketing efforts were moving slowly and, toward the end of
the current quarter, the division was behind its sales goal with only
C= 1,700,000 booked and was headed toward reporting another operating
loss. Sales to major accounts had been slow because a weakened Euro-
pean economy had stalled corporate buyers. Sales to resellers were
also disappointing because they were more difficult to identify and
reach than previously thought, and retailers reported that their inven-
tory stocks were high and did not need more product.
One week before the end of the quarter, the situation was critical.
The division head met with his marketing director to discuss plans
they had developed earlier in case sales were short of their goal. The
marketing director then contacted two potential customers that were
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retailers with multiple store locations throughout Germany, Computer-
Werken AG in Dusseldorf and UberComputer AG in Bonn, to see if
they could make their purchase decisions before the quarter ended. On
another front, the division head contacted Compagnie des Machines
Franc¸aise SA in Tours, a large integrated computer and chip manufac-
turer, to see if that firm could proceed with its purchase.
All the last-minute efforts met with apparent success as large
purchase orders were faxed in to the Paris office. The German retailers
had ordered about C= 500,000 each and the French distributor ordered
C= 700,000. The software was packed and shipped over the last few days
remaining in the quarter, and, with those sales, the European division
was set to report a larger-than-expected operating income for the quar-
ter of C= 3,400,000.
When the sales contracts were faxed to San Diego, the corporate
controller contacted the European division head with some questions.
First, with regard to the German firms, the terms of the sale did not
require payment until 120 days; MQB’s standard policy was for pay-
ment to be received within 30 days. The division head responded that
a provision of German law, the Ladenschlussgesetz, requires that Ger-
man retailers purchasing product originating outside the European
Union be allowed extra time to pay to effect currency conversion and
transfer of funds. When asked why this provision was not stated in
sales agreements with other German retailers, the division head
responded that, with the prior sales agreements, ‘‘we were techni-
cally violating the law, but I wanted to get into compliance with these
two orders because the quantities were so much larger than the
others.’’
The corporate controller then asked if the European sales group
had complied with company policies to obtain and review the financial
statements of firms purchasing more than US$100,000 (roughly
C= 102,000), and the division head replied, ‘‘Certainly!’’ In actuality, for
the German firms, the division head had only an unaudited, German-
language income statement and balance sheet for each, with little
footnote commentary. These financial statements did satisfy MQB’s
credit requirements, though, because the credit policies did not require
audited financial statements from customers unless orders for a given
quarter exceeded US$500,000. As the orders from each of the German
firms were about C= 500,000, which translated to about US$490,000,
audited statements were not required. Because Compagnie des
Machines Franc¸aise was publicly traded, it did have audited financial
statements, prepared in accordance with International Accounting
Standards (IAS). The IAS financial statements satisfied the credit
requirements for the French distributor’s C= 700,000 order because, when
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MQB opened its European office, it made allowances in its credit policy
for firms reporting on standards other than U.S. GAAP.
When the corporate controller received the financial data, she saw
that both German firms appeared to have substantial assets in excess
of liabilities, but most of the assets consisted of goodwill. The corporate
controller readily saw that her ability to understand the financial data,
particularly the income statement, was limited and called the European
controller, who confirmed that the firms indeed did have substantial
earnings. One oddity that the U.S. corporate controller noticed were
statements in the otherwise scarce footnotes that both companies had
Dutch shareholders with Netherlands Antilles charters, but she did
not think to pursue that issue because it seemed irrelevant.
As for the sale to the French firm, the corporate controller had
only one question about a condition in the sales agreement referencing
to ‘‘l’action du Ministe`re d’Etat Provencial.’’ She asked what that meant,
and the division head said, ‘‘Don’t worry about that—all contracts with
companies that are owned by the government have that clause.’’ ‘‘I
didn’t realize we were selling to the French government,’’ replied the
corporate controller, and the division head responded, ‘‘Oh, not really,
Compagnie des Machines Franc¸aise is publicly held and traded on the
Paris Bourse; its just that the government is the largest shareholder.’’
According to the division head, the clause meant that the contract was
‘‘subject to government review,’’ which he insisted was perfunctory.
Because the explanations seemed plausible, and because all mem-
bers of MQB senior management desperately wanted the European
division to begin reporting operating profits, the corporate controller
decided to recognize these last-minute revenues. MQB reported earn-
ings for the quarter that fell within the range of analysts’ estimates,
and the stock price continued its climb that had run for several quarters
in a row.
Pursuant to company practice, the controller’s staff prepared an
estimate of sales returns under MQB’s 120-day return policy. However,
the company’s sales history in Europe was limited, so the staff based
their estimates for European sales on the company’s sales return expe-
rience in the United States. The company’s overall sales return estimate
was 12 percent, so the staff set European returns at C= 408,000 for the
quarter just ended.
As the following quarter’s European results were reported to San
Diego, the corporate controller noticed additional large sales to the
German and French firms. The corporate controller, not entirely com-
fortable with the large concentrations of sales to a few firms, carefully
analyzed accounts receivable agings on a monthly basis. She was satis-
fied to see that, while the large firms’ balances owed to MQB grew,
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intermittent payments were also being recorded. However, full pay-
ment never came within the 120-day period.
Pursuant to the company’s internal control policies, the corporate
controller dispatched an internal auditor to review the sales, returns,
and receivables records of the European division (external auditors did
not see European operations to be sufficiently material to merit on-
site visits). The auditor spent much of her time verifying receivables
and tying those receivables to cash remittances. She noticed that the
software engineers never seemed to be very busy, but the European
controller stated that ‘‘there just were not many calls for assistance’’
from their large corporate customers.
Then, suddenly, without explanation, the European division head
departed to take a position with Compagnie des Machines Franc¸aise.
The corporate controller decided she would make a trip to Paris to take
a look at the financial records before a new division head was appointed.
When she arrived, she uncovered a number of disturbing facts:
• The German firms, ComputerWerken and UberComputer, were both
experiencing financial difficulty and collectibility of the balances
outstanding was highly uncertain. When the corporate controller
asked the European controller why the firms were in such poor
financial condition when the income statements they tendered
looked so strong, her European counterpart responded that the Ger-
man economy must have turned down ‘‘very suddenly.’’ When the
corporate controller asked how many retail locations each firm had
running, she was surprised to hear that there were no more than
five between the two firms. The U.S. internal auditor did not address
this issue because, at the time of her visit, most of the sales were
within the 120-day payment period and were not past due.
• The corporate controller discovered that the French customer, Com-
pagnie des Machines Franc¸aise, under instruction of the Ministe`re
d’Etat Provencial, had actually rejected the software shipments
under provisions of a domestic content law: Government-controlled
firms were supposed to purchase certain products only from French
firms. Because the software had been developed in the United States,
and there were French alternatives available, the company was
required to purchase from the French competitor even though its
software reliability, scalability, and technical support were inferior.
• Payments had been ‘‘inadvertently’’ posted to the account of Compag-
nie des Machines Franc¸aise, according to the European controller,
presenting the appearance that the customer had accepted delivery
and was paying. The U.S. auditor had not picked up on this issue.
The incorrectly posted payments were made by wire transfers, and
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when she examined the wire records, she was not able to trace them
beyond the originating bank. Figuring that other customers would
complain if the payments had been misapplied, she passed on
attempting to source the wire transfers further.
• When asked why more licenses and product were sold to Compagnie
des Machines Franc¸aise after the large initial sale, the European
controller had no explanation other than ‘‘it must have taken some
time for the government ministry to act.’’
The following day, the European controller and the sales manager
resigned, and both went to work for Compagnie des Machines Fran-
c¸aise. The corporate controller spent the day on the phone explaining
to the chief financial officer that MQB was faced with having to take
a charge for previous quarter sales to these companies in the range of
C= 1.5 million (net of allowance for returns) and that current quarter
sales were also much lower than previously reported.
Example Analysis. This scenario illustrates the ‘‘dumb American’’
theme repeated so many times when U.S. companies naı¨vely forge into
foreign markets. It also illustrates the difficulty in catching revenue
recognition fraud in the short-run.
The situation was worse than the corporate controller detected in
that the fraud was much more devious; all that the controller saw were
the consequences of the fraud. First, though, for the record, the French
and German companies in the scenario are fictitious, as is the French
ministry. To some extent, the French domestic content law and the
Netherlands Antilles restrictions are fabrications, but such laws are
common and can snag or fool the unwary. However, the German Laden-
schlussgesetz is quite real and does apply to retail stores, but the law
sets out the hours of operations for those stores, not the terms under
which stores make payments on bills.
The warning flags were numerous, but it would have required a
controller experienced in European operations to catch most of them.
Beginning with the German companies, the accountants who prepared
the unaudited financial statements nevertheless found it important to
mention the Netherlands Antilles charters for a reason: Under certain
provisions, Dutch law restricts the disclosure of the identities of share-
holders when a company is chartered in the Dutch protectorate. Cer-
tainly, then, firms that are chartered in known tax havens should merit
extra scrutiny.
In this case, the retail store chains were probably related, and
while definitively determining common ownership could have been
quite difficult given Dutch legal constraints, a related-party red flag
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should have gone up based on other facts. First, aside from tax reasons,
one should wonder why firms operating in Germany need Netherlands
Antilles charters unless they are availing themselves of the Dutch
secrecy provisions. Second, the large sales to the two chains were split
evenly between two firms in the same geographic market and with the
same peculiar ownership structure, and the split sales were just under
amounts that would have triggered MQB’s more stringent credit screen-
ing requirements.
Another troubling fact is that both chains were relatively small
(each chain consisting of at most three stores) and yet those stores were
ordering large quantities of product, making only occasional payments.
The corporate controller also overlooked important industry indicators
that were signaling that other retailers throughout Europe had a glut
of product and were cutting back on new orders. The controller should
have asked, ‘‘What makes their stores different?’’
The financial statements of the German firms had red flags as
well. The corporate controller noticed large quantities of goodwill on
the firms’ balance sheets. She did not understand, though, that, under
German GAAP, in some cases goodwill is amortized to equity and not
as an expense, and impairment testing will not become mandated, if
ever, until IAS is implemented more widely. By failing to gain a better
understanding of the principles that governed financial statement prep-
aration, that controller was easily misled about the profitability of the
German firms because amortization of significant quantities of goodwill
was omitted from the income statement.
Finally, in spite of the fact that the U.S. corporate controller was
bamboozled by the European division head’s mischaracterization of the
Ladenschlussgesetz, she should have recognized that the extension of
payment terms to 120 days, combined with the 120-day return policy,
meant that the products were effectively sold on consignment. No pay-
ment would be made until the customer’s return privilege expired;
therefore, the customer had nothing invested in the purchase until
that point in time. At the very least, assuming the controller were able
to make a convincing argument for recognizing revenue on the date of
the transaction, the returns allowance should have been increased
significantly.
As for the French firm, it is clear that the corporate controller
should have gained a better understanding of local laws and procedures,
especially when dealing with a different, in this case socialist, govern-
ment system. However, there were other clues that something was not
right. The internal auditor noticed, but failed to report, that the soft-
ware technicians were mostly idle. If she had talked with them, they
may have told her that they thought it odd that after a major corporate
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account purchased a significant amount of software, there were no
requests for help with integration issues.
Further, because the technicians were not a part of the team hired
by the European division head, they may have been more forthcoming.
The division head succeeded in defrauding MQB largely with the help
of the European controller and the marketing director, who were both
rewarded later with jobs at the firm that subsequently hired the division
head. It is doubtful, though, that the division head would have
attempted to bring the technicians into his scheme because he did not
know them as well as he knew the others he had hired. The division
head was able to gather all the conspirators he needed because he had
complete hiring autonomy; the technicians were the weak link in his
scheme that the internal auditor overlooked.
Overall, the returns allowance was quite insufficient, and not just
because the corporate controller missed the warnings already dis-
cussed. Applying returns data from the United States to Europe was
not supportable. A more reasonable estimate should have come from
the returns experience of other firms in Europe, or, if that data were
not available, MQB should have used a significantly larger estimate
reflecting the weakened European economy relative to the United
States. Monitoring the inventory levels of its customers in Europe
would also have signaled that higher returns were likely.
Clearly, one can see that the returns allowance was a ‘‘critical
accounting estimate’’ for MQB. In this example, had the allowance been
under audit committee review, the likelihood is greater that committee
members would have asked some probing questions—questions that
management was not so eager to ask given the need to hit analysts’
consensus estimates. Those questions likely would have started with
why the European estimate was not more carefully researched. Then
there may have been questions about the large sales to three European
firms that were not known to U.S. managers. Those questions may
have caused the corporate controller to make her visit to Europe earlier
to meet with the customers personally. With an active and engaged
audit committee, then, issues that get glossed over by management
eager to achieve financial targets may be brought under more intense
scrutiny at an earlier date.
If MQB management were required to present its ‘‘critical account-
ing estimates’’ to the audit committee for review, the SEC staff sug-
gested the following disclosure:
Our recognition of revenue from sales to distributors and
retailers (the ‘‘distribution channel’’) is impacted by
agreements we have giving them rights to return our soft-
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ware titles within 120 days after purchase. At the time we
recognize revenue, upon shipment of our software products,
we reduce our measurements of those sales by our estimate
of future returns and we also reduce our measurements of
accounts receivable by the same amount.
For our products, a historical correlation exists between
the amount of distribution channel inventory and the
amount of returns that actually occur. The greater the distri-
bution channel inventory, the more product returns we
expect. For each of our products, we monitor levels of product
sales and inventory at our distributors’ warehouses and at
retailers as part of our effort to reach an appropriate account-
ing estimate for returns. In estimating returns, we analyze
historical returns, current inventory in the distribution
channel, current economic trends, changes in consumer
demand, introduction of new competing software and accep-
tance of our products.
Of course, in this example, MQB failed to perform such an analysis
for the European operations. The audit committee, though, could have
used this statement as the benchmark by which to judge the adequacy
of the methodology used to estimate the European returns allowance.
CONCLUSION
Frequently, revenue recognition fraud is difficult to detect in the short-
run. The schemes usually depend on improving sales in future quarters
to provide cover for the fraudsters: The fraudsters hope that improved
sales will allow them to charge off the phony sales they booked earlier
without anyone noticing or minding. If future sales do not improve,
though, the fraud schemes become more difficult to cover up. Customers
who did not order product begin to complain, deadbeats who will not pay
come to light, and buyers with side agreements begin to exercise their
right to return product. These developments usually reveal the fraud
scheme.
The best chance the CPA has to catch this kind of fraud is to throw
a broad net when asking questions. The CPA should always strive to
determine the economic justification of a transaction, particularly if one
customer is buying product in quantities that are unusually high relative
to other firms in that industry. The CPA should spend some time talking
with people outside the accounting function of a firm; those employees
in service, shipping, and sales may possess knowledge that clearly points
to fraud. Finally, as the example illustrates, the CPA should be especially
wary of grants of autonomy to division or subsidiary heads because the
autonomy allows them to override controls or form conspiracies to imple-
ment their fraud schemes.
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PROPOSED RULE: DISCLOSURE IN
MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION
AND ANALYSIS ABOUT THE
APPLICATION OF CRITICAL
ACCOUNTING POLICIES*
[Author’s Note: Even prior to the bankruptcy of Enron, the Securities and
Exchange Commission staff had discussed the concept of companies making
disclosure of critical accounting policies and estimates. In May of 2002, the
SEC proposed this rule to better define the disclosure concept. When the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted in June 2002, Section 204 of the
Act required auditors to discuss critical accounting policies in reports made
to audit committees. The Act also incorporated other concepts discussed in
the proposed rule. This book expands upon the examples given in this
proposed rule.
Appendix A reproduces relevant portions of the rule for this book’s discussion
only. The complete rule is available on the SEC’s Web site.]
Proposed Rule: Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and
Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies
Securities and Exchange Commission
17 CFR Parts 228, 229 and 249
*Source: The complete proposed rule can be found at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-
8098.htm.
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[Release Nos. 33-8098; 34-45907
International Series Release No. 1258
File No. S7-16-02]
RIN 3235-AI44
Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about the Appli-
cation of Critical Accounting Policies
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’)
Action: Notice of proposed rulemaking
Summary: As an initial step in improving the transparency of companies’
financial disclosure, the Commission is proposing disclosure requirements
that would enhance investors’ understanding of the application of companies’
critical accounting policies. The proposals would encompass disclosure in
two areas: accounting estimates a company makes in applying its accounting
policies and the initial adoption by a company of an accounting policy that
has a material impact on its financial presentation. Under the first part of
the proposals, a company would have to identify the accounting estimates
reflected in its financial statements that required it to make assumptions
about matters that were highly uncertain at the time of estimation. Disclosure
about those estimates would then be required if different estimates that the
company reasonably could have used in the current period, or changes in
the accounting estimate that are reasonably likely to occur from period to
period, would have a material impact on the presentation of the company’s
financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of operations. A
company’s disclosure about these critical accounting estimates would include
a discussion of: the methodology and assumptions underlying them; the
effect the accounting estimates have on the company’s financial presentation;
and the effect of changes in the estimates. Under the second part of the
proposals, a company that has initially adopted an accounting policy with a
material impact would have to disclose information that includes: what gave
rise to the initial adoption; the impact of the adoption; the accounting principle
adopted and method of applying it; and the choices it had among accounting
principles. Companies would place all of the new disclosure in the ‘‘Manage-
ment’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Opera-
tions’’ section (commonly referred to as ‘‘MD&A’’) of their annual reports,
registration statements and proxy and information statements. In addition,
in the MD&A section of their quarterly reports, U.S. companies would have
to update the information regarding their critical accounting estimates to
disclose material changes.
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Dates: Comments should be received on or before July 19, 2002.
Addresses: You should send three copies of your comments to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth
Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549-0609. You also may submit your com-
ments electronically to the following address: rule-comments@sec.gov. All
comment letters should refer to File No. S7-16-02; this file number should
be included in the subject line if you use electronic mail. Comment letters
will be available for public inspection and copying at the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549-0102. We
will post electronically-submitted comment letters on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov). We do not edit personal identifying
information, such as names or electronic mail addresses, from electronic
submissions. Submit only information you wish to make publicly available.
For Further Information Contact: Questions about this release should be
referred to Anita Klein or Andrew Thorpe, Division of Corporation Finance
(202-942-2980) or Jackson Day or Jenifer Minke-Girard, Office of the Chief
Accountant (202-942-4400), Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth
Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549.
Supplementary Information:
We are proposing amendments to Item 3031 of Regulation S-K,2 Item 3033
of Regulation S-B4 and Item 5 of Form 20-F5 under the Securities Exchange
Act of 19346 (‘‘Exchange Act’’).
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I. Executive Summary
One important challenge facing our capital markets today is the need to
improve the quality and transparency of corporate disclosure. Our capital
markets could reach a higher level of efficiency and investor confidence if
companies were to provide higher-quality, more insightful financial informa-
tion. To serve that purpose, we issued cautionary advice in December 2001
regarding MD&A disclosure.7 In that release, we recognized the need for
disclosure that allows investors to understand more completely the manner
in which, and degree to which, a company’s reported operating results,
financial condition and changes in financial condition depend on estimates
involved in applying accounting policies that entail uncertainties and subjec-
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tivity. We also asked companies to begin better addressing investors’ need
for this disclosure.
As contemplated in that release, we are now proposing to amend the
MD&A requirements8 to mandate improved disclosure in a new ‘‘Application
of Critical Accounting Policies’’ section in companies’ filed annual reports,
annual reports to shareholders, registration statements and proxy and infor-
mation statements.9 The new section would encompass disclosure both about
accounting estimates resulting from the application of critical accounting
policies and the initial adoption of accounting policies that have a material
impact on a company’s financial presentation. The proposed disclosure
requirements would apply to all companies except small business issuers
that have not had revenues from operations during the last two fiscal years.
The proposed MD&A disclosure requirements would cover the most recent
fiscal year and any subsequent interim period for which financial statements
are required to be presented.
To determine whether an accounting estimate10 involved in applying the
company’s accounting policies would entail disclosure under the proposals,
a company would have to answer two questions:
1. Did the accounting estimate require us to make assumptions about matters
that were highly uncertain at the time the accounting estimate was made?
2. Would different estimates that we reasonably could have used in the
current period, or changes in the accounting estimate that are reasonably
likely to occur from period to period, have a material impact on the presenta-
tion of our financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of
operations?
If the answers to both questions are ‘‘yes,’’ the accounting estimate would
be a ‘‘critical accounting estimate,’’ and disclosure would be required in the
new ‘‘Application of Critical Accounting Policies’’ section.
The proposed disclosure about these accounting estimates would involve
three basic elements.11 The first element would be the basic disclosures
needed to understand the accounting estimates. A company would have to
describe them, identify where and how they affect the company’s reported
financial results, financial condition and changes in financial condition, and,
where material, identify the affected line items. It would have to describe the
methodology underlying each critical accounting estimate, the assumptions
that are about highly uncertain matters and other assumptions that are
material. If applicable, a company would have to discuss why it could have
chosen in the current period estimates that would have had a materially
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different impact on the company’s financial presentation. Similarly, a com-
pany would have to discuss, if applicable, why the accounting estimate is
reasonably likely to change in future periods with a material impact on the
company’s financial presentation.12
A company would have to identify the segments13 of its business that a
critical accounting estimate affects. A company also would have to provide
appropriate parts of the proposed disclosure for affected segments where a
failure to present that information would result in an omission that renders
the disclosure materially misleading.
The second element of the proposed disclosure about critical accounting
estimates would give investors a better understanding of the sensitivity of
the reported operating results and financial condition to changes in those
estimates or their underlying assumption(s). For each critical accounting
estimate, a company would discuss changes that would result either from:
(i) making reasonably possible, near-term changes in the most material
assumption(s) underlying the estimate; or (ii) using in place of the recorded
estimate the ends of the range of reasonably possible amounts which the
company likely determined when formulating its recorded estimate. The com-
pany would describe the impact of those changes on the company’s overall
financial performance and, to the extent material, on the line items in the
company’s financial statements. In addition, the proposals would require a
quantitative and qualitative discussion of management’s history of changing
its critical accounting estimates in recent years.
The third element of the proposed disclosure about critical accounting esti-
mates would require a company to state whether or not senior management
discussed the development, selection and disclosure of those estimates with
the company’s audit committee. This part of the proposals is designed to
inform investors about whether there is oversight of critical accounting esti-
mates by audit committee members and may incidentally encourage such
oversight and increase reliability of the proposed MD&A disclosure about
critical accounting estimates.
Our proposals also address MD&A disclosure regarding initial adoption of
an accounting policy. If an accounting policy initially adopted by a company
had a material impact on the company’s financial presentation, the company
would provide certain disclosures about that initial adoption unless it resulted
solely from new accounting literature issued by a recognized accounting
standard setter. The initial adoption of an accounting policy may occur in
situations such as when events or transactions affecting the company occur
for the first time, or were previously immaterial in their effect but become
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material, or events or transactions occur that are clearly different in substance
from previous ones.
The proposed MD&A disclosure about the initial adoption of accounting
policies seeks more qualitative information from companies about those types
of situations. The disclosures we are proposing would include a description of:
• The events or transactions that gave rise to the initial adoption;
• The accounting principle adopted and the method of applying that principle;
and
• The impact, discussed qualitatively, on the company’s financial presenta-
tion.
In addition, if upon initial adoption the company had a choice between accept-
able accounting principles under generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), the company would disclose that it made a choice, explain the
alternatives and state why it made the choice that it did. Further, if no
accounting literature governed the accounting upon initial adoption, the com-
pany would have to explain which accounting principle and method of applica-
tion it decided to use and how it made its decision.
All of the proposed MD&A disclosure regarding the application of critical
accounting policies would have to be presented in language and a format
that is clear, concise and understandable to the average investor. Boilerplate
disclosures, or disclosures written in overly technical accounting terminology,
would not satisfy the proposed requirements.
Our proposals do not attempt to address all circumstances where a company
may exercise discretion in its accounting under GAAP. We focus our propos-
als on two areas involving the application of critical accounting policies in
which there is a clear need for improved disclosure—critical accounting
estimates and the initial adoption of accounting policies that have a material
impact. As discussed below, disclosure in many other areas of accounting
judgment is provided by existing MD&A requirements, materiality standards
and financial statement disclosure requirements.
II. Background
A. Current MD&A Disclosure
For decades, the regulations governing disclosure in registration statements
under the Securities Act of 1933 (‘‘Securities Act’’) and the Exchange Act,
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as well as annual and quarterly reports and proxy and information statements
by public companies under the Exchange Act, have mandated MD&A disclo-
sure.14 MD&A disclosure should satisfy three related objectives:
1. to provide a narrative explanation of companies’ financial statements that
enables investors to see the company through the eyes of management;
2. to improve overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which
financial statements should be analyzed; and
3. to provide information about the quality of, and potential variability of, a
company’s earnings and cash flow, so that investors can ascertain the
likelihood that past performance is indicative of future performance.15
In MD&A, a company must discuss its results of operations, liquidity and
capital resources and other information necessary to an understanding of
the company’s financial condition or changes in financial condition. A well-
prepared MD&A discussion focuses on explaining a company’s financial
results and condition by identifying key elements of the business model and
the drivers and dynamics of the business, and also addressing key variables.
A company currently must disclose known trends, demands, commitments,
events and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to occur and have material
effects.16
In addition to these general subjects, a company must include in MD&A
historical and prospective analysis of its financial statements, and identify
the cause of material changes from prior periods in the line items of the
financial statements where those changes are reflected. A company must
analyze significant components of revenues or expenses needed to under-
stand the results of operations. It also must discuss significant or unusual
economic events or transactions that materially affected results of operations.
Finally, a company also must discuss its ability to generate adequate amounts
of cash to meet its short-term and long-term needs for capital and identify
the anticipated sources of funds necessary to fulfill its commitments.
These requirements do not call for, and indeed we have discouraged and
continue to discourage companies from providing, rote calculations of per-
centage changes in figures in the financial statements combined with boiler-
plate recitations of a surfeit of inadequately differentiated material and
immaterial factors related to such changes. Rather, companies should
emphasize material factors and their underlying reasons and preferably omit,
or at least differentiate, immaterial information.
Recognizing the paramount importance of MD&A information to investors,
in addition to today’s proposal, we intend to continue to focus on improving
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disclosure in this area. In particular, we are considering MD&A proposals
that will focus discussion on the three key objectives of MD&A noted above.
We are considering a more explicit requirement for a summary of the
MD&A section that would, in relatively short form, identify what management
considers the most important factors in determining its financial results and
condition, including the principal factors driving them, the principal trends on
which management focuses and the principal risks to the business. We also
are considering how to adjust the relative attention devoted in MD&A towards
a more general discussion of material matters and away from a detailed
description of business results that too often recites information that is other-
wise available or is not material to investors.
In addition, we are continuing our consideration of subjects as to which
we believe MD&A disclosure is particularly important, including the topics
discussed in our January 22, 2002 release regarding MD&A.17 For example,
investors have become increasingly concerned about the sufficiency of dis-
closure regarding structured finance transactions, including those consum-
mated using special purpose entities. A company’s relationships with those
types of entities may facilitate its transfer of, or access to, assets. Investors
need to know more about the liquidity risk, market price risks and effects of
‘‘off-balance sheet’’ transaction structures and obligations. Another item of
concern is a lack of transparent disclosure about transactions where that
information appeared necessary to understand how significant aspects of
the business were conducted. Investors would better understand financial
statements in many circumstances if MD&A included descriptions of all mate-
rial transactions involving related persons or entities, with a clear discussion
of terms that differ from those which would likely be negotiated with clearly
independent parties. Investors should understand these transactions’ busi-
ness purpose and economic substance, their effects on the financial state-
ments, and any special risks or contingencies arising from them.
Finally, we are considering improvements to MD&A disclosures relating to
trend information. We believe that investors may be better able to see the
company through management’s eyes if MD&A includes information about
the trends that a company’s management follows and evaluates in making
decisions about how to guide the company’s business. As with today’s pro-
posal, that disclosure would naturally entail a certain degree of forward-
looking information.
B. Current Disclosure in Financial Statements about Accounting
Estimates
Currently, GAAP and generally accepted auditing standards acknowledge
that there are numerous circumstances in which companies, in applying
page 197 05-09-03 13:00:19
198 Financial Reporting Fraud
accounting policies, exercise judgment and make estimates for purposes of
the financial statements. For example, they call for companies to communi-
cate in a number of circumstances about the use of estimates in the prepara-
tion of financial information. The use of estimates results in the presentation
of many amounts that are in fact approximate rather than exact.18 For exam-
ple, APB No. 20 notes that ‘‘changes in estimates used in accounting are
necessary consequences of periodic presentation of financial statements’’
because preparing financial statements requires estimating the effects of
future events, and future events and their effects cannot be perceived with
certainty.19 Estimating the impact of those events therefore requires the
exercise of judgment. Because the preparation of financial statements
requires estimates that are likely to change over time, APB No. 20 requires
disclosure about changes in estimates that are expected to affect several
future reporting periods and that are not made each period in the ordinary
course of accounting. It recommends disclosure if the effects of other changes
in the estimate are material.20
In addition, AICPA Statement of Position No. 94-621 requires general disclo-
sure in notes to financial statements that the preparation of financial state-
ments requires the use of estimates in the determination of the carrying
amounts of assets or liabilities, including gain or loss contingencies.22 That
Statement also requires note disclosure regarding those specific estimates
when known information indicates that it is at least reasonably possible23
that the estimate will change in the near term and the effect would be material
to the financial statements.24 A company must disclose the nature of the
uncertainty, in addition to stating that a change in the estimate in the near
term is at least reasonably possible. SOP 94-6, encourages, but does not
require, disclosure of the factors that cause an estimate to be susceptible
to change from period to period.25
SOP 94-6 references SFAS No. 5, which itself requires certain disclosures
about accounting estimates -- specifically, estimated losses that arise from
loss contingencies. A company is required to accrue (by a charge to income)
an estimated loss from a loss contingency if certain criteria are met.26 If an
estimated loss does not meet the criteria for accrual, but there is at least a
reasonable possibility that a loss may have been incurred, the company is
required to disclose the nature of the contingency and an estimate of the
possible loss or range of loss, or state that an estimate of the loss cannot be
made. Although SFAS No. 5 elicits useful disclosure about certain accounting
estimates, not all uncertainties inherent in the accounting process give rise
to loss contingencies as that term is used in SFAS No. 5, and therefore that
Statement does not apply to all estimates in the financial statements.27
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Further, while not specifically requiring disclosure about estimates, APB
Opinion No. 22 requires disclosure about the application of accounting poli-
cies which may entail generalized disclosure about estimation techniques.28
APB No. 22 notes that a company’s accounting principles, and their method
of application, can affect significantly the presentation of its financial position,
results of operations and cash flows,29 and accordingly, requires disclosure
that describes those accounting principles and the company’s methods of
applying them.30 In particular, APB No. 22 indicates that a company should
provide disclosure when:
• unusual or innovative applications of accounting principles materially affect
the determination of financial position, results of operations or cash flows
(such as the recognition of revenue);
• a selection is made among alternative permissible policies; or
• policies are unique to the industry of the reporting company.31
Under APB No. 22, a company’s disclosure also should encompass important
judgments as to appropriateness of principles relating to revenue recognition
and allocation of asset costs to current and future periods. Although the
particular format or location of these APB No. 22 disclosures in financial
statements is not prescribed by GAAP, a summary of these significant
accounting policies is customarily the first note to the financial statements.
Finally, some accounting standards currently prescribe specific disclosures
about accounting estimates or the underlying methodologies and assump-
tions.32 For example, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 132
requires specific disclosures of the assumptions used in accounting for pen-
sions and other post-retirement benefits.33 Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 140 requires disclosure regarding the measurement of
retained interests in securitized financial assets, including the methodology,
assumptions and sensitivity of the assumptions used in determining their fair
value.34
C. Current Disclosure in Financial Statements about Initial Adoption
of Accounting Policies
Certain general requirements under GAAP may elicit information about the
initial adoption of an accounting policy by a company. When companies
present comparative financial statements, any exceptions to comparability
between the most recent period and prior periods must be clearly presented.35
In addition, if a company initially adopts an accounting policy and considers
that policy to be a significant accounting policy, the company would provide
certain disclosures about that policy as required by APB No. 22.36
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APB No. 20 provides financial statement disclosure requirements for account-
ing changes, which include changes in an accounting principle, an accounting
estimate and the reporting entity.37 Neither ‘‘(a) the initial adoption of an
accounting principle in recognition of events or transactions occurring for the
first time or that previously were immaterial in their effect nor (b) adoption
or modification of an accounting principle necessitated by transactions or
events that are clearly different in substance from those previously occurring’’
are considered, however, to be ‘‘accounting changes’’ under GAAP.38 As
discussed below, our proposals about initial adoption of accounting policies
address these circumstances that are not accounting changes under GAAP
if they have a material impact on a company’s financial presentation.
III. PROPOSED RULES
A. Objectives of the Current Proposals
Our proposals would promote greater investor understanding of a company’s
important accounting estimates that reflect significant management judgment
and uncertainty, and of a company’s initial adoption of accounting policies
that may reflect such judgment and uncertainty. Our primary objectives are:
• to enhance investors’ understanding of the existence of, and necessity
for, estimation in a company’s financial statements;
• to focus investors on the important estimates that are particularly difficult
for management to determine and where management therefore exercises
significant judgment;
• to give investors an understanding of the impact those estimates have
on the presentation of a company’s financial condition, changes in financial
condition or results of operations;
• to give investors an appreciation for how sensitive those estimates are;
and
• to give investors an understanding of new material accounting policies as
they arise and affect a company’s financial results.
Our aim is to increase the transparency of the application of those accounting
policies where management is the most prone to use judgment, generally
because objective data and methodologies do not exist for the estimates or
management is given initial policy choices under GAAP. We believe that it
is these accounting policies that are least understood by investors and that
mandated disclosure regarding areas of the application of them would provide
meaningful insight into the importance of estimates and adoption of policies
to a company’s financial presentation. With a greater understanding of the
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application of critical accounting policies, we believe that investors would be
in a better position to assess the quality of, and potential variability of, a
company’s earnings.
We propose to mandate enhanced disclosure of critical accounting estimates
and initial adoption of material policies by specifically linking them to the
objectives of MD&A, and the type of disclosure presented in MD&A. A focused
discussion of these areas is well-suited to MD&A because it would further
explain to investors the company’s financial condition ‘‘through manage-
ment’s eyes.’’ Moreover, MD&A’s emphasis on disclosure of significant uncer-
tainties and favorable or unfavorable trends naturally dovetails with disclosure
of the more subjective aspects used in arriving at critical accounting estimates
or selecting which accounting policies to adopt initially. Finally, as we have
noted previously, the less technical language customarily used outside the
financial statements may be conducive to a clearer explanation to investors
of the effects of estimates, assumptions, methodologies and initial accounting
policy adoption on a company’s financial reporting.39
B. Scope of the Proposals
Our proposals address estimates that a company makes in preparing financial
statements using accounting policies under GAAP and the initial adoption
by a company of an accounting policy under GAAP that has a material impact
on its financial presentation.40 We believe the proposals address directly and
clearly two areas where there is a need for improved disclosure. While
certain elements of our proposed critical accounting estimates disclosure
are subsumed in existing general MD&A requirements, we believe more direct
and complete requirements in our rules would lead to improved disclosure. In
addition, while there are financial statement disclosure requirements that
would elicit certain information about initially adopted accounting policies in
some cases, our proposals are designed to provide additional MD&A disclo-
sure that would assist investors to understand better a company’s new
accounting policies.
We are leaving disclosure about other circumstances where a company
may exercise discretion over its accounting under GAAP to existing MD&A
disclosure requirements, materiality standards and existing financial state-
ment disclosure requirements. Our proposals do not, for example, alter disclo-
sure requirements regarding a company’s change from an accounting policy
it has been using to another policy acceptable under GAAP.41 The proposals
also do not require disclosure of a company’s adoption of a new accounting
pronouncement where the company must make its best judgment as to how
to apply the new accounting pronouncement in the absence of interpretive
guidance.
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Discipline surrounding a company’s changes in accounting policies is pro-
vided under GAAP and the federal securities laws. When a company changes
an accounting policy, the company must determine that the alternative princi-
ple is preferable under the circumstances.42 We require that the company
file a letter from its independent public accountant confirming its opinion to
that effect.43 In addition, a company is required to make certain disclosures
in the financial statements about the accounting change, including the nature
and justification for the change and its effect on income when the change
is made.44 In its justification for the change, the company is required to explain
clearly why the newly adopted accounting principle is preferable.45
In addition to the existing disclosure requirements in the financial statements,
scrutiny over management’s discretion and judgment in applying accounting
policies occurs on a number of different levels. Auditors are required to inform
audit committees about management’s ‘‘initial selection of and changes in
significant accounting policies or their application’’ and about management’s
judgments and estimates.46 We have encouraged companies, management,
audit committees and auditors to consult with our accounting staff if they are
uncertain about the application of GAAP.47 We also have committed to provide
assistance to companies in a timely fashion to address problems before they
happen.
We recognize that the circumstances where a company may exercise discre-
tion over its accounting policies under GAAP could yield significantly different
financial results. Given the existing disclosure regime, we are not currently
proposing additional MD&A disclosure to address all of these cases. Compa-
nies should provide complete, transparent disclosure under the applicable
requirements. While we believe the proposed disclosure may be sufficient to
achieve our currently stated objective, we may revisit the other circumstances
where a company may exercise discretion over its accounting policies under
GAAP at a later date.
We solicit comment with regard to broadening the scope of our
proposals to achieve a more expansive objective.
• Should we require additional MD&A disclosure specifically regarding the
effects of a change by a company from one accounting policy to another
acceptable (and preferable) accounting policy under GAAP?
• Should we require in MD&A a discussion of the impact that alternative
accounting policies acceptable under GAAP would have had on a com-
pany’s financial statements even when a company did not choose to apply
the alternatives?
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• What costs would companies incur if they had to prepare disclosure about
the effects of alternative accounting policies that could have been chosen
but were not?
• Beyond a company’s initial adoption of those policies, should we require
disclosure in MD&A regarding a company’s reasons for choosing, and
the effects of applying, accounting policies used for unusual or innovative
transactions or in emerging areas? Similarly, should we require companies
to disclose in MD&A the effects of accounting policies that a company could
have adopted, but did not adopt, for unusual or innovative transactions or
in emerging areas?
• Should we require more disclosure by companies about their process of
making estimates, or in other areas of discretion relating to recognition
and measurement in financial statements? If so, please describe in detail.
• Should we require in MD&A a discussion of the impact of a company’s
choice among accounting methods under GAAP that are used in the
company’s industry (for example, the completed contract and the percent-
age of completion methods of accounting for construction-type con-
tracts48)? Should we require that type of disclosure only where a company
uses a method under GAAP that is not generally used by other companies
in the industry?
C. Proposed Disclosure about Critical Accounting Estimates
To inform investors of each critical accounting estimate and to place it in the
context of the company’s financial presentation, we would require the follow-
ing information in the MD&A section:49
• A discussion that identifies and describes:
• the critical accounting estimate;
• the methodology used in determining the critical accounting estimate;
• any underlying assumption that is about highly uncertain matters and
any other underlying assumption that is material;
• any known trends, demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that
are reasonably likely to occur and materially affect the methodology or
the assumptions described;
• if applicable, why different estimates that would have had a material
impact on the company’s financial presentation could have been used
in the current period; and
• if applicable, why the accounting estimate is reasonably likely to change
from period to period with a material impact on the financial presenta-
tion;
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• An explanation of the significance of the accounting estimate to the com-
pany’s financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of
operations and, where material, an identification of the line items in the
company’s financial statements affected by the accounting estimate;
• A quantitative discussion of changes in overall financial performance and,
to the extent material, line items in the financial statements if the company
were to assume that the accounting estimate were changed, either by
using reasonably possible near-term changes in the most material
assumption(s) underlying the accounting estimate or by using the reason-
ably possible range of the accounting estimate;50
• A quantitative and qualitative discussion of any material changes made
to the accounting estimate in the past three years, the reasons for the
changes, and the effect on line items in the financial statements and
overall financial performance;51
• A statement of whether or not the company’s senior management has
discussed the development and selection of the accounting estimate,
and the MD&A disclosure regarding it, with the audit committee of the
company’s board of directors;
• If the company operates in more than one segment, an identification of
the segments of the company’s business the accounting estimate affects;
and
• A discussion of the accounting estimate on a segment basis, to the extent
that a failure to present that information would result in an omission that
renders the disclosure materially misleading.
Unless otherwise stated, the discussion would cover the financial statements
for the most recent fiscal year and any subsequent period for which interim
period financial statements are required to be included.52
1. Accounting estimates covered under the proposals
A number of circumstances can require a company to make accounting
estimates. For example, a company typically will estimate the net realizable
value of its accounts receivable and of its inventory.53 Not all accounting
estimates in a company’s financial statements, however, will necessarily be
critical accounting estimates to which the proposed disclosure relates. An
accounting estimate would be a critical accounting estimate for purposes of
the proposed disclosure only if it meets two criteria. First, the accounting
estimate must require a company to make assumptions about matters that
are highly uncertain at the time the accounting estimate is made. Second,
it must be the case that different estimates that the company reasonably
could have used for the accounting estimate in the current period, or changes
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in the accounting estimate that are reasonably likely to occur from period to
period, would have a material impact on the presentation of the company’s
financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of operations.54
For purposes of the first criterion, a matter involves a high degree of uncer-
tainty if it is dependent on events remote in time that may or may not
occur, or it is not capable of being readily calculated from generally accepted
methodologies or derived with some degree of precision from available data.
Accordingly, a matter that is highly uncertain requires management to use
significant judgment in making assumptions about that matter. The applica-
tion of management’s judgment in those circumstances typically results in
management developing a range within which it believes the accounting
estimate should fall.
The second criterion focuses the proposals further on two types of accounting
estimates involved in the application of accounting policies. First, it includes
accounting estimates for which a company in the current period could reason-
ably have recorded in the financial statements an amount sufficiently different
such that it would have had a material impact on the company’s financial
presentation. Second, it includes any accounting estimate that is reasonably
likely to change from period to period to the extent that the change would have
a material impact on the company’s financial presentation. Thus, whether
management’s judgment has an impact primarily in the current period or on
an ongoing basis (or both), the estimate would qualify.
Under the proposals, a company would discuss any accounting estimate
that it determines to be critical. We believe that few of a company’s accounting
estimates generally would meet those thresholds. We do not currently pro-
pose an outside limit to the number of accounting estimates that a company
must discuss under the proposals. As the term ‘‘critical accounting estimate’’
implies, however, the disclosure should not encompass a long list of account-
ing estimates resulting from the application of accounting policies which
cover a substantial number of line items in the company’s financial state-
ments.55 While the number of critical accounting estimates will vary by com-
pany, we would expect a very few companies to have none at all and the
vast majority of companies to have somewhere in the range of three to five
critical accounting estimates. The number could be at the high end of the
range, or be slightly higher, for companies that conclude that one or more
critical accounting estimates must be identified and discussed primarily
because of particular segments. Investors, however, will not benefit from a
lengthy discussion of a multitude of accounting estimates in which the truly
critical ones are obscured. If we adopt the proposals without a maximum
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number, we may monitor disclosure to determine whether disclosure would
be improved if a maximum number were set.
We seek comment on the proposed definition of critical accounting
estimates.
• Is the definition appropriately tailored?
• Does the definition capture the appropriate type and scope of accounting
estimates?
• Is the definition appropriately designed to identify the accounting estimates
that require management to use significant judgment or that are the most
uncertain? If not, what other aspects descriptive of that type of estimate
should be included?
• Is the definition appropriately designed to identify the accounting estimates
involving a high potential to result in a material impact on the company’s
financial presentation?
• Would it be difficult for a company to discern which of its accounting
estimates require assumptions about highly uncertain matters? If so, how
could the proposal better target them?
• Should we consider setting a minimum percentage impact on results
of operations in the second criterion of the definition, or would that be
unnecessary because the proposed definition would not capture changes
that have an insignificant impact?
• How many accounting estimates would a company typically identify as
critical accounting estimates under the proposed definition?
• Would a company with multiple segments have a greater number of critical
accounting estimates than a company without multiple segments? If so,
please provide an explanation.
• Should we establish a maximum number of accounting estimates that
may be discussed as critical accounting estimates (e.g., seven)? If so,
what should the maximum number be and what criteria should be applied
to set the number so as to strike the appropriate balance between informa-
tion truly useful to investors and overly extensive disclosure of marginal
use? If a maximum were set, should the number of segments a company
has be considered?
• Should we expand the definition to include MD&A disclosure of volatile
accounting estimates that use complex methodologies but do not involve
significant management judgment? Should we do so only when the under-
lying assumptions or methodologies of those estimates are not commonly
used and therefore not understood by investors?
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2. Identification and description of the accounting estimate, the methodology
used, certain assumptions and reasonably likely changes
A company first would have to identify and describe each critical accounting
estimate in such a way that it gives the appropriate context for investors
reading that section and reflects management’s view of the importance of
the critical accounting estimate.56 A company would have to disclose the
methodology it used in determining the estimate. It also would have to
disclose the assumptions underlying the accounting estimate that reflect
matters highly uncertain at the time the estimate was made as well as other
assumptions underlying the estimate that are material. We recognize that a
critical accounting estimate may involve multiple assumptions. The proposed
disclosure would focus in the first instance on those that are about highly
uncertain matters because they have the greatest potential to make the
accounting estimate highly susceptible to change.
If applicable, the company would have to describe why different estimates
could have been used in the current period and why the accounting estimate
is reasonably likely to change from period to period in the financial statements.
For example, a critical accounting estimate related to a significant portfolio
of over-the-counter derivative contracts may require that a company estimate
the fair value of such contracts using a model or other valuation method. In
that case, the company would disclose the methods it employs to estimate
fair value, e.g., the types of valuation models used such as the present value
of estimated future cash flows, and assumptions such as an estimated price
in the absence of a quoted market price.57
A company also would have to explain known trends, demands, commit-
ments, events or uncertainties that are reasonably likely to occur and materi-
ally affect the assumptions made or the methodology used. Like the
requirements elsewhere in MD&A, disclosure would be required if the trend,
demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is currently known, it is reasonably
likely to occur and it is reasonably likely to have a material impact. Disclosure
would not be required if management could affirmatively conclude that the
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is not reasonably likely to
come to fruition or that a material effect is not reasonably likely to occur.58
3. Impact of the estimate on financial condition, changes in financial condition
and results of operations
For each critical accounting estimate, a company would have to explain
its significance to the company’s financial condition, changes in financial
condition and results of operations and, where material, identify its effect
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on the line items in the company’s financial statements.59 Because not all
estimates themselves are line items in the financial statements,60 their exis-
tence and their effect may not be readily apparent. Thus, this disclosure
would provide additional information and clarity for investors.
4. Quantitative disclosures
There are two areas of the proposed MD&A disclosure relating to critical
accounting estimates in which we explicitly would require a presentation of
quantitative information.61 First, the proposals would require disclosure that
demonstrates the sensitivity of financial results to changes made in connec-
tion with each critical accounting estimate. Second, the proposals would
require quantitative disclosure relating to historical changes in a company’s
critical accounting estimates in the past three years.
a. Quantitative disclosures to demonstrate sensitivity
We propose to require that a company present quantitative information about
changes in its overall financial performance and, to the extent material, line
items in the financial statements that would result if certain changes relating
to a critical accounting estimate were assumed to occur. The company would
identify the change being assumed and discuss quantitatively its impact on
the company. Because the point of the disclosure is to demonstrate the
degree of sensitivity, the impact on overall financial performance would be
discussed regardless of how large that is.
As proposed, a company would have two possible choices of changes it
would assume for purposes of the sensitivity analysis. First, the company
could choose to assume that it changed the most material assumption or
assumptions underlying the critical accounting estimate and discuss the
results of those changes. Second, the company could choose to assume
that the critical accounting estimate itself changes. In addition to providing
two choices of methods to demonstrate sensitivity, we allow a company to
determine the amount of the change that it assumes for this analysis rather
than attempting to standardize those amounts. Under the first choice, a
company could select the alternative material assumption or assumptions
to use as long as the alternative represents a change that is reasonably
possible in the near term. ‘‘Reasonably possible’’ means the chance of a
future transaction or event occurring is more than remote but less than likely.62
‘‘Near-term’’ means a period of time going forward up to one year from the
date of the financial statements.63 Under the second choice, the company
would use the upper and the lower ends of the range of reasonably possible
estimates which it likely determined in formulating its recorded critical
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accounting estimate. It would substitute the upper end of the range for the
recorded estimate and discuss the results. It would do the same for the lower
end of the range.
We believe the most informative disclosure about sensitivity would result if
we allow companies significant flexibility to customize these analyses. Our
approach would accommodate different types of companies, different critical
accounting estimates and different types of underlying assumptions. The
parameters selected for the sensitivity analysis must, however, be realistic
and meaningful measures of change.64 For purposes of the sensitivity analy-
sis, a company should disclose, if known or available, the likelihood of occur-
rence of the changes it selects, such as estimated probabilities of occurrence
or standard deviations where applicable.
Under the first choice for demonstrating sensitivity, we would provide that a
company choose its most material assumption underlying the critical account-
ing estimate and alter it at least twice65 to reflect reasonably possible, near-
term changes.66 A company would have to complete the analysis assuming
a positive change in the assumption. It would also have to complete the
analysis assuming a negative change. In some cases, a company may not
be able to select a single most material assumption to use for purposes of
these analyses, or it may believe that using a single assumption would not
provide meaningful sensitivity information for investors. If that were to occur,
a company either could select the second choice for analyzing sensitivity
(i.e., using the ends of the range) or it could demonstrate the effects of near-
term reasonably possible changes in more than one material assumption
underlying the critical accounting estimate. If the company chooses the latter
course of action, it also would have to disclose clearly the separate effect
of each changed assumption.
In general, we believe the impact of a positive change and the impact of a
negative change would both have to be disclosed where a company is
assuming changes in its most material assumption (or assumptions). There
may be cases, however, where both types of changes would not be applica-
ble. In some instances, an increase in an assumption, but not a decrease
in an assumption, or vice versa, would have no effect on the line items or
the overall financial performance and therefore would not have to be dis-
cussed other than noting that fact.67 It is conceivable that in other cases
either a decrease or an increase would not be reasonably possible and
therefore would not have to be discussed other than noting that fact.
With the proposed analysis, a company would demonstrate sensitivity of
reported results to changes that affect its critical accounting estimates. Inves-
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tors would have a better understanding of the extent to which there is a
correlation between management’s key assumptions and the company’s
overall financial performance. Investors also would understand better which
particular line items in reported results would be materially affected and how
much. In addition, a company would be required to state whether those
assumed changes could have a material effect on the company’s liquidity
or capital resources. If they could have such an effect, the company would
have to explain how, as a company currently is required to explain in
MD&A when factors affecting liquidity or capital resources are present.68
From the proposed disclosure, the average investor should be able to ascer-
tain the general degree to which the company’s results of operations, liquidity
and capital resources are susceptible to changes in management’s views
relating to critical accounting estimates. Along with the other provisions in
the proposal, this quantitative and qualitative disclosure conveys information
about the impact of management’s subjective assumptions on current and
future financial results.
We request comment on the proposed identification and analysis
of changes.
• Are there some types of critical accounting estimates or some circum-
stances where the proposed disclosure relating to sensitivity would not
be meaningful or otherwise helpful to investors? If so, which estimates or
what circumstances?
• In addition to the two choices we propose for assuming changes relating
to the critical accounting estimates to analyze sensitivity, are there others
that we should permit? Should we require instead that all companies use
the same method? If so, which one?
• Should we require a company to use whichever of the two proposed
choices demonstrates the greatest impact on the company’s financial
presentation?
• Are there circumstances under which a company should be required to
demonstrate sensitivity using both of the proposed choices?
• Are there any critical accounting estimates for which neither of the two
choices for selecting the assumed changes would be appropriate?
• Will companies be able to select appropriate changes in their most material
assumption or assumptions, or should we provide further guidance?
• To enhance an investors’ ability to compare the sensitivity of various
companies’ financial statements to changes relating to a particular type
of accounting estimate, should we standardize the changes that compa-
nies must assume for various types of estimates? If so, what should they
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be and why? For example, should we set a specified percentage increase
and decrease to assume (e.g., a 10% increase and decrease), or a pre-
sumptive increase and decrease, provided that degree of change is rea-
sonably possible in the near term?
• Conversely, would any changes we standardize not be equally meaningful
to measure sensitivity, or equally probable, for various accounting esti-
mates, industries and companies, and thus reduce the value of any disclo-
sure about sensitivity?
b. Quantitative and qualitative disclosures concerning past changes in the
estimate
We recognize that a company will change its accounting estimates over
time as new events occur or as management acquires more experience or
additional information. Existing MD&A disclosure rules would call for discus-
sion of the effects of changes in accounting estimates where those changes
are material to an investor’s understanding of financial position or results of
operations. For example, MD&A currently requires companies to disclose:
• information necessary for an understanding of financial condition, changes
in financial condition and results of operations;69
• significant components of revenues or expenses that should, in the com-
pany’s judgment, be described in order to understand results of opera-
tions;70
• a material change in the relationship between costs and revenues resulting
from a known event;71
• matters that will have an impact on future operations and have not had
an impact in the past;72 and
• matters that have had an impact on reported operations and are not
expected to have an impact upon future operations.73
Notwithstanding the existing MD&A disclosure requirements, we believe it
would be appropriate to require specific disclosure regarding past changes
in critical accounting estimates. This type of information required under the
proposal would give investors a clear understanding of a company’s recent
history of those changes. A company other than a small business issuer
would have to include the proposed quantitative and qualitative discussion
of any material changes in those accounting estimates under the proposals
during the past three fiscal years.74 A small business issuer would discuss
material changes in its critical accounting estimates during the past two
years.75 Companies would have to identify how the material changes affected
measurements in the financial statements and their overall financial perfor-
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mance.76 This would enable investors to evaluate management’s formulation
of critical accounting estimates over time.
Companies also would be required to describe the reasons for those changes.
If no material changes in the critical accounting estimates were made in the
prescribed time period, or if a company did not make that estimate during
any part of that period, a company would only be required to disclose that
fact.
Although the period covered for the proposed disclosure of past changes in
critical accounting estimates would be two years for small business issuers
and three years for other companies, our proposed requirement relating to
past changes would be put into effect in stages. Thus, when a small business
issuer or other company files its first covered report, registration statement
or proxy or information statement following adoption of the proposed rules,
the rules would require it to provide the proposed specific past changes
disclosure only for the past one or two years respectively. For example, if
the first report were an annual report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2002, the company would include that information in the
‘‘Application of Critical Accounting Policies’’ section of MD&A about changes
in 2001 and 2002 (and a small business issuer would include it only for
2002). In the first annual report, registration statement or proxy or information
statement filed by a company more than one year following the effective
date of the rules, it would have to provide that information for the past three
years (two years for a small business issuer).77
We solicit comment on the proposed disclosure of past material
changes in critical accounting estimates.
• Is sufficient disclosure of these changes already required under current
MD&A requirements?
• Is a three-year period the most appropriate period of time over which
investors should consider changes? If not, why would a shorter or longer
period be more appropriate?
• Would requiring disclosure over a longer period, such as five years, make
it easier for investors to identify trends? If so, over how many years should
we phase in a longer period requirement?
• Should we mandate a standardized format for quantitative disclosure
about past changes in critical accounting estimates (e.g., a chart illustrating
the dollar value of the change from the prior year for each year showing
the impacted line items and other effects in each year)?
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5. Senior management’s discussions with the audit committee
Independent auditors discuss accounting estimates with management in
order to conduct an audit, and the auditors may discuss them with the audit
committee. In 1999, following the recommendations in the Report of the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees, we adopted a rule that would require an audit committee report
in proxy or information statements connected to board of director elections.78
Among other items, the audit committee report must state whether the audit
committee has discussed with the independent auditors the matters required
to be discussed by Statement on Auditing Standards (‘‘SAS’’) No. 61 (codified
in AU §380), as may be modified or supplemented.79 SAS 61 requires inde-
pendent auditors to communicate certain matters related to the conduct of
an audit to those who have responsibility for oversight of the financial reporting
process, specifically the audit committee. With respect to accounting esti-
mates, SAS 61 states, ‘‘[t]he auditor should determine that the audit commit-
tee is informed about the process used by management in formulating
particularly sensitive accounting estimates and about the basis for the audi-
tor’s conclusions regarding the reasonableness of those estimates.’’80 In
addition, in connection with each SEC engagement, the auditor should dis-
cuss with the audit committee the auditor’s judgments about the quality of
the entity’s accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. The
discussion should include items that have a significant impact on the financial
statements (for example, estimates, judgments and uncertainties, among
other items).81
In addition to the disclosure relating to SAS 61 (as amended), the audit
committee report must state whether the audit committee has reviewed and
discussed the audited financial statements with management.82 Because that
item relates to the financial statements generally, a focused discussion on
critical accounting estimates may or may not result from it. Moreover, the
newly required disclosure in MD&A would not be a part of the financial
statements, and therefore would not necessarily be covered by that proxy
statement disclosure requirement.
The existing audit committee report also requires audit committees to state
whether, based on discussions with management and the auditors, the com-
mittee recommended to the board of directors that the audited financial
statements be included in the company’s Form 10-K or 10-KSB for the
last fiscal year.83 This disclosure requirement conveys whether the audit
committee review of the financial statements and discussions with manage-
ment and the auditors have provided a basis for recommending to the board
that the audited financial statements be filed with the Commission. This item
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too does not require any specific discourse between management and the
audit committee about critical accounting estimates.
We believe that senior management should discuss the company’s critical
accounting estimates with the audit committee of its board of directors.84
If specific discussions between senior management and audit committees
regarding the development, selection and disclosure of the critical accounting
estimates were to take place, the audit committee may seek to understand
the company’s critical accounting estimates, the underlying assumptions
and methodologies, the appropriateness of management’s procedures and
conclusions, and the disclosure about those accounting estimates. This type
of oversight would have the potential to improve the quality and the transpar-
ency of disclosure.
Requiring a company to disclose in MD&A whether or not senior management
has engaged in discussions with the audit committee about the critical
accounting estimates would give investors a better understanding of whether
such oversight by those responsible for the general oversight of the financial
reporting process was applied to those accounting estimates and the disclo-
sure about those accounting estimates. We therefore are proposing to require
such disclosure.85 When senior management and the audit committee have
not had those discussions, we would require disclosure that they have not,
and an explanation of the reasons why they have not.86 If the company does
not have an audit committee, then the proposed disclosure would address
discussions with the board committee that performs equivalent functions to
those of an audit committee or, if no such committee exists, the entire board
of directors.87 Unlike the audit committee report, our proposed disclosure of
discussions between the audit committee and senior management would
not be limited to proxy and information statements that involve the election
of directors.88
We do not propose to require disclosure of the substance of the discussions
between senior management and the audit committee. We believe that such
a requirement could deter the type of open discourse that we expect to take
place in those discussions.
We request comment on the proposed disclosure about discussions
between senior management and the audit committee regarding the
development, selection and disclosure of critical accounting
estimates.
• To what extent does senior management currently discuss critical account-
ing estimates with the audit committee of the board of directors and the
company’s auditors?
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• Would the proposed requirement provide useful information to investors?
• Would the proposed disclosure be a catalyst for discussion between audit
committees and senior management? Could it chill discussions?
• Is there other related disclosure that should be required for the benefit of
investors?
• Should we require that companies disclose any unresolved concerns of
the audit committee about the critical accounting estimates or the related
MD&A disclosure?
• Should we require disclosure of any specific procedures employed by the
audit committee to ensure that the company’s response to the proposed
disclosure requirements is complete and fair?
• Should we consider requiring disclosure of whether the audit committee
recommends the disclosure be included in the MD&A, which is akin to
the disclosure required in the Item 306 audit committee report?
• Instead of the proposed disclosure, should we amend Item 306 of Regula-
tion S-K and Regulation S-B to require that the audit committee report
disclose whether the audit committee has reviewed and discussed with
senior management the development, selection and disclosure regarding
critical accounting estimates?
• If we were to amend Items 306 in this manner, should we also expand
them to include the discussions about critical accounting estimates
between senior management and the audit committee as one of the bases
for the audit committee’s recommendation to include the financial state-
ments in the annual report?
• Should we expand Items 306 to require disclosure of whether, based on
an audit committee’s review of and discussions about the MD&A, the audit
committee recommended to the board of directors that the MD&A be
included in the company’s annual report?
• Should we expand Items 306 to require disclosure of whether the audit
committee has reviewed and discussed the entire MD&A disclosure (cur-
rent and proposed) with management and/or the auditors?
• If any of a company’s accounting policies diverge, to its knowledge, from
the policies predominately applied by other companies in the same indus-
try, should we require that the company disclose, possibly in connection
with the audit committee report, whether the audit committee has had
discussions with senior management about the appropriateness of the
accounting policies being used? When such discussions have taken place,
should we require that the company disclose the audit committee’s unre-
solved concerns about the divergent accounting policies being applied?
Prior to the adoption of our proposals, to what extent would a company
know that its accounting policies diverge from those of other companies
in its industry?
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6. Disclosure relating to segments
Current MD&A disclosure requirements provide companies with the discre-
tion to include a discussion of segment information where, in the company’s
judgment, such a discussion would be appropriate to an understanding of
the company.89 In 1989, we stated in an interpretive release, ‘‘[t]o the extent
any segment contributes in a materially disproportionate way to [revenues,
profitability, and cash needs], or where discussion on a consolidated basis
would present an incomplete and misleading picture of the enterprise, seg-
ment disclosure should be included.’’90 In accordance with this interpretation,
we are proposing disclosure regarding the impact of critical accounting esti-
mates on segments of a company’s business.91 Where applicable, we believe
that this disclosure would be important for investors because it would enable
them to determine which reported segments’ results are dependent on man-
agement’s subjective estimates, and material information would be provided
on a segment basis.
Under the proposals, if a company operates in more than one segment92
and a critical accounting estimate affects fewer than all of the segments, the
company would have to identify the segments it affects. A company also
would have to determine whether it must include, in addition to the disclosure
on a company-wide basis, a separate discussion of the critical accounting
estimates for each identified segment about which disclosure is otherwise
required.93 That determination would follow an analysis similar to that in the
1989 guidance. A company would have to provide a discussion on a segment
basis to the extent that discussion only on a company-wide basis would
result in an omission that renders the disclosure materially misleading.94 We
would not mandate repetition on a segment basis of all matters discussed
on a company-wide basis. Rather, a company would have to disclose only
that information necessary to avoid an incomplete or misleading picture.
We request comment regarding identification of the segments
affected and the proposed additional disclosure of the critical
accounting estimates on a segment basis.
• Should we provide more guidance for determining the circumstances that
warrant segment disclosure?
• Should we require the additional segment discussion only when more
than one segment is affected?
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D. Examples of Proposed Disclosure about Critical Accounting
Estimates
To assist in understanding the scope of the MD&A disclosure that is proposed,
we have developed three examples. Each example examines how a fictional
public company that has identified a critical accounting estimate could draft
MD&A disclosure to satisfy the proposal. The examples are illustrative only.
In addition, our January 22, 2002 release provides an example of disclosure
that companies should consider when discussing in MD&A trading activities
involving contracts that are accounted for at fair value where a lack of market
price quotations necessitates the use of fair value estimation techniques.95
Example 1
Background
Alphabetical Company manufactures and distributes electrical equipment
used in large-scale commercial pumping and water treatment facilities. The
company operates in four business segments. The company’s equipment
carries standard product warranties extending over a period of 6 to 10 years. If
equipment covered under the standard warranty requires repair, the company
provides labor and replacement parts to the customer at no cost. Historically,
the costs of fulfilling warranty obligations have principally related to providing
replacement parts, with labor costs representing the remainder. Over the
past 3 years, the cost of copper included in replacement parts constituted
approximately 35% to 40% of the total cost of warranty obligations.
A liability for the expected cost of warranty-related claims is established
when equipment is sold. The amount of the warranty liability accrued reflects
the company’s estimate of the expected future costs of honoring its obliga-
tions under the warranty plan. Because of the long-term nature of the com-
pany’s equipment warranties, estimating the expected cost of such warranties
requires significant judgment. Based on management’s evaluation of ana-
lysts’ forecasts for copper prices, management believes a 30% decrease in
copper prices or a 50% increase in copper prices is reasonably possible in
the near term. In each of the last three years, warranty expense represented
approximately 19% to 22% of cost of sales.
Possible MD&A disclosure under the proposal
Application of Critical Accounting Policies
Alphabetical’s products are covered by standard product warranty plans that extend
6 to 10 years. A liability for the expected cost of warranty-related claims is estab-
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lished when equipment is sold. The amount of the warranty liability accrued reflects
our estimate of the expected future costs of honoring our obligations under the
warranty plan. We believe the accounting estimate related to warranty costs is a
‘‘critical accounting estimate’’ because: changes in it can materially affect net
income, it requires us to forecast copper prices in the distant future which are
highly uncertain and require a large degree of judgment, and copper is a significant
raw material in the replacement parts used in warranty repairs. The estimate for
warranty obligations is a critical accounting estimate for all of our four segments.
Historically, the costs of fulfilling our warranty obligations have principally related
to replacement parts, with labor costs representing the remainder. Over the past
3 years, the cost of copper included in our parts constituted approximately 35%
to 40% of the total cost of warranty repairs. Over that same period, warranty
expense represented approximately 19% to 22% of cost of sales.
Over the past 10 years, the price of copper has exhibited significant volatility. For
example, during 1994, the price of copper rose by approximately 72%, while in
2001 the price decreased by approximately 19%. Our hedging programs provide
adequate protection against short-term volatility in copper prices, as described in
‘‘Risk Management,’’ but our hedging does not extend beyond 5 years. Accordingly,
our management must make assumptions about the cost of that raw material in
periods 6 to 10 years in the future. Management forecasts the price of copper for
the portion of our estimated copper requirements not covered by hedging. Our
forecasts are based principally on long-range price forecasts for copper which are
published by private research companies specializing in the copper markets.
Each quarter, we reevaluate our estimate of warranty obligations, including our
assumptions about the cost of copper. During 2001, we decreased our estimated
cost of unhedged copper purchases over the next 10 years by 15%, reflecting a
growing excess of supply over forecasted demand, which reduced our accrued
warranty costs and our cost of sales (and, accordingly, increased operating income)
by $15 million. In contrast, during 2000, long-term price forecasts were essentially
unchanged, so we made no adjustments to our estimated cost of unhedged copper
purchases over the next 10 years. During 1999, copper prices increased by approxi-
mately 28% over the prior year. Long-term prices also reflected increases in prices
over those projected in 1998. Thus, in 1999, we increased our estimated cost of
unhedged copper purchases over the next 10 years (through 2009) by 15%. That
increase in our estimate resulted in an $18 million addition to our accrued warranty
cost and our cost of sales, and an equal reduction in our operating income.
If, for the unhedged portion of our estimated copper requirements, we were to
decrease our estimate of copper prices as of December 31, 2001 by 30%, our
accrued warranty costs and cost of sales would have been reduced by approxi-
mately $27 million or 6% and 4%, respectively, while operating income would have
increased by 9%. If we were to increase our estimate as of December 31, 2001
by 50%, our accrued warranty costs and cost of sales would have been increased
by approximately $45 million or 10% and 7%, respectively, while our operating
income would have been reduced by 23%.
A very significant increase in our estimated warranty obligation, such as one
reflecting the increase in copper prices that occurred in 1994, could lower our
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earnings and increase our leverage ratio (leverage refers to the degree to which
a company utilizes borrowed funds). That, in turn, could limit our ability to borrow
money through our revolving credit facilities described in ‘‘Liquidity and Capital
Resources.’’
Our management has discussed the development and selection of this critical ac-
counting estimate with the audit committee of our board of directors and the audit
committee has reviewed the company’s disclosure relating to it in this MD&A.
Example 2
Background
MQB Corp. is a developer and publisher of desktop publishing software that
operates in two segments. MQB distributes its products primarily through
third-party distributors, resellers, and retailers (customers). Like many com-
panies in the software industry, MQB has a product return policy and has
historically accepted significant product returns. MQB permits its customers
to return software titles published and distributed by the company within 120
days of purchase.
MQB recognizes revenues under SOP 97-2, ‘‘Software Revenue Recogni-
tion.’’ The company ships its products FOB (Free on Board) shipping point.
Therefore, legal title to the products passes to the customers upon shipment,
and the company has no legal obligation for product damage in transit.
Accordingly, MQB recognizes revenue upon shipment of its software prod-
ucts, provided that collection of payment is determined to be probable and
no significant obligations on MQB’s part remain. Payment is due from custom-
ers 30 days after shipment. At the time revenue is recorded, MQB accounts
for estimated future returns by reducing sales by its estimate of future returns
and by reducing accounts receivable by the same amount. For example,
MQB reduced its gross sales and accounts receivable by 12% for its fiscal
year ended December 31, 2001 to reflect estimated product returns. In the
last three years, the range in which the company has reduced its gross sales
and accounts receivable to reflect product returns has been between 11%
and 13%.
MQB receives weekly reports from distributors and retailers regarding the
amount of MQB products in their inventory. A historical correlation exists
between levels of inventory held by distributors and retailers (together, the
distribution channel) and the amount of returns that actually occur. The
weekly reports from distributors and retailers provide the company with visibil-
ity into the distribution channel such that MQB has the ability to estimate
future returns. In each of the past few years, actual returns have varied from
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period to period, although they have not exceeded the estimated amounts
by more than 5%. The company’s products are, however, subject to intense
marketplace competition, including several recently introduced competing
products. If actual returns significantly exceed the previously estimated
amounts, it would result in materially lower sales and net income before
taxes in one or more future periods.
Possible MD&A disclosure under the proposal
Application of Critical Accounting Policies
Our recognition of revenue from sales to distributors and retailers (the ‘‘distribution
channel’’) is impacted by agreements we have giving them rights to return our
software titles within 120 days after purchase. At the time we recognize revenue,
upon shipment of our software products, we reduce our measurements of those
sales by our estimate of future returns and we also reduce our measurements of
accounts receivable by the same amount.
For our products, a historical correlation exists between the amount of distribution
channel inventory and the amount of returns that actually occur. The greater the
distribution channel inventory, the more product returns we expect. For each of
our products, we monitor levels of product sales and inventory at our distributors’
warehouses and at retailers as part of our effort to reach an appropriate accounting
estimate for returns. In estimating returns, we analyze historical returns, current
inventory in the distribution channel, current economic trends, changes in consumer
demand, introduction of new competing software and acceptance of our products.
In recent years, as a result of a combination of the factors described above, we
have materially reduced our gross sales to reflect our estimated amount of returns.
It is also possible that returns could increase rapidly and significantly in the future.
Accordingly, estimating product returns requires significant management judgment.
In addition, different return estimates that we reasonably could have used would
have had a material impact on our reported sales and thus have had a material
impact on the presentation of the results of operations. For those reasons, we
believe that the accounting estimate related to product returns is a ‘‘critical account-
ing estimate.’’ Our estimate of product returns is a critical accounting estimate for
both of our segments. Management of the company has discussed the develop-
ment and selection of this critical accounting estimate with the audit committee of
our board of directors and the audit committee has reviewed the company’s disclo-
sure relating to it in this MD&A.
We are aware of several recently introduced products that compete with several of
our significant products. These new competitive factors have not, to date, materially
impacted returns; therefore, we have made no adjustment as a result of these
factors in our estimated returns for 2001. In our highly competitive marketplace,
these factors have some potential to increase our estimates of returns in the future.
The introduction of new competing products has impacted our estimate of returns
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in the past. In 1999, we increased our estimate of returns over the previous year
by 1%, as a percentage of gross sales, because of increased inventory in the
distribution channel due to new products introduced by two of our competitors.
In preparing our financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2001, we
estimated future product returns for all of our products to be $145 million, and we
reduced our gross sales by that amount. Our 2001 estimate for returns was $20
million greater than our estimate in 2000 and $15 million greater than our estimate
in 1999. From 1999 to 2000, products introduced by two of our competitors in
1998 lost market share to our products and our sales increased. Due to our
increased sales in 2000, the distribution channel inventory declined over levels in
1999, which also resulted in a 2% decline in the estimated amount of returns, as
a percentage of gross sales. In 2001, with the slow down in consumer spending
over the prior period, distribution channel inventory grew faster than sales, necessi-
tating an increase in the estimated returns equal to 1% of gross sales. The estimates
for returns represented approximately 12%, 11% and 13% of our gross sales for
2001, 2000 and 1999, respectively.
If we were to assume that our estimate of future product returns for all of our
products was changed to the upper end or lower end of the range we developed
in the course of formulating our estimate, the estimate for future returns as of
December 31, 2001 would range from $130 million to $160 million. Accordingly,
the amounts by which we would reduce gross sales and operating income also
would range from $130 million to $160 million as compared to the recorded amount
of $145 million. In each of the years in the three-year period ended 2001, our
actual returns have not deviated from our estimates by more than 5%. Our actual
returns for 2000 and 1999 were $129 million and $134 million, respectively. If we
were to change our estimate of future product returns to the high end of the range,
there would be no material impact on our liquidity or capital resources.
Example 3
Background
Betascott Company manufactures and sells data storage devices including
computer hard drives. The hard drive industry is subject to intense competition
and significant shifts in market share amongst the competitors. In the last
three years, Betascott has reported falling sales and market share, which
has contributed to a fiscal year 2001 loss from operations in the hard drive
segment. (This trend is separately discussed in MD&A.)
As of December 31, 2001, the company had $200 million in property, plant
and equipment (‘‘PP&E’’) used in producing hard drives. The company’s
accounting policies require that it test long-lived assets for impairment when-
ever indicators of impairment exist. The 2001 fiscal year loss from operations
in that segment, coupled with the company’s falling sales and market share,
are indicators of a potential impairment of the hard drive-related PP&E.
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The company follows the provisions of FASB SFAS No. 121, Accounting for
the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Dis-
posed Of.96 That accounting standard requires that if the sum of the future
cash flows expected to result from the assets, undiscounted and without
interest charges, is less than a company’s reported value of the assets, then
the asset is not recoverable and the company must recognize an impairment.
The amount of impairment to be recognized is the excess of the reported
value of the assets over the fair value of those assets.
The hard drive-related PP&E accounts for approximately 67% of Betascott’s
PP&E. The sum of Betascott’s current estimate of expected future cash flows
from its hard drive-related PP&E, undiscounted and without interest charges,
is near the reported value of that PP&E. In the year ended December 31,
2001, Betascott would have been required to recognize an impairment loss
of approximately $30 million if its estimate of those future cash flows had
been 10% lower.
Possible MD&A disclosure under the proposal
Application of Critical Accounting Policies
We evaluate our property, plant and equipment (‘‘PP&E’’) for impairment whenever
indicators of impairment exist. Accounting standards require that if the sum of the
future cash flows expected to result from a company’s asset, undiscounted and
without interest charges, is less than the reported value of the asset, an asset
impairment must be recognized in the financial statements. The amount of impair-
ment to recognize is calculated by subtracting the fair value of the asset from the
reported value of the asset.
As we discuss in the notes to the financial statements, we operate in four segments,
one of which is the hard drive segment. In our hard drive segment, we reviewed
our hard drive-related PP&E for impairment as of December 31, 2001, due to a
trend of declining sales and market share. We determined that the undiscounted
sum of the expected future cash flows from the assets related to the hard drive
segment exceeded the recorded value of those assets, so we did not recognize
an impairment in accordance with GAAP. The PP&E in our hard-drive segment
represents approximately two-thirds of our total PP&E.
We believe that the accounting estimate related to asset impairment is a ‘‘critical
accounting estimate’’ because: (1) it is highly susceptible to change from period
to period because it requires company management to make assumptions about
future sales and cost of sales over the life of the hard drive-related PP&E (generally
seven years); and (2) the impact that recognizing an impairment would have on
the assets reported on our balance sheet as well as our net loss would be material.
Management’s assumptions about future sales prices and future sales volumes
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require significant judgment because actual sales prices and volumes have fluctu-
ated in the past and are expected to continue to do so. Management has discussed
the development and selection of this critical accounting estimate with the audit
committee of our board of directors and the audit committee has reviewed the
company’s disclosure relating to it in this MD&A.
In estimating future sales, we use our internal budgets. We develop our budgets
based on recent sales data for existing products, planned timing of new product
launches, customer commitments related to existing and newly developed prod-
ucts, and current unsold inventory held by distributors.
Our estimates of future cash flows assume that our sales of hard drive inventory
will remain consistent with current year sales. While actual sales have declined
by an average of approximately 2% per year during the last three years, our
introduction of the Stored line of hard drives in August 2001 has resulted in a 0.5%
increase in market share over the last five months of 2001, and a corresponding
increase in sales of 5% over the comparable 5-month period last year. We therefore
have assumed that sales will not continue to decline in the future. We have also
assumed that our costs will have annual growth of approximately 2%. This level
of costs is comparable to actual costs incurred over the last two years, following
the 1999 restructuring of the hard drive division (which is described in the note 2
to the financial statements).
In each of the last two years, we have tested the hard drive-related PP&E for
impairment and in each year we determined that, based on our assumptions, the
sum of the expected future cash flows, undiscounted and without interest charges,
exceeded the reported value and therefore we did not recognize an impairment.
Because 2001 sales were lower than those in 2000 and 1999, despite the improve-
ment in the latter part of the year, and because our estimates of future cash flows
are assumed to be consistent with current year sales, the current year impairment
analysis includes estimated sales that are 2% and 5% less than those assumed
in the 2000 and 1999 impairment tests, respectively.
As of December 31, 2001, we estimate that our future cash flows, on an undis-
counted basis, are greater than our $200 million investment in hard drive-related
PP&E. Any increases in estimated future cash flows would have no impact on the
reported value of the hard drive-related PP&E. In contrast, if our current estimate
of future cash flows from hard drive sales had been 10% lower, those cash flows
would have been less than the reported amount of the hard drive-related PP&E.
In that case, we would have been required to recognize an impairment loss of
approximately $30 million, equal to the difference between the fair value of the
equipment (which we would have determined by calculating the discounted value
of the estimated future cash flows) and the reported amount of the hard drive-
related PP&E. A $30 million impairment loss would have reduced PP&E and Total
Assets as of December 31, 2001 by 10% and 3%, respectively. That impairment
loss also would have increased Net Loss Before Taxes, for the year ended Decem-
ber 31, 2001, by 100%.
If we had been required to recognize an impairment loss on our hard-drive related
PP&E, it would likely not have affected our liquidity and capital resources because,
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even with the impairment loss, we would have been within the terms of the tangible
net-worth covenant in our long-term debt agreement discussed in note 5 to the
financial statements.
E. Auditor Examination of MD&A Disclosure Relating to Critical
Accounting Estimates
A company’s management bears primary responsibility for its accounting
estimates. Auditors also have important responsibilities regarding a com-
pany’s accounting estimates. A company’s auditor currently is responsible
for evaluating the reasonableness of the accounting estimates made by
management in the context of the financial statements taken as a whole.97
When a company’s audited financial statements are included in an annual
report filed with the Commission, the independent auditor is required to read
the information in the entire filed document, including the MD&A, and consider
whether such information, or the manner of its presentation, is materially
inconsistent with information, or the manner of its presentation, appearing
in the financial statements.98
Despite the current auditing standards, and the auditor’s consideration of
the proposed MD&A disclosure that may take place by virtue of them, we
are considering whether to take additional steps with a view to ensuring the
accuracy and reliability of the proposed disclosure. Subjecting the MD&A
disclosure to the auditing process itself would require the imposition of
auditing standards, including examination of the disclosure itself, application
of auditing processes regarding internal controls, coverage in management
representations of material relevant to the disclosure and other procedures.
One possible approach would be to adopt a requirement that an independent
auditor must examine, in accordance with Attestation Standards,99 the new
MD&A disclosure relating to critical accounting estimates.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has established stan-
dards and procedures when an auditor is engaged by a company to examine
and render an opinion that the disclosure in a company’s MD&A satisfies
applicable Commission requirements.100 An auditor’s objective in an examina-
tion is to express an opinion on:
• whether the MD&A presentation includes in all material respects the
required elements of the disclosure mandated by the Commission;
• whether the historical financial amounts have been accurately derived, in
all material respects, from the company’s financial statements; and
• whether the underlying information, determinations, estimates and
assumptions of the company provide a reasonable basis for the disclo-
sures contained in the MD&A.101
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To complete an examination, an auditor must examine documents and
records and accumulate sufficient evidence in support of the disclosures and
assumptions and take other steps to get reasonable assurance of detecting
both intentional and unintentional misstatements that are material to the
MD&A presentation.102 To accept an examination engagement, an auditor
must have sufficient knowledge about the company and its operations. AT
§701 therefore requires that an auditor must have at least audited the com-
pany’s financial statements for the most recent period covered by the
MD&A, and the other periods covered by the MD&A must have been audited
by it or another auditor.103
Auditor examinations of MD&A disclosure are, we believe, undertaken on
few occasions. Some companies have engaged independent auditors to
conduct an examination of their MD&A disclosures either in connection with
their initial public offering or after a major restructuring or acquisition when
the company disclosure is being presented on a pro forma basis.104 In one
case, an auditor examination of MD&A was undertaken pursuant to a settle-
ment with the Commission of an enforcement action alleging material defi-
ciencies in the company’s past MD&A disclosure.105
We solicit comment with respect to independent auditor
examinations of the proposed MD&A disclosure regarding
critical accounting estimates.
• Should we require that the critical accounting estimates disclosure in the
MD&A undergo an auditor examination comparable to that enumerated
in AT §701?
• Would these engagements significantly improve the disclosure provided
in MD&A?
• In practice, when companies engage auditors to examine the MD&A pursu-
ant to AT §701, does it elicit a higher quality of disclosure than when
auditors consider only, as currently required, whether an MD&A is materi-
ally inconsistent with the financial statements?
• If we were to require examinations by auditors of part or all of MD&A
disclosures, should we also require that a company file, or disclose the
results of, the auditor’s reports?
• If we do not require auditors’ examinations of MD&A disclosure but an
auditor nonetheless examines MD&A disclosure on critical accounting
estimates, should we require that the auditor’s report be filed or the results
be disclosed?
• What would be the relative benefits and costs of a requirement for an
auditor examination with respect to the critical accounting estimates por-
tion of the MD&A?
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• Should we require an auditor ‘‘review’’ under standards comparable to
AT §701,106 as opposed to an auditor ‘‘examination’’ of the critical account-
ing estimates MD&A disclosure?
• Do current requirements relating to what an auditor must consider make an
examination or review of the proposed MD&A disclosure under standards
comparable to AT §701 unnecessary?
• If we do not require auditor examination or review, are there other steps
we should take to help ensure the quality of disclosure in this proposed
section of MD&A?
F. Quarterly Updates
Material changes relating to critical accounting estimates may occur from
fiscal period to fiscal period. For example, management could materially
change an accounting estimate previously disclosed as a critical accounting
estimate because it changes the methodology for computing it. A company
could determine that an additional accounting estimate met the standards
and is a critical accounting estimate for the period subsequent to its most
recent annual or quarterly report. A company also could materially change
one of the important assumptions underlying an existing critical accounting
estimate (which may or may not result in a change to the critical accounting
estimate depending on what changes in other assumptions underlying the
estimate are made). Any of those changes could have a material effect on
the company’s financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of
operations. We expect that U.S. companies would be evaluating accounting
estimates and the underlying assumptions and methodologies on at least a
quarterly basis107 and therefore we believe that quarterly updates to reflect
material developments would be appropriate. Disclosure of material develop-
ments made only at the end of each fiscal year also may not identify changes
quickly enough to inform investors adequately.
In quarterly reports on Form 10-Q or Form 10-QSB, companies would be
required to provide an update to the MD&A information related to critical
accounting estimates discussed in the company’s last filed annual or quarterly
report under the Exchange Act.108 Newly identified critical accounting esti-
mates would be disclosed in the same manner as in an annual report. If other
material changes have occurred that would render the critical accounting
estimates disclosure in the company’s latest report materially out of date or
otherwise materially misleading, we propose that those changes and their
effect be described in the quarterly report. The proposed rules would not,
however, require quarterly updates with regard to the proposed quantitative
and qualitative discussion concerning past material changes in critical
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accounting estimates in annual reports, registration statements and proxy
and information statements.
We solicit comment on the quarterly updating requirement for U.S.
companies.
• Are there some accounting estimates or material assumptions or method-
ologies that would normally be considered by companies only on a less
frequent basis than quarterly? If so, which ones? Should they be omitted
from the quarterly updating requirement on that basis?
• Is the scope of the disclosure required in a quarterly update appropriate?
If not, what should be added or omitted?
G. Proposed Disclosure about Initial Adoption of Accounting
Policies
A company initially adopts an accounting policy when events or transactions
that affect the company occur for the first time, when events or transactions
that were previously immaterial in their effect become material, or when
events or transactions occur that are clearly different in substance from
previous events or transactions. For example, a company may for the first
time enter into transactions involving derivative instruments, such as interest
rate swaps, or may begin selling a new type of product that has delivery terms
and conditions that are different from those associated with the products the
company has previously been selling.
If an initially adopted accounting policy has a material impact on the com-
pany’s financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of opera-
tions, that impact will likely be of interest to investors, to financial analysts
and others. If a company considers an accounting policy that it has initially
adopted to be a significant accounting policy, the company would provide
certain disclosures about that accounting policy as required by APB No. 22.
Those disclosures are typically in the first note to the financial statements.109
The disclosure provided in the notes to the financial statements, however,
may not adequately describe, in a qualitative manner, the impact of the
initially adopted accounting policy or policies on the company’s financial
presentation. We are therefore proposing additional MD&A disclosure to
further describe, where a material impact exists, the initial adoption of
accounting policies.110 The proposed MD&A disclosure would be provided in
companies’ filed annual reports, annual reports to shareholders, registration
statements and proxy and information statements and would include descrip-
tion of:
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• The events or transactions that gave rise to the initial adoption of an
accounting policy;
• The accounting principle that has been adopted and the method of applying
that principle; and
• The impact (discussed qualitatively) resulting from the initial adoption of
the accounting policy on the company’s financial condition, changes in
financial condition and results of operations.
If, upon initial adoption of one of those accounting policies, a company is
permitted a choice among acceptable accounting principles,111 the company
also would be required to explain in MD&A that it had made a choice among
acceptable alternatives, identify the alternatives, and describe why it made
the choice that it did. In addition, where material, the company would have
to provide a qualitative discussion of the impact on the company’s financial
condition, changes in financial condition and results of operations that the
alternatives would have had. Finally, if no accounting literature exists that
governs the accounting for the events or transactions giving rise to the initial
adoption of a material accounting policy (e.g., the events or transactions are
unusual or novel or otherwise have not been contemplated in past standard-
setting projects), the company would be required to explain its decision
regarding which accounting principle to use and which method of applying
that principle to use.
We seek comment on the proposed disclosures related to initial
adoption of accounting policies.
• Would the proposed disclosures about initial adoption of accounting poli-
cies provide useful information to investors and other readers of financial
reports?
• Are there particular situations involving the initial adoption of a material
accounting policy for which we should require additional disclosure? If
so, what are those situations and what additional disclosure should we
require?
• Should we require companies to disclose, in MD&A or in the financial
statements, the estimated effect of adopting accounting policies that they
could have adopted, but did not adopt, upon initial accounting for unusual
or novel transactions?
• What would be the costs for companies to prepare disclosure about the
effects of alternative accounting policies that could have been chosen but
were not?
• Would investors be confused if companies presented disclosure of the
effects of acceptable alternative policies that were not chosen?
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• Should we require in MD&A a discussion of whether the accounting policies
followed by a company upon initial adoption differ from the accounting
policies applied, in similar circumstances, by other companies in its indus-
try, and the reasons for those differences? Please explain. If such a
discussion should be required, please identify the specific disclosures
companies should make.
• Would a company know the policies applied in similar circumstances by
other companies in its industry? If not, would auditing firms or other finan-
cial advisors be able to assist companies in determining whether their
accounting policies generally diverge from industry practices?
H. Disclosure Presentation
The proposals would require that a company present the required information
in a separate section of MD&A. While the proposed disclosure may relate
to other aspects of the discussion in MD&A, such as the results of operations
or liquidity and capital resources, we have chosen to separate it both to
highlight the discussion and because we believe the proposed discussion
would present information that is better communicated separately to promote
understanding.
The proposed MD&A discussion must be presented in language, and a
format, that is clear, concise and understandable to the average investor.112
The disclosure should not be presented in such a way that only an investor
who is also an accountant or an expert on a particular industry would be
able to understand it fully. To reinforce the importance of the disclosure
being presented in a manner that investors will understand, we also would
specify that the proposed disclosure must not be presented, for example,
solely as a single discussion of the aggregate consequences of multiple
critical accounting estimates or the aggregate consequences of the initial
application of multiple new accounting policies.113 Because a company may
identify and discuss more than one critical accounting estimate or more than
one newly adopted accounting policy, and those estimates or those policies
could materially affect a company’s financial presentation in differing ways,
a separate discussion of the application of each estimate and each new
accounting policy will facilitate investors’ understanding of the implications
of each one.
Boilerplate disclosures that do not specifically address the company’s particu-
lar circumstances and operations also would not satisfy the proposed require-
ments.114 Disclosure that could easily be transferred from year to year, or
from company to company, with no change would neither inform investors
adequately nor reflect the independent thinking that must accompany the
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periodic assessment by management that is intended under the proposal.
Finally, the purpose of the proposed disclosure would be hindered if a com-
pany were to include disclosures that consisted principally of blanket disclaim-
ers of legal responsibility for its application of a new accounting policy or its
development of its critical accounting estimates in light of the uncertainties
associated with them. While the Commission fully expects companies to
craft the proposed disclosure responsibly to take advantage of any available
safe harbors, simple disclaimers of legal liability would be contrary to the
disclosure goals underlying the proposal and would not be permitted.115
We solicit comment on the disclosure presentation aspects of the
proposals.
• Should the proposed disclosure be presented in a separate section of
MD&A or should we require that it be integrated into the other discussions
of financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations
and liquidity and capital resources when the proposed disclosure is closely
related to an aspect discussed in those separate sections of MD&A?
• Should other requirements relating to the language and format be added
to the requirement for clear, concise and understandable disclosure? If
so, what requirements?
****
[Appendix A reproduces relevant portions of the rule for this book’s discus-
sion only. The complete rule is available on the SEC’s Web site at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8098.htm.]
****
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83 See Item 306(a)(4) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.306(a)(4).
84 See Securities Act Release No. 8040, FR-60 (Dec. 12, 2001) [66 FR 65013].
85 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iii)(E) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iii)(E); proposed
Item 303(c)(3)(v) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(3)(v); and proposed Item 5.E.3.(e) of
Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
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86 The proposed MD&A disclosure is distinguishable from the audit committee report in annual
proxy or information statements. Under the proxy requirements, the audit committee must prepare
a report and state whether it recommended, based on its review and discussions with management
and the auditors, that the financial statements be included in the Form 10-K. In our proposals,
we would not require an audit committee report or recommendation, but only that the company
state whether or not discussions between the audit committee and senior management occurred
and, if they did not, why not. We therefore are not convinced that a liability exemption like that
applicable to the audit committee report is necessary for disclosure in MD&A of whether or not a
company’s senior management has discussed the development and selection of critical accounting
estimates, and the disclosure in MD&A regarding them.
87 If the registrant is not a corporation, the disclosure would address senior management’s discus-
sions with the equivalent group responsible for the oversight of the financial reporting process.
88 This disclosure would be required in annual reports filed with the Commission, annual reports
to shareholders, registration statements and proxy and information statements. When a new
critical accounting estimate is identified in a quarterly report, there also would be disclosure in
the Form 10-Q or Form 10-QSB regarding whether the development, selection and disclosure
regarding the estimate was discussed by management with the audit committee of the board of
directors.
89 See Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(a).
90 See Securities Act Release No. 6835 (May 18, 1989) [54 FR 22427].
91 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iii)(F) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iii)(F); proposed
Item 303(c)(3)(vi) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(3)(vi); and proposed Item 5.E.3.(f) of
Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
92 See SFAS No. 131 for requirements as to presentation of segment disclosure in the financial
statements.
93 Certain foreign private issuers providing disclosure under Item 17 of Form 20-F are not required
to provide segment disclosure in their filed financial statements and therefore would not be required
to provide a quantitative discussion of the identified segments.
94 Any discussion on a segment basis would appear in the section of MD&A devoted to critical
accounting estimates, and not in the separate discussion of segment results in MD&A.
95 See Securities Act Release No. 8056, FR-61 (Jan. 22, 2002)[67 FR 3746], Section II.B.
96 SFAS No. 144 superseded SFAS No. 121 and is effective for financial statements issued for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001.
97 See AU §342, paragraph 4. In evaluating the reasonableness, the auditor’s objective is ‘‘to
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to provide a reasonable assurance that—
a. All accounting estimates that could be material to the financial statements have been
developed.
b. Those accounting estimates are reasonable in the circumstances.
c. The accounting estimates are presented in conformity with applicable accounting principles
and are properly disclosed.’’
AU §342, paragraph 7. The auditor normally focuses on key factors and assumptions that are
significant to the accounting estimate, that are sensitive to variations, that are deviations from
historical patterns or that are subjective and susceptible to misstatement and bias. See AU §342,
paragraph 9.
98 See AU §550, Other Information in Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements (‘‘AU
§550’’).
99 See Codification of Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements (‘‘AT’’) §101, Attest
Engagements and AT §701, Management’s Discussion and Analysis.
100 AT §701 contemplates two levels of service by an auditor with respect to MD&A: an ‘‘examina-
tion’’ of an MD&A presentation and a more limited ‘‘review’’ of an MD&A presentation. Unlike an
examination, a review culminates with the auditor giving negative assurance. The auditor’s review
report states whether any information came to the auditor’s attention to cause him or her to believe
that: the MD&A presentation taken as a whole does not include in all material respects the required
elements of the disclosure; the historical financial amounts have not been accurately derived, in
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all material respects, from the company’s financial statements; or the underlying information,
determinations, estimates and assumptions of the company do not provide a reasonable basis
for the disclosures contained in the MD&A. In undertaking a review, an auditor is expected to
apply analytical procedures and make inquiries of people at the company who are responsible
for financial, accounting and operational matters, but is not expected to test accounting records
through inspection or observation, obtain corroborating evidence in response to inquiries, or take
other steps required during an MD&A examination. An auditor’s review report is not intended to
be filed with the Commission. See AT §701, paragraph 2.
101 See AT §701, paragraph 5.
102 See AT §701, paragraphs 28-29.
103 See AT §701, paragraph 6.
104 Goldman Sachs engaged an auditor to review its MD&A disclosure in connection with its initial
public offering. See Form S-1, Commission File No. 333-74449. In addition, in the course of
reading agreements between issuers and their underwriters created in connection with registered
offerings, the staff has noted that approximately 50 companies have agreed to engage an auditor
to conduct an examination of the company’s MD&A disclosure as a condition to closing.
105 In 1998, we issued a cease-and-desist order in a settlement with Sony Corporation that required
Sony to engage an independent auditor to examine its MD&A disclosure for the fiscal year ending
March 31, 1999. See SEC v. Sony Corporation, Litigation Release No. 15832 (Aug. 5, 1998).
106 See supra fn. 100.
107 The procedures performed by an independent accountant to issue a review report on the
financial statements filed in a Form 10-Q generally would include reading information such as
that found in the MD&A section of the Form 10-Q. Further, the independent accountant’s associa-
tion with those financial statements would require the independent accountant to read the MD&
A. See AU §722, Interim Financial Information, paragraph 35 and AU §550, paragraph 4.
108 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(v) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(v), and proposed
Item 303(c)(5) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(5). To assist companies in preparing quarterly
updates, we would allow them to presume that investors have read, or have access to, the
discussion of critical accounting estimates in their previously filed Exchange Act annual reports
and any quarterly reports filed subsequent to the most recent annual report.
109 See APB No. 22, paragraphs 12 and 15.
110 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iv); proposed Item
303(c)(4) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(4); and proposed Item 5.E.4. of Form 20-F, 17
CFR 249.220f. These proposed disclosures would not be required if the initial adoption of an
accounting policy solely results from adoption of new accounting literature issued by a recognized
accounting standard setter (including, in the U.S., new accounting pronouncements or rules issued
by the FASB, AICPA or SEC or a new consensus of the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF)).
111 See supra fn. 31 and accompanying text.
112 See proposed Instruction 3 to paragraph (b)(3) of Item 303 of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR
228.303(b)(3); proposed Instruction 4 to paragraph (c) of Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR
229.303(c); and proposed Instruction 3 to Item 5.E. of Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING
BULLETIN NO. 99—
MATERIALITY*
[Author’s Note: For some time, the staff of the Securities and Exchange
Commission studied and analyzed the relative merits of quantitative versus
qualitative materiality. In August of 1999, the staff issued SAB No. 99—
‘‘Materiality’’ coming down solidly on the side of qualitative materiality as the
standard accountants should apply. The staff rejected exclusive reliance on
quantitative measures to determine if an item was material.]
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99—Materiality
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 211
[Release No. SAB 99]
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission
Action: Publication of Staff Accounting Bulletin
Summary: This staff accounting bulletin expresses the views of the staff that
exclusive reliance on certain quantitative benchmarks to assess materiality
in preparing financial statements and performing audits of those financial
statements is inappropriate; misstatements are not immaterial simply
because they fall beneath a numerical threshold.
*Source: SAB No. 99 is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/acctrps/sab99.htm.
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Date: August 12, 1999
For Further Information Contact: W. Scott Bayless, Associate Chief
Accountant, or Robert E. Burns, Chief Counsel, Office of the Chief Accountant
(202-942-4400), or David R. Fredrickson, Office of General Counsel (202-
942-0900), Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20549-1103; electronic addresses: BaylessWS@sec.gov;
BurnsR@sec.gov; FredricksonD@sec.gov.
Supplementary Information: The statements in the staff accounting bulle-
tins are not rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published
as bearing the Commission’s official approval. They represent interpretations
and practices followed by the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office
of the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure requirements of the
Federal securities laws.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Date: August 12, 1999
Part 211–(AMEND) Accordingly, Part 211 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal
Regulations is amended by adding Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 to the
table found in Subpart B.
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99
The staff hereby adds Section M to Topic 1 of the Staff Accounting Bulletin
Series. Section M, entitled ‘‘Materiality,’’ provides guidance in applying mate-
riality thresholds to the preparation of financial statements filed with the
Commission and the performance of audits of those financial statements.
Staff Accounting Bulletins
Topic 1: Financial Statements
* * * * *
M. Materiality
1. Assessing Materiality
Facts: During the course of preparing or auditing year-end financial state-
ments, financial management or the registrant’s independent auditor
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becomes aware of misstatements in a registrant’s financial statements. When
combined, the misstatements result in a 4% overstatement of net income
and a $.02 (4%) overstatement of earnings per share. Because no item in
the registrant’s consolidated financial statements is misstated by more than
5%, management and the independent auditor conclude that the deviation
from generally accepted accounting principles (‘‘GAAP’’) is immaterial and
that the accounting is permissible.1
Question: Each Statement of Financial Accounting Standards adopted by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (‘‘FASB’’) states, ‘‘The provisions
of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial items.’’ In the staff’s
view, may a registrant or the auditor of its financial statements assume the
immateriality of items that fall below a percentage threshold set by manage-
ment or the auditor to determine whether amounts and items are material
to the financial statements?
Interpretive Response: No. The staff is aware that certain registrants, over
time, have developed quantitative thresholds as ‘‘rules of thumb’’ to assist
in the preparation of their financial statements, and that auditors also have
used these thresholds in their evaluation of whether items might be consid-
ered material to users of a registrant’s financial statements. One rule of
thumb in particular suggests that the misstatement or omission2 of an item
that falls under a 5% threshold is not material in the absence of particularly
egregious circumstances, such as self-dealing or misappropriation by senior
management. The staff reminds registrants and the auditors of their financial
statements that exclusive reliance on this or any percentage or numerical
threshold has no basis in the accounting literature or the law.
The use of a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as 5%, may provide
the basis for a preliminary assumption that—without considering all relevant
circumstances—a deviation of less than the specified percentage with respect
to a particular item on the registrant’s financial statements is unlikely to be
material. The staff has no objection to such a ‘‘rule of thumb’’ as an initial
step in assessing materiality. But quantifying, in percentage terms, the magni-
tude of a misstatement is only the beginning of an analysis of materiality; it
cannot appropriately be used as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant
considerations. Materiality concerns the significance of an item to users of a
registrant’s financial statements. A matter is ‘‘material’’ if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important. In its State-
ment of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, the FASB stated the essence
of the concept of materiality as follows:
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if,
in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such
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that it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the
report would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction
of the item.3
This formulation in the accounting literature is in substance identical to the
formulation used by the courts in interpreting the federal securities laws. The
Supreme Court has held that a fact is material if there is—
a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘‘total mix’’ of informa-
tion made available.4
Under the governing principles, an assessment of materiality requires that
one views the facts in the context of the ‘‘surrounding circumstances,’’ as
the accounting literature puts it, or the ‘‘total mix’’ of information, in the words
of the Supreme Court. In the context of a misstatement of a financial statement
item, while the ‘‘total mix’’ includes the size in numerical or percentage terms
of the misstatement, it also includes the factual context in which the user of
financial statements would view the financial statement item. The shorthand
in the accounting and auditing literature for this analysis is that financial
management and the auditor must consider both ‘‘quantitative’’ and ‘‘qualita-
tive’’ factors in assessing an item’s materiality.5 Court decisions, Commission
rules and enforcement actions, and accounting and auditing literature6 have
all considered ‘‘qualitative’’ factors in various contexts.
The FASB has long emphasized that materiality cannot be reduced to a
numerical formula. In its Concepts Statement No. 2, the FASB noted that
some had urged it to promulgate quantitative materiality guides for use in a
variety of situations. The FASB rejected such an approach as representing
only a ‘‘minority view,’’ stating—
The predominant view is that materiality judgments can properly be made
only by those who have all the facts. The Board’s present position is that
no general standards of materiality could be formulated to take into account
all the considerations that enter into an experienced human judgment.7
The FASB noted that, in certain limited circumstances, the Commission and
other authoritative bodies had issued quantitative materiality guidance, citing
as examples guidelines ranging from one to ten percent with respect to a
variety of disclosures.8 And it took account of contradictory studies, one
showing a lack of uniformity among auditors on materiality judgments, and
another suggesting widespread use of a ‘‘rule of thumb’’ of five to ten percent
of net income.9 The FASB also considered whether an evaluation of material-
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ity could be based solely on anticipating the market’s reaction to accounting
information.10
The FASB rejected a formulaic approach to discharging ‘‘the onerous duty
of making materiality decisions’’11 in favor of an approach that takes into
account all the relevant considerations. In so doing, it made clear that—
[M]agnitude by itself, without regard to the nature of the item and the circum-
stances in which the judgment has to be made, will not generally be a
sufficient basis for a materiality judgment.12
Evaluation of materiality requires a registrant and its auditor to consider all
the relevant circumstances, and the staff believes that there are numerous
circumstances in which misstatements below 5% could well be material.
Qualitative factors may cause misstatements of quantitatively small amounts
to be material; as stated in the auditing literature:
As a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations
in materiality judgments, misstatements of relatively small amounts that come
to the auditor’s attention could have a material effect on the financial state-
ments.13
Among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively small
misstatement of a financial statement item are—
• whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise measure-
ment or whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of
imprecision inherent in the estimate14
• whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends
• whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus
expectations for the enterprise
• whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa
• whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the
registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a significant role
in the registrant’s operations or profitability
• whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with regula-
tory requirements
• whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with loan
covenants or other contractual requirements
• whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s
compensation—for example, by satisfying requirements for the award of
bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation
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• whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful transac-
tion.
This is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances that may affect the material-
ity of a quantitatively small misstatement.15 Among other factors, the demon-
strated volatility of the price of a registrant’s securities in response to certain
types of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors regard
quantitatively small misstatements as material. Consideration of potential
market reaction to disclosure of a misstatement is by itself ‘‘too blunt an
instrument to be depended on’’ in considering whether a fact is material.16
When, however, management or the independent auditor expects (based,
for example, on a pattern of market performance) that a known misstatement
may result in a significant positive or negative market reaction, that expected
reaction should be taken into account when considering whether a misstate-
ment is material.17
For the reasons noted above, the staff believes that a registrant and the
auditors of its financial statements should not assume that even small inten-
tional misstatements in financial statements, for example those pursuant to
actions to ‘‘manage’’ earnings, are immaterial.18 While the intent of manage-
ment does not render a misstatement material, it may provide significant
evidence of materiality. The evidence may be particularly compelling where
management has intentionally misstated items in the financial statements to
‘‘manage’’ reported earnings. In that instance, it presumably has done so
believing that the resulting amounts and trends would be significant to users
of the registrant’s financial statements.19 The staff believes that investors
generally would regard as significant a management practice to over- or
under-state earnings up to an amount just short of a percentage threshold
in order to ‘‘manage’’ earnings. Investors presumably also would regard as
significant an accounting practice that, in essence, rendered all earnings
figures subject to a management-directed margin of misstatement.
The materiality of a misstatement may turn on where it appears in the financial
statements. For example, a misstatement may involve a segment of the
registrant’s operations. In that instance, in assessing materiality of a misstate-
ment to the financial statements taken as a whole, registrants and their
auditors should consider not only the size of the misstatement but also the
significance of the segment information to the financial statements taken as
a whole.20 ‘‘A misstatement of the revenue and operating profit of a relatively
small segment that is represented by management to be important to the
future profitability of the entity’’21 is more likely to be material to investors
than a misstatement in a segment that management has not identified as
especially important. In assessing the materiality of misstatements in seg-
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ment information—as with materiality generally—situations may arise in prac-
tice where the auditor will conclude that a matter relating to segment
information is qualitatively material even though, in his or her judgment, it is
quantitatively immaterial to the financial statements taken as a whole.22
Aggregating and Netting Misstatements
In determining whether multiple misstatements cause the financial state-
ments to be materially misstated, registrants and the auditors of their financial
statements should consider each misstatement separately and the aggregate
effect of all misstatements.23 A registrant and its auditor should evaluate
misstatements in light of quantitative and qualitative factors and ‘‘consider
whether, in relation to individual line item amounts, subtotals, or totals in the
financial statements, they materially misstate the financial statements taken
as a whole.’’24 This requires consideration of the significance of an item to
a particular entity (for example, inventories to a manufacturing company),
the pervasiveness of the misstatement (such as whether it affects the presen-
tation of numerous financial statement items), and the effect of the misstate-
ment on the financial statements taken as a whole. . . .25
Registrants and their auditors first should consider whether each misstate-
ment is material, irrespective of its effect when combined with other misstate-
ments. The literature notes that the analysis should consider whether the
misstatement of ‘‘individual amounts’’ causes a material misstatement of the
financial statements taken as a whole. As with materiality generally, this
analysis requires consideration of both quantitative and qualitative factors.
If the misstatement of an individual amount causes the financial statements
as a whole to be materially misstated, that effect cannot be eliminated by
other misstatements whose effect may be to diminish the impact of the
misstatement on other financial statement items. To take an obvious example,
if a registrant’s revenues are a material financial statement item and if they
are materially overstated, the financial statements taken as a whole will be
materially misleading even if the effect on earnings is completely offset by
an equivalent overstatement of expenses.
Even though a misstatement of an individual amount may not cause the
financial statements taken as a whole to be materially misstated, it may
nonetheless, when aggregated with other misstatements, render the financial
statements taken as a whole to be materially misleading. Registrants and
the auditors of their financial statements accordingly should consider the
effect of the misstatement on subtotals or totals. The auditor should aggregate
all misstatements that affect each subtotal or total and consider whether the
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misstatements in the aggregate affect the subtotal or total in a way that
causes the registrant’s financial statements taken as a whole to be materially
misleading.26
The staff believes that, in considering the aggregate effect of multiple mis-
statements on a subtotal or total, registrants and the auditors of their financial
statements should exercise particular care when considering whether to
offset (or the appropriateness of offsetting) a misstatement of an estimated
amount with a misstatement of an item capable of precise measurement. As
noted above, assessments of materiality should never be purely mechanical;
given the imprecision inherent in estimates, there is by definition a corre-
sponding imprecision in the aggregation of misstatements involving estimates
with those that do not involve an estimate.
Registrants and auditors also should consider the effect of misstatements
from prior periods on the current financial statements. For example, the
auditing literature states,
Matters underlying adjustments proposed by the auditor but not recorded by
the entity could potentially cause future financial statements to be materially
misstated, even though the auditor has concluded that the adjustments are
not material to the current financial statements.27
This may be particularly the case where immaterial misstatements recur in
several years and the cumulative effect becomes material in the current
year.
2. Immaterial Misstatements That are Intentional
Facts: A registrant’s management intentionally has made adjustments to
various financial statement items in a manner inconsistent with GAAP. In each
accounting period in which such actions were taken, none of the individual
adjustments is by itself material, nor is the aggregate effect on the financial
statements taken as a whole material for the period. The registrant’s earnings
‘‘management’’ has been effected at the direction or acquiescence of man-
agement in the belief that any deviations from GAAP have been immaterial
and that accordingly the accounting is permissible.
Question: In the staff’s view, may a registrant make intentional immaterial
misstatements in its financial statements?
Interpretive Response: No. In certain circumstances, intentional immaterial
misstatements are unlawful.
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Considerations of the Books and Records Provisions Under the
Exchange Act
Even if misstatements are immaterial,28 registrants must comply with Sections
13(b)(2)-(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘‘Exchange Act’’).29
Under these provisions, each registrant with securities registered pursuant
to Section 12 of the Exchange Act,30 or required to file reports pursuant to
Section 15(d),31 must make and keep books, records, and accounts, which,
in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposi-
tions of assets of the registrant and must maintain internal accounting controls
that are sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that, among other things,
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial
statements in conformity with GAAP.32 In this context, determinations of what
constitutes ‘‘reasonable assurance’’ and ‘‘reasonable detail’’ are based not
on a ‘‘materiality’’ analysis but on the level of detail and degree of assurance
that would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.33 Accord-
ingly, failure to record accurately immaterial items, in some instances, may
result in violations of the securities laws.
The staff recognizes that there is limited authoritative guidance34 regarding
the ‘‘reasonableness’’ standard in Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act. A
principal statement of the Commission’s policy in this area is set forth in an
address given in 1981 by then Chairman Harold M. Williams.35 In his address,
Chairman Williams noted that, like materiality, ‘‘reasonableness’’ is not an
‘‘absolute standard of exactitude for corporate records.’’36 Unlike materiality,
however, ‘‘reasonableness’’ is not solely a measure of the significance of a
financial statement item to investors. ‘‘Reasonableness,’’ in this context,
reflects a judgment as to whether an issuer’s failure to correct a known
misstatement implicates the purposes underlying the accounting provisions
of Sections 13(b)(2)-(7) of the Exchange Act.37
In assessing whether a misstatement results in a violation of a registrant’s
obligation to keep books and records that are accurate ‘‘in reasonable detail,’’
registrants and their auditors should consider, in addition to the factors dis-
cussed above concerning an evaluation of a misstatement’s potential materi-
ality, the factors set forth below.
• The significance of the misstatement. Though the staff does not believe
that registrants need to make finely calibrated determinations of signifi-
cance with respect to immaterial items, plainly it is ‘‘reasonable’’ to treat
misstatements whose effects are clearly inconsequential differently than
more significant ones.
• How the misstatement arose. It is unlikely that it is ever ‘‘reasonable’’
for registrants to record misstatements or not to correct known misstate-
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ments—even immaterial ones—as part of an ongoing effort directed by
or known to senior management for the purposes of ‘‘managing’’ earnings.
On the other hand, insignificant misstatements that arise from the opera-
tion of systems or recurring processes in the normal course of business
generally will not cause a registrant’s books to be inaccurate ‘‘in reasonable
detail.’’38
• The cost of correcting the misstatement. The books and records provi-
sions of the Exchange Act do not require registrants to make major expen-
ditures to correct small misstatements.39 Conversely, where there is little
cost or delay involved in correcting a misstatement, failing to do so is
unlikely to be ‘‘reasonable.’’
• The clarity of authoritative accounting guidance with respect to the
misstatement. Where reasonable minds may differ about the appropriate
accounting treatment of a financial statement item, a failure to correct it
may not render the registrant’s financial statements inaccurate ‘‘in reason-
able detail.’’ Where, however, there is little ground for reasonable disagree-
ment, the case for leaving a misstatement uncorrected is correspondingly
weaker.
There may be other indicators of ‘‘reasonableness’’ that registrants and their
auditors may ordinarily consider. Because the judgment is not mechanical,
the staff will be inclined to continue to defer to judgments that ‘‘allow a
business, acting in good faith, to comply with the Act’s accounting provisions
in an innovative and cost-effective way.’’40
The Auditor’s Response to Intentional Misstatements
Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act requires auditors to take certain actions
upon discovery of an ‘‘illegal act.’’41 The statute specifies that these obligations
are triggered ‘‘whether or not [the illegal acts are] perceived to have a material
effect on the financial statements of the issuer . . . .’’ Among other things,
Section 10A(b)(1) requires the auditor to inform the appropriate level of
management of an illegal act (unless clearly inconsequential) and assure
that the registrant’s audit committee is ‘‘adequately informed’’ with respect
to the illegal act.
As noted, an intentional misstatement of immaterial items in a registrant’s
financial statements may violate Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act and
thus be an illegal act. When such a violation occurs, an auditor must take
steps to see that the registrant’s audit committee is ‘‘adequately informed’’
about the illegal act. Because Section 10A(b)(1) is triggered regardless of
whether an illegal act has a material effect on the registrant’s financial state-
ments, where the illegal act consists of a misstatement in the registrant’s
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financial statements, the auditor will be required to report that illegal act to
the audit committee irrespective of any ‘‘netting’’ of the misstatements with
other financial statement items.
The requirements of Section 10A echo the auditing literature. See, for exam-
ple, Statement on Auditing Standards No. (‘‘SAS’’) 54, ‘‘Illegal Acts by Cli-
ents,’’ and SAS 82, ‘‘Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.’’
Pursuant to paragraph 38 of SAS 82, if the auditor determines there is
evidence that fraud may exist, the auditor must discuss the matter with the
appropriate level of management. The auditor must report directly to the
audit committee fraud involving senior management and fraud that causes
a material misstatement of the financial statements. Paragraph 4 of SAS 82
states that ‘‘misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial
statements to deceive financial statement users.’’42 SAS 82 further states
that fraudulent financial reporting may involve falsification or alteration of
accounting records; misrepresenting or omitting events, transactions or other
information in the financial statements; and the intentional misapplication
of accounting principles relating to amounts, classifications, the manner of
presentation, or disclosures in the financial statements.43 The clear implication
of SAS 82 is that immaterial misstatements may be fraudulent financial
reporting.44
Auditors that learn of intentional misstatements may also be required to (1)
re-evaluate the degree of audit risk involved in the audit engagement, (2)
determine whether to revise the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures
accordingly, and (3) consider whether to resign.45
Intentional misstatements also may signal the existence of reportable condi-
tions or material weaknesses in the registrant’s system of internal accounting
control designed to detect and deter improper accounting and financial
reporting.46 As stated by the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting, also known as the Treadway Commission, in its 1987 report,
The tone set by top management—the corporate environment or culture
within which financial reporting occurs—is the most important factor contribut-
ing to the integrity of the financial reporting process. Notwithstanding an
impressive set of written rules and procedures, if the tone set by management
is lax, fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur.47
An auditor is required to report to a registrant’s audit committee any reportable
conditions or material weaknesses in a registrant’s system of internal
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accounting control that the auditor discovers in the course of the examination
of the registrant’s financial statements.48
GAAP Precedence Over Industry Practice
Some have argued to the staff that registrants should be permitted to follow
an industry accounting practice even though that practice is inconsistent with
authoritative accounting literature. This situation might occur if a practice is
developed when there are few transactions and the accounting results are
clearly inconsequential, and that practice never changes despite a subse-
quent growth in the number or materiality of such transactions. The staff
disagrees with this argument. Authoritative literature takes precedence over
industry practice that is contrary to GAAP.49
General Comments
This SAB is not intended to change current law or guidance in the accounting
or auditing literature.50 This SAB and the authoritative accounting literature
cannot specifically address all of the novel and complex business transactions
and events that may occur. Accordingly, registrants may account for, and
make disclosures about, these transactions and events based on analogies
to similar situations or other factors. The staff may not, however, always be
persuaded that a registrant’s determination is the most appropriate under
the circumstances. When disagreements occur after a transaction or an
event has been reported, the consequences may be severe for registrants,
auditors, and, most importantly, the users of financial statements who have
a right to expect consistent accounting and reporting for, and disclosure of,
similar transactions and events. The staff, therefore, encourages registrants
and auditors to discuss on a timely basis with the staff proposed accounting
treatments for, or disclosures about, transactions or events that are not
specifically covered by the existing accounting literature.
Footnotes
1 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (‘‘AICPA’’), Codification of Statements on
Auditing Standards (‘‘AU’’) §312, ‘‘Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit,’’ states that
the auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) planning and setting the scope
for the audit and (b) evaluating whether the financial statements taken as a whole are fairly
presented in all material respects in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
The purpose of this Staff Accounting Bulletin (‘‘SAB’’) is to provide guidance to financial manage-
ment and independent auditors with respect to the evaluation of the materiality of misstatements
that are identified in the audit process or preparation of the financial statements (i.e., (b) above).
This SAB is not intended to provide definitive guidance for assessing ‘‘materiality’’ in other contexts,
such as evaluations of auditor independence, as other factors may apply. There may be other
rules that address financial presentation. See, e.g., Rule 2a-4, 17 CFR 270.2a-4, under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.
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2 As used in this SAB, ‘‘misstatement’’ or ‘‘omission’’ refers to a financial statement assertion that
would not be in conformity with GAAP.
3 FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Account-
ing Information (‘‘Concepts Statement No. 2’’), 132 (1980). See also Concepts Statement No. 2,
Glossary of Terms—Materiality.
4 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988). As the Supreme Court has noted, determinations of materiality require
‘‘delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set
of facts and the significance of those inferences to him . . . .’’ TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 450.
5 See, e.g., Concepts Statement No. 2, 123–124; AU §312.10 (‘‘. . . materiality judgments are
made in light of surrounding circumstances and necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative
considerations.’’); AU §312.34 (‘‘Qualitative considerations also influence the auditor in reaching
a conclusion as to whether misstatements are material.’’). As used in the accounting literature
and in this SAB, ‘‘qualitative’’ materiality refers to the surrounding circumstances that inform an
investor’s evaluation of financial statement entries. Whether events may be material to investors
for non-financial reasons is a matter not addressed by this SAB.
6 See, e.g., Rule 1-02(o) of Regulation S-X, 17 CFR 210.1-02(o), Rule 405 of Regulation C, 17
CFR 230.405, and Rule 12b-2, 17 CFR 240.12b-2; AU §§312.10 - .11, 317.13, 411.04 n. 1, and
508.36; In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation, 10 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Parnes
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90
F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996); In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. (‘‘AAER’’) 1140 (June 30, 1999); In the Matter of Eugene Gaughan, AAER 1141
(June 30, 1999); In the Matter of Thomas Scanlon, AAER 1142 (June 30, 1999); and In re
Sensormatic Electronics Corporation, Sec. Act Rel. No. 7518 (March 25, 1998).
7 Concepts Statement No. 2, 131 (1980).
8 Concepts Statement No. 2, 131 and 166.
9 Concepts Statement No. 2, 167.
10 Concepts Statement No. 2, 168–69.
11 Concepts Statement No. 2, 170.
12 Concepts Statement No. 2, 125.
13 AU §312.11.
14 As stated in Concepts Statement No. 2, 130: Another factor in materiality judgments is the
degree of precision that is attainable in estimating the judgment item. The amount of deviation
that is considered immaterial may increase as the attainable degree of precision decreases. For
example, accounts payable usually can be estimated more accurately than can contingent liabilities
arising from litigation or threats of it, and a deviation considered to be material in the first case
may be quite trivial in the second. This SAB is not intended to change current law or guidance
in the accounting literature regarding accounting estimates. See, e.g., Accounting Principles Board
Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes 10, 11, 31–33 (July 1971).
15 The staff understands that the Big Five Audit Materiality Task Force (‘‘Task Force’’) was convened
in March of 1998 and has made recommendations to the Auditing Standards Board including
suggestions regarding communications with audit committees about unadjusted misstatements.
See generally Big Five Audit Materiality Task Force, ‘‘Materiality in a Financial Statement Audit—
Considering Qualitative Factors When Evaluating Audit Findings’’ (August 1998). The Task Force
memorandum is available at www.aicpa.org.
16 See Concepts Statement No. 2, 169.
17 If management does not expect a significant market reaction, a misstatement still may be
material and should be evaluated under the criteria discussed in this SAB.
18 Intentional management of earnings and intentional misstatements, as used in this SAB, do not
include insignificant errors and omissions that may occur in systems and recurring processes in
the normal course of business. See notes 38 and 50 infra.
19 Assessments of materiality should occur not only at year-end, but also during the preparation
of each quarterly or interim financial statement. See, e.g., In the Matter of Venator Group, Inc.,
AAER 1049 (June 29, 1998).
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20 See, e.g., In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., AAER 1140 (June 30, 1999).
21 AUI §326.33.
22 Id.
23 The auditing literature notes that the ‘‘concept of materiality recognizes that some matters, either
individually or in the aggregate, are important for fair presentation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.’’ AU §312.03. See also AU §312.04.
24 AU §312.34. Quantitative materiality assessments often are made by comparing adjustments
to revenues, gross profit, pretax and net income, total assets, stockholders’ equity, or individual
line items in the financial statements. The particular items in the financial statements to be
considered as a basis for the materiality determination depend on the proposed adjustment to
be made and other factors, such as those identified in this SAB. For example, an adjustment to
inventory that is immaterial to pretax income or net income may be material to the financial
statements because it may affect a working capital ratio or cause the registrant to be in default
of loan covenants.
25 AU §508.36.
26 AU §312.34.
27 AU §380.09.
28 FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (‘‘Standards’’ or ‘‘Statements’’) generally
provide that ‘‘[t]he provisions of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial items.’’ This
SAB is consistent with that provision of the Statements. In theory, this language is subject to the
interpretation that the registrant is free intentionally to set forth immaterial items in financial
statements in a manner that plainly would be contrary to GAAP if the misstatement were material.
The staff believes that the FASB did not intend this result.
29 15 U.S.C. §§78m(b)(2)-(7).
30 15 U.S.C. §78l.
31 15 U.S.C. §78o(d).
32 Criminal liability may be imposed if a person knowingly circumvents or knowingly fails to imple-
ment a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsifies books, records or accounts.
15 U.S.C. §§78m(4) and (5). See also Rule 13b2-1 under the Exchange Act, 17 CFR 240.13b2-
1, which states, ‘‘No person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book,
record or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act.’’
33 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(7). The books and records provisions of section 13(b) of the Exchange Act
originally were passed as part of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (‘‘FCPA’’). In the conference
committee report regarding the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, the committee stated,
The conference committee adopted the prudent man qualification in order to clarify that the current
standard does not connote an unrealistic degree of exactitude or precision. The concept of
reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including
the costs of compliance.
Cong. Rec. H2116 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
34 So far as the staff is aware, there is only one judicial decision that discusses Section 13(b)(2)
of the Exchange Act in any detail, SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724
(N.D. Ga. 1983), and the courts generally have found that no private right of action exists under
the accounting and books and records provisions of the Exchange Act. See e.g., Lamb v. Phillip
Morris Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) and JS Service Center Corporation v. General Electric
Technical Services Company, 937 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
35 The Commission adopted the address as a formal statement of policy in Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 17500 (January 29, 1981), 46 FR 11544 (February 9, 1981), 21 SEC Docket
1466 (February 10, 1981).
36 Id. at 46 FR 11546.
37 Id.
38 For example, the conference report regarding the 1988 amendments to the FCPA stated,
The Conferees intend to codify current Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement
policy that penalties not be imposed for insignificant or technical infractions or inadvertent conduct.
The amendment adopted by the Conferees [Section 13(b)(4)] accomplishes this by providing that
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criminal penalties shall not be imposed for failing to comply with the FCPA’s books and records
or accounting provisions. This provision [Section 13(b)(5)] is meant to ensure that criminal penalties
would be imposed where acts of commission or omission in keeping books or records or administer-
ing accounting controls have the purpose of falsifying books, records or accounts, or of circum-
venting the accounting controls set forth in the Act. This would include the deliberate falsification
of books and records and other conduct calculated to evade the internal accounting controls
requirement.
Cong. Rec. H2115 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
39 As Chairman Williams noted with respect to the internal control provisions of the FCPA, ‘‘[t]hou-
sands of dollars ordinarily should not be spent conserving hundreds.’’ 46 FR 11546.
40 Id., at 11547.
41 Section 10A(f) defines, for purposes of Section 10A, an ‘‘illegal act’’ as ‘‘an act or omission that
violates any law, or any rule or regulation having the force of law.’’ This is broader than the
definition of an ‘‘illegal act’’ in AU §317.02, which states, ‘‘Illegal acts by clients do not include
personal misconduct by the entity’s personnel unrelated to their business activities.’’
42 AU §316.04. See also AU §316.03. An unintentional illegal act triggers the same procedures
and considerations by the auditor as a fraudulent misstatement if the illegal act has a direct and
material effect on the financial statements. See AU §§110 n. 1, 316 n. 1, 317.05 and 317.07.
Although distinguishing between intentional and unintentional misstatements is often difficult, the
auditor must plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial state-
ments are free of material misstatements in either case. See AU §316 note 3.
43 AU §316.04. Although the auditor is not required to plan or perform the audit to detect misstate-
ments that are immaterial to the financial statements, SAS 82 requires the auditor to evaluate
several fraud ‘‘risk factors’’ that may bring such misstatements to his or her attention. For example,
an analysis of fraud risk factors under SAS 82 must include, among other things, consideration
of management’s interest in maintaining or increasing the registrant’s stock price or earnings
trend through the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices, whether management has
a practice of committing to analysts or others that it will achieve unduly aggressive or clearly
unrealistic forecasts, and the existence of assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on
significant estimates that involve unusually subjective judgments or uncertainties. See AU
§§316.17a and .17c.
44 AU §§316.34 and 316.35, in requiring the auditor to consider whether fraudulent misstatements
are material, and in requiring differing responses depending on whether the misstatement is
material, make clear that fraud can involve immaterial misstatements. Indeed, a misstatement
can be ‘‘inconsequential’’ and still involve fraud.
Under SAS 82, assessing whether misstatements due to fraud are material to the financial
statements is a ‘‘cumulative process’’ that should occur both during and at the completion of the
audit. SAS 82 further states that this accumulation is primarily a ‘‘qualitative matter’’ based
on the auditor’s judgment. AU §316.33. The staff believes that in making these assessments,
management and auditors should refer to the discussion in Part 1 of this SAB.
45 AU §§316.34 and 316.36. Auditors should document their determinations in accordance with
AU §§316.37, 319.57, 339, and other appropriate sections.
46 See, e.g., AU §316.39.
47 Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting at 32 (October 1987).
See also Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effective-
ness of Corporate Audit Committees (February 8, 1999).
48 AU §325.02. See also AU §380.09, which, in discussing matters to be communicated by the
auditor to the audit committee, states,
The auditor should inform the audit committee about adjustments arising from the audit that could,
in his judgment, either individually or in the aggregate, have a significant effect on the entity’s
financial reporting process. For purposes of this section, an audit adjustment, whether or not
recorded by the entity, is a proposed correction of the financial statements. . . .
49 See AU §411.05.
50 The FASB Discussion Memorandum, Criteria for Determining Materiality, states that the financial
accounting and reporting process considers that ‘‘a great deal of the time might be spent during
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the accounting process considering insignificant matters . . . . If presentations of financial informa-
tion are to be prepared economically on a timely basis and presented in a concise intelligible
form, the concept of materiality is crucial.’’ This SAB is not intended to require that misstatements
arising from insignificant errors and omissions (individually and in the aggregate) arising from the
normal recurring accounting close processes, such as a clerical error or an adjustment for a
missed accounts payable invoice, always be corrected, even if the error is identified in the audit
process and known to management. Management and the auditor would need to consider the
various factors described elsewhere in this SAB in assessing whether such misstatements are
material, need to be corrected to comply with the FCPA, or trigger procedures under Section 10A
of the Exchange Act. Because this SAB does not change current law or guidance in the accounting
or auditing literature, adherence to the principles described in this SAB should not raise the costs
associated with recordkeeping or with audits of financial statements.
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SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING
BULLETIN: NO. 101—REVENUE
RECOGNITION IN FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS*
[Author’s Note: After promulgating the bulletin on materiality (No. 99), the
staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission issued bulletin No. 101
on another important issue, revenue recognition, in December 1999. After
publishing the initial bulletin, though, companies that filed with the SEC
asked for more time to examine the impact of this bulletin on their revenue
recognition policies and procedures, and the staff granted two extensions
with the issuance of bulletins Nos. 101A and 101B.]
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 101—Revenue Recognition in
Financial Statements
Securities and Exchange Commission
17 CFR Part 211
[Release No. SAB 101]
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission
Action: Publication of Staff Accounting Bulletin
*Source: SAB No. 101 is available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101.htm.
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Summary: This staff accounting bulletin summarizes certain of the staff’s
views in applying generally accepted accounting principles to revenue recog-
nition in financial statements. The staff is providing this guidance due, in
part, to the large number of revenue recognition issues that registrants
encounter. For example, a March 1999 report entitled Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1987–1997 An Analysis of U. S. Public Companies, sponsored
by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway
Commission, indicated that over half of financial reporting frauds in the study
involved overstating revenue.
Date: December 3, 1999
For Further Information Contact: Richard Rodgers, Scott Taub, or Eric
Jacobsen, Professional Accounting Fellows (202/942-4400) or Robert Bay-
less, Division of Corporation Finance (202/942-2960), Securities and
Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549; elec-
tronic addresses: RodgersR@sec.gov; TaubS@sec.gov; JacobsenE@sec.-
gov; BaylessR@sec.gov.
Supplementary Information: The statements in the staff accounting bulle-
tins are not rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published
as bearing the Commission’s official approval. They represent interpretations
and practices followed by the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office
of the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure requirements of the
Federal securities laws.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Date: December 3, 1999
Part 211–(AMEND)
Accordingly, Part 211 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended by adding Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101 to the table found in
Subpart B.
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101
The staff hereby adds new major Topic 13, ‘‘Revenue Recognition,’’ and
Topic 13-A, ‘‘Views on Selected Revenue Recognition Issues,’’ to the Staff
Accounting Bulletin Series. Topic 13-A provides the staff’s views in applying
generally accepted accounting principles to selected revenue recognition
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issues. In addition, the staff hereby revises Topic 8-A to conform to FASB
Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases.
Topic 13: Revenue Recognition
A. Selected Revenue Recognition Issues
1. Revenue Recognition—General
The accounting literature on revenue recognition includes both broad concep-
tual discussions as well as certain industry-specific guidance. Examples
of existing literature on revenue recognition include Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) Statements of Financial Accounting Standards
(SFAS) No. 13, Accounting for Leases, No. 45, Accounting for Franchise
Fee Revenue, No. 48, Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists,
No. 49, Accounting for Product Financing Arrangements, No. 50, Financial
Reporting in the Record and Music Industry, No. 51, Financial Reporting by
Cable Television Companies, and No. 66, Accounting for Sales of Real
Estate ; Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 10, Omnibus Opin-
ion—1966; Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) Nos. 43 (Chapter 1a) and
45, Long-Term Construction-Type Contracts; American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) Statements of Position (SOP) No. 81-1, Account-
ing for Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type Con-
tracts, and No. 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition; Emerging Issues Task
Force (EITF) Issue No. 88-18, Sales of Future Revenues, No. 91-9, Revenue
and Expense Recognition for Freight Services in Process, No. 95-1, Revenue
Recognition on Sales with a Guaranteed Minimum Resale Value, and No. 95-
4, Revenue Recognition on Equipment Sold and Subsequently Repurchased
Subject to an Operating Lease; and FASB Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts (SFAC) No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial State-
ments of Business Enterprises.1 If a transaction is within the scope of specific
authoritative literature that provides revenue recognition guidance, that litera-
ture should be applied. However, in the absence of authoritative literature
addressing a specific arrangement or a specific industry, the staff will consider
the existing authoritative accounting standards as well as the broad revenue
recognition criteria specified in the FASB’s conceptual framework that contain
basic guidelines for revenue recognition.
Based on these guidelines, revenue should not be recognized until it is
realized or realizable and earned.2 SFAC No. 5, paragraph 83(b) states that
‘‘an entity’s revenue-earning activities involve delivering or producing goods,
rendering services, or other activities that constitute its ongoing major or
central operations, and revenues are considered to have been earned when
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the entity has substantially accomplished what it must do to be entitled
to the benefits represented by the revenues’’ [footnote reference omitted].
Paragraph 84(a) continues ‘‘the two conditions (being realized or realizable
and being earned) are usually met by the time product or merchandise is
delivered or services are rendered to customers, and revenues from manufac-
turing and selling activities and gains and losses from sales of other assets
are commonly recognized at time of sale (usually meaning delivery)’’ [footnote
reference omitted]. In addition, paragraph 84(d) states that ‘‘If services are
rendered or rights to use assets extend continuously over time (for example,
interest or rent), reliable measures based on contractual prices established
in advance are commonly available, and revenues may be recognized as
earned as time passes.’’
The staff believes that revenue generally is realized or realizable and earned
when all of the following criteria are met:
• Persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists,3
• Delivery has occurred or services have been rendered,4
• The seller’s price to the buyer is fixed or determinable,5
and
• Collectibility is reasonably assured.6
2. Persuasive Evidence of an Arrangement
Question 1
Facts: Company A has product available to ship to customers prior to the
end of its current fiscal quarter. Customer Beta places an order for the
product, and Company A delivers the product prior to the end of its current
fiscal quarter. Company A’s normal and customary business practice for this
class of customer is to enter into a written sales agreement that requires the
signatures of the authorized representatives of the Company and its customer
to be binding. Company A prepares a written sales agreement, and its
authorized representative signs the agreement before the end of the quarter.
However, Customer Beta does not sign the agreement because Customer
Beta is awaiting the requisite approval by its legal department. Customer
Beta’s purchasing department has orally agreed to the sale and stated that
it is highly likely that the contract will be approved the first week of Company
A’s next fiscal quarter.
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Question: May Company A recognize the revenue in the current fiscal
quarter for the sale of the product to Customer Beta when (1) the product
is delivered by the end of its current fiscal quarter and (2) the final written
sales agreement is executed by Customer Beta’s authorized representative
within a few days after the end of the current fiscal quarter?
Interpretive Response: No. Generally the staff believes that, in view of
Company A’s business practice of requiring a written sales agreement for
this class of customer, persuasive evidence of an arrangement would require
a final agreement that has been executed by the properly authorized person-
nel of the customer. In the staff’s view, Customer Beta’s execution of the
sales agreement after the end of the quarter causes the transaction to be
considered a transaction of the subsequent period.7 Further, if an arrange-
ment is subject to subsequent approval (e.g., by the management committee
or board of directors) or execution of another agreement, revenue recognition
would be inappropriate until that subsequent approval or agreement is
complete.
Customary business practices and processes for documenting sales transac-
tions vary among companies and industries. Business practices and pro-
cesses may also vary within individual companies (e.g., based on the class
of customer, nature of product or service, or other distinguishable factors).
If a company does not have a standard or customary business practice of
relying on written contracts to document a sales arrangement, it usually
would be expected to have other forms of written or electronic evidence to
document the transaction. For example, a company may not use written
contracts but instead may rely on binding purchase orders from third parties
or on-line authorizations that include the terms of the sale and that are
binding on the customer. In that situation, that documentation could represent
persuasive evidence of an arrangement.
The staff is aware that sometimes a customer and seller enter into ‘‘side’’
agreements to a master contract that effectively amend the master contract.
Registrants should ensure that appropriate policies, procedures, and internal
controls exist and are properly documented so as to provide reasonable
assurances that sales transactions, including those affected by side
agreements, are properly accounted for in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and to ensure compliance with Section 13
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (i.e., the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act). Side agreements could include cancellation, termination, or other provi-
sions that affect revenue recognition. The existence of a subsequently exe-
cuted side agreement may be an indicator that the original agreement was
not final and revenue recognition was not appropriate.
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Question 2
Facts: Company Z enters into an arrangement with Customer A to deliver
Company Z’s products to Customer A on a consignment basis. Pursuant to
the terms of the arrangement, Customer A is a consignee, and title to the
products does not pass from Company Z to Customer A until Customer A
consumes the products in its operations. Company Z delivers product to
Customer A under the terms of their arrangement.
Question: May Company Z recognize revenue upon delivery of its product
to Customer A?
Interpretive Response: No. Products delivered to a consignee pursuant to
a consignment arrangement are not sales and do not qualify for revenue
recognition until a sale occurs. The staff believes that revenue recognition
is not appropriate because the seller retains the risks and rewards of owner-
ship of the product and title usually does not pass to the consignee.
Other situations may exist where title to delivered products passes to a
buyer, but the substance of the transaction is that of a consignment or a
financing. Such arrangements require a careful analysis of the facts and
circumstances of the transaction, as well as an understanding of the rights
and obligations of the parties, and the seller’s customary business practices
in such arrangements. The staff believes that the presence of one or more
of the following characteristics in a transaction precludes revenue recognition
even if title to the product has passed to the buyer:
1. The buyer has the right to return the product and:
a) the buyer does not pay the seller at the time of sale, and the buyer is
not obligated to pay the seller at a specified date or dates,8
b) the buyer does not pay the seller at the time of sale but rather is
obligated to pay at a specified date or dates, and the buyer’s obligation
to pay is contractually or implicitly excused until the buyer resells the
product or subsequently consumes or uses the product,9
c) the buyer’s obligation to the seller would be changed (e.g., the seller
would forgive the obligation or grant a refund) in the event of theft or
physical destruction or damage of the product,10
d) the buyer acquiring the product for resale does not have economic
substance apart from that provided by the seller,11 or
e) the seller has significant obligations for future performance to directly
bring about resale of the product by the buyer.12
2. The seller is required to repurchase the product (or a substantially identical
product or processed goods of which the product is a component) at
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specified prices that are not subject to change except for fluctuations due
to finance and holding costs,13 and the amounts to be paid by the seller
will be adjusted, as necessary, to cover substantially all fluctuations in
costs incurred by the buyer in purchasing and holding the product (including
interest).14 The staff believes that indicators of the latter condition include:
a) the seller provides interest-free or significantly below market financing
to the buyer beyond the seller’s customary sales terms and until the
products are resold,
b) the seller pays interest costs on behalf of the buyer under a third-party
financing arrangement, or
c) the seller has a practice of refunding (or intends to refund) a portion
of the original sales price representative of interest expense for the
period from when the buyer paid the seller until the buyer resells the
product.
3. The transaction possesses the characteristics set forth in EITF Issue No.
95-1, Revenue Recognition on Sales with a Guaranteed Minimum Resale
Value, and does not qualify for sales-type lease accounting.
4. The product is delivered for demonstration purposes.15
This list is not meant to be a checklist of all characteristics of a consignment
or a financing arrangement, and other characteristics may exist. Accordingly,
the staff believes that judgment is necessary in assessing whether the sub-
stance of a transaction is a consignment, a financing, or other arrangement
for which revenue recognition is not appropriate. If title to the goods has
passed but the substance of the arrangement is not a sale, the consigned
inventory should be reported separately from other inventory in the consign-
or’s financial statements as ‘‘inventory consigned to others’’ or another appro-
priate caption.
3. Delivery and Performance
Question 3
Facts: Company A receives purchase orders for products it manufactures.
At the end of its fiscal quarters, customers may not yet be ready to take
delivery of the products for various reasons. These reasons may include,
but are not limited to, a lack of available space for inventory, having more
than sufficient inventory in their distribution channel, or delays in customers’
production schedules.
Questions: May Company A recognize revenue for the sale of its products
once it has completed manufacturing if it segregates the inventory of the
products in its own warehouse from its own products?
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May Company A recognize revenue for the sale if it ships the products to a
third-party warehouse but (1) Company A retains title to the product and (2)
payment by the customer is dependent upon ultimate delivery to a customer-
specified site?
Interpretative Response: Generally, no. The staff believes that delivery
generally is not considered to have occurred unless the customer has taken
title and assumed the risks and rewards of ownership of the products specified
in the customer’s purchase order or sales agreement. Typically this occurs
when a product is delivered to the customer’s delivery site (if the terms of
the sale are ‘‘FOB destination’’) or when a product is shipped to the customer
(if the terms are ‘‘FOB shipping point’’).
The Commission has set forth criteria to be met in order to recognize revenue
when delivery has not occurred.16 These include:
1. The risks of ownership must have passed to the buyer;
2. The customer must have made a fixed commitment to purchase the goods,
preferably in written documentation;
3. The buyer, not the seller, must request that the transaction be on a bill
and hold basis.17 The buyer must have a substantial business purpose for
ordering the goods on a bill and hold basis;
4. There must be a fixed schedule for delivery of the goods. The date for
delivery must be reasonable and must be consistent with the buyer’s
business purpose (e.g., storage periods are customary in the industry);
5. The seller must not have retained any specific performance obligations
such that the earning process is not complete;
6. The ordered goods must have been segregated from the seller’s inventory
and not be subject to being used to fill other orders; and
7. The equipment [product] must be complete and ready for shipment.
The above listed conditions are the important conceptual criteria which should
be used in evaluating any purported bill and hold sale. This listing is not
intended as a checklist. In some circumstances, a transaction may meet all
factors listed above but not meet the requirements for revenue recognition.
The Commission also has noted that in applying the above criteria to a
purported bill and hold sale, the individuals responsible for the preparation
and filing of financial statements also should consider the following factors:18
1. The date by which the seller expects payment, and whether the seller has
modified its normal billing and credit terms for this buyer;19
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2. The seller’s past experiences with and pattern of bill and hold transactions;
3. Whether the buyer has the expected risk of loss in the event of a decline
in the market value of goods;
4. Whether the seller’s custodial risks are insurable and insured;
5. Whether extended procedures are necessary in order to assure that there
are no exceptions to the buyer’s commitment to accept and pay for the
goods sold (i.e., that the business reasons for the bill and hold have not
introduced a contingency to the buyer’s commitment).
Delivery generally is not considered to have occurred unless the product
has been delivered to the customer’s place of business or another site
specified by the customer. If the customer specifies an intermediate site but
a substantial portion of the sales price is not payable until delivery is made
to a final site, then revenue should not be recognized until final delivery has
occurred.20
After delivery of a product or performance of a service, if uncertainty exists
about customer acceptance, revenue should not be recognized until accep-
tance occurs.21 Customer acceptance provisions may be included in a con-
tract, among other reasons, to enforce a customer’s rights to (1) test the
delivered product, (2) require the seller to perform additional services subse-
quent to delivery of an initial product or performance of an initial service
(e.g., a seller is required to install or activate delivered equipment), or (3)
identify other work necessary to be done before accepting the product. The
staff presumes that such contractual customer acceptance provisions are
substantive, bargained-for terms of an arrangement. Accordingly, when such
contractual customer acceptance provisions exist, the staff generally believes
that the seller should not recognize revenue until customer acceptance occurs
or the acceptance provisions lapse.
A seller should substantially complete or fulfill the terms specified in the
arrangement in order for delivery or performance to have occurred.22 When
applying the substantially complete notion, the staff believes that only incon-
sequential or perfunctory actions may remain incomplete such that the failure
to complete the actions would not result in the customer receiving a refund
or rejecting the delivered products or services performed to date. In addition,
the seller should have a demonstrated history of completing the remaining
tasks in a timely manner and reliably estimating the remaining costs. If
revenue is recognized upon substantial completion of the arrangement, all
remaining costs of performance or delivery should be accrued.
If an arrangement (i.e., outside the scope of SOP 81-1) requires the delivery
or performance of multiple deliverables, or ‘‘elements,’’ the delivery of an
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individual element is considered not to have occurred if there are undelivered
elements that are essential to the functionality of the delivered element
because the customer does not have the full use of the delivered element.23
In licensing and similar arrangements (e.g., licenses of motion pictures,
software, technology, and other intangibles), the staff believes that delivery
does not occur for revenue recognition purposes until the license term
begins.24 Accordingly, if a licensed product or technology is physically deliv-
ered to the customer, but the license term has not yet begun, revenue should
not be recognized prior to inception of the license term. Upon inception of
the license term, revenue should be recognized in a manner consistent with
the nature of the transaction and the earnings process.
Question 4
Facts: Company R is a retailer that offers ‘‘layaway’’ sales to its customers.
Company R retains the merchandise, sets it aside in its inventory, and collects
a cash deposit from the customer. Although Company R may set a time
period within which the customer must finalize the purchase, Company R
does not require the customer to enter into an installment note or other fixed
payment commitment or agreement when the initial deposit is received. The
merchandise generally is not released to the customer until the customer
pays the full purchase price. In the event that the customer fails to pay the
remaining purchase price, the customer forfeits its cash deposit. In the event
the merchandise is lost, damaged, or destroyed, Company R either must
refund the cash deposit to the customer or provide replacement merchandise.
Question: In the staff’s view, when may Company R recognize revenue for
merchandise sold under its layaway program?
Interpretive Response: Provided that the other criteria for revenue recogni-
tion are met, the staff believes that Company R should recognize revenue
from sales made under its layaway program upon delivery of the merchandise
to the customer. Until then, the amount of cash received should be recognized
as a liability entitled such as ‘‘deposits received from customers for layaway
sales’’ or a similarly descriptive caption. Because Company R retains the
risks of ownership of the merchandise, receives only a deposit from the
customer, and does not have an enforceable right to the remainder of the
purchase price, the staff would object to Company R recognizing any revenue
upon receipt of the cash deposit. This is consistent with item two (2) in the
Commission’s criteria for bill-and-hold transactions which states that ‘‘the
customer must have made a fixed commitment to purchase the goods.’’
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Question 5
Facts: Registrants may negotiate arrangements pursuant to which they may
receive nonrefundable fees upon entering into arrangements or on certain
specified dates. The fees may ostensibly be received for conveyance of a
license or other intangible right or for delivery of particular products or ser-
vices. Various business factors may influence how the registrant and cus-
tomer structure the payment terms. For example, in exchange for a greater
up-front fee for an intangible right, the registrant may be willing to receive
lower unit prices for related products to be delivered in the future. In some
circumstances, the right, product, or service conveyed in conjunction with the
nonrefundable fee has no utility to the purchaser separate and independent
of the registrant’s performance of the other elements of the arrangement.
Therefore, in the absence of the registrant’s continuing involvement under
the arrangement, the customer would not have paid the fee. Examples of
this type of arrangement include the following:
• A registrant sells a lifetime membership in a health club. After paying a
nonrefundable ‘‘initiation fee,’’ the customer is permitted to use the health
club indefinitely, so long as the customer also pays an additional usage
fee each month. The monthly usage fees collected from all customers
are adequate to cover the operating costs of the health club.
• A registrant in the biotechnology industry agrees to provide research and
development activities for a customer for a specified term. The customer
needs to use certain technology owned by the registrant for use in the
research and development activities. The technology is not sold or licensed
separately without the research and development activities. Under the
terms of the arrangement, the customer is required to pay a nonrefundable
‘‘technology access fee’’ in addition to periodic payments for research
and development activities over the term of the contract.
• A registrant requires a customer to pay a nonrefundable ‘‘activation fee’’
when entering into an arrangement to provide telecommunications ser-
vices. The terms of the arrangement require the customer to pay a monthly
usage fee that is adequate to recover the registrant’s operating costs.
The costs incurred to activate the telecommunications service are nominal.
Question: When should the revenue relating to nonrefundable, up-front fees
in these types of arrangements be recognized?
Interpretive Response: The staff believes that registrants should consider
the specific facts and circumstances to determine the appropriate accounting
for nonrefundable, up-front fees. Unless the up-front fee is in exchange for
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products delivered or services performed that represent the culmination of
a separate earnings process,25 the deferral of revenue is appropriate.
In the situations described above, the staff does not view the activities
completed by the registrants (i.e., selling the membership, signing the con-
tract, or enrolling the customer or activating telecommunications services)
as discrete earnings events.26 The terms, conditions, and amounts of these
fees typically are negotiated in conjunction with the pricing of all the elements
of the arrangement, and the customer would ascribe a significantly lower,
and perhaps no, value to elements ostensibly associated with the up-front
fee in the absence of the registrant’s performance of other contract elements.
The fact that the registrants do not sell the initial rights, products, or services
separately (i.e., without the registrants’ continuing involvement) supports the
staff’s view. The staff believes that the customers are purchasing the on-
going rights, products, or services being provided through the registrants’
continuing involvement. Further, the staff believes that the earnings process
is completed by performing under the terms of the arrangements, not simply
by originating a revenue-generating arrangement.
Supply or service transactions may involve the charge of a nonrefundable
initial fee with subsequent periodic payments for future products or services.
The initial fees may, in substance, be wholly or partly an advance payment
for future products or services. In the examples above, the on-going rights
or services being provided or products being delivered are essential to the
customers receiving the expected benefit of the up-front payment. Therefore,
the up-front fee and the continuing performance obligation related to the
services to be provided or products to be delivered are assessed as an
integrated package. In such circumstances, the staff believes that up-front
fees, even if nonrefundable, are earned as the products and/or services are
delivered and/or performed over the term of the arrangement or the expected
period of performance27 and generally should be deferred and recognized
systematically over the periods that the fees are earned.28
Question 6
Facts: Company A provides its customers with activity tracking or similar
services (e.g., tracking of property tax payment activity, sending delinquency
letters on overdue accounts, etc.) for a ten-year period. Company A requires
customers to prepay for all the services for the term specified in the arrange-
ment. The on-going services to be provided are generally automated after
the initial customer set-up. At the outset of the arrangement, Company A
performs set-up procedures to facilitate delivery of its on-going services
to the customers.29 Such procedures consist primarily of establishing the
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necessary records and files in Company A’s pre-existing computer systems
in order to provide the services. Once the initial customer set-up activities
are complete, Company A provides its services in accordance with the
arrangement. Company A is not required to refund any portion of the fee if
the customer terminates the services or does not utilize all of the services
to which it is entitled. However, Company A is required to provide a refund
if Company A terminates the arrangement early. Assume Company A’s
activities are not within the scope of SFAS No. 91.
Question: When should Company A recognize the service revenue?
Interpretive Response: The staff believes that, provided all other revenue
recognition criteria are met, service revenue should be recognized on a
straight-line basis, unless evidence suggests that the revenue is earned or
obligations are fulfilled in a different pattern, over the contractual term of the
arrangement or the expected period during which those specified services
will be performed,30 whichever is longer. In this case, the customer contracted
for the on-going activity tracking service, not for the set-up activities. The
staff notes that the customer could not, and would not, separately purchase
the set-up services without the on-going services. The services specified in
the arrangement are performed continuously over the contractual term of
the arrangement (and any subsequent renewals). Therefore, the staff
believes that Company A should recognize revenue on a straight-line basis,
unless evidence suggests that the revenue is earned or obligations are
fulfilled in a different pattern, over the contractual term of the arrangement or
the expected period during which those specified services will be performed,
whichever is longer.
In this situation, the staff would object to Company A recognizing revenue
in proportion to the costs incurred because the set-up costs incurred bear
no direct relationship to the performance of services specified in the arrange-
ment. The staff also believes that it is inappropriate to recognize the entire
amount of the prepayment as revenue at the outset of the arrangement by
accruing the remaining costs because the services required by the contract
have not been performed.
4. Fixed or Determinable Sales Price
A company’s contracts may include customer cancellation or termination
clauses. Cancellation or termination provisions may be indicative of a demon-
stration period or an otherwise incomplete transaction. Examples of transac-
tions that financial management and auditors should be aware of and where
such provisions may exist include ‘‘side’’ agreements and significant transac-
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tions with unusual terms and conditions. These contractual provisions raise
questions as to whether the sales price is fixed or determinable. The sales
price in arrangements that are cancelable by the customer are neither fixed
nor determinable until the cancellation privileges lapse.31 If the cancellation
privileges expire ratably over a stated contractual term, the sales price is
considered to become determinable ratably over the stated term.32 Short-
term rights of return, such as thirty-day money-back guarantees, and other
customary rights to return products are not considered to be cancellation
privileges, but should be accounted for in accordance with SFAS No. 48.33
Question 7
Facts: Company M is a discount retailer. It generates revenue from annual
membership fees it charges customers to shop at its stores and from the
sale of products at a discount price to those customers. The membership
arrangements with retail customers require the customer to pay the entire
membership fee (e.g., $35) at the outset of the arrangement. However, the
customer has the unilateral right to cancel the arrangement at any time
during its term and receive a full refund of the initial fee. Based on historical
data collected over time for a large number of homogeneous transactions,
Company M estimates that approximately 40% of the customers will request
a refund before the end of the membership contract term. Company M’s
data for the past five years indicates that significant variations between actual
and estimated cancellations have not occurred, and Company M does not
expect significant variations to occur in the foreseeable future.
Question: May Company M recognize in earnings the revenue for the mem-
bership fees and accrue the costs to provide membership services at the
outset of the arrangement?
Interpretive Response: No. In the staff’s view, it would be inappropriate for
Company M to recognize the membership fees as earned revenue upon
billing or receipt of the initial fee with a corresponding accrual for estimated
costs to provide the membership services. This conclusion is based on
Company M’s remaining and unfulfilled contractual obligation to perform
services (i.e., make available and offer products for sale at a discounted
price) throughout the membership period. Therefore, the earnings process,
irrespective of whether a cancellation clause exists, is not complete.
In addition, the ability of the member to receive a full refund of the membership
fee up to the last day of the membership term raises an uncertainty as to
whether the fee is fixed or determinable at any point before the end of the
term. Generally, the staff believes that a sales price is not fixed or determin-
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able when a customer has the unilateral right to terminate or cancel the
contract and receive a cash refund. A sales price or fee that is variable until
the occurrence of future events (other than product returns that are within
the scope of SFAS No. 48) generally is not fixed or determinable until the
future event occurs. The revenue from such transactions should not be
recognized in earnings until the sales price or fee becomes fixed or determin-
able. Moreover, revenue should not be recognized in earnings by assessing
the probability that significant, but unfulfilled, terms of a contract will be
fulfilled at some point in the future. Accordingly, the revenue from such
transactions should not be recognized in earnings prior to the refund privi-
leges expiring. The amounts received from customers or subscribers (i.e.,
the $35 fee mentioned above) should be credited to a monetary liability
account such as ‘‘customers’ refundable fees.’’
The staff believes that if a customer has the unilateral right to receive both
(1) the seller’s substantial performance under an arrangement (e.g., providing
services or delivering product) and (2) a cash refund of prepaid fees, then
the prepaid fees should be accounted for as a monetary liability in accordance
with SFAS No. 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, paragraph 16. SFAS No. 125
provides that liabilities may be derecognized only if (1) the debtor pays the
creditor and is relieved of its obligation for the liability (paying the creditor
includes delivery of cash, other financial assets, goods, or services or reacqui-
sition by the debtor of its outstanding debt securities) or (2) the debtor is legally
released from being the primary obligor under the liability.34 If a customer has
the unilateral right to receive both (1) the seller’s substantial performance
under the arrangement and (2) a cash refund of prepaid fees, then the refund
obligation is not relieved upon performance of the service or delivery of the
products. Rather, the seller’s refund obligation is relieved only upon refunding
the cash or expiration of the refund privilege.
Some have argued that there may be a limited exception to the general rule
that revenue from membership or other service transaction fees should not
be recognized in earnings prior to the refund privileges expiring. Despite the
fact that SFAS No. 48 expressly does not apply to the accounting for service
revenue if part or all of the service fee is refundable under cancellation
privileges granted to the buyer,35 they believe that in certain circumstances
a potential refund of a membership fee may be seen as being similar to a
right of return of products under SFAS No. 48. They argue that revenue from
membership fees, net of estimated refunds, may be recognized ratably over
the period the services are performed whenever pertinent conditions of SFAS
No. 48 are met, namely, there is a large population of transactions that
grant customers the same unilateral termination or cancellation rights and
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reasonable estimates can be made of how many customers likely will exercise
those rights.
The staff believes that, because service arrangements are specifically
excluded from the scope of SFAS No. 48, the most direct authoritative
literature to be applied to the extinguishment of obligations under such con-
tracts is SFAS No. 125. As noted above, because the refund privilege extends
to the end of the contract term irrespective of the amount of the service
performed, SFAS No. 125 indicates that the liability would not be extinguished
(and therefore no revenue would be recognized in earnings) until the cancella-
tion or termination and related refund privileges expire. Nonetheless, the
staff recognizes that over the years the accounting for membership refunds
evolved based on analogy to SFAS No. 48 and that practice did not change
when SFAS No. 125 became effective. Reasonable people held, and continue
to hold, different views about the application of the accounting literature. For
the staff to prohibit such accounting in this SAB may result in significant
change in practice that, in these particular circumstances, may be more
appropriately addressed in a formal rulemaking or standards-setting project.
Pending further action in this area by the FASB, the staff will not object to
the recognition of refundable membership fees, net of estimated refunds, as
earned revenue over the membership term in the limited circumstances
where all of the following criteria have been met:36
• The estimates of terminations or cancellations and refunded revenues
are being made for a large pool of homogeneous items (e.g., membership
or other service transactions with the same characteristics such as terms,
periods, class of customers, nature of service, etc.).
• Reliable estimates of the expected refunds can be made on a timely
basis.37 Either of the following two items would be considered indicative of
an inability to make reliable estimates: (1) recurring, significant differences
between actual experience and estimated cancellation or termination rates
(e.g., an actual cancellation rate of 40% versus an estimated rate of 25%)
even if the impact of the difference on the amount of estimated refunds
is not material to the consolidated financial statements38 or (2) recurring
variances between the actual and estimated amount of refunds that are
material to either revenue or net income in quarterly or annual financial
statements. In addition, the staff believes that an estimate, for purposes
of meeting this criterion, would not be reliable unless it is remote39 that
material adjustments (both individually and in the aggregate) to previously
recognized revenue would be required. The staff presumes that reliable
estimates cannot be made if the customer’s termination or cancellation
and refund privileges exceed one year.
page 268 05-09-03 13:25:15
Appendix C: SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 101 269
• There is a sufficient company-specific historical basis upon which to esti-
mate the refunds,40 and the company believes that such historical experi-
ence is predictive of future events. In assessing these items, the staff
believes that estimates of future refunds should take into consideration,
among other things, such factors as historical experience by service type
and class of customer, changing trends in historical experience and the
basis thereof (e.g., economic conditions), the impact or introduction of
competing services or products, and changes in the customer’s ‘‘accessi-
bility’’ to the refund (i.e., how easy it is for customers to obtain the refund).
• The amount of the membership fee specified in the agreement at the
outset of the arrangement is fixed, other than the customer’s right to
request a refund.
If Company M does not meet all of the foregoing criteria, the staff believes
that Company M should not recognize in earnings any revenue for the
membership fee until the cancellation privileges and refund rights expire.
If revenue is recognized in earnings over the membership period pursuant
to the above criteria, the initial amounts received from customer or subscrib-
ers (i.e., the $35 fee mentioned above) should be allocated to two liability
accounts. The amount of the fee representing estimated refunds should be
credited to a monetary liability account, such as ‘‘customers’ refundable
fees,’’ and the remaining amount of the fee representing unearned revenue
should be credited to a nonmonetary liability account, such as ‘‘unearned
revenues.’’ For each income statement presented, registrants should disclose
in the footnotes to the financial statements the amounts of (1) the unearned
revenue and (2) refund obligations as of the beginning of each period, the
amount of cash received from customers, the amount of revenue recognized
in earnings, the amount of refunds paid, other adjustments (with an explana-
tion thereof), and the ending balance of (1) unearned revenue and (2) refund
obligations.
If revenue is recognized in earnings over the membership period pursuant
to the above criteria, the staff believes that adjustments for changes in
estimated refunds should be recorded using a retrospective approach
whereby the unearned revenue and refund obligations are remeasured and
adjusted at each balance sheet date with the offset being recorded as earned
revenue.
Companies offering memberships often distribute membership packets
describing and discussing the terms, conditions, and benefits of membership.
Packets may include vouchers, for example, that provide new members with
discounts or other benefits. The costs associated with the vouchers should
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be expensed when distributed. Advertising costs to solicit members should
be accounted for in accordance with SOP 93-7, Reporting on Advertising
Costs. Incremental direct costs incurred in connection with enrolling custom-
ers (e.g., commissions paid to agents) should be accounted for as follows:
(1) if revenue is deferred until the cancellation or termination privileges expire,
incremental direct costs should be either (a) charged to expense when
incurred if the costs are not refundable to the company in the event the
customer obtains a refund of the membership fee, or (b) if the costs are
refundable to the company in the event the customer obtains a refund of the
membership fee, recorded as an asset until the earlier of termination or
cancellation or refund; or (2) if revenue, net of estimated refunds, is recog-
nized in earnings over the membership period, a like percentage of incremen-
tal direct costs should be deferred and recognized in earnings in the same
pattern as revenue is recognized, and the remaining portion should be either
(a) charged to expense when incurred if the costs are not refundable to the
company in the event the customer obtains a refund of the membership fee,
or (b) if the costs are refundable to the company in the event the customer
obtains a refund of the membership fee, recorded as an asset until the refund
occurs.41 All costs other than incremental direct costs (e.g., indirect costs)
should be expensed as incurred.
Question 8
Facts: Company A owns and leases retail space to retailers. Company A
(lessor) renews a lease with a customer (lessee) that is classified as an
operating lease. The lease term is one year and provides that the lease
payments are $1.2 million, payable in equal monthly installments on the first
day of each month, plus one percent of the lessee’s net sales in excess of
$25 million if the net sales exceed $25 million during the lease term (i.e.,
contingent rental). The lessee has historically experienced annual net sales
in excess of $25 million in the particular space being leased, and it is probable
that the lessee will generate in excess of $25 million net sales during the
term of the lease.
Question: In the staff’s view, should the lessor recognize any rental income
attributable to the one percent of the lessee’s net sales exceeding $25 million
before the lessee actually achieves the $25 million net sales threshold?
Interpretive Response: No. The staff believes that contingent rental income
‘‘accrues’’ (i.e., it should be recognized as revenue) when the changes in
the factor(s) on which the contingent lease payments is (are) based actually
occur.42
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SFAS No. 13, Accounting for Leases, paragraph 19(b) states that lessors
should account for operating leases as follows: ‘‘Rent shall be reported in
income over the lease term as it becomes receivable according to the provi-
sions of the lease. However, if the rentals vary from a straight-line basis, the
income shall be recognized on a straight-line basis unless another systematic
and rational basis is more representative of the time pattern in which use
benefit from the leased property is diminished, in which case that basis shall
be used.’’
SFAS No. 29, Determining Contingent Rentals, amended SFAS No. 13 and
clarifies that ‘‘lease payments that depend on a factor that does not exist or
is not measurable at the inception of the lease, such as future sales volume,
would be contingent rentals in their entirety and, accordingly, would be
excluded from minimum lease payments and included in the determination
of income as they accrue.’’ [Summary] Paragraph 17 of SFAS No. 29 provides
the following example of determining contingent rentals:
A lease agreement for retail store space could stipulate a monthly base
rental of $200 and a monthly supplemental rental of one-fourth of one percent
of monthly sales volume during the lease term. Even if the lease agreement
is a renewal for store space that had averaged monthly sales of $25,000 for
the past 2 years, minimum lease payments would include only the $200
monthly base rental; the supplemental rental is a contingent rental that is
excluded from minimum lease payments. The future sales for the lease term
do not exist at the inception of the lease, and future rentals would be limited
to $200 per month if the store were subsequently closed and no sales were
made thereafter.
FASB Technical Bulletin (FTB) 85-3, Accounting for Operating Leases with
Scheduled Rent Increases, addresses whether it is appropriate for lessors
in operating leases to recognize scheduled rent increases on a basis other
than as required in SFAS No. 13, paragraph 19(b). Paragraph 2 of FTB 85-3
states ‘‘using factors such as the time value of money, anticipated inflation,
or expected future revenues [emphasis added] to allocate scheduled rent
increases is inappropriate because these factors do not relate to the time
pattern of the physical usage of the leased property. However, such factors
may affect the periodic reported rental income or expense if the lease
agreement involves contingent rentals, which are excluded from minimum
lease payments and accounted for separately under Statement 13, as
amended by Statement 29.’’ In developing the basis for why scheduled
rent increases should be recognized on a straight-line basis, the FASB
distinguishes the accounting for scheduled rent increases from contingent
rentals. Paragraph 13 states ‘‘There is an important substantive difference
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between lease rentals that are contingent upon some specified future event
and scheduled rent increases that are unaffected by future events; the
accounting under Statement 13 reflects that difference. If the lessor and
lessee eliminate the risk of variable payments by agreeing to scheduled rent
increases, the accounting should reflect those different circumstances.’’
The example provided in SFAS No. 29 implies that contingent rental income
in leases classified as sales-type or direct-financing leases becomes ‘‘accru-
able’’ when the changes in the factors on which the contingent lease pay-
ments are based actually occur. FTB 85-3 indicates that contingent rental
income in operating leases should not be recognized in a manner consistent
with scheduled rent increases (i.e., on a straight-line basis over the lease
term or another systematic and rational allocation basis if it is more represen-
tative of the time pattern in which the leased property is physically employed)
because the risk of variable payments inherent in contingent rentals is sub-
stantively different than scheduled rent increases. The staff believes that the
reasoning in FTB 85-3 supports the conclusion that the risks inherent in
variable payments associated with contingent rentals should be reflected in
financial statements on a basis different than rental payments that adjust on
a scheduled basis and, therefore, operating lease income associated with
contingent rents would not be recognized as time passes or as the leased
property is physically employed. Furthermore, prior to the lessee’s achieve-
ment of the target upon which contingent rentals are based, the lessor has
no legal claims on the contingent amounts. Consequently, the staff believes
that it is inappropriate to anticipate changes in the factors on which contingent
rental income in operating leases is based and recognize rental income prior
to the resolution of the lease contingencies.
Because Company A’s contingent rental income is based upon whether the
customer achieves net sales of $25 million, the contingent rentals, which
may not materialize, should not be recognized until the customer’s net sales
actually exceed $25 million. Once the $25 million threshold is met, Company
A would recognize the contingent rental income as it becomes accruable,
in this case, as the customer recognizes net sales. The staff does not believe
that it is appropriate to recognize revenue based upon the probability of a
factor being achieved. The contingent revenue should be recorded in the
period in which the contingency is resolved.
Question 9
Facts: Paragraph 8 of SFAS No. 48 lists a number of factors that may
impair the ability to make a reasonable estimate of product returns in sales
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transactions when a right of return exists.43 The paragraph concludes by
stating ‘‘other factors may preclude a reasonable estimate.’’
Question: What ‘‘other factors,’’ in addition to those listed in paragraph 8
of SFAS No. 48, has the staff identified that may preclude a registrant from
making a reasonable and reliable estimate of product returns?
Interpretive Response: The staff believes that the following additional fac-
tors, among others, may affect or preclude the ability to make reasonable
and reliable estimates of product returns: (1) significant increases in or excess
levels of inventory in a distribution channel (sometimes referred to as ‘‘chan-
nel stuffing’’), (2) lack of ‘‘visibility’’ into or the inability to determine or observe
the levels of inventory in a distribution channel and the current level of sales
to end users, (3) expected introductions of new products that may result in
the technological obsolescence of and larger than expected returns of current
products, (4) the significance of a particular distributor to the registrant’s (or
a reporting segment’s) business, sales and marketing, (5) the newness of
a product, (6) the introduction of competitors’ products with superior technol-
ogy or greater expected market acceptance, and other factors that affect
market demand and changing trends in that demand for the registrant’s
products. Registrants and their auditors should carefully analyze all factors,
including trends in historical data, that may affect registrants’ ability to make
reasonable and reliable estimates of product returns.
The staff reminds registrants that if a transaction fails to meet all of the
conditions of paragraphs 6 and 8 in SFAS No. 48, no revenue may be
recognized until those conditions are subsequently met or the return privilege
has substantially expired, whichever occurs first.44 Simply deferring recogni-
tion of the gross margin on the transaction is not appropriate.
5. Income Statement Presentation
Question 10
Facts: Company A operates an internet site from which it will sell Company
T’s products. Customers place their orders for the product by making a
product selection directly from the internet site and providing a credit card
number for the payment. Company A receives the order and authorization
from the credit card company, and passes the order on to Company T.
Company T ships the product directly to the customer. Company A does not
take title to the product and has no risk of loss or other responsibility for the
product. Company T is responsible for all product returns, defects, and
disputed credit card charges. The product is typically sold for $175 of which
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Company A receives $25. In the event a credit card transaction is rejected,
Company A loses its margin on the sale (i.e., the $25).
Question: In the staff’s view, should Company A report revenue on a gross
basis as $175 along with costs of sales of $150 or on a net basis as $25,
similar to a commission?
Interpretive Response: Company A should report the revenue from the
product on a net basis. In assessing whether revenue should be reported
gross with separate display of cost of sales to arrive at gross profit or on a
net basis, the staff considers whether the registrant:
1. acts as principal in the transaction,
2. takes title to the products,
3. has risks and rewards of ownership, such as the risk of loss for collection,
delivery, or returns, and
4. acts as an agent or broker (including performing services, in substance,
as an agent or broker) with compensation on a commission or fee basis.45
If the company performs as an agent or broker without assuming the risks
and rewards of ownership of the goods, sales should be reported on a net
basis.
B. Disclosures
Question 1
Question: What disclosures are required with respect to the recognition of
revenue?
Interpretive Response: A registrant should disclose its accounting policy
for the recognition of revenue pursuant to APB Opinion No. 22, Disclosure
of Accounting Policies. Paragraph 12 thereof states that ‘‘the disclosure
should encompass important judgments as to appropriateness of principles
relating to recognition of revenue. . . .’’ Because revenue recognition gener-
ally involves some level of judgment, the staff believes that a registrant
should always disclose its revenue recognition policy. If a company has
different policies for different types of revenue transactions, including barter
sales, the policy for each material type of transaction should be disclosed.
If sales transactions have multiple elements, such as a product and service,
the accounting policy should clearly state the accounting policy for each
element as well as how multiple elements are determined and valued. In
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addition, the staff believes that changes in estimated returns recognized in
accordance with SFAS No. 48 should be disclosed, if material (e.g., a change
in estimate from two percent of sales to one percent of sales).
Regulation S-X requires that revenue from the sales of products, services,
and other products each be separately disclosed on the face of the income
statement.46 The staff believes that costs relating to each type of revenue
similarly should be reported separately on the face of the income statement.
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) requires a discussion of
liquidity, capital resources, results of operations and other information neces-
sary to an understanding of a registrant’s financial condition, changes in
financial condition and results of operations.47 This includes unusual or infre-
quent transactions, known trends or uncertainties that have had, or might
reasonably be expected to have, a favorable or unfavorable material effect
on revenue, operating income or net income and the relationship between
revenue and the costs of the revenue. Changes in revenue should not be
evaluated solely in terms of volume and price changes, but should also
include an analysis of the reasons and factors contributing to the increase
or decrease. The Commission stated in Financial Reporting Release (FRR)
36 that MD&A should ‘‘give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant
through the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospective
analysis of the registrant’s financial condition and results of operations, with
a particular emphasis on the registrant’s prospects for the future.’’48 Examples
of such revenue transactions or events that the staff has asked to be disclosed
and discussed in accordance with FRR 36 are:
• Shipments of product at the end of a reporting period that significantly
reduce customer backlog and that reasonably might be expected to result
in lower shipments and revenue in the next period.
• Granting of extended payment terms that will result in a longer collection
period for accounts receivable (regardless of whether revenue has been
recognized) and slower cash inflows from operations, and the effect on
liquidity and capital resources. (The fair value of trade receivables should
be disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements when the fair
value does not approximate the carrying amount.)49
• Changing trends in shipments into, and sales from, a sales channel or
separate class of customer that could be expected to have a significant
effect on future sales or sales returns.
• An increasing trend toward sales to a different class of customer, such
as a reseller distribution channel that has a lower gross profit margin than
existing sales that are principally made to end users. Also, increasing
service revenue that has a higher profit margin than product sales.
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• Seasonal trends or variations in sales.
• A gain or loss from the sale of an asset(s).50
Question 2
Question: Will the staff expect retroactive changes by registrants to comply
with the accounting described in this bulletin?
Interpretive Response: All registrants are expected to apply the accounting
and disclosures described in this bulletin. The staff, however, will not object
if registrants that have not applied this accounting do not restate prior financial
statements provided they report a change in accounting principle in accor-
dance with APB Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes, no later than the first
fiscal quarter of the fiscal year beginning after December 15, 1999. In periods
subsequent to transition, registrants should disclose the amount of revenue
(if material to income before income taxes) recognized in those periods that
was included in the cumulative effect adjustment. If a registrant files financial
statements with the Commission before applying the guidance in this bulletin,
disclosures similar to those described in Staff Accounting Bulletin Topic 11-M,
Disclosure of the Impact that Recently Issued Accounting Standards Will
Have on the Financial Statements of a Registrant When Adopted in a Future
Period, should be provided. With regard to question 10 of Topic 13-A and
Topic 8-A regarding income statement presentation, the staff would normally
expect retroactive application to all periods presented unless the effect of
applying the guidance herein is immaterial.
However, if registrants have not previously complied with generally accepted
accounting principles, for example, by recording revenue for products prior
to delivery that did not comply with the applicable bill-and-hold guidance,
those registrants should apply the guidance in APB Opinion No. 20 for the
correction of an error.51 In addition, registrants should be aware that the
Commission may take enforcement action where a registrant in prior financial
statements has violated the antifraud or disclosure provisions of the securities
laws with respect to revenue recognition.
Topic 8: Retail Companies
A. Sales of Leased or Licensed Departments
Facts: Department stores and other retailers customarily include the sales
of leased or licensed departments in the amount reported as ‘‘total revenues.’’
Question: Does the staff have any objection to this practice?
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Interpretive Response: In November 1975 the staff issued staff accounting
bulletin number 1 that addressed this issue. In that bulletin the staff did not
object to retailers presenting sales of leased or licensed departments in the
amount reported as ‘‘total revenues’’ because of industry practice. Subse-
quently, in November 1976 the FASB issued SFAS No. 13. In June 1995,
the AICPA staff amended its Technical Practice Aid (TPA) section 5100.16,
Rental Revenue Based on Percentage of Sales, based upon an interpretation
of SFAS No. 13 that leases of departments within a retail establishment are
leases of tangible assets within the scope of SFAS No. 13.52 Consistent with
the interpretation in TPA section 5100.16, the staff believes that SFAS No.
13 requires department stores and other retailers that lease or license store
space to account for rental income from leased departments in accordance
with SFAS No. 13. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate for a department
store or other retailer to include in its revenue the sales of the leased or
licensed departments. Rather, the department store or other retailer should
include the rental income as part of its gross revenue. The staff would not
object to disclosure in the footnotes to the financial statements of the amount
of the lessee’s sales from leased departments. If the arrangement is not a
lease but rather a service arrangement that provides for payment of a fee
or commission, the retailer should recognize the fee or commission as reve-
nue when earned. If the retailer assumes the risk of bad debts associated
with the lessee’s merchandise sales, the retailer generally should present
bad debt expense in accordance with Regulation S-X article 5-03 (b)(5).
B. * * * * *
This Staff Accounting Bulletin is not intended to change current guidance in
the accounting literature. For this reason, adherence to the principles
described in this Staff Accounting Bulletin should not raise the costs associ-
ated with record-keeping or with audits of financial statements.
1 In February 1999, the AICPA published a booklet entitled ‘‘Audit Issues in Revenue Recognition.’’
This booklet provides an overview of the current authoritative accounting literature and auditing
procedures for revenue recognition and identifies indicators of improper revenue recognition.
2 SFAC No. 5, ¶83-84; ARB No. 43, Chapter 1A, ¶1; APB Opinion No. 10, ¶12. The citations
provided herein are not intended to present the complete population of citations where a particular
criterion is relevant. Rather, the citations are intended to provide the reader with additional
reference material.
3 SFAC No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, ¶63 states ‘‘Representational
faithfulness is correspondence or agreement between a measure or description and the phenome-
non it purports to represent.’’ The staff believes that evidence of an exchange arrangement must
exist to determine if the accounting treatment represents faithfully the transaction. See also SOP
97-2, ¶8. The use of the term ‘‘arrangement’’ in this Staff Accounting Bulletin is meant to identify
the final understanding between the parties as to the specific nature and terms of the agreed-
upon transaction.
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4 SFAC No. 5, ¶84(a), (b), and (d). Revenue should not be recognized until the seller has substan-
tially accomplished what it must do pursuant to the terms of the arrangement, which usually
occurs upon delivery or performance of the services.
5 SFAC No. 5, ¶83(a); SFAS No. 48, ¶6(a); SOP 97-2, ¶8. SOP 97-2 defines a ‘‘fixed fee’’ as a
‘‘fee required to be paid at a set amount that is not subject to refund or adjustment. A fixed fee
includes amounts designated as minimum royalties.’’ Paragraphs 26-33 of SOP 97-2 discuss
how to apply the fixed or determinable fee criterion in software transactions. The staff believes
that the guidance in paragraphs 26 and 30-33 is appropriate for other sales transactions where
authoritative guidance does not otherwise exist. The staff notes that paragraphs 27 through 29
specifically consider software transactions, however, the staff believes that guidance should be
considered in other sales transactions in which the risk of technological obsolescence is high.
6 ARB No. 43, Chapter 1A, ¶1 and APB Opinion No. 10, ¶12. See also SFAC No. 5, ¶84(g) and
SOP 97-2, ¶8.
7 AICPA, Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards (AU) §560.05, Subsequent Events.
8 SFAS No. 48, ¶6(b) and 22.
9 SFAS No. 48, ¶6(b) and 22. The arrangement may not specify that payment is contingent upon
subsequent resale or consumption. However, if the seller has an established business practice
permitting customers to defer payment beyond the specified due date(s) until the products are
resold or consumed, then the staff believes that the seller’s right to receive cash representing
the sales price is contingent.
10 SFAS No. 48, ¶6(c).
11 SFAS No. 48, ¶6(d).
12 SFAS No. 48, ¶6(e).
13 SFAS No. 49, ¶5(a). Paragraph 5(a) provides examples of circumstances that meet this require-
ment. As discussed further therein, this condition is present if (a) a resale price guarantee exists,
(b) the seller has an option to purchase the product, the economic effect of which compels the
seller to purchase the product, or (c) the buyer has an option whereby it can require the seller
to purchase the product.
14 SFAS No. 49, ¶5(b).
15 See SOP 97-2, ¶25.
16 See In the Matter of Stewart Parness, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement (AAER) Release
No. 108 (August 5, 1986); SEC v. Bollinger Industries, Inc., et al, Lit. Rel. No. 15093 (September
30, 1996); In the Matter of Laser Photonics, Inc., AAER No. 971 (September 30, 1997); In the
Matter of Cypress Bioscience Inc., AAER No. 817 (September 19, 1996). Also see SFAC No. 5,
¶84(a). and SOP 97-2, ¶22.
17 Such requests typically should be set forth in writing by the buyer.
18 See Note 16, supra.
19 Such individuals should consider whether APB Opinion No. 21, Interest on Receivables and
Payables, pertaining to the need for discounting the related receivable, is applicable. APB Opinion
No. 21, ¶3(a), indicates that the requirements of that Opinion to record receivables at a discounted
value are not intended to apply to ‘‘receivables and payables arising from transactions with
customers or suppliers in the normal course of business which are due in customary trade terms
not exceeding approximately one year’’ (emphasis added).
20 SOP 97-2, ¶22.
21 SOP 97-2, ¶20. Also, SFAC No. 5, ¶83(b) states ‘‘revenues are considered to have been earned
when the entity has substantially accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits
represented by the revenues.’’ If an arrangement expressly requires customer acceptance, the
staff generally believes that customer acceptance should occur before the entity has substantially
accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the revenues, especially
when the seller is obligated to perform additional steps.
22 SFAC No. 5, ¶83(b) states that ‘‘revenues are considered to have been earned when the entity
has substantially accomplished what it must do to be entitled the benefits represented by the
revenues.’’
23 SOP 97-2, ¶13, and 68-70.
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24 SFAS No. 53, Financial Reporting by Producers and Distributors of Motion Picture Films, ¶6.
The FASB has issued an Exposure Draft to rescind SFAS No. 53. The AICPA’s Accounting
Standards Executive Committee intends to issue a new SOP that would replace SFAS No. 53
and provide authoritative guidance on accounting for motion pictures. The Exposure Draft of the
proposed new SOP contains a similar criterion for revenue recognition of a licensed film (i.e., the
license period of the arrangement has begun and the customer can begin its exploitation, exhibition,
or sale).
25 See SFAC No. 5, footnote 51, for a description of the ‘‘earning process.’’
26 In a similar situation, lenders may collect nonrefundable loan origination fees in connection with
lending activities. The FASB concluded in SFAS No. 91, Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and
Costs Associated with Originating or Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs of Leases, that
loan origination is not a separate revenue-producing activity of a lender, and therefore, those
nonrefundable fees collected at the outset of the loan arrangement are not recognized as revenue
upon receipt but are deferred and recognized over the life of the loan (paragraphs 5 and 37).
27 The revenue recognition period should extend beyond the initial contractual period if the relation-
ship with the customer is expected to extend beyond the initial term and the customer continues
to benefit from the payment of the up-front fee (e.g., if subsequent renewals are priced at a
bargain to the initial up-front fee).
28 A systematic method would be on a straight-line basis, unless evidence suggests that revenue
is earned or obligations are fulfilled in a different pattern, in which case that pattern should be
followed.
29 Footnote 1 of SOP 98-5, Reporting on the Costs of Start-Up Activities, states that ‘‘this SOP
does not address the financial reporting of costs incurred related to ongoing customer acquisition,
such as policy acquisition costs in Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement No.
60, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, and loan origination costs in FASB
Statement No. 91, Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and Costs Associated with Originating or
Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs of Leases. The SOP addresses the more substantive
one-time efforts to establish business with an entirely new class of customers (for example, a
manufacturer who does all of its business with retailers attempts to sell merchandise directly to
the public).’’ As such, the set-up costs incurred in this example are not within the scope of SOP
98-5. The staff believes that the incremental direct costs (SFAS No. 91 provides an analogous
definition) incurred related to the acquisition or origination of a customer contract, unless specifi-
cally provided for in the authoritative literature, should be accounted for in accordance with
paragraph 4 of FASB Technical Bulletin (FTB) 90-1, Accounting for Separately Priced Extended
Warranty and Product Maintenance Contracts or paragraph 5 of SFAS No. 91.
30 See Note 27, supra.
31 SOP 97-2, ¶31.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 SFAS No. 125, ¶16.
35 SFAS No. 48, ¶4.
36 The staff will question further analogies to the guidance in SFAS No. 48 for transactions expressly
excluded from its scope.
37 Reliability is defined in SFAC No. 2 as ‘‘the quality of information that assures that information
is reasonably free from error and bias and faithfully represents what it purports to represent.’’
Paragraph 63 of SFAC No. 5 reiterates the definition of reliability, requiring that ‘‘the information
is representationally faithful, verifiable, and neutral.’’
38 For example, if an estimate of the expected cancellation rate varies from the actual cancellation
rate by 100% but the dollar amount of the error is immaterial to the consolidated financial state-
ments, some would argue that the estimate could still be viewed as reliable. The staff disagrees
with that argument.
39 The term ‘‘remote’’ is used here with the same definition as used in SFAS No. 5, Accounting
for Contingencies.
40 Paragraph 8 of SFAS No. 48 notes various factors that may impair the ability to make a
reasonable estimate of returns, including the lack of sufficient historical experience. The staff
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typically expects that the historical experience be based on the particular registrant’s historical
experience for a service and/or class of customer. In general, the staff typically expects a start-
up company, a company introducing new services, or a company introducing services to a new
class of customer to have at least two years of experience to be able to make reasonable and
reliable estimates.
41 SFAS No. 91, paragraph 5 and FTB 90-1, paragraph 4 both provide for the deferral of incremental
direct costs associated with acquiring a revenue-producing contract. Even though the revenue
discussed in this example is refundable, if a registrant meets the aforementioned criteria for
revenue recognition over the membership period, the staff would analogize to this guidance.
However, if neither a nonrefundable contract nor a reliable basis for estimating net cash inflows
under refundable contracts exists to provide a basis for recovery of incremental direct costs, the
staff believes that such costs should be expensed as incurred. See Note 29, supra.
42 Lessees should follow the guidance established in EITF Issue No. 98-9, Accounting for Contin-
gent Rent.
43 These factors include ‘‘a) the susceptibility of the product to significant external factors, such
as technological obsolescence or changes in demand, b) relatively long periods in which a
particular product may be returned, c) absence of historical experience with similar types of sales
of similar products, or inability to apply such experience because of changing circumstances, for
example, changes in the selling enterprise’s marketing policies and relationships with its custom-
ers, and d) absence of a large volume of relatively homogeneous transactions.’’
44 SFAS No. 48, ¶6.
45 See, for example, ARB 43, Chapter 11A, ¶20; SOP 81-1, ¶58-60; and SFAS No. 45, ¶16.
46 See Regulation S-X, Article 5-03 (b) (1) and (2).
47 See Regulation S-K, Article 303 and Financial Reporting Release No. 36.
48 FRR 36, also see In the Matter of Caterpillar Inc., AAER No. 363 (March 31, 1992).
49 SFAS No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Values of Financial Instruments.
50 Gains or losses from the sale of assets should be reported as ‘‘other general expenses’’ pursuant
to Regulation S-X, Article 5-03 (b) (6). Any material item should be stated separately.
51 APB Opinion No. 20, ¶13 and ¶36-37 describe and provide the accounting and disclosure
requirements applicable to the correction of an error in previously issued financial statements.
Because the term ‘‘error’’ as used in APB Opinion No. 20 includes ‘‘oversight or misuse of facts
that existed at the time that the financial statements were prepared,’’ that term includes both
unintentional errors as well as intentional fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of
assets as described in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit.
52 SFAS No. 13, ¶1 defines a lease as ‘‘the right to use property, plant, or equipment (land or
depreciable assets or both) usually for a stated period of time.’’
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SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 101A—Amendment: Revenue
Recognition in Financial Statements**
Securities and Exchange Commission
17 CFR Part 211
[Release No. SAB 101A]
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101A
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission
Action: Publication of Staff Accounting Bulletin
Summary: Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101 (‘‘SAB 101’’) was released on
December 3, 1999 (64FR68936 December 9, 1999) and provides the staff’s
views in applying generally accepted accounting principles to selected reve-
nue recognition issues. Since the issuance of SAB 101, the staff received
requests from a number of groups asking for additional time to study the
guidance. Many registrants have calendar year-ends and may need more
time to perform a detailed review of the SAB since its issuance on December
3, 1999. This staff accounting bulletin delays the implementation date of
SAB 101 for registrants with fiscal years that begin between December 16,
1999 and March 15, 2000.
Date: March 24, 2000
For Further Information Contact: Richard Rodgers, Scott Taub, or Eric
Jacobsen, Professional Accounting Fellows, Office of the Chief Accountant
(202/942-4400) or Robert Bayless, Division of Corporation Finance (202/
942-2960), Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20549; electronic addresses: RodgersR@sec.gov; TaubS-
@sec.gov; JacobsenE@sec.gov; or BaylessR@sec.gov.
Supplementary Information: The statements in the staff accounting bulle-
tins are not rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published
as bearing the Commission’s official approval. They represent interpretations
and practices followed by the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office
**Source SAB No. 101A is available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101a1.htm.
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of the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure requirements of the
Federal securities laws.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Date: March 24, 2000
Part 211–(AMEND)
Accordingly, Part 211 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended by adding Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101A to the table found
in Subpart B.
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101A
The staff hereby amends Question 2 of Section B of Topic 13 of the Staff
Accounting Bulletin Series.
Topic 13: Revenue Recognition
* * * * *
B. Disclosures
Question 1
* * * * *
Question 2
Question: Will the staff expect retroactive changes by registrants to comply
with the accounting described in this bulletin?
Interpretive Response: All registrants are expected to apply the accounting
and disclosures described in this bulletin. The staff, however, will not object
if registrants that have not applied this accounting do not restate prior financial
statements provided they report a change in accounting principle in accor-
dance with APB Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes, no later than the first
fiscal quarter of the fiscal year beginning after December 15, 1999, except
that registrants with fiscal years that begin between December 16, 1999 and
March 15, 2000 may report a change in accounting principle no later than
their second fiscal quarter of the fiscal year beginning after December 15,
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1999 in accordance with FASB Statement No. 3, Reporting Accounting
Changes in Interim Financial Statements. In periods subsequent to transition,
registrants should disclose the amount of revenue (if material to income
before income taxes) recognized in those periods that was included in the
cumulative effect adjustment. If a registrant files financial statements with
the Commission before applying the guidance in this bulletin, disclosures
similar to those described in Staff Accounting Bulletin Topic 11-M, Disclosure
of the Impact that Recently Issued Accounting Standards Will Have on the
Financial Statements of a Registrant When Adopted in a Future Period,
should be provided. With regard to question 10 of Topic 13-A and Topic 8-A
regarding income statement presentation, the staff would normally expect
retroactive application to all periods presented unless the effect of applying
the guidance herein is immaterial.
However, if registrants have not previously complied with generally accepted
accounting principles, for example, by recording revenue for products prior
to delivery that did not comply with the applicable bill-and-hold guidance,
those registrants should apply the guidance in APB Opinion No. 20 for the
correction of an error.1 In addition, registrants should be aware that the
Commission may take enforcement action where a registrant in prior financial
statements has violated the antifraud or disclosure provisions of the securities
laws with respect to revenue recognition.
1 APB Opinion No. 20, ¶13 and ¶36-37 describe and provide the accounting and disclosure
requirements applicable to the correction of an error in previously issued financial statements.
Because the term ‘‘error’’ as used in APB Opinion No. 20 includes ‘‘oversight or misuse of facts
that existed at the time that the financial statements were prepared,’’ that term includes both
unintentional errors as well as intentional fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of
assets as described in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit.
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SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 101B—Second Amendment:
Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements***
Securities and Exchange Commission
17 CFR Part 211
[Release No. SAB 101B]
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101B
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission
Action: Publication of Staff Accounting Bulletin
Summary: Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101 (‘‘SAB 101’’) was released on
December 3, 1999 (64 FR 68936 December 9, 1999) and provides the
staff’s views in applying generally accepted accounting principles to selected
revenue recognition issues. SAB 101A was released on March 24, 2000 (65
FR 16811 March 30, 2000) and delayed for one fiscal quarter the implementa-
tion date of SAB 101 for registrants with fiscal years beginning between
December 16, 1999 and March 15, 2000. Since the issuance of SAB 101
and SAB 101A, the staff has continued to receive requests from a number of
groups asking for additional time to determine the effect, if any, on registrant’s
revenue recognition practices. This staff accounting bulletin delays the imple-
mentation date of SAB 101 until no later than the fourth fiscal quarter of
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1999.
Date: June 26, 2000
For Further Information Contact: Richard Rodgers, Scott Taub, or Eric
Jacobsen, Professional Accounting Fellows, Office of the Chief Accountant
(202/942-4400) or Robert Bayless, Division of Corporation Finance (202/
942-2960), Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20549; electronic addresses: RodgersR@sec.gov; TaubS-
@sec.gov; JacobsenE@sec.gov; or BaylessR@sec.gov.
Supplementary Information: The statements in the staff accounting bulle-
tins are not rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published
as bearing the Commission’s official approval. They represent interpretations
and practices followed by the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office
*** Source: SAB 101B is available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101b1.htm.
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of the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure requirements of the
Federal securities laws.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Date: June 26, 2000
Part 211–(AMEND)
Accordingly, Part 211 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended by adding Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101B to the table found
in Subpart B.
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101B
The staff hereby amends Question 2 of Section B of Topic 13 of the Staff
Accounting Bulletin Series.
Topic 13: Revenue Recognition
* * * * *
B. Disclosures
Question 1
* * * * *
Question 2
Question: Will the staff expect retroactive changes by registrants to comply
with the accounting described in this bulletin?
Interpretive Response: All registrants are expected to apply the accounting
and disclosures described in this bulletin. The staff, however, will not object
if registrants that have not applied this accounting do not restate prior financial
statements provided they report a change in accounting principle in accor-
dance with APB Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes, and FASB Statement
No. 3, Reporting Accounting Changes in Interim Financial Statements, no
later than the fourth fiscal quarter of the fiscal year beginning after December
15, 1999. In periods subsequent to transition, registrants should disclose the
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amount of revenue (if material to income before income taxes) recognized
in those periods that was included in the cumulative effect adjustment. If a
registrant files financial statements with the Commission before applying
the guidance in this bulletin, disclosures similar to those described in Staff
Accounting Bulletin Topic 11-M, Disclosure of the Impact that Recently Issued
Accounting Standards Will Have on the Financial Statements of a Registrant
When Adopted in a Future Period, should be provided. With regard to question
10 of Topic 13-A and Topic 8-A regarding income statement presentation,
the staff would normally expect retroactive application to all periods presented
unless the effect of applying the guidance herein is immaterial.
However, if registrants have not previously complied with generally accepted
accounting principles, for example, by recording revenue for products prior
to delivery that did not comply with the applicable bill-and-hold guidance,
those registrants should apply the guidance in APB Opinion No. 20 for the
correction of an error.1 In addition, registrants should be aware that the
Commission may take enforcement action where a registrant in prior financial
statements has violated the antifraud or disclosure provisions of the securities
laws with respect to revenue recognition.
1 APB Opinion No. 20, ¶13 and ¶36-37 describe and provide the accounting and disclosure
requirements applicable to the correction of an error in previously issued financial statements.
Because the term ‘‘error’’ as used in APB Opinion No. 20 includes ‘‘oversight or misuse of facts
that existed at the time that the financial statements were prepared,’’ that term includes both
unintentional errors as well as intentional fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of
assets as described in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit.
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APPENDIX D
FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD
SUPPLEMENTAL CHECKLIST*
[Author’s Note: The following checklist addresses internal controls issues,
taken from the discussion in this book, specific to suspected financial
reporting fraud. The checklist is intended to be a supplement to other
commonly used internal control checklists and procedures. For auditing pur-
poses, this checklist is recommended (though not required) when fraud is
suspected. If the nature of the suspected fraud can be limited to specific
areas, only portions of the checklist need be used.]
Financial Reporting Fraud Supplemental Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Incentives/Pressures
A yes answer to any of the questions in this
section indicates a greater likelihood of potential
financial reporting fraud.
a. Is there a perception among management of
the company or individual operating units
that there is extraordinary pressure (over and
above the pressures typically associated
with this industry) to achieve a higher level of
reported earnings?
b. Do management compensation agreements
tie compensation or bonuses to higher
levels of reported earnings?
* This checklist is adapted with permission from the ‘‘Financial Statement Fraud Checklist,’’ in
chapter 10, ‘‘Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud,’’ of The CPA’s Guide to Fraud and
Commercial Crime Prevention by Tedd Avey, Ted Baskerville, and Alan Brill, published by the
AICPA.
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c. Is there extraordinary pressure from outside
shareholders or other outsiders to improve
the value of company stock?
d. With regard to shares held by management or
major shareholders, could the existence of
any of the following provide an incentive to
maintain or increase reported earnings,
especially in the near term?
• Vesting provisions in employee stock
ownership plans that postpone ownership
• Stock option exercise restrictions that
prevent managers from acquiring shares until
specified dates or the occurrence of specific
events
• Rule 144A restrictions that limit the number
of shares that can be sold on U.S.
securities exchanges on a given trading day
• Income tax provisions that afford more
favorable treatment to capital gains in
shares held for a sufficient period of time to
qualify as long-term capital gains (the
restriction being that the government would
receive more of the sale proceeds if the
share sales were classified as short-term
capital gains)
• Corporate control requirements that
necessitate holding significant blocks of
stock past some event such as an annual
shareholders’ meeting before they can be
sold
e. Is the company in danger of losing its listing
on a major stock exchange, or is it
attempting to obtain a new listing?
f. Is there extraordinary pressure, whether
explicit or implicit, to continue to report a
rising trend in earnings and/or
revenues?
g. Is the company operating close to or in
violation of the limits of financial covenants,
such as minimum shareholders’ equity,
maximum debt-to-equity ratios, or minimum
current ratios, contained in bank credit facility
agreements or other debt instruments?
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h. For firms doing business in regulated
industries, is the company operating close
to or in violation of the financial restrictions set
by regulators or by statute?
2. Quantitative Characteristics
A yes answer to any of the questions in this
section indicates a greater likelihood of potential
financial reporting fraud.
a. When calculating the following indexes for the
previous and the current year, do any of the
indexes show a year-over-year increase
greater than 10 percent (meaning, an index
greater than 1.1)?
• Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
• Gross Margin Index
• Asset Quality Margin Index
• Sales Growth Index
b. When calculating the following indexes for the
previous and the current year, do any of the
indexes show a year-over-year increase
greater than 10 percent more than
increases for similar indexes of peer (same
industry) companies?
• Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
• Gross Margin Index
• Asset Quality Index
• Sale’s Growth Index
c. Is the change in working capital over the past
year (excluding cash changes) relative to
total assets at the end of the period more than
20 percent greater than similar calculations
for peer companies?
3. Qualitative Predictors: The Audit
Committee
A yes answer to any of the questions in this
section indicates a need to take action to improve
the integrity and effectiveness of the Audit
Committee.
a. Has the board of directors failed to designate
an audit committee or failed to approve a
charter for an audit committee?
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b. If there is an audit committee, do any of the
following conditions exist with regard to
members of that committee?
• A director being employed by the corporation
or any of its affiliates for the current year
or any of the past five years
• A director accepting any compensation from
the corporation or any of its affiliates other
than compensation for board service or
benefits under a tax-qualified retirement
plan
• A director being a member of the immediate
family of an individual who is or has been
in any of the past five years employed by the
corporation or any of its affiliates as an
executive officer
• A director being a partner in or a controlling
shareholder, or to which the corporation
made, or from which the corporation
received, payments that are or have been
significant to the corporation or business
organization in any of the past five years
• A director being employed as an executive
of another company while any of the
corporation’s executives serves on that
company’s compensation committee
c. Are there less than three audit committee
members with at least some financial
accounting experience?
d. Is it not clear or not the case that the audit
committee—
• Should be responsible for selecting the
outside auditors?
• Has a formal written statement from the
outside auditors describing all relationships
between the auditors and the company?
• Regularly discusses with the outside auditors
all aspects of the propriety or lack thereof of
the company’s accounting practices?
• Receives all reports of internal control
deficiencies in a timely manner from both
internal and outside auditors?
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4. Other Qualitative Predictors
A yes answer to any of the questions in this
section indicates a greater likelihood of potential
financial reporting fraud.
a. Has the company had a history of internal
control problems, whether those problems
resulted in the detection of financial reporting
or any other type of fraud?
b. Does the company chief executive officer
engage in micro-management or other
practices that could unduly influence
accounting decision-makers with regard to
financial reporting?
c. Are outside auditors unaware of any interim
or quarterly financial reportings or financial
statements prepared for selected outside
parties such as banks or investors?
d. In establishing and reviewing internal controls,
has management failed to establish
adequately the key metrics or guidelines to
determine the extent and frequency of
internal auditor review?
e. Is there a lack of evidence that management
has properly communicated the internal
control guidelines and procedures to
appropriate personnel?
f. Does it appear that management does not
assess the quality of its internal controls
over time?
g. Have any audit tests detected significant risks
not previously known to management?
h. Is there a history of using a quantitative
standard for materiality, such as a
percentage of earnings or assets, to fail to
correct known accounting errors or
irregularities?
5. Special Areas
A yes answer to any of the questions in this
section should generate further inquiry to
determine if specific internal controls need to
be improved.
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Failure to Record Loss Contingencies
a. Given the nature of the company’s business,
is it likely that any of the following issues
could be relevant?
• Collectibility of receivables
• Obligations related to product warranties and
product defects
• Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property
• Threat of expropriation of assets
• Pending or threatened litigation
• Actual or possible claims and assessments
• Guarantees of indebtedness of others
• Agreements to repurchase receivables (or
repurchase related property) that have
been sold
b. With regard to possible contingencies, do any
of the following exist?
• The incidence of claims prior to the date of
financial statements
• Correspondence with (and bills from) outside
legal counsel
• Internal correspondence within production
and research staffs as to the need to address
a critical problem with a product already on
the market
• Internal correspondence among department
heads of production, R&D, general
counsel, and senior management about
postproduction problems and product
claims
• External correspondence between the
manufacturer and its customers about a
given product concerning special price
concessions or special return privileges
• The incidence of special or over budget
freight charges to accommodate returns and/
or the shipment of replacement product
• Shifting of production schedules to
manufacture replacement product
• Halting manufacture of the product in
question
• Shifting of R&D staff away from planned
research projects to applications engineering
relating to redesign of existing products
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• Payments in sometimes seemingly
immaterial amounts to customers on a
regular basis over a period of weeks or
months that indicate some arrangement to
compensate for product defects
c. If there is a suspected contingency, does
correspondence between departments or
within departments indicate a problem?
d. If a contingency is likely to exist, has
management used an inadequate or
inappropriate standard for quantifying the
potential claim?
Failure to Record Asset Writeoffs
a. Has the company’s industry experienced rapid
changes in engineering or materials
applications that may lead to asset writeoffs?
b. Is the industry in which the company operates
very cost competitive?
c. Has the company experienced any of the
following?
• Significant changes in customer demand
• Significant loss of business to a competitor
• A need to obtain or retain a customer
relationship by bidding below cost
d. When reviewing fixed asset schedules with
production or divisional personnel, have any
of the following occurred?
• A significant decrease in the market value of
an asset
• A significant change in the extent or manner
in which an asset is used or a significant
physical change in an asset
• A significant adverse change in legal factors
or in the business climate that could affect the
value of an asset or an adverse action or
assessment by a regulator
• An accumulation of costs significantly in
excess of the amount originally expected to
acquire or construct an asset
• A current period operating or cash-flow loss
combined with a history of operating or
cash-flow losses or a projection or forecast
that demonstrates continuing losses
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associated with an asset used for the
purpose of producing revenue
e. Is there evidence of significant changes in
production or product demand?
f. From the review of moving expenses and
discussion with production personnel, does
it appear that any equipment has been moved
off the shop floor into storage?
g. Does the company not maintain profitability
analyses by product line or by customer?
h. Upon reviewing profitability analyses, does it
appear that certain products have not been
historically profitable?
i. For historically unprofitable product lines, to
justify not writing down assets for
impairment, has management used any of the
following?
• Overly optimistic forecasts of future
profitability
• Out-of-date forecasts
• Forecasts not prepared or reviewed by
personnel with line responsibility for production
j. If written narratives accompany the forecasts,
do they discuss downside possibilities that
management has not adequately taken into
account?
k. Are there any facts now known that would
invalidate assumptions contained in the
forecast?
l. For investments in non-publicly traded
securities, have any of the following
occurred?
• Does the company have financial data
adequate to determine historical
profitability of the investee?
• If the investee has not been historically
profitable, has management failed to write
down the investment based upon an overly
optimistic forecast?
• If the investee has not been historically
profitable, has management failed to write
down the investment based upon a forecast
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prepared by management with business or
family ties to the investor company?
Acquisition and Cookie Jar Reserves
a. Were reserves established without a clear
purpose or justification?
b. If reserves were established by a current
period charge to income, were earnings
prior to the charge in excess of management
or outside expectations?
c. Were reserves established at or near the close
of a reporting period?
d. Were reserves established without adequate
review by senior management?
e. Upon review of charges to a given reserve,
are there charges for expenses that are not
appropriate to the stated purpose of the
reserve?
f. Was the timing of the takedown of reserves
coincident with achieving certain financial
targets set by management or outsiders?
g. Was the amount of the takedown of reserves
for a given period necessary to achieve
certain financial targets set by management
or outsiders?
h. Has any of the following occurred with regard
to acquisition reserves?
• Were reserves established after twelve
months from the date of the acquisition?
• Were reserves set up for items not related
to the acquisition?
• Does the quantity of costs allocated to the
reserve in a given period cause earnings to
reach certain financial targets set by
management or outsiders?
Cost Shifting
a. Has management made a recent change in
policy with regard to capitalizing previously
expensed costs?
b. Has a change in policy with regard to
capitalizing previously expensed costs not
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been disclosed in company financial
statements?
c. Has management proposed to capitalize a
new category of expenditure that
customarily is expensed on peer-group firm
financial statements?
d. Does the timing of changes in policy with
regard to capitalizing expenses coincide
with any of the following?
• Implementation of a management bonus
plan or calculation of bonuses under that
plan
• Commencement of the sale of stock or the
search for an equity partner
• Implementation of a new credit facility or
recent problems in maintaining financial
covenants under an existing facility
e. But for the capitalization of certain expenses,
would any of the following occur?
• Management would not receive certain
bonuses or other benefits under a
management compensation plan.
• In the opinion of securities analysts,
appraisers, or underwriters, the
company’s share price would be significantly
lower.
• The company would be in violation of loan
or debt covenants.
f. Does the capitalization of expenses cause the
firm’s Asset Quality Index to increase
significantly in excess of increases (if any) for
its industry peers?
g. If company management provides segment or
subsidiary financial data, especially if
management or outsiders tend to point to
performance of that segment or subsidiary
in their discussions of company performance,
has either of the following occurred?
• Have expenses been incurred by the parent
that relates to the segment or subsidiary?
• Have other segments or subsidiaries
incurred expenses that should be
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allocated to the segment or subsidiary in
question?
h. Has senior management failed to establish
proper procedures for allocating or
apportioning costs among affiliates or, if there
is a policy, is there evidence that adherence
is lax or that there have been documented
lapses?
i. Is there correspondence among heads of
affiliates concerning disputes over expense
allocations or apportionment that has not
come to the attention of the audit
committee?
j. Were reserves established at the parent
company for expenses anticipated for
subsidiaries?
k. Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense
or liability accounts that could reflect cost
transfers to the parent or another subsidiary?
l. Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense
or liability accounts that could reflect cost
transfers to reserves established at the parent
level or in another subsidiary?
m. Is there any correspondence between
accounting personnel at the parent and
subsidiary levels that describe special
procedures for certain costs that are
incurred by the subsidiary but not charged to
earnings of that subsidiary?
Recording Fictitious Revenues
a. If the company requires signed agreements
from customers before revenue is
recognized, have sales personnel indicated or
stated any of the following?
• Their managers have approved as income
sales contracts that were not signed as of
the period end.
• Unsigned contracts were recorded as
revenue under the premise that key buyer
personnel had given verbal approvals.
• Unsigned contracts were recorded as
revenue under the premise that key buyer
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personnel had signed the contract but the
contract was held up for other reasons.
b. Have there been prior internal control failures
with sales cutoff?
c. If fabricated contracts are suspected, have the
sales cutoff tests performed by internal or
outside auditors failed to look for the
fabrication and substitution of contracts?
d. Have sales cutoff tests failed to examine the
history of sales returns and reversals over
time?
e. With regard to the requirement for timely
delivery, has any of the following occurred?
• Are there lapses in documentation of
delivery?
• Have customers complained about receiving
deliveries too early?
• Have returns from a certain customer or
reseller been abnormally high?
f. Is there evidence that certain customers or
resellers are receiving unusually generous
sales terms for returns or refunds?
g. Is there evidence that certain customers or
resellers are receiving unusually low prices
or above-average discounts?
h. Is the price for component products sold by
the company dependent, at least in part,
upon the price of the final product sold by
another company?
i. Have royalties been accrued to income prior
to receipt of confirmation from the payor that
royalties are owed?
j. Do department heads have the authority to
both approve sales and the recognition of
related revenue in the financial statements?
k. Is there a lack of review of sales revenue
recognition at the senior management
level?
l. Is there a history of revenue being recognized
improperly?
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m. Have department heads approved significant
refunds or returns that are out of the
ordinary or appear to violate company
policies?
n. Have refunds or returns been historically high
for a certain department?
o. Have the reasons for refunds and returns not
been documented or, if documented, have
the reasons given been insufficient?
p. Has senior management failed to review or
been lax in reviewing significant sales
refunds and returns?
q. If side letters are suspected, has either of the
following occurred?
• Engineers, technicians, or others involved
with the installation of the products
indicated that certain customers made
additional demands before agreeing to
buy.
• There are notes or letters in sales files
indicating that customer demands had been
made to allow for returns or refunds.
r. Are sales approved before obtaining credit
checks for new customers or for existing
customers that are experiencing financial
difficulties?
s. Is there an unusual concentration of orders
from small or distressed customers
occurring near the end of a reporting period
or sales contest?
6. Critical Accounting Policies and Estimates
(CAPE)
A yes answer to any of the questions in this
section should prompt a re-evaluation of internal
controls and communications between senior
management, internal and outside auditors and
the audit committee of the board of directors.
A yes answer may also prompt disclosures to and
discussions with the audit committee
a. Management’s assessment of the range of
potential issues that could rise to the level
of becoming a CAPE appears:
page 299 05-12-03 08:26:09
300 Financial Reporting Fraud
Financial Reporting Fraud Supplemental Checklist Yes No NA Ref
i. To ignore significant issues identified in
notes to the financial statements,
ii. To ignore significant issues identified in
management letters and other
communications from outside auditors,
including SAS 61 meetings,
iii. To be constructed either hastily or simply
in an effort to provide a list that appears to
comport with reporting requirements, or
iv. To be a mere recitation of general
accounting policies without any substantive
analysis of risks from alternative accounting
interpretations or estimates.
b. Having discovered a deficiency in the list of
potential issues that could rise to the level
of becoming a CAPE, neither management
nor the board of directors have taken
corrective action, which may include retaining
forensic accountants.
c. Of the range of potential issues that could rise
to the level of becoming a CAPE,
i. Management’s analysis of accounting
policies appears to be incomplete in that
significant alternative treatments were
ignored,
ii. Management’s analysis of accounting
policies appears to be inaccurate in that
alternative accounting policies were
incorrectly interpreted,
iii. Management’s analysis of accounting
estimates failed to account for reasonably
likely potential negative changes in cash
flows, or
iv. Management’s analysis of accounting
estimates ignored information that
significantly increased the likelihood of a
previously assessed potential negative
change in cash flows.
d. For critical accounting policies presented to
the audit committee, management’s
analysis of alternative accounting treatments
appears to be biased against those policies
because:
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i. Management has misstated the scope or
applicability of alternative accounting
treatments,
ii. Management has mischaracterized the
nature of alternative accounting treatments,
iii. Management has omitted relevant
alternative accounting treatments, or
iv. Management incorrectly assessed the
materiality of alternative accounting
treatments.
e. For critical accounting policies presented to
the audit committee, management’s
analysis of alternative accounting treatments
appears to be biased in favor of
management’s recommended policy because:
i. Management has misstated the scope or
applicability of management’s
recommended policy,
ii. Management has mischaracterized the
nature of management’s recommended
policy, or
iii. Management incorrectly assessed the
materiality of management’s recommended
policy.
f. For critical accounting estimates presented to
the audit committee, management’s
analysis:
i. Fails to account for the full range of
reasonably likely cash flows under different
circumstances,
ii. Fails to account for known data relating to
quoted markets or comparable asset
values, or
iii. Incorrectly applies valuation models or
methodology.
g. Management fails to update its analyses of
CAPE and/or fails to notify the audit
committee in a timely manner should there be
a change in facts known to management.
h. Management fails to update its analyses of
CAPE and/or fails to notify the audit
committee in a timely manner should there be
a change in accounting policy (due to action
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of accounting standard setters or due to firm
management’s decision to change).
i. Management has not discussed with firm
outside auditors either management’s
analysis of CAPE or changes to the analysis
of CAPE.
j. Management has not consulted with firm
internal auditors regarding management’s
analysis of CAPE or changes to the analysis
of CAPE.
k. Disagreements by and between management
and internal auditors have not been shared
with the audit committee.
l. For those meetings of the audit committee in
which management presents CAPE or
changes to CAPE, the minutes do not indicate
any substantive review or discussion.
m. For those meetings of the audit committee in
which management presents CAPE or
changes to CAPE, the minutes do not indicate
that corrective action was taken when
needed.
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